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Abstract 
 
  
The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor 
(1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given 
the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, 
the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian 
intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s 
domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the 
violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily 
intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided 
only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not 
jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s 
domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take 
place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence 
of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing 
sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped 
to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen. These two 
conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the 
communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and 
democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international 
community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving 
the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic 
government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Research Problems 
 
Indonesia from 1997 to 1999 was a state in limbo. Its government, which had for 
decades coercively tied the vast diverse nation together, had lost its authoritative control. The 
power and credibility of the state apparatus, in particular the security forces and bureaucracy, 
were gravely resisted by popular groups. The national economy, which had contributed to 
keep together the very heterogenic entities, was severely hit by the Asian financial crisis. Its 
people, who had been ruled by coercive force, defused by economic development or unified 
by nationalism-secular ideology, found themselves as different to each other. This condition, 
widely seen as a transition era of contemporary Indonesian politics marked by hesitation, 
vagueness, ambiguity and insecurity, led to dislocation and disorientation.1 The reformasi, 
another word positively used to describe the transition, was marked by tumult, intrigue, 
tragedy and misery.2 And era reformasi (reform era) was also “the period of paradoxes”.3   
Due to this uncertainty, the politics of Indonesia was marked by huge speculation. 
Not only individual observers but also research centres and state agencies attempted to assess 
the future of Indonesia. Colin Brown,4 William Liddle,5 Jamie Mackie6 and Harold Crouch7, 
just to name a few established Indonesianists, sought to foresee Indonesia’s prospects for 
democratization. The International Crisis Group (ICG) closely examined every political 
movement and regularly revealed short-term assessments of the country. The US, the EU, 
Australia and UN organizations took similar measures in documenting the political changes, 
assessing the country’s future and offering several recommendations on what they could or 
should do individually or collectively.8  
                                                 
1 Anas Urbaningrum, Mewaspadai Ranjau-ranjau Reformasi, Kompas, 6 January 1999. 
2 Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Crows Nest NSW: 
Allen & Unwin, 2002). 
3 Amich Alhumami, Paradoks-paradoks Reformasi, Kompas, 15 September 1999. 
4 Colin Brown, A Short History of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation? (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin, 2003). 
5 R. William Liddle, Indonesia’s Democratic Opening, in Government and Opposition, Vol. 34 No.1, 
January 1999, pp. 94 – 116. 
6 Jamie Mackie, What will the post-Suharto regime be like? in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May eds., The 
Fall of Soeharto, (Bathurst NSW: Crawford House Publishing, 1998) pp. 200 – 207. 
7 Harold Crouch, Indonesian Democracy, in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May eds., Ibid. pp. 208 – 211. 
8 See for examples Commission of the European Communities, Indonesia: Country Strategy Paper 
2002-2006, IP/02/862, Brussels, 13 June 2002; Australian Parliament House, Indonesia’s Dangerous 
Transition: The Politics of Recovery and Democratization, Research Paper, 28 April 1999 available 
on http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp18.htm; and After the Election, After East 
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The assessments and recommendations of what the international community should 
do were all based on the recognition that Indonesia’s future was complicated. Within the 
global system, whether it was called interdependent, interventionist or solidarist, it was 
obvious that neighbouring states, international major states and non-governmental 
institutions had certain interests in Indonesia’s political changes and its near future. The 
situation became problematic when the international interests were against Indonesia’s. 
Many elements in Indonesia’s domestic politics saw the international system not as a source 
of assistance but of obstruction to solving the crisis. The international system was part of the 
problem rather than the solution. Many domestic groups tended to believe that foreign states 
and organizations were more likely to undermine Indonesian territorial sovereignty and 
destabilize national politics.  
By the fall of President Suharto in May 1998 Indonesia was in disarray. The thirty-
two year authoritarian regime collapsed and left the country without effective authority to 
control the people, the nation and the state.9 As students and democratic movements in 
Jakarta were demanding democracy, communal entities in different regions were calling for 
independence from Indonesia, or at least demanding more power in administering their local 
interests. Demands for such political changes, however, had led the country into internal 
violence. Whereas in Jakarta the violence was relatively quickly brought under control, 
violent conflict outside Java tended to be perpetuated due to inappropriate government 
policy. Thousands of people lost their lives, many more people were forced to flee as their 
homes and other social and economic infrastructures were severely devastated.  It was not 
only various societal groups that were involved in destabilizing national security; the 
security forces (the military and police) were also responsible for causing such unrest. This 
research focuses on violent conflict that took place in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh. 
The number of casualties and the intensity of the conflict are generally used to 
define a humanitarian crisis and as the basis on which international humanitarian 
intervention is made. As nearly a thousand East Timorese were killed and almost all the East 
Timorese people were forced to seek safe places due to the intensifying violence following 
the August 1999 referendum, there was a consensus among leading members of the 
international community in sending a peacekeeping force (INTERFET) into Dili. Its mandate 
was internationally recognized, that was to restore order and security in East Timor10 by 
which the lives of East Timorese could be protected from further repression by either 
Indonesian security forces or pro-Indonesia supporters. In the same year violent conflict was 
                                                                                                                                          
Timor: What’s Next for Indonesia? Current Issue, 28 September 1999 available on 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/1999-2000/2000cib05.htm, accessed on 27 July 2006.  
9 Jusuf Wanandi, “Indonesia: A Failed State?”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25:3, Summer 2002, 
pp. 135 – 146.  
10 UN Security Council Resolution 1264, S/RES/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999. 
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erupting in Ambon and armed clashes were re-intensifying in Aceh. There was a higher 
death toll and more internally displaced persons (IDPs) and physical destruction occurred in 
these two areas. Ironically, the international major powers paid less attention and allowed the 
bloody conflict to continue.  
This research examines such an apparent contradiction or inconsistency. If an 
international humanitarian intervention is fundamentally motivated by universal 
humanitarian values or is altruistically intended to save people from suffering and gross 
violation of human rights, the international community should act fairly in handling 
problems in East Timor, Ambon and Aceh. Why were foreign states and international 
organizations prepared to send a multinational force to East Timor (INTERFET) in order to 
end suffering and resolve the violent conflict, while failing to intervene in the humanitarian 
crisis caused by violent conflict in Maluku and Aceh? This is the first problem explored in 
this research. 
Political commentators may argue that the East Timor case was totally different 
from the cases of Maluku and Aceh.11 By believing East Timor with its colonial history, 
ethnicity and religion was different to the rest of Indonesia, there was some sort of 
acclamation that East Timor deserved the right to be independent from Indonesia. It was 
fortified by a legal fact that the United Nation never recognized the incorporation of East 
Timor within Indonesia. Nonetheless, it was self-evident that the international humanitarian 
intervention through INTERFET only occurred when the territory was embroiled in violence 
following the popular consultation held in August 1999.  
By considering East Timor’s historical and cultural background, one may see that 
the imposition of international humanitarian intervention was not purely based on 
international norms of human rights and humanitarian laws. This leads to an observation 
about the political context of the violent conflict which was theoretically decisive in 
determining what the international community had done and should or could do.  
At the time the international community paid attention and poured resources in to 
stopping violence in East Timor, Christian and Muslim groups were involved in bloody 
conflicts in Maluku. Armed clashes were also re-escalating in Aceh where the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) was fighting against Indonesian armed forces. Each of the conflicts had 
its own background, but both occurred in quite similar political contexts in terms of 
Indonesia’s political transition. There was no meaningful presence and role played by the 
international community in the two regions to help people from great misery, however. The 
international community seemed to perceive the domestic political context of the two 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: 
Combridge University Press, 2004) and Garry van Klinken, “Big states and little secessionist 
movements”, in Damien Kingsbury ed., Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence 
(Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 2000) pp. 157-168.  
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internal violent conflicts in different ways. This leads to another research question: to what 
extent were the dynamics of the internal conflict and its political context were significant in 
giving a reliable explanation for the imposition of international humanitarian intervention?   
The political transition in the aftermath of the collapse of Suharto’s New Order 
regime is believed to have been central to either the eruption of a number of intrastate or 
domestic conflicts or the imposition of external intervention. It was widely and positively 
referred to as reformasi (reform) to express a great hope for a better system which was 
generally identified as demokratisasi (democratization). Freedom was then the very core of 
every discourse starting with freedom of the press, the release of political prisoners, and 
opening a space for political participation and association. Social associations, which had 
had no political freedom for more than three decades in the past, now found a broader space 
to articulate their particular identities and to organize their different interests. Regional 
entities too had the opportunity to revise the relations with the central governments and 
revive their significance to their local communities.  
In the name of democratization, various organizations raised the need for human 
rights protection, demanded a reduction of the military presence in East Timor and Aceh and 
asked for justice in social, economic and political life. Most importantly, as it was the time of 
reform, people in East Timor re-asserted their right for self-determination that had been 
fiercely denied by Suharto’s government. President Habibie, in responding to such demand, 
decided on a popular consultation in East Timor through which the East Timorese fairly and 
democratically would determine their political future. Facilitated by the United Nation 
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET),12 the popular consultation resulted in the separation of 
East Timor from Indonesia. 
East Timor’s independence from Indonesia was shocking and difficult for many 
elements in Indonesia. The future of Indonesia’s territorial integration was uncertain. 
Reformasi or demokratisasi had gone beyond the government’s capacity to control. Whether 
the state was to sacrifice its territorial integration for the sake of reform and democracy was 
certainly a crucial question that needed an immediate and convincing answer. It became 
commanding as the East Timor’s independence was allegedly made possible because of the 
international pressures. On behalf of humanitarianism and universal human rights, the 
international community endorsed and approved the East Timorese right to self-
determination, which, practically, meant it could be a sovereign state of East Timor free from 
the Indonesian state.  
Similarly, violent conflict in Maluku and Aceh also demonstrated the complicated 
relations between democratization, territorial integration and human rights protection. The 
                                                 
12 UN Security Council Resolution 1246, S/RES/1246 (1999), 11 June 1999. 
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latter was usually perceived as the entry point for the international community to influence 
domestic politics of particular states such as Indonesia. Although it claimed to have a 
democratic system, which is believed to be the best system to have human rights protected 
and promoted, the case of East Timor proved that international humanitarian intervention did 
not merely bring Indonesia a democratic system – it also brought East Timor’s independence.  
The resolution to the East Timor conflict inspired parties to the conflicts in Maluku 
and Aceh. Students, pro-democracy and human rights activists regularly reported practices of 
human rights violation in the regions.13 Parties to the conflict also sought arguments to 
justify the fight for and right to self-determination and they frequently called for a 
referendum and an international role to end violence and solve the conflict.14  
The Indonesian government and political forces seemed to draw some important 
lessons from the case of East Timor. These were helpful not only in coping with violent 
conflicts in Maluku and Aceh, but also in dealing with the international community. The 
basic interest was to improve the protection of human rights within a developing democratic 
system while preserving national territorial integrity. Any progress in harmonizing these 
three interests was influential in affecting the role the international community could play in 
Maluku and Aceh conflicts. The international community seemed to align with the post-
Suharto major political views in positively connecting the interests of protecting human 
rights, promoting a democratic system and preserving Indonesia’s territorial integrity. 
How the internal violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were then resolved is the 
third question of this research. This question is addressed in order to see how domestic 
politics could make an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
irrelevant and unjustified. For the most part, the international community and major 
Indonesian political forces saw the violent conflicts in the two provinces as being caused by 
the democratization process rather than by the weakening state of Indonesia. In addition, 
they saw the two bloody conflicts as Indonesian domestic affairs and thereby their solutions 
had to be sought domestically. Based on such arguments, the calls for international military 
intervention in those regions became groundless and fruitless.  
                                                 
13 See, for example, Koalisi NGO-HAM, Tragedi Kemanusiaan Aktivis Kemanusiaa, Laporan HAM, 
Edisi Kedua, n.d. and Aceh: Perjuangan Sipil Vs. Represitas Negara, Human Rights Report, n.d. For 
more specific cases, see Laporan Kemanusiaan Koalisi NGO-HAM Aceh, Pembantaian Idi Cut; 
Tragedi Dewantara Berdarah; and Tragedi Beutong (all without date of publication). “31 Terbunuh 
di Beutong”, Serambi Indonesia, 26 July 1999; “Mereka Dibantai Tanpa Perlawanan”, Waspada 27 
July 1999. See also Human rights Watch, Indonesia: The War in Aceh, Vol. 13, No.4 (C), August 
2001. For the case of Maluku, see “PBB Ancam Intervensi Jika Situasi Ambon Memburuk”, Siwalima, 
6 July 2000. See also HRW, Moluccan Islands: Communal Violence in Indonesia: Human Rights 
Watch Recommendations, Indonesia: HRW World Report 2000. 
14 See, for example, “Pendakwah “Aceh Merdeka” Ditahan”, Serambi Indonesia, 17 February 1999; 
“Mahasiswa Lancarkan Aksi Moral”, Serambi Indonesia, 31 July 1999; and “Reflection on 3 Years 
after DOM”, Free-DOM, Law and Human Rights Bulletin, Edition 5, 2001, pp. 3-4. See also “Mgr 
Mandagi: Kami Tak Bermaksud Merdekakan Maluku”, Siwalima, 28 July 2000; “Maluku Harus 
Merdeka”, Siwalima, 17 July 2002. 
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B. The Objectives of the Research 
 
Human rights activists and humanitarian workers, inspired by their experiences in 
the field, have been promoting the importance of humanitarian intervention as a response of 
the international community to humanitarian crises caused by violent conflict.  Scholars 
continue to develop theories on the principles of international humanitarian intervention. 
Students write a lot of assignments to discuss the theoretical reliability of the principles and 
their practical applicability in different cases. State representatives in both national and 
international forums frequently debate legislating these principles. However, international 
humanitarian intervention is obviously an inconclusive issue.  
Gareth Evans, the President of the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Co-Chair of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), asserts: 
 
Until terrorism overwhelmed international attention after 11 September 2001, the 
really big issue in international relations – the one that must have launched a 
thousand Ph.Ds – was the “right of humanitarian intervention” – the question of 
when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive action, and in particular 
coercive military action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at 
risk in that other state. Man-made internal catastrophe, and what the international 
community should do about it, is what preoccupied international practitioners, 
commentators and scholars more than anything else in the decade after the Cold 
War.15  
 
Debate on humanitarian intervention is all about moral, legal, political and 
operational issues. This research encompasses all these issues and seeks to contribute to the 
literature on international humanitarian intervention. As the excerpt above clearly mentions, 
the very central issue is the uncertainty in the implementation of humanitarian intervention. 
The cases considered in this study show the international enthusiasm to send international 
military forces to save the lives of East Timorese, but points out there is less attention on the 
people at risk in Maluku and Aceh. As the principles of humanitarian intervention have been 
established (although remains debated), an explanation for the absence of military and 
political humanitarian intervention in Maluku and Aceh has to be sought both inside and 
outside the principles. In the first place, the objective of this research is to investigate the 
justification of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). This will be carried out 
firstly by examining the humanitarian intervention principles and secondly by exploring 
Indonesian political context that provided INTERFET an undisputable justification.  
                                                 
15 The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, Paper addressed to The 
American Society of International Law, 98th Meeting, Washington DC, 1 April 2004.  
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  International humanitarian intervention is primarily aimed at salvaging people from 
the devastating misery caused by internal violent conflict. But, it has to be asserted that the 
salvation and protection of the people will be made possible if violent conflict is able to be 
resolved. The international humanitarian intervention therefore must be seen as not the only 
alternative of the international mechanisms in solving violent conflict and in dealing with 
humanitarian crises. Since the presence and the role of INTERFET has been internationally 
recognized as the last resort to solve violent conflict in East Timor, the second objective of 
this research is to examine the resolution of conflict in Maluku in the absence of 
international intervention and also the resolution of the conflict in Aceh given the limited 
role of the international community. This research argues that the resolution to the Maluku 
and Aceh conflicts was heavily determined by Indonesian domestic political changes which 
were conducive to a domestic solution with or without a limited intervention by the 
international community. 
In order to meet the objectives, this research pays more attention to the Indonesia’s 
domestic politics to appreciate the context of the conflicts, the role of the international 
community and the possibility of their resolutions. The reasons for such an approach are both 
theoretical and practical. Theoretically, although there are internationally recognized 
principles, norms or instruments which justify humanitarian intervention, its implementation 
is heavily determined by the kind and the context of the conflict wanted to be resolved. In 
addition, the principles are still debated and therefore a better understanding about the 
imposition of an international humanitarian intervention would be reached through a case-
by-case approach. For practical reasons, it is my contention that exploring and gathering data 
about the conflicts and approaching and analysing the Indonesian political context of the 
conflicts is more helpful than examining the limited data from international sources.   
Fieldwork was conducted by visiting East Timor, Maluku and Aceh in 2004. Deep 
interviews and discussions were held with a number of people in Dili, Ambon and Banda 
Aceh, the capitals of the regions respectively. Former leaders and members of the parties to 
the conflicts were some of the interviewees. These peoples were questioned in order to 
obtain their perception about the conflicts, their justification to wage violence and armed 
conflict, or to call for international involvement in resolving the conflict. Indonesian 
politicians and government officials, both civil and military, were also asked about their 
views on the conflict and the possible solutions. Journalists, ex-student activists, and human 
rights advocates were the larger part of the list and they provided more objective views about 
the conflicts and plausible solutions to the conflicts. Scholars and NGOs activists were also 
important in seeking a better understanding about the political context of the violent conflicts. 
When the fieldwork was conducted, it had been four years since the popular ballot 
that brought the independence of East Timor from Indonesia. Meetings and conversations 
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with Falintil veterans were conducted without difficulty as was the case with former 
clandestine and student activists who now compete for power within the free Timor Leste. 
While meeting and interviews were easily organized with the Christian leaders in Ambon 
and with some of those who took part in a series of incidents of communal violence, it was 
impossible to organize similar meetings with the Muslim leaders. It was only the local 
leaders of formal organizations of MUI (Council of Islamic Scholars – Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia) and PPRMI (Perhimpunan Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia) that 
welcomed the interviews. As tensions were ongoing at the time of the fieldwork, getting into 
the Muslim areas and interviewing their field leaders was extremely risky. Conditions were 
worst in Banda Aceh. Although the status of military emergency had in place for more than 
one year, organizing interviews with human rights activists in Banda Aceh was still risky. 
Without any guarantee for security, there was no chance to meet with GAM members.  
Several politicians were also interviewed in Jakarta. DPR members from PDIP, 
Golkar and PKB were asked about their individual views and their parties’ platforms in 
dealing with conflict in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh. This was linked to issues of national 
integration, democratization and human rights. A few interviews with representatives of 
foreign states and international organizations were carried out in Dili and Jakarta. As for 
those with Indonesian government officials, it was very hard to arrange time for an interview 
with international representatives in Jakarta.  
 
 
C. The Significance of the Research 
 
There have been a huge number of publications about Indonesian politics before, 
around and after the fall of Suharto. How and why Suharto had to resign from his long held 
authoritarian power and Indonesia’s political future were attractive themes to both domestic 
and foreign political analysts.16 The roles of major political forces that had contributed to or 
attempted to obstruct the reform movements became the interest of other observers.17 Some  
                                                 
16 See for example Angus McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal toward 
Constitutional Rule (Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005); Damien Kingsbury, The 
Politics of Indonesia, 3rd ed. (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005); Edward Aspinall, 
Herb Feith and Gerry van Klinken eds., The Last Days of President Suharto (Clayton, Vic.: Monash 
Asia Institute, 1999); Michael R. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of 
the New Order, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 1998); Geoff Forrester and R. J. May eds., The Fall of 
Suharto (Bathurst, NSW: Crawford House, 1998). 
17 Among others, see Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime 
Change in Indonesia (Stanford, Calf: Stanford University Press, 2005); R. Siti Zuhro, The Role of the 
Indonesian Bureaucracy in the Transition Era: The Struggle for Democratization, PhD Thesis at 
Curtin University of Technology, 2005; ); Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganizing Power 
in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); 
Damien Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); 
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scholars were more interested in the economic factors and implications of the power 
change.18 Others paid more attention to the prospect of democratization in Indonesia and the 
future of the nation.19 
While the political transition in Indonesia was likely to be the central theme of 
publications, the political conflict and violence that accompanied the transitional politics was 
also focussed on. Several individual observers and research centres paid attention to conflict 
and conflict resolution. Their findings were then presented in books, proceedings, reports 
and journal articles.20 Moreover, training centres for peace education and non-government 
organizations for reconciliation programs were established in several places. The interest in 
peace studies and reconciliation activities was undoubtedly emerged out of the mushrooming 
violent internal conflicts following the end of Suharto’s dictatorial power.  
The tendencies to link political transition and violent conflict, however, were likely 
to produce either generalization or simplification. This was in part shown in many books, as 
mentioned above. Journal articles or working papers, on the other hand, tended to focus on 
specific themes and/or use very specific approaches. 21  Research reports were likely to 
                                                                                                                                          
Robert W. Hofner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
18 Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons (St. Leonard, 
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999); Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Andrinof A. Chaniago, Gagalnya Pembangunan: Kajian Ekonomi Politik 
terhadap Akar Krisis Indonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2001). 
19 Colin Brown, Op.cit. See also David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz eds., Indonesian Politics and 
Society: A Reader (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy eds., Local 
Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Damien Kingsbury and Arief Budiman eds., Indonesia: The 
Uncertain Transition (Hindmarsh, SA: Crawford House, 2001); Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and 
Damien Kingsbury eds., Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monas Asia 
Institute, 1999);  
20 See, for example, Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (South 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad eds., Roots 
of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
2002); Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer eds., Violence in Indonesia (Hamburg: Abera, 2001); 
Benedict R. O’G. Anderson ed., Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ithaca: SEAP, 2001).  
21 For example, see Donald K. Emmerson, “Will Indonesia Survive?”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 79, Issue 3, 
May/June 2000, pp. 95–107; Patrick M. Regan, “Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in 
Intrastate Conflicts”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2, June 1996, pp. 336-359; Gerry 
van Klinken, “The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In”, Indonesia 71, April 2001; George Junus 
Aditjondro, Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local ethni-religious 
tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges, Paper presented at Conference 
on Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia organized by the Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 
Department of Africas and Asian Studies, Humboldt-University in Berlin, 3 – 5 July 2000; and Robert 
Weissman, “Deadly Drilling in Aceh”, Multinational Monitor Vol. 22, Issue 7/8, July/August 2001, 
pp. 7–8.  
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generate comprehensive analyses.22 However, because of their limited objectives, such as for 
policy recommendation, their usage for public or academic purposes was hardly accessible.23  
 This research is not specifically intended to present an integrated relationship 
between the political transition and the eruption of many violent conflicts in Indonesia. 
Neither will it provide a comprehensive analysis of conflict and conflict resolution in East 
Timor, Maluku and Aceh. Instead, this research focuses on what the international community 
had done to help solve the internally violent conflicts. And, again, the international responses 
will be seen from Indonesia’s domestic political point of view. 
 The focus on Indonesian politics to see the international responses to the violent 
conflict in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh has both academic and practical significance. For 
academic importance, this research will contribute to a better understanding of the concept of 
international humanitarian intervention. In this sense, humanitarian intervention will be seen 
from the perspective of the state which would be the target of the intervention. More broadly, 
this research provides further understanding about the extent of trans-border interactions in 
the post-Cold War era. These interactions are not examined in a peaceful circumstance, 
namely in the terms of economic and social fields. Also, they are not examined within a war 
situation or in the Cold War system, which was basically founded on a series of principles 
such as national sovereignty, non-intervention or balance of power. The cross border 
interactions examined were taking place in exceptional circumstances that seemed to put 
aside the conventional conceptions and principles. The circumstances included the ongoing 
process of democratization and the mushrooming violent conflict in Indonesia on the one 
hand and the growing international concern on human rights protection and promotion on the 
other.  
 The practical significance of this research is obvious, that is, to contribute to the 
literature on the international responses to the conflict in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh. 
Some have analysed the international reaction to violent conflict in East Timor that was 
implemented through INTERFET. 24  The analyses tended to confirm that military 
intervention in East Timor was needed and justified. However, there has been no study so far 
on why the intervention in East Timor was so late and why the international community 
                                                 
22 See, for examples, USAID, Conflict in Indonesia, Conflict Task Force/Office of Democracy and 
Governance, January 29, 2002; ICG, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, ICG Asia 
Report No. 10, 19 December 2000; ICG, Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, ICG Asia Report 
No. 117, 31 July 2006. 
23 This might include the reports by different investigative commissions established by Indonesian 
national commission on human rights, Komnas HAM, on human rights violations in East Timor, 
Maluku and Aceh. 
24 See, Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2001); Sue Downie, The United Nations in East Timor: Comparisons with Cambodia, in Damien 
Kingsbury ed., Op.cit., pp. 117–134; James Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention”, 
Survival, Vol. 43, Spring 2001, pp. 127–42; P J Cosgrove, “Complex Questions – A Commander’s 
Perspectives”, RUSI Journal, London, Feb 2001, Vol. 146, Iss.1, pp.31–35. 
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reacted differently in the cases of Maluku and Aceh. In the latter cases, the international 
community and national elements tended to put aside the moral imperative or the 
humanitarian motives of humanitarian intervention. In the case of the Aceh conflict, the 
international community, in particular through the international NGOs HDC and CMI, 
rejected the use of military force to end the armed conflict and to halt the grave violation of 
human rights in the region.25  This issue had been ignored by many publications mentioned 
above. This research aims to fill the gap. 
 
 
D. An Overview of the Thesis 
 
Chapter One has introduced the problems which will be investigated and discussed 
throughout this research. As mentioned above, this research raises a question on why the 
international community sent an international force (INTERFET) to East Timor in order to 
put the violent conflict there to an end, but did not do so in Maluku and Aceh. This is 
followed by the second and the third questions on the extent to which the Indonesian 
domestic politics affected the dynamics of the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh and the role of 
the international community in resolving the conflicts. This chapter also shows the scope of 
this research as shown by its objectives, which are to examine the international intervention 
in East Timor and the absence of international intervention in resolving the conflicts in 
Maluku and Aceh.  
Chapter Two provides a discussion of key theoretical concepts used in this research. 
The concept of humanitarian intervention is central in this research and therefore the concept 
is needed to be explored. The international debate about moral, ethics and the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention is discussed in the first part of the chapter. It is followed in the 
second part by the political aspects of humanitarian intervention. In the third part the pull 
factors of humanitarian intervention are presented. These relate to the conditions within the 
state where the intervention will be carried out. After having shown the general principles of 
humanitarian intervention, the last part of the chapter provides a framework of analysis to 
guide this research to answer the research problems and meet its objectives. 
Chapter Three presents the main characteristics of the Indonesian political system 
in the later years of the twentieth century. This discussion is aimed at showing the 
weaknesses of Indonesia as a nation and state, particularly under the New Order regime. It is 
                                                 
25 Analysis on the role of HDC, see Konrad Huber, The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO 
Mediation and Implementation, Policy Studies 9 (Washington: East-West Center, 2004). See also 
Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed, Policy Studies 1 
(Washington: East-West Center, 2003). 
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believed that the eruption of different violent conflict across the country following the 
collapse of the New Order regime was deeply rooted in such weaknesses.  
Chapter Four further shows that the downfall of Suharto and his authoritarian rule 
not only triggered regional conflicts but also exacerbated the conflicts. Reformasi, a very 
broad term used to denote the post-Suharto era, was initially and ideally expected to solve 
the weaknesses of the nation-state as revealed in Chapter Three. However, it is argued that 
the reformasi made the weaknesses become more obvious and made the conflicts in East 
Timor, Maluku and Aceh uncontrollable and unresolved. The eruption, the intractability and 
the humanitarian effect of these conflicts are discussed in this chapter.  
Considering the effects caused by the conflicts and the Indonesian political context, 
there was a well-founded perception that conflict in East Timor has resulted in a 
humanitarian crisis. The latter was widely seen as a condition to justify international 
humanitarian intervention. Discussions on humanitarian crisis and the implementation of 
INTERFET will be presented in Chapter Five. This chapter is crucial to confirming one 
example of intervention that met the principles of humanitarian intervention. However, this 
chapter also shows that the intervention was conducted only after Indonesia’s consent had 
been gained. This case becomes a basic reference for further analysis on the case of Maluku 
and Aceh.  
Chapter Six focuses on the differing views on violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh. 
Unlike the case of East Timor, the international community saw the conflicts in Maluku and 
Aceh as Indonesia’s domestic affairs. In the meantime, the separation of East Timor from 
Indonesia had raised fear in Indonesia of national disintegration and suspicion of the 
international intervention. This simply led to increasing nationalist sentiment and assertions 
that the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were Indonesian domestic affairs and their solutions 
had to be sought domestically. But more importantly, the country also showed significant 
progress in consolidating democracy. This progress made the domestic solutions to the 
conflicts in Maluku and Aceh more feasible and thus eliminated the possibility of foreign 
intervention. 
 Chapter Seven provides a comprehensive explanation about the way the 
Indonesian government resolved the violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh without 
international military force. The first part of the chapter is about domestic solution to the 
Maluku conflict without the presence of foreign military force. The second part discusses the 
solution to the Aceh conflict. In this part it will be presented that the emergence of a strong 
democratic government in Indonesia generated a different solution to these conflicts in the 
sense of the role of the international community. Although there was an international and 
national common perception about the domestic nature of the conflict and a common 
demand for its domestic solution, the Indonesian government had deliberately involved 
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international non-government organization (the Crisis Management Initiative, CMI) to 
facilitate negotiations with GAM in seeking a solution to the conflict. Based on the Helsinki 
Memorandum of Understanding that resulted from the negotiations, the Indonesian 
government invited the European Union and ASEAN to establish the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM) to monitor its implementation.  
Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter, which will highlight several important 
points that could be seen as answering the research questions, confirming the propositions 
and meeting the objectives of this research outlined in the introductory chapter.  
 
====== 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 This thesis works exclusively on a classical definition of humanitarian intervention; that 
is the use of military force by states or an international organization for the purpose of 
protecting the people of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally 
recognized human rights. This definition is definitely referring to theoretical and practical 
abstractions set up by prominent scholars and institutions. Adam Robert from Oxford University 
for example defines humanitarian intervention as “military intervention in a state, without the 
approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death 
among the inhabitants.” 1  For Robert C. Johansen humanitarian intervention means “(1) 
intervening in a country without its consent, (2) using coercive means that often is military but 
need not be exclusively so and (3) intending to terminate a government’s gross violations of 
human rights”.2 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse in their insightful and inspiring book 
present several classic concepts proposed by previous academies and then offer a 
reconceptualized definition by bridging the perspective of international relief organizations and 
the traditional ‘narrow’ issue of military intervention by states. 3  Barbara Harff 4  and Sean 
Murphy 5  also offer certain definitions of humanitarian intervention. Overall, the principal 
elements within their definitions of humanitarian intervention are not significantly different.  
                                                 
1Adam Roberts, “New Criteria for Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period”, in Peter Wallensteen ed., 
International Intervention: New Norms in the post-Cold War Era? (Uppsala: Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research, 1997) p. 125. See also in Shashi Tahoor and Sam Daws, “Humanitarian intervention: 
getting past the reef”, World Policy Journal, Vol.18, Issue 2, New York: Summer 2001. 
2 Robert C. Johansen, “Limits and Opportunities in Humanitarian Intervention” in Stanley Hoffmann, The 
Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1996) p. 66. 
3 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) pp 42–7 and 114–21. The reconceptualization is discussed further in Part 
D of this chapter. 
4 Barbara Harff, “Humanitarian Intervention: At Issue” in Peter Wallensteen ed., International 
Intervention: New Norms in the Post-Cold War Era? (Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University, 1997) pp. 61–67.  
5 In Robert Tomes, “Operation allied forces and the legal basis for humanitarian intervention”, 
Parameters, Vol. 30/1, Carlisle Barracks, Spring 2000 online 
http://global.umi.com/pqdweb?TS=1047455059&RQT=309&CC=2&Dtp=1&Did=00 accessed on 12 
March 2003. 
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Apart from individual scholars, several institutions such as Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research at Uppsala University6, the Dutch CAVV and AIV institutions7, the Danish 
institute (DUPI) and the Canadian sponsored institution ICISS8 have also been formed and 
involved in defining and developing the concept of humanitarian intervention. Instead of 
debating the fundamental elements of humanitarian intervention, their contribution to the 
concept is likely to develop its justification and to advance its operational prospects.  
 Debates on humanitarian intervention both at academic and practical levels have been 
dominated by the interest in seeking various sources that could justify humanitarian intervention 
and/or fortify its justification. This was carried out by, on the one hand, considering the new 
setting of international relations following the end of Cold-War system. 9 Included in this effort 
is the exploration of the international moral, ethical, legal and practices of intervention carried 
out by the United Nations Organization (UN) or other organizations and by an individual or a 
group of states. The development in this effort prompted Barbara Harff to argue that the 
international trend is toward a codification of principles of humanitarian intervention.10  
On the other hand, there were efforts to focus on the domestic condition of the targeted 
state where violent conflicts take place and humanitarian crises emerge. For example, Richard 
Lillich proposed several domestic conditions that made a military intervention justified. These 
include “systematic and indiscriminative attacks on civilians by a central government, a system 
breakdown in law and order producing the dislocation and starvation of the civilian 
population”.11 Nicholas Wheeler proposed a condition that events had taken place which had 
                                                 
6 On 21 May 1996 the Department organized a symposium on the issue of humanitarian intervention and 
was then resulted in a published report. See Peter Wallensteen, Ibid.  
7 CAVV is the Dutch Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law and AIV is the Advisory 
Council on International Affairs. See AIV and CAVV, Humanitarian Intervention, No. 13, April 2000.See 
also Ige F. Dekker, Illegality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention: Synopsis and comments on a 
Dutch Report, Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2001), Vol.6 No.1, pp.115–126. 
8 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in September 
2000. It is said that its objective is to wrestle with the whole range of questions – legal, moral, operational 
and political – of humanitarian intervention. Its work report was then published in ICISS, The 
Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, September 2001). The 
work of the ICISS is also used widely in this research. 
9 The Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University considered the international 
changes in developing the new understanding of humanitarian intervention. See also Oliver Ramsbotham 
and Tom Woodhouse, Op.cit., pp. 69–164. 
10 “Humanitarian Intervention: At Issue” in Peter Wallensteen ed., Op.cit, p. 61 
11 As quoted in Martin Griffiths, Iain Levine and Mark Weller, Sovereignty and Suffering, in John Harris 
ed., The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Pinter, 1995) p. 41. 
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shocked the international conscience. 12 ICISS identified the condition where there was the threat 
or occurrence of large scale loss of life and/or ethnic cleansing.13 
This thesis pays more attention on the domestic conditions such as the “widespread 
deprivations of human rights or the humanitarian crisis in a concerned state” that could justify 
the deployment of international military force. As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis 
proposes that the international decision to deploy a military force for humanitarian purposes is 
not solely based on the international principles, perspectives and interests. To a great extent, the 
action or inaction of the international community to use military force to protect people from 
grave violations of human rights caused by internal violent conflict such as those in Indonesia is 
determined greatly by Indonesia’s domestic context. This hypothesis does not necessarily mean 
to deny the international norms of humanitarian intervention. Instead, this thesis wants to 
examine the contention that Indonesian domestic politics had made a multinational force in East 
Timor (INTERFET) reasonable and justified, but made it irrelevant in Maluku and Aceh.  
This chapter will discuss further the international and domestic aspects of the 
justification of humanitarian intervention. The first part will specifically explore the international 
aspects, which may be categorized as “external” or “push” factors of humanitarian intervention. 
It is then followed in the second part by discussion of the domestic or “internal” or “pull” factors 
of humanitarian intervention. At the end of this chapter a theoretical framework will be set up 
which is expected to guide the whole analysis.  
 
 
 
B. The international or push factors of humanitarian intervention 
  
Humanitarian intervention is about the response of the international community to 
humanitarian crises. Simply stated, the response is motivated by reasons which can be divided 
into two general groups: humanitarian and non-humanitarian. The humanitarian motives of the 
use of military force are generally associated with the interests and the purposes of preventing or 
putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights, while the non-humanitarian 
motives are usually linked to the economic, political and security interests of the intervening 
state(s). But, the non-humanitarian motives are also concerned with the real possibility of the 
                                                 
12 Nicholas Wheeler, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a 
New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes, in Jennifer M. Welsh ed., Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 29–51.  
13 ICISS, Op.cit., p.33 
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success of the intervention. “No one is suggesting that the international community has acted in 
a consistent manner over every issue of human rights abuse or genocide but it is important to act 
where feasible”, Anthony Smith suggested.14  
Efforts have been made in order to justify the international response particularly in the 
case where the response took the form of military intervention such as in Rwanda, Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Some experts seek to justify the military intervention within the United Nations 
framework. Others attempt to elaborate the International Bill of Human Rights, while many 
others use ethical and moral considerations. The political and operational aspects of 
humanitarian intervention have also been the focus of many other analysts.15  
 
1. International moral and human rights  
 The UN framework has been used as the primary reference to humanitarian intervention. 
It is used as the resource of the legality of humanitarian intervention and the authoritative 
institution of its implementation.16 The first and foremost step in using the UN framework to 
justify humanitarian intervention is by looking at the objective of the UN. Article 1(1) of the 
Charter states the objective, that is: 
 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace. 
 
But, the use of the UN framework to justify humanitarian intervention is carried out by 
assuming the international peace and security is basically founded on respect for human rights. 
Many scholars believe international peace and security could be achieved if human rights were 
widely protected and respected. According to David Forsythe, the UN Charter was the first 
treaty in world history to endorse human rights in the name of the promotion of international 
peace and security.17 Antonio Casese also argued that many countries, including those in the 
                                                 
14 Anthony Smith, “Intervention and East Timor: A New Zealand Perspective”, in David Dickens and Guy 
Wilson-Robers eds., Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington: Centre for 
Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) p. 76. 
15 See J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
16 Sir Adam Roberts, “The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention”, in Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 
Op.cit., pp. 71–97.  
17 See David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) 2000, p. 36. 
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socialist world, held the notion that protection of human rights was one of the ways to promote 
and maintain peaceful relations among states.18  
The second important way to assert the UN’s legalization of humanitarian intervention is 
by referring to the Charter phrase of “we the peoples of the United Nations” enshrined in its 
Preamble. Based upon this phrase there is a growing interpretation that the true subject of the 
UN Charter is or should be individuals and not states. This is followed by the notion that state 
sovereignty and state jurisdiction over its internal affairs is irrelevant if the state violates the 
rights of its citizens or fails to govern effectively. Accordingly, as Robert Tomes suggested, 
humanitarian intervention is, if nothing else, a deliberate check on the power of sovereign states 
in favour of less formal human rights norms.19 A similar idea is also expressed by the ICISS, 
namely that sovereignty should be understood as the responsibility of state to protect its own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe.20 In a situation where sovereignty is violated effectively and 
ruthlessly by indigenous agents21 or when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its people, that 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.22 All these notions seem to be 
included in Obrad Savic’s view that “the Charter did announce an ‘internationalization’ of 
human rights and pave the way for the international conviction that human rights are not 
something that exists exclusively within the internal jurisdiction of particular countries”.23 
Proponents of humanitarian intervention also frequently refer to Chapters VII and VIII 
of the UN Charter. Article 2(7) principally prohibits any intervention in the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state, “but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII”. Supporters of humanitarian intervention strongly consider Chapter VII 
(Article 39, 41 and 42) and Chapter VIII (Article 51) as the UN-legal basis of humanitarian 
intervention. Article 39 affirms that the Security Council could and should determine that human 
rights violations are threats to peace and security. When there is a Security Council consensus on 
such decision, the Security Council can employ effective measures including interruption of 
economic relations, communication and the severance of diplomatic relations (Article 41), and if 
those measures are inadequate, the Security Council may take action by air, sea, or land forces 
                                                 
18 See Antonio Cassese, “Are human rights truly universal?”, in The Politics of Human Rights, edited by 
the Belgrade Circle (London: Verso, 1999) p.157. 
19 Robert Tomes, Op.cit., p. 4. 
20 ICISS, Op.cit., pp. 12–3. See also in Jennifer Welsh, Caroline Thielking and S. Neil Macfarlane, “The 
responsibility to protect”, International Journal, Vol. LVII, No.4, Autumn 2002, p. 493. 
21 Michael Reisman quoted in Stephen A. Garrett, Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of 
Humanitarian Intervention (Westport: Praeger, 1999) p. 54. 
22 Jennifer Welsh, et al., Op.cit., p.493 
23 See Obrad Savic, “The global and the local in human rights: the case of Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia”, in The Politics of Human Rights, edited by The Belgrade Circle, Op.cit., p.4. 
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(Article 42). In addition to such legal considerations, Article 51 is widely seen as an explicit 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force by one state or group of states. “Nothing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in an 
armed attack occur against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” has been understood as a right 
to individual or collective self-defence and a right to collective security.24  
It is clear enough that the Security Council on behalf of the UN has the authority to 
make binding decisions on security and peace related issues and can authorize necessary 
intervention in order to preserve international peace and human rights.25 Moreover, the Security 
Council can delegate its authority to regional organizations to undertake the same measures 
(Article 52 and Article 53).26  
Mass killings and mass flight of refugees caused by intrastate conflicts or civil wars in 
particular state are often identified as a threat to regional, if not international, peace – or at least 
for the security of the bordering states. Exemplified by the Balkan crisis, which caused 
uncontrolled refugee flight, the NATO intervention was portrayed as being necessary to prevent 
a threat to regional security and thereby the international intervention in Yugoslavia was 
justified.27 As we will see in subsequent chapters, human rights activists and religious leaders in 
Maluku and Aceh used the UN framework to call for military intervention in order to halt the 
massive violations of human rights that took place in their regions. 
 Nonetheless, one may see that the UN Charter does not provide any clause that 
explicitly legalizes the use of military force for humanitarian purposes. “At the heart of the UN’s 
difficulty with humanitarian intervention lies a paradox”, Sir Adam Roberts says.28 He and many 
other scholars argue that the UN Charter precisely prohibits the use of force and makes illegal 
every form of intervention, even on behalf of humanitarianism. Robert Tomes argues that the 
Charter’s main objective was to prevent war by making the use of force illegal. He asserts that 
the UN as a matter of principle will not intervene in domestic affairs of any state, even to 
                                                 
24 Robert Tomes, Op.cit, p. 7 and Barbara Harff, op.cit., p. 63; Michael Akehurst, “Humanitarian 
Intervention”, in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press 
1984) p.106; Evan Luard, “Collective Intervention”, in Hedley Bull, Ibid., p. 157–179. 
25 David P. Forsythe, Op.cit., p. 37 and 220; Barbara Harff, Op.cit.; ICISS, Op.cit., pp. 47–55.  
26 ICISS, Ibid., p. 53–4. 
27 Robert Tomes, Op.cit., p. 8. It is also said that since 1991 the Security Council has identified the 
conflict in Bosnia as a threat to the peace and the UN did support any attempt to resolve the conflict. See 
also Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and the law of “humanitarian intervention””, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol.93, Issue 4, October 1999 
28 Sir Adam Roberts, Op.cit., p. 71 
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prevent, stop, or roll back human rights violations.29 Tom Farer also holds the same idea that for 
the founding fathers of the UN, humanitarian intervention is illegal.30  According to Louis 
Henkin, “there was a general agreement, that the Charter prohibits intervention by any state for 
humanitarian intervention”31 . Toward the interpretation that humanitarian crises are serious 
threat to peace and security, Tobias Vogel holds that such interpretation means there are no 
purely humanitarian problems that can legitimize humanitarian interventions.32 
Realizing the unconvincingly legal stipulations within the UN framework and 
considering the increasing demand to protect civilians from widespread and severe deprivations 
of human rights, proponents of humanitarian intervention endeavour to seek its legalization 
through international humanitarian norms comprising humanitarian law and human rights law.33  
The use of international humanitarian law to justify humanitarian intervention proceeds 
by seeking to construct its just causes. It is widely accepted that the self-defence principle is a 
just cause to use military force and to wage war as enshrined in the UN Charter. However, the 
principle has been extended to cover the defence of another state against aggression, intervention 
to protect victims of massacre, assisting secessionists, and even pre-emptive strikes against 
potential aggressors.34 For Ian Holliday, for example, citing self-defence to justify war is too 
limiting and poor. In order to achieve a more just state of affairs, he said, just war could and 
should be a creative endeavour. The starting point is a demonstrable injustice which enables us 
to cast our net as widely as possible in search for military interventions that could merit the 
                                                 
29 Article 2(7): Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; put this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
30 Quoted in Stanley Hoffmann, Op.cit., p. 28 
31 Louis Henkin, Op.cit.  
32 Tobias Vogel, “The politics of humanitarian intervention”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 
online http://www.jha.ac/article/a011.htm, posted 4 June 2000, accessed on 17/11/2003. 
33 See Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects, published by DUPI (Danish Institute of 
International Affairs), Copenhagen, 1999, DKR, ISBN 87-90681-21-5 downloaded from 
http://www.dupi.dk/fmp4.o/web/en1224.html#download, on 17 November 2003. In its introduction it is 
said that “Normally, the birth of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is associated with natural law 
and early international law”, p.11. See also Hugo Slim, “Military Humanitarianism and the new 
peacekeeping: an agenda for peace?”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, online 
http://www.jha.ac/articles/a084.htm accessed on 25/09/2003. Whereas international humanitarian law 
incorporates the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, human rights laws comprise the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (1948), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International 
Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (1966) which are altogether known as International 
Bill of Rights. 
34 As cited from Donald A. Wells, Encyclopedia of War and Ethics (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996) 
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designation of just war status. His presumption in favour of justice can extend and strengthen the 
just cause of intervention in dealing with the present and future intractable injustice.35 
Another condition that could legitimize just war and intervention is when people rebel 
against oppression and tyranny. Wars of liberation and the struggle for the right to self-
determination are partly seen as to contain some elements of jus ad bellum and the basis for a 
right to humanitarian intervention in international law. “At best such rights may be considered as 
an emerging right derived from the obligations that Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law impose on state”, says Jose Zalaquett36.  
The legal justification of humanitarian intervention is also explored through the 
development of international human rights laws. A remarkable extension of the generations of 
human rights laws37  and their ratification by many more states has been seen positively and has 
strong implications on the interventionist trend within the global society. Antonio Cassese, for 
example, pointed out that after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights all 
countries in the world have at their disposal an international code to decide how to conduct 
themselves and how to judge others. International laws of human rights are now parameters of 
                                                 
35 Ian Holliday, “When is a cause just?”, Review of International Studies, Vol.28, © British International 
Studies Association, 2003, pp. 557-575. In this article Holliday endeavors to extend the just theory of war 
by elaborating the structural division of just war conditions. The standard package of just war conditions 
encompasses just cause, right intention, legitimate authority, formal declaration of war, reasonable hope of 
success, last resort and proportionality (of ends). By excluding the formal declaration of war, which is so 
marginal to contemporary practice, he then classifies the rest of six standard ad bellum packages into three 
categories: perceived problem, proposed solution and risk assessment. Perceived problem, which is 
labeled as intractable injustice, consists of demonstrable injustice (substituting just cause) and last resort. 
Proposed solution, which is termed responsible intervention, relates to legitimate authority and right 
intention. And risk assessment, which is called weighing contingent factors, includes reasonable hope of 
success and proportionality of ends. See also Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic 
Books, 1992) and Arguing about War (Yale Universty Press, 2004). 
36 See Jose Zalaquett, “The legitimacy of armed humanitarian intervention: Basic concepts”, November 
2000 online http://www.isn.ethz.ch/4isf/4/Papers/ISF_WS_II-2_Zalaquett.pdf assessed on 17/11/2003. 
37 The three generations of human rights laws covering the (1) civil and political rights, (2) economic, 
social and cultural rights, and (3) minority and people rights. Civil and political rights, known as the first 
generation rights, are the basic rights which reflect the protection of the individual from the arbitrary 
exercise of power by the all powerful state. This is also called as “negative rights” because the state is 
required to refrain from certain actions against the individual, and as consequence the individual can enjoy 
freedom. Economic, social and cultural rights, generally known as the second generation rights and 
“positive rights”, encapsulate those rights concerned with the material, social and cultural welfare of 
persons. States are required to provide social goods and services, such as housing, food, clothing, 
education, or social security for all people to enjoy. Minority and people rights are perceived as the third 
generation rights but in various understanding such as “collective” or “solidarity rights”. In general these 
rights postulate the rights of people for peace and the right to the enjoyment of a healthy environment. In a 
more explicit acceptance this is the right of people to create a social and political institution that is suitable 
in articulating particular identity and value. On this base, these rights are identified or strongly associated 
with the right of self-determination and the rights of minority groups to preserve their specified identities. 
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action that impose modes of behaviour of the governments and instruments of protection of 
individual rights.38 
There is a general claim that the International Bill of Human Rights has universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated characteristics.39 One crucial consequence of these 
characteristics is the growing belief that the protection and promotion of human rights should be 
simultaneously implemented through national policies and international responsibility. And to 
do this, it is a basic standard for government to develop a democratic system in order to comply 
with human rights law.40 Democracy, as it is widely understood, is the best decision-making 
process which enables different interests be effectively articulated within the “general will”. 
Democracy improves human rights and helps make human rights to emerge on the international 
stage. 41  Once a democratic system is accepted as a global standard for human rights, the 
international community will become “solidarist”42 and interventionist alike. 
Apart from the general understanding of human rights issue that could justify 
humanitarian intervention, there are two important issues which are closely related to the cases 
of this research. They are the right to self-determination and minority rights. The International 
Bill of Rights clearly postulates that “all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.” 43  The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) also affirms that  
 
(1) States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall encourage 
conditions for the promotion of that identity; and  
 
                                                 
38 Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in A Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) p. 2. 
39 See Antonio Cassese, “Are human rights truly universal?”, Op.cit., pp. 149–165. Universality of human 
rights means that it applies globally regardless nationality. Indivisibility refers to the equal importance of 
each human rights law. The interdependent character demands the complementary framework of their 
implementation. And finally, the interrelationship reasserts the mutual-connectedness of civil, political, 
economic, social, and cultural rights. All those characteristics are enshrined at the Preamble of the UDHR 
eloquently stating that the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human being is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
40 Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice; International Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity, 
2002) p. 134–5. 
41 Obrad Savic, Op.cit., p. 4–5. 
42 The useful sources of the pluralist and solidarist international system, albeit shortly, can be seen in Chris 
Brown, Op.cit.. The “solidarist” conception of international society is referred to Michael Walzer.  
43 It is argued that the “principle” became the “right” to self-determination after the establishment of the 
UN organization (1945) and the adoption of UDHR (1948), ICCPR and ICESCR (1976). See John B. 
Henriksen, “Implementation of the Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples”, Indigenous 
Affairs, Vol.3/01, p.7, online http://iwgia.inforce.dk/graphics/synkron-
library/Documents/IndigenousAffairs/selfdetermination.pdf, accessed on 06/06/2003. 
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(2) States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.44  
 
 
These stipulations have been frequently exploited to legitimize external intervention. As 
mentioned before, humanitarian intervention may be extended to assist liberation movements or 
secessionists against alien domination. Such extension has raised wide anxieties and fears among 
states and international organizations. They argue that such issues will threaten the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of the existing state system and has the potential to cause tensions, 
conflicts and instability. Instead of inviting international intervention, the right of self-
determination and the rights of minorities should be faced domestically.45 
 Although the International Bill of Human Rights seem to have strong linkages with 
humanitarian intervention, it is fair to say that those human rights laws do not explicitly show 
any legal basis for the use of military force for protecting or promoting human rights. The Bill is 
more likely to emphasize the basic rights of individuals and people groups and the obligations of 
states or national governments. Its basic assumption is that the compliance of those rights and 
obligations will diminish the necessity of humanitarian intervention in general and the use of 
force for humanitarian interest in particular. This is relevant to the CAVV and the AIV 
conclusion that “although human rights are playing an increasingly important role in 
international relations, this has not resulted in a proportionately greater willingness to intervene 
militarily, except in highly exceptional and grave circumstances.46 
 Since the legal basis of humanitarian intervention remains debated, many scholars and 
practitioners in international relations look instead to international ethics and morality to justify 
humanitarian intervention. This might be seen as part of a creative endeavour as Ian Holliday 
suggested above. In dealing with situations where there is no international law legalizing 
humanitarian intervention and at the same time there are massive violations of human rights, the 
ethics and morality of the international community are rightly addressed. In this sense, the 
CAVV and AIV made the following suggestion.  
 
Ethically and morally speaking, external states have the ‘right’ to decide unilaterally to 
violate the international principles (sovereignty and non-intervention) in order to prevent 
or contain an even graver infringement of that selfsame rule of law. In extreme cases 
humanitarian intervention is considered as an “emergency exit”; however, its 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Michael van Walt van Praag in The Implementation of the Right to Self-Determination as a Contribution 
to Conflict Resolution, Report of the International Conference of Experts held in Barcelona from 21 to 27 
November 1998, organized by UNESCO, p. 14. 
46 AIV and CAVV, Op.cit., p. 34. See also in Ige F. Dekker, Op.cit., pp.121. 
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implementation should be based on an “assessment framework” and subject to the 
international principle of “approximate treaty application”.47 
 
Moral justification of humanitarian intervention has its roots in the medieval literature 
and Christian values. 48  The main idea of that tradition is that it is just to wage war in order to 
punish wrongdoing. It is also said that a Christian ruler might properly use force to liberate an 
oppressed people, in the name of humanity, from tyranny and servitude. Further, in order to 
establish such an idea of humanitarian intervention it is imperative to shift attention from wrongs 
done by one community to another to those done by a government to its own subjects, either 
directly or by permitting mistreatment. 
 Referring to Hugo Grotius’s thoughts of natural law, Nardin said that international 
morality is one that permits such intervention but does not demand it. In natural law self-
preservation is the first imperative, which is inherent in nature and belongs to natural persons 
and also artificial persons, such as states. The law of nature is a law that prescribes forbearance, 
not beneficence. Natural law requires only that we leave one another alone; it does not demand 
that we assist or protect one another. But we may assist or protect one another. On the interstates 
level, it is said that sovereigns have the right to punish any acts that excessively violate the law 
of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever. The right to punish is based not on 
civil power but on the law of nature, which is existed before there were civil societies.49  
It is also said that any government has the right to enforce natural law against any other 
government that is guilty of violating it. The reason is that in the “state of nature”, where there is 
no enforcing power superior to that of the sovereign of each state, every violation of natural law 
will harm every other sovereign. Within such premises every state has an “imperfect duty” or a 
“duty of beneficence” in order to preserve such state of nature. Towards this proposition it is 
asserted that in moral the act of oppression, not a request of assistance, justifies an 
intervention.50 
Terry Nardin elaborates further a common morality as the moral basis for humanitarian 
intervention. Its principles constitute a common moral world in which human beings have rights 
                                                 
47 The “assessment framework” outlines the procedural and substantial conditions related to the problems 
to be intervened in humanitarian terms. Meanwhile, the “approximate treaty application” considers the 
necessity to obtain an authorization from the Security Council or even a mandate from the General 
Assembly for the military action. See Ige F. Dekker, Ibid, pp. 121–2.  
48 The moral and ethics aspect of humanitarian intervention in this section largely and basically refers to 
Terry Nardin, “The moral basis of humanitarian intervention”, in Ethics & International Affairs, Vol.16, 
Issue 1, New York, 2002, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=7&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=... 
accessed on 29 July 2003.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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as members of the human community and not as members of particular community. In this 
context, Nardin holds that humanitarian intervention is a response to grave human rights 
violation, and the most basic human rights are universal moral rights – rights, in other words, 
that rest on the principles of common morality. These become good reasons for grounding the 
ethics of humanitarian intervention in common morality and not in particular religious or 
national moralities, or even in international law, which rests on custom and agreement, not moral 
reasoning. 
Two main foundations of common morality, according to Nardin, are the principle of 
respect and the idea of beneficence. To respect other human beings as rational agents means not 
only that we must not interfere with their freedom but also that we should assist them in 
achieving their ends. Common morality also asks people to advance the well-being of others – 
by being cooperative, helpful, charitable, and the like – in ways that are morally permissible and 
not disproportionately costly.51  
Common morality forbids the use of force without good reason because it violates the 
principle of respect. The use of force for self-defence is morally justifiable. But common 
morality does not limit the use of force to self-defence. It also permits to defend the rights of 
others when those rights are threatened. We are therefore justified in using force to thwart 
violence against other persons, provided that those persons are “innocent” – that is, not 
themselves engaged in unjust violence. Using force to resist those who attack the innocent does 
not violate the attackers’ rights as free persons because they have, by their own actions, lost the 
moral right to act as they choose. It is even permitted to kill attackers, if necessary, to protect 
their victims. We are justified in using as much force as is needed to thwart the attack, but not 
more – bearing in mind that precise calculations about such matters are impossible.52 
 
2. International politics  
 
While the international society has the UN, which is intended to preserve peace and 
security, there are many violent conflicts that persistently threat the international peace. While 
there has been a set of human rights laws, there are continuing human rights violations. 
Although international society has been taught about ethics and moral standards, its members 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 For this moral and ethic justification of humanitarian intervention see also Robert Tomes proposing the 
moral obligations and Louis Henkin saying the moral-political conclusion of humanitarian intervention. 
See Robert Tomes, “Operation allied forces and the legal basis for humanitarian intervention”, in Op.cit. 
and Louis Henkin, Op.cit. 
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tend to ignore them. These are continuing problems the contemporary international system deals 
with: there remains a disjuncture between human rights discourse and continuing practice of 
human wrongs and a discrepancy between the supposed norms of mutual respect and 
interventionist practices.53  
In responding to such contradictory facts, two views have emerged; one is positive and 
the other is negative in seeing the prospect of humanitarian intervention. The positive view 
suggests that giving adequate respect to contextual case-by-case analysis and maintaining an 
acceptable balance between the sovereign equality and the international commitment to human 
dignity will provide the opportunity for improving international standard.54 On the other hand, 
the negative view argues that it is irrelevant to discuss humanitarian intervention on a legal basis. 
In fact, any discourse of humanitarian intervention is humanitarian politics and humanitarian 
politics are essentially hegemonic politics.55  
These two different views highlight the two grand theories of international relations: 
liberalism and realism. Each has different descriptions of the international system and different 
prescriptions in order to maintain international peace and security.56  But more importantly, 
realism and liberalism inspire the emergence of pluralist and solidarist perspectives in explaining 
the possibility and plausibility of international humanitarian intervention.  
Pluralists argue that there is a distribution of power to peoples through the plurality of 
states and each state has right to develop its own way of life. The right is formulated in 
sovereignty and non-intervention principles as “the powerful norms that combine state interests, 
moral principles, and formal laws”.57 Based on sovereignty and non-intervention as legal and 
moral standards, the pluralist view of international society allows national communities to 
promote their diverse ends with the minimal of outside interference. 
One important point from the pluralist perspective is its strong objection to the 
legitimacy and efficacy of humanitarian intervention. Its arguments are (1) there is no 
agreement, even possible agreement, about what constitutes a supreme humanitarian emergency; 
(2) human rights are constructed within a specific cultural context and are not universal; (3) 
                                                 
53 Alex Bergamy, “Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in international society”, 
Review of International Studies, Vol.29, 2003, pp. 321–2.  
54 ICISS held this view. See also Rosalyn Higgins, “Intervention and international law”, in Hedley Bull, 
Op.cit., pp. 30–39. 
55 Tobias Vogel, Op.cit.  
56 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Controversies in International Relations Theory, Realism and the Neoliberal 
Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) pp. 1–17; Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, 
World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2001) pp. 32–35. See also 
James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism 1991-1994, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
pp. 1–24. 
57 Alex Bellamy, Ibid., p.323. 
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proposals for universal ethics and common standards of humane governance are always 
culturally biased and claims of an emerging legitimate right of humanitarian intervention cannot 
be accepted; and (4) interventionist practice, even well-intentioned interventionism, threatens 
international order.58  
On the contrary, the solidarist perspective maintains that the diverse communities within 
the international society “can and do reach agreement about substantive moral standards and that 
international society has moral agency to uphold those standards”.59 The solidarist asserts that 
there is a degree of solidarity among the society of states to develop and enforce international 
law on which “there is agreement in international society about what constitutes a supreme 
humanitarian emergencies and legitimate act of intervention”.60 
What is clear from such intellectual debates is that the significance of humanitarian 
intervention is theoretically determined by a particular perspective held by the major 
international actors. Consequently, the implementation of humanitarian intervention is strongly 
dependent upon values, interests and power of the international actors. Humanitarian 
intervention is most likely a matter of politics. The following section will show how 
humanitarian intervention is perceived by certain international actors. 
 
The UN position on humanitarian intervention 
 As has been mentioned, many scholars and institutions continue to examine the UN 
Charter and institution in order to construct the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Michael 
Akehurst sees Chapter VII conferring upon the Security Council a discrete authority to 
determine the existence of threats of peace.61 For Stephen Garrett the UN is the only institution 
in determining, legitimizing, and implementing humanitarian intervention, including in carrying 
out a forceful interventionary action.62 Evan Luard also sees the UN as the ultimate organization 
that can provide the broadest legitimacy for a collective intervention for collective purposes and 
with lawful methods.63 ICISS asserts a similar notion, “The UN, whatever arguments may persist 
about the meaning and scope of various Chapter provisions, is unquestionably the principal 
institution for building, consolidating and using the authority of the international community.” 64  
To support the primacy of the UN, the former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
                                                 
58 Alex Bellamy, Ibid., p. 324.  
59 Quoted in Alex Bellamy, Ibid. See also James Mayall, ed., Ibid. 
60 Alex Bellamy, Ibid. 
61 Michael Akehurst, Op.cit., p. 106. 
62 Stephen A. Garrett, Op.cit., p. 152. 
63 See Evan Luard, Collective Intervention, in Hedley Bull, Op.cit., p. 157–79. 
64 ICISS, Op.cit., p. 48. 
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proposed the idea of the need to establish a UN rapid deployment force “that would be of 
battalion-size, trained to similar standards and operating procedures, share common 
communications equipment, and train together in regular joint exercise”.65 
However, there are still doubts about the UN’s credibility in determining, legitimizing 
and implementing humanitarian intervention. Four main reasons are usually presented66. First, 
there is a political problem within the UN. Any intervention mandated by the Security Council is 
a result of political process. Humanitarian intervention could be successfully undertaken only 
when there is a political consensus among the Security Council members. Second, there are 
structural problems in the UN system. The veto privilege of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, the under-representation of the international community and the lack of 
consultation and transparency in decision-making process could reduce the UN legitimacy in 
undertaking humanitarian intervention. The veto right is also assumed to open the chance for 
finding other alternatives, including for great powers to act unilaterally. It is also seen as a 
political instrument for the permanent members to maintain the status quo. The third reason is 
the absence of hard legal provisions within the UN Charter. And finally, the operational and 
technical incompetence of the UN has frequently forced the UN to be dependent upon individual 
or group of major power states for the realization of its humanitarian objectives.  
All the arguments lead to one common but critical question on the inherently 
institutional double standards within the UN. At one extreme, the Security Council might easily 
come into conclusion on the need to take military intervention for humanitarian purposes and 
have significant support from country members. On the other extreme, the Security Council 
might not have any resolve at all to take necessary measures to stop human suffering in a 
particular state. In most cases what the Security Council has done or would do lies in between 
the two extremes. Within the UN system the issue of humanitarian intervention is likely to be a 
political issue rather than humanitarian issue, as Tobias Vogel has suggested.67 
 
Developed countries’ perspectives  
 The UN’s double standards in the practice of humanitarian intervention are also 
demonstrated by the leading world powers, which are in fact predominantly the Western 
democratic states. In the case of the USA for example, it is said that there are significant traces 
of altruism among American public. Most of the general public feels that promoting and 
defending human rights in other countries should be an important goal of the US. They also 
                                                 
65 See in Stephen Garrett, Op.cit., p. 161. 
66 Stanley Hoffmann, Op.cit., p. 21–27. See also Tobias Vogel, Op.cit. 
67 Tobias Vogel, Ibid. 
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agree that “sometimes the US should be willing to make some sacrifices if these will help the 
world as a whole”.68 
 The ethics and moral dimension of the Western humanitarian intervention is clearly 
expressed through the following notion.  
 
The formula ‘right to intervene’ does not derive from divine origin and its imposition 
tends to extend and meddle in others’ affairs. If it is we ourselves who take on this 
responsibility, then it is not a right, but a duty, and voluntarily assumed. Furthermore, 
this duty should be determined not by the form that our intervention will take (military 
intervention) but by the needs of those who request intervention. Those who suffer do 
indeed have a right to assistance (an unwritten right, a human right); we who are willing 
to aid them can have only a duty to assist…This duty is one that we all share: we should 
not remain ignorant of what happens around us; we should, at the very least, accept our 
roles as witnesses of our time.69 
 
 The Western countries’ perspective on humanitarian intervention, however, is not solely 
determined by moral and ethical values. The wave of democratization in many countries and the 
rising capitalisation of the international economy have made these countries more convinced of 
their ideological rightness and strength. According to Andrew Hurrell, the growing links 
between political liberalization and market-based economy prompted the industrialized-
democratic-Western countries to carry out foreign policies stressing the holy trinity of human 
rights, political democracy and good governance.70 This indicates the significant advance of 
Western altruism based on non-humanistic motives and interests. 
The alignment of altruism and non-humanitarian interests makes humanitarian 
intervention a highly selective manner. The decision by Western countries to take military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes is in fact heavily affected by their interests in non-
humanitarian fields such as economy and security.  
According to many scholars such as Stephen Garrett and Tzvetan Todorov, the decision 
for humanitarian intervention is influenced by several reasons or considerations. The first 
consideration is the power of the country suspected of wrongdoing. If the wrongdoing state is 
too powerful such as Russia in Chechnya or China in Tibet, there will be no intervention. In this 
sense, realism finds ground.  
                                                 
68 Two surveys run by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Program on International Policy 
Attitude at the University of Maryland in 1990 showed 52 percent and 84 percent respectively of the 
American respondents had this altruistic view. See Stephen Garrett, Op.cit., p. 174. 
69 Tzvetan Todorov , “Right to intervene or duty to assist” in Nicholas Owen, ed., Human Rights, Human 
Wrongs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) pp. 26–48. 
70 Andrew Hurrell, “Power, principles, and prudence: Protecting human rights in a deeply divided world”, 
in Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler, eds., Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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The second consideration is the relationship between the Western countries and the 
suspected wrongdoing states. On this ground it is said that the US and NATO will not intervene 
in the states of their strategic allies, but they will intervene in those states which are not their 
allies. 
The third consideration for intervention is domestic public opinion. Domestic policy 
considerations frequently took priority over humanitarian concerns. The duty to assist is likely 
formed and demonstrated through public opinion. Nonetheless, Garrett has suggested that the 
general public is basically immature and hopelessly sentimental and therefore decisions whether 
to intervene or not to intervene ought to be left to those who are “tough-minded” enough to set 
aside whatever natural human feeling they may have and focus instead strictly on the national 
self-interest narrowly defined.71  
The last but not least consideration is national interests. One illustration suggested that 
the US’s recognition of violent acts committed by the Turks against the Armenians would run 
counter to its national interests. By contrast, the US would have nothing to gain materially, 
politically or in terms of moral prestige by employing humanitarian intervention in African 
conflicts. 72 
Anthony Lake maintains that national interests are a compelling explanation for the 
interventionist behaviour of the US, not only during the Cold War but also before and after it. He 
emphasizes several conditions relating to US national interests that will ensure the use of 
military power, such as to defend against direct attacks on the US, its citizens at home and 
abroad, and its allies, to counter aggression, to defend its most important economic interests, to 
preserve, promote, and defend democracy and for humanitarian purposes.73 
                                                 
71 Stephen Garrett, Op.cit., p. 81. 
72 Tzvetan Todorov, Op.cit., p. 36; Stephen Garrett, Op.cit., pp. 170–4. 
73 Quoted in Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, 5th edition (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) pp.100–122. See also Peter Schrader who highlights five contexts of the 
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missions, terrorism counteraction, anti-drug operations, pacification or control of ethnic conflict, 
humanitarian assistance and military civic action. Two fundamental assumptions for this rising strategic 
emphasis are (a) that the vital US interests are threatened by radical and revolutionary violence in the 
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official recognition of individual Third World or regions as strategic or vital to the US interests; and (5) 
the spill over effect of the US intervention in the Third World. Obviously, any US intervention has had 
effects on the US institutions and society, and contribution to the US domestic crises of legitimacy. See 
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 Western countries’ perspectives about humanitarian intervention are strongly influenced 
by their humanitarian values and non-humanitarian interests as well. In this context, it may be 
said that “With regard to the role of human rights in foreign policy, no government has proven to 
be a model of consistency. Even among the most consistent, there always seems to be a double 
standard – or sometimes no standard at all – in the way that governments engage in human rights 
diplomacy”.74 
 
Developing countries position 
 Not surprisingly, the vast majority of developing countries strongly resist any form of 
intervention, even on behalf of humanitarianism, in other countries’ domestic affairs. This 
position particularly relates to the fact that almost all exercises of humanitarian intervention have 
been directed to developing countries where humanitarian crises have occurred.  
Another explanation of such position is the historical factor that most developing 
countries are former colonies of European powers. Although decolonization has conferred 
political liberation and independence on many political entities which have become equal 
members of the international system, international relations are highly characterized by ex-
colonial and ex-colony relationships. These in many dimensions show superior-inferior or core-
peripheral interactions and involve some feelings of hostility. There is a great distrust among the 
developing countries that “a new writ for intervention in world affairs would simply be a 
disguise for these [former colonial] powers’ manipulation of their affairs as in the past”75.  
 The increasing cultural significance of the various Asian traditions including 
Confucianism, Islam and Buddhism is the third explanation for the resistance of developing 
countries to humanitarian intervention. Led by China, “Asian values”, for example, assert that 
the “concepts of democracy, human rights, and freedom are relative and specific and they are to 
be determined by the specific national situation of different countries”76. This is an explicit 
opposition to the idea of universal human rights and the possibility of intervention, borne out of 
the desire not to let the developed countries impose certain definitions of democracy and human 
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rights upon them, especially if that imposition tends to violate the central moral principles of 
their own cultural communities.77 
 There are also moral, even religious, considerations that have emerged from a number of 
cases where humanitarian interventions have taken place in many Islamic societies and cultures, 
such as in Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Since the international interveners are mostly t 
Western countries with the Christian traditions and most of the international humanitarian-relief 
agencies are based in the West, the Islamic countries tended to refuse the Western-derived 
international humanitarian laws and demand that humanitarian intervention should be based on 
Islamic laws.78  
 The principal reference for developing countries to refuse humanitarian intervention is 
the international principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in their conventional meanings. 
To amplify such principles the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, once said that 
“sovereignty is our final defence against the rules of an unjust world”.79 Although there have 
been efforts to make humanitarian intervention not to be in contrast with sovereignty, most of 
the developing countries still hold firmly  the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.  
But, it is worth noting that Third World countries also show inconsistencies in the issue 
of sovereignty and non-intervention principles. India intervention in East Pakistan (1971), 
Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda (1979) and Vietnam’s in Cambodia (1979) are three stark 
cases of disrespect for other sovereignties. Another instance is the demand of African states for 
the UN to take action over South Africa for her apartheid politics. Further, the Organization of 
African Union passed a resolution that called upon its members to appeal to the UN Security 
Council to pressure the UK to use force to rescue the people of Zimbabwe from a tyrannical 
white minority regime.  
It is also striking, in this connection, how many in the Muslim world stridently 
denounced what they saw as the indifference of the Western nations to the suffering in the 
former Yugoslavia, particularly the Muslim community in Bosnia. There were also repeated 
calls for a humanitarian intervention that would assist their coreligionists; this vividly contrasted 
with their resistance to similar efforts in other areas. Several Muslim countries, among them Iran 
and Turkey, evidently decided on unilateral intervention themselves, and provided the Sarajevo 
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regime with considerable quantities of financial assistance, military equipment, and even 
volunteers. Stephen Garrett then writes:  
 
All this suggests that the abstract commitment to the norm of sovereignty, even within 
the developing world, may wax or wane depending on the circumstances of individual 
case. Yet this hardly needs to be regarded as necessarily objectionable or invariably 
hypocritical.80 
 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations and the Media 
Two non-state entities that have increasingly played significant role in the course of 
humanitarian intervention are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media. In this 
context the NGOs are specifically humanitarian agencies whose personnel are practically 
concerned with impartial humanitarian activities and who actively engage in the protection and 
assistance of civilians, refugees, and other non-combatants suffering as a result of armed 
conflict. 81 These agencies may include ICRC, UNHCR, MSF, OXFAM, CARE, SCR, World 
Vision and also religious organizations such as Christian churches. 
The role of NGOs in humanitarian intervention is based on their commitment to human 
values. NGOs, according to Andrew Hurrell, attempt “to harness the growing sense of a 
cosmopolitan moral awareness and to respond to the multiple failures of state system, both 
locally and globally”.82 Moreover, NGOs take soft measures in implementing the international 
human rights standards namely through inquiry and exposure which are different to the harder 
and more coercive enforcement measures employed by powerful states. By soft measures NGOs 
seek to protect human rights through the mobilization of shame and by increasing the costs to a 
state’s reputation.83 William Korey added that the influence of NGOs mostly derives from ideas 
and values rather than from narrow economic incentives or from power-political interests. Their 
strength and significance rest on “their ability to transform international moral standard into 
reality or at least into ‘customary international law’ that would carry the veritable obligatory 
character.”84 
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NGOs make a great contribution in determining where a humanitarian intervention 
should be deployed. In this context, there are at least four activities NGOs can carry out.85 The 
first is to gather information and facilitate the flow of information from those directly affected to 
international human rights groups and monitoring bodies. This has been critical in opening up 
knowledge of human rights abuses in remote areas where national media might be uninterested. 
The second is to use that information both to mobilize shame and to apply pressure in specific 
cases and to extract from governments the need for new areas of rights. The third role is to 
channel external assistance on human rights and create social structures within which external 
assistance can be effectively used, especially when state structures have been weakened or 
destroyed. Finally, NGOs are a “transmission belt” for changes in attitudes and values where the 
focus of attention is not directly on governments but rather on broader social changes. 
The NGOs’ role in humanitarian intervention is particularly determined by their status as 
constituting a group of informed and active citizenry. Through their institutionalized activities 
they can organize public opinion internationally to ask, for instance, for an international action to 
end grave violations of human rights in a particular state. Due to their flexibility they may 
employ various methods in forming public opinion and launching political lobbies.  
Although the role of NGOs in promoting human rights is widely recognized, it remains 
difficult to determine precisely their position in the controversy of humanitarian intervention. 
This particularly points to the use of military force in order to protect civilians from violent 
conflict. While some NGOs may give support and even justify military intervention or at least 
show their tacit consent on a sort of collaboration between forcible and non-forcible 
intervention, others raise questions about the kind of militarization of humanitarian relief. 86  
Collaboration with the media is another factor that makes NGOs more influential by 
putting human rights on the journalistic and academic map of the world.87 This is in line with the 
following illustration:  
 
If a tree falls in the forest, and there is no one to hear it, does it really make a sound? 
The notion seems to be that trees may indeed be falling all over the world – that is, 
human catastrophes are steadily taking place – but if CNN is not there to ‘hear’ them, 
then we don’t have to notice, indeed won’t notice, and we can be comfortable in our 
ignorance.88 
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 The illustration shows that the media coverage has “significant influence on the policy 
process and might operate as either a necessary or even sufficient factor in producing a particular 
policy outcome”.89 Due to the continuing development of real-time communication technology, 
the print and electronic media, specifically television, are able to provoke wider responses from 
various levels of audiences, from ordinary peoples to elite groups, to national, regional, and 
global events. This so-called “CNN effect” highlights a proposition that news media has a strong 
impact upon foreign policy-making and international politics. Piers Robinson writes, “Both TV 
news, because of the visual imagery, and newspapers, because of their greater tendency to 
express overt political opinion and influence elite opinion, might play an important role in 
influencing opinion during humanitarian crises”.90 In other words, the media attempts to raise 
international attention on the events of humanitarian emergencies, create public opinion and 
persuade decision-makers. 
 The media’s role in humanitarian intervention is described by Martin Shaw in the case 
of the Kurds in Iraq. Shaw said that television news programmes were the central agencies of 
global civil society in the Kurdish crisis which forced changes in state policies and led to 
humanitarian intervention. “Television – not newspapers, not social movements, certainly not 
the traditional representative institutions – took up the plight of the Kurds and in an 
unprecedented campaign successfully forced governments’ hands”. 91  A similar illuminating 
observation is made by Stephen Garrett:  
 
The technical capabilities of the electronic media in covering disasters around the world 
– symbolized in particular by the international coverage of CNN – have created a 
situation in which the emotions of the mass public can easily be aroused by terrible 
pictures. This, in turn, puts great pressure on their leaders to do something about the 
suffering on display.92 
 
However, it is hard to define whether the media has a strong and constant concern for 
human rights violations on which we can assess its position on humanitarian intervention. 
Despite its vital role in raising international concern, the media coverage of humanitarian crises 
is likely motivated by non-humanitarian interests. And this is part of the media’s weaknesses. 
Taking the Kurdish crisis as a case of Western humanitarian intervention, Martin Shaw 
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investigates four limits of television as a representative of a threatened society in zones of 
crises.93 First, television can only fully represent people with film but cannot make all global 
voices of more brutally repressed people heard. Second, television represents people better as 
victims than as combatants or protagonists. Third, television mainly represents people indirectly 
and the campaign of human tragedies was built up by the authoritative voice of Western 
television reporters. Finally, television generally depends on state policies to give it its cues. In 
addition to such limits are financial constraints and the general public’s supposed lack of interest 
in foreign affairs.94  
Humanitarian intervention might be a matter of politics where many values and actors 
intermingle. The politics of humanitarian intervention is the discourse of uncertainty in 
responding to humanitarian crises. Ideally, it is the politics of how to place human values before 
national interests. It is also a debate on how to transform the right to intervene, the responsibility 
to protect and the duty to assist, into real action.  
 
 
C. The domestic or pull factors of humanitarian intervention 
 
Many would now argue that humanitarian intervention should not derive from divine 
origins such as moral or ethics of international relations. Rather, humanitarian intervention with 
or without military involvement should be determined by the needs of those who request 
intervention. The ones who have the right to intervention are those who suffer from violent 
conflicts or government atrocities and those whose human rights are abused. What others have to 
or will do is to exercise their responsibility to give a hand voluntarily. The central idea is to 
make the humanitarian crises brought about by violent conflicts, civil wars, or state oppression 
the genuine reason for international humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian crisis in a certain 
state is therefore the primary pull factor of humanitarian intervention. 
In cause-effect analysis of humanitarian intervention, the deployment of external 
military force is simply seen as being triggered by a condition in which a segment of the people 
are suffering from widespread deprivations of basic rights. The condition is descriptively called 
a humanitarian crisis, 95  a humanitarian emergency 96  or an international-social conflict. 97 
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Nicholas Wheeler, as mentioned before, calls this condition one that has shocked the 
international conscience, while for the ICISS the condition is marked by the threat or occurrence 
of large scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing.98 The humanitarian crisis itself is generally 
perceived as caused by protracted violent conflict, and this protracted violent conflict usually 
takes place in a failed or collapsed state.  
 
1. Failed states 
As mentioned, the rejection of humanitarian intervention comes primarily from 
developing countries. This is related to the fact that humanitarian intervention predominantly 
takes place in those countries. In recent practices humanitarian interventions are not merely 
intended to handle the situation in which large scale of killings or massive destructions had 
already emerged; they have also aimed to assist countries that have been identified as weakening 
states or that have nearly collapsed.  
A failed state is one that has failed to perform its basic function, particularly in 
providing order and security. When states have failed or are failing to establish national order 
and security, this is the basic condition for eruption of domestic conflicts and the abuses of 
human rights.99 This is in line with Michael Ignatieff’s proposition that, “Yet even if some strong 
states remain a menace to their own people, the worst abuse now occurs not where there is too 
much state power, but too little. The human rights dilemmas of the twenty-first century derive 
more from anarchy than tyranny”.100 
The inference that human rights violations are derived from state failures draws attention 
to the critical issue of the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty where 
questions of the legality of humanitarian intervention persist. Mohammed Ayoob elucidates that 
many new states are struggling to establish themselves as full-fledged members of international 
society.101 In the processes of state-making and nation-making, some of them continue to suffer 
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and may undertake coercive actions against recalcitrant elements that refuse to accept the state’s 
authority to maintain national order and security. Where a state fails to establish the security of 
the state and the security of the regime, the intractable groups will dominate and bring the state 
into violent protracted conflicts. Humanitarian intervention in such instances might be 
justifiable, and “the question of violating sovereignty becomes redundant because the state has 
disappeared. It does not pose the same normative dilemma as in those cases where a locus of 
sovereignty clearly exists.”102  
 The two scholars cited above are clearly distinguishing states which fail to maintain 
order and security from states which deliberately violate human rights of selected groups of their 
citizens. In the first cases, Ignatieff and Ayoob argued, the states have lost their formal and 
material legitimacy as states. Ayoob asserted that the states have disappeared or not yet 
appeared. Further, Ayoob called these conflicts that take place within this category state-making 
wars, similar to those which occurred during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries.103 In the 
second group of cases, where the states violate human rights, Ayoob argued that the locus of 
sovereignty clearly exists. Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Congo fall in the failed 
states category, whereas Iraq and Kosovo do not. In the latter the state authority still exists and 
the governments are also able to perform effectively most of its basic functions.  
In practices, international interventions for humanitarian purposes are more likely to be 
directed to failed or collapsed states. These interventions relate to the many problems stemming 
from failed states. William Zartman listed these problems. He claimed that as the decision- 
making centre of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is 
not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced; as a symbol of identity, it has lost its power 
of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action; as a territory, it is no 
longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organization; as the 
authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so 
has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs; as a system of socioeconomic 
organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives 
support from nor exercises control over its people, and it no longer is even the target of 
demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer 
functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has 
lost the right to rule.104  
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A failed state does not directly lead to widespread deprivation of human rights. What 
scholars suggest is that when state structures weaken, violent conflict often follows. Michael 
Brown elaborates further.  
 
In the time of state structures are weakening, power struggles between and among 
politicians and would-be leaders intensify. Regional leaders become increasingly 
independent and, should they consolidate control over military assets, become virtual 
warlords. Ethnic groups which had been oppressed by the centre are more able to assert 
themselves politically, perhaps in the form of developing more administrative autonomy 
or their own states. Ethnic groups which had been protected by the centre or which had 
exercised power through the state find themselves more vulnerable. Criminal 
organizations become more powerful and pervasive…. Massive humanitarian problems, 
such as famines and epidemics, can develop. Widespread human rights violations often 
take place. The state in question might ultimately fragment or simply cease to exist as a 
political entity.105  
  
 
What the international community should do in dealing with collapsed or nearly failed 
states like Indonesia in the end of 1990s is central to this research. Some possible answers can be 
found in the Responsibility to Protect report prepared by the ICISS; broadly, these include the 
responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild. But Michael Ignatieff’s propositions are 
inspiring. First, he said, “intervention occurs, in general, where states are too weak, too 
friendless, to resist”.106 This is in line with the previous discussion that military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes will not occur where the states that have oppressed their people are strong 
and have the military might to deter and dissuade. As will be discussed, the international 
intervention in East Timor was likely to take place at a time when Indonesia was too weak to 
resist. 
Second, Ignatieff proposed the necessity of rethinking the traditional suspicion of the 
state and of the exercise of sovereignty. Referring to the cases of the Balkans and Africa, where 
population are menaced by banditry, civil war, guerrilla campaigns and counter-insurgency by 
beleaguered governments, he argued that it is important to return to the Weberian concept of the 
state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of force. “The chief prerequisite for creation of a basic 
rights regime for ordinary people is the re-creation of a stable national state capable of giving 
orders and seeing them carried out throughout the territory”.107 State sovereignty, he went on, is 
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the basic precondition rather than the enemy of human rights. This notion seems to suggest that 
an international intervention is justified if it aims to restore the state authority on its domestic 
affairs.  
 
2. Intrastate Conflicts  
Michael Brown maintained that a weak state is one of the structural factors that leads to 
internal conflict. He also proposed other underlying factors including political, economic and 
cultural causes of internal conflict. Duly considering the fact that these underlying factors do not 
necessarily lead to violence and that some places and some situations are more predisposed to 
violence than others, he then suggested a matrix of catalytic or triggering factors of internal 
violent conflict. He said that violent conflict in particular states might be triggered by internal, 
mass-level factors (bad domestic problems), internal, elite-level factors (bad leaders), external, 
mass-level factors (bad neighbourhoods) and external, elite-level factors.108  
As the term fashionable, failed state is recognized to be “frustratingly imprecise”,109 so 
too the term intrastate conflict is very broad. 110  The term intrastate conflict is interchangeably 
used with internal conflict, domestic conflict or non-interstate conflict, each of which generically 
refers to conflict taking place within a state.111. The term intrastate conflict includes the three 
types of non-interstate conflict proposed by Miall et al which include revolutionary/ideology 
conflict, identity/secession conflict and factional conflict.112  
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According to Miall et al, revolution/ideology conflict has the ambitious aim of changing 
the nature of the government of a state. This aim may include (a) the changing of the system 
from capitalist to socialist, or (b) the form of government from dictatorship to democracy, or (c) 
the religious orientation of the state from secular to Islamic. The second type, identity/secession 
conflict, involves the status of communities or ‘communal groups’ in relation to the state and 
their struggles for access, for autonomy, for secession or for control. Factional conflict shows a 
struggle to control the state or part of the state. This type of conflict covers coups d’etat, intra-
elite power-struggles, brigandage, criminality and warlordism, where the aim is to usurp, seize 
or retain state power merely to further particular interests.113 
The types of the conflicts roughly indicate the parties, the content and the different 
objectives within violent conflict which altogether influence the dynamics of conflict. Further 
investigation, however, remains useful since the parties to a conflict are opened to manipulation. 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse noted that conflict parties are likely to use a particular identity 
mix of ethnicity, religion, region and other primordial elements. The collective identity of parties 
to conflict is an instrument which is constructed, reconstructed or deconstructed.114 
Interests, values and power significantly influence the conflict parties and the dynamics 
of the conflict. But, since it is also not easy to draw a distinction between the core and peripheral 
interests, the escalation and de-escalation of internal conflict are heavily influenced by the 
qualitative and quantitative balance of power among the conflict parties and by how interests or 
values can be negotiated and compromises made.  
Just as the interests and power relations among the conflicting parties are crucial, the 
dynamics and intensity of the conflict also influence on the possibility of external intervention. 
The international dimension of a conflict and the humanitarian crisis it causes are two 
important issues that need to be taken into account. According to Patrick Regan the importance 
of internal conflict to the international community is affected by (1) the strategic environment in 
which the conflict is being waged, including both cold war dynamics and the number of shared 
borders, (2) the existence of a humanitarian crisis associated with the conflict, (3) the number of 
fatalities, and (4) the intensity of the conflict.115  
In identifying the internationally strategic environment of domestic conflicts it has been 
noted that conflicts within countries may have crucial impacts to other countries in terms of 
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economic and/or security interests. International implications of domestic conflicts include, but 
are not limited to, cross-border arms transfers, ethnic affinities, and refugee flows. 116 
Nevertheless, a broader analysis of the structural circumstances should be added, and this is 
more daunting in the cases of intrastate conflicts in Indonesia. 
 There is no doubt that developing countries like Indonesia have huge structural, 
political, economic and cultural factors which collectively or separately may become the 
underlying or permissive causes of internal conflict. The transformation of these national 
problems into violent conflicts may be triggered, according to Michael Brown, by the elite or the 
mass. 117  The mass-triggered conflict is closely related to mounting economic problems, 
intensifying competition for resources, growing economic inequalities and modernization 
processes. The elite-triggered conflict is related to the power struggles involving civilian or 
military leaders. It is also worth noting that political reform following the collapse of 
authoritarian rule is likely to make particular states prone to violence.118  
 
3. Humanitarian crisis 
As mentioned above, the international dimension of intrastate conflict is also shown by 
the existence of a humanitarian crisis caused by the conflicts. Many international agencies have 
attempted to describe humanitarian crises, and their descriptions contain several crucial 
elements. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN-IASC) offered a sort of official 
definition of a complex emergency as  
 
a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable 
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an 
international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency 
and/ or the ongoing United Nations country program. 
 
 
It is also said that such “complex emergencies” are typically characterized by:  extensive 
violence and loss of life; massive displacements of people; widespread damage to  societies and 
economies, the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance, the hindrance or 
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prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints and significant 
security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas.119 
There may be disagreement about the quantitative aspects of the items characterizing a 
humanitarian emergency. The loss of life by 100 – 999 people and more than 1000 people might 
be seen as a low intensity conflict and high intensity conflict respectively, as the 
Interdisciplinary Research Program on Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) 
suggested.120 A similar controversy may happen to the extent of damage caused by the conflicts. 
Perhaps, the most controversial issues are the assessment of the breakdown of national 
authority and the necessity for international response. Such controversy links to another 
controversial condition for humanitarian intervention where a state is concluded to be unable or 
unwilling to handle the crisis appropriately. This also relates to traditional debates on the 
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
This thesis is intended to investigate humanitarian crises in Indonesia that could have 
justified humanitarian intervention. The investigation is challenging since what is called a 
humanitarian crisis is understood more in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. The 
international community has not so far reached a consensus on the number of people affected by 
the crisis, the scale of damage caused by the conflict and the assessment of the competency and 
willingness of the concerned state individually or internationally to solve the crisis. Although a 
humanitarian crisis is in theory the objective reason for external humanitarian intervention, in 
practice it is subject to political calculations. In the words of Michael Ignatieff, a humanitarian 
crisis is mainly political rather than humanitarian or moral.121 
 
                                                 
119 IASC, December 1994. See in OCHA Orientation Handbook on Complex Emergencies, Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, August 1999.  See also Andrew Natsios, Commander's Guidance: 
A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies, in Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 50 – 66 who 
defines humanitarian emergency as a national crisis in which: (1) political authority and public services 
deteriorate or completely collapse; (2) internal ethnic, tribal, or religious conflict occurs, with widespread 
atrocities against noncombatants; (3) massive population movements take place, with people escaping 
violence or searching for food; (4) widespread food insecurity appears, frequently deteriorating into 
starvation; (5) a public health emergency causes epidemics of communicable disease; and (6) the chaos 
leads to macro-economic collapse with massive unemployment, destruction of the currency, and negative 
GNP growth. See also J.J. Albala Bertrand, What is a “Complex Humanitarian Emergency”? An 
Analytical Essay, Working Paper No.420, October 2000, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, 
University of London,  ISSN 1473-0278. 
120 Mapping the Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Human Rights Violations as accessed from 
http://www.conflict-prevention.net/page.php?id=45&formid=72&action=show&articleid=31 on 12 June 
2004. 
121 Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights, Sovereignty, and Intervention”, Op.cit., p. 66. 
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D. Framing the analysis 
 
 While the international community continually develops moral, ethical, legal and 
institutional foundations of humanitarian intervention, and while there is no universally accepted 
consensus on what the humanitarian crisis is, there has been a set of principles upon which the 
deployment of military force for humanitarian purposes is seen as justified. Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse proposed several aspects that have to be considered in analysing humanitarian 
intervention. These include (1) the purpose should be humanitarian, (2) the agency is one which 
is ideally run by a global and/or regional organization such as the UN, (3) the target state, (4) the 
level of force to ensure the success of intervention and (5) the legitimacy of the intervention.  
 Other scholars such as Nicholas Wheeler, Peter Baehr and the Independent Commission 
on Kosovo proposed several criteria of humanitarian intervention. These include (1) the 
existence of a supreme humanitarian emergency that shocks the conscience of mankind or 
reliable and objective evidence of grave and large scale of human rights violations, (2) the use of 
military force as the last resort, (3) the proportionality in using military force and the calculation 
that the military intervention has a reasonable chance of ending the humanitarian catastrophe.122 
Fernando Teson suggests eight principles for humanitarian intervention which are based on the 
legal, ethic and moral principles as discussed previously.123 
 Six criteria for humanitarian intervention proposed by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) are particularly useful in this thesis. The criteria are 
divided into two main groups: the threshold criterion and precautionary criteria. The threshold 
criterion solely points to (1) the just cause of intervention. The precautionary criteria include (2) 
the right intention of the intervention, (3) the use of military force as the last resort, (4) the 
proportionality of military intervention, and (5) the reasonable prospect of success of the military 
intervention. The final criterion, right authority of the intervention, particularly points to 
organizations such as the UN Security Council that hold the legal and legitimate authority to 
conduct the intervention.124 
 By the just cause of humanitarian intervention, ICISS argues that the use of military 
force is justified if there is a large scale loss of life or large scale ethnic cleansing. The loss of 
life may be actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is a product either of 
deliberate state action or state neglect or inability to act or a failed state situation. The large scale 
                                                 
122 See in Shashi Tharoor and Sam Daws, Op.cit.  
123 Fernando R. Teson, “Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention”, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 
5, No. 2, 2006, pp. 93–113. 
124 ICISS, Op.cit. pp. 32–37.  
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ethnic cleansing may be also actual or apprehended which is carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror, or rape. It is important to note that ICISS does not make any distinction 
between the situation where the large scale of killing is caused by the action or deliberate 
inaction of a state, and the situation where the massacres take place in a failed or collapsed 
state.125 
 About the right intention of intervention, ICISS clearly emphasizes that the primary 
purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering. This is in line with the 
classical definition of humanitarian intervention presented at the beginning.  
 ICISS also makes it clear that the use of military force for humanitarian purposes must 
be perceived as the last resort after every non-military measure has been explored. The military 
force must be used proportionally in the sense that it should be in line with the humanitarian 
objective and the rules of international humanitarian law. ICISS also asserted that for the 
military intervention to be justified, it has to have a reasonable prospect of success in fulfilling 
its humanitarian objective. 
 There is no question that the UN organizations are the legitimate and authoritative 
institutions to carry out humanitarian intervention. By looking at the UN Charter and the 
organizational authority of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-
General as having the primary responsibility for international peace and security, ICISS 
maintains that the UN is the only organization with universally accepted authority to justify 
humanitarian intervention. But, since it has not by itself the operational capacity, ICISS suggests 
that states should be willing to use force on behalf and for the goals of the UN. A further 
possibility, ICISS suggests, is the collective intervention by a regional or sub-regional 
organization motivated by humanitarian concerns 126  or approved by the community of 
democratic states.127 
In an attempt to examine the international intervention in East Timor and to investigate 
the absence of humanitarian intervention in Maluku and Aceh, this thesis has to consider the 
international or push factors and domestic or pull factors which contributed to these different 
responses. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 ICISS, Ibid, p. 33. 
126 ICISS, Ibid., pp. 47–54. 
127 Fernando Teson, Op.cit., pp. 107–08. 
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Figure 1: Factors influencing international responses to intrastate conflicts in Indonesia: East Timor, 
Maluku and Aceh 
 
 
 
The diagram above shows that for the international community to decide on military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes, they have to consider the set of international principles 
of humanitarian intervention and the domestic condition of the state concerned. As has been 
discussed, the principles are based on the UN framework, international morality and ethics, the 
International Bill of Human Rights and international politics where the latter specifically refers 
to the interests of the major countries in non-humanitarian fields. Based on the principles, it is 
proposed that humanitarian intervention was likely to occur in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh. 
However, the reality showed that military intervention for humanitarian purposes did not 
take place in Maluku and Aceh. This fact is likely to support the theoretical proposition that for 
humanitarian intervention to occur, it is determined greatly by the domestic or pull factors 
within the Indonesia state. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) 
is then assumed as being closely related to a situation where Indonesia at that time was too weak 
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to resist. On the other hand, the absence of humanitarian intervention in Maluku and Aceh is 
assumed as being associated with the situation that the state had began to restore its effective 
authority. 
In order to support such hypothesis, further investigation of the domestic aspects of 
Indonesian state is crucial. Central to this investigation is the issue of reformasi. Apart from 
identifying the post-Suharto Indonesia as a weakening or nearly failed state, reformasi or the 
democratization process was widely used to interpret Indonesian domestic politics following the 
forced resignation of the authoritarian Suharto. The signs of political democratization in 
Indonesia seemed to make military intervention in Maluku and Aceh unnecessary. 
Democratization had even prompted the international community to delay the deployment of a 
multinational military force (INTERFET) in East Timor. 
This research will therefore focus on the dynamics of Indonesian domestic politics. The 
investigation will include how the reformasi was correlated to the eruption and escalation of 
violent conflicts in the three regions. While many elements of major political forces were 
involved in the conflicts, many human rights activists and religious leaders in Maluku and Aceh 
called on the UN and foreign countries to intervene. Investigation will also be aimed at seeing 
how the conflicts and humanitarian crises affected the international responses. Finally, this 
research will discuss how the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were then resolved based on the 
domestic political dynamics. All these will be presented in the next chapters. 
 
====== 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
INDONESIA: A WEAK NATION AND WEAKENING STATE 
 
 
A. Introduction: 
 
As many violent conflicts take place in Indonesia, the public, political observers, and 
government officials usually link them to Indonesian social heterogeneity.1  This apparently 
suggests that Indonesia’s multi-culturalism is a natural or even a legitimate source of internal 
conflicts. As such multi-culturalism is a given characteristic of the Indonesian nation, intrastate 
conflict is thus seen as being natural and should be understood as normal.  
The eruption of violent intrastate conflict since 1997, on the other hand, could indicate 
that the government of Indonesia was no longer effective to control its societal entities.2 The 
security forces that had been so repressive during the New Order regime now seemed to be 
incompetent to provide security. Neither national bureaucracy nor the political machinery of 
Golkar, the other two powerful and foundations of Suharto’s regime, was able to prevent various 
social groups from acting violently. They had even been the target of political attacks. 
Whether the explosion of intrastate conflict in the second half of the 1990s is seen in 
connection to the national plurality or as related to the inability of the government institutions to 
provide security and economic goods, it points to a condition of the nearly-failed state of 
Indonesia in the sense that the nation (or people) and the government were facing serious 
problem. The Indonesian nation, which was built on a very heterogeneous group of ethnic, 
cultural and religious entities, was trapped in deadly internal conflicts. The Indonesian state, 
whose power and functions were carried out by the government, found itself powerless and 
dysfunctional.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Selo Soemardjan, “Konflik-konflik Social di Indonesia: Refleksi Keresahan 
Masyarakat”, Analysis CSIS, Tahun XXXI/2002, No.3, pp. 306–21; Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, “Migrasi dan 
Konflik Etnis: Belajar dari Konflik di Kalimantan Barat and Kalimantan Tengah”, Ibid., pp. 340–52. See 
also Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
2 See, for example, Harold Crouch, “Introduction: Political Transition and Communal Violence”, in 
Peacebuilding Initiatives in Indonesia, Reader for the Seminar, The Hague, 16 December 2004. Crouch 
said that “the democratic transition failed to produce strong and effective governments. All three post-
Suharto governments were too concerned with self-preservation in Jakarta to devote adequate attention to 
communal and religious tensions in distant parts of the archipelago”. Ibid., p. 371. 
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Considering the contemporary idea that a failed state rather than an authoritarian state is 
the prime cause of the widespread deprivation of human rights, this chapter explores the 
weaknesses of Indonesia as a nation and the failure of its government. This is particularly 
important in order to see the nature and dynamics of intrastate conflicts which proliferated 
following the fall of authoritarian regime in May 1998. It is also vital to foresee the kinds of 
resolution to the conflicts, especially the possibility of international humanitarian intervention.  
In the first part of this chapter, the discussion focuses on the political characteristics of 
the Indonesian nation-state. This is done by looking at major societal groupings which 
significantly shaped national orientations and influenced the relations among community groups 
and the interaction between the community organizations and the state institutions.3 The main 
characteristics of the government and the military institution are also explored. All these help to 
clarify the identity of the Indonesian state and the government’s primary political commitments.  
The second part of the chapter will investigate the inability of state institutions to deal 
with many inherent problems within Indonesian people and nation. In the early 1990s the 
government appeared to be weakening when the call for national change and improvement 
became stronger. Because the government institutions themselves had inbuilt weaknesses, the 
endeavours to maintain the Indonesian nation-state according to the government’s initial 
conception were seriously challenged. To accommodate demands for change and improvement 
was even more difficult. The wave of such demands for power distribution, respect for human 
rights and security apparently exceeded the capacity of state institutions to accommodate or was 
even beyond the political principles that had been established for a long time.  
The third part will show the international dimensions of Indonesian nation-state. The 
multipolar or unipolar character of the post-Cold War global system and the internationalization 
of democracy and human rights brought both challenges and opportunities to create new forms 
of community organizations and state institutions and to transform their interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 To a high degree this interest is similar to Jacques Bertrand’s historical institutionalist explanation. This 
approach seems effective in particular to show both the forms and relations of people groupings and state 
institutions. More importantly, the institutionalist perspective helps to explain the relations among societal 
groups and their interactions with state institutions. See Jacques Bertrand, Op.cit. 
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B. Political character of Indonesian nation-state 
 
With 1,072 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups residing in more than 13,600 islands – even 
though only 15 groups have more than one million members – the unitary state form of 
Indonesia was and is questionable. What made the unitary state of the Indonesian republic 
possible is, according to many Indonesian observers, history: the history of being under Dutch 
colonial power.4 In addition to this is the role of Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno.5 
Apart from such cohesive forces, which I call historical and political factors, there are socio-
cultural and religious factors that helped to conserve Indonesian stability and integration.  
Colonialism, the role of strong governments (both Sukarno and Suharto), the social 
harmony emphasized by the Javanese culture and a majority of Muslim population mean that the 
question of Indonesia’s identity has not yet been settled. In addition, national liberation 
movement, the role of the government, social and interethnic relations and inter-religious 
interactions are chiefly characterizing Indonesian contemporary politics. More specifically, 
Indonesian nation-state is chiefly characterized by three main issues: the Javanese hegemony, 
Islamic politics, and authoritarian regime. In addition to this is the dominant role of the military. 
Each issue has strongly affected to whom the nation-state tended to refer and what kind of 
political commitment the state stood for. 
  
1. Javanese hegemony  
There are three things underlying the significance of the Javanese in the Indonesian 
nation. First, demographically, the Javanese is the largest ethnic group in Indonesia.6 Second, 
geographically, Jakarta, the centre of national government and power, is located in the island of 
Java. Third, politically, as a consequence, the combination of Javanese majority and Jakarta-
based power raises the notion of Javanese hegemony in cultural, social and political terms. 
Jakarta, Java and Javanese are terms widely used but with contradictory implications.7 On the 
one hand, the terms symbolize Indonesian stateness, modernity and prosperity to which the outer 
                                                 
4 See, for examples, in Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945 (New 
York: Longman, 1995), pp. 32–46; Christine Drake, National Integration in Indonesia: Patterns and 
Policies, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989). 
5 David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, eds., Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader (London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 255; Colin Brown, A Short History of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation? 
(Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003), p. 126. 
6 Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, Penduduk Indonesia: Ethnis dan Agama dalam 
Era Perubahan Politik (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2003) p. 21. 
7 The term of “orang Jakarta” or Jakarta-person is frequently used to refer to a person employed by the 
central government in regional office regardless his/her ethnicity.  
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islands extend respect, and loyalty, and in which they have strong interests. On the other hand, 
the terms reflect somewhat of a feeling of internal imperialism by the Javanese over other ethnic 
groups and the outer islands. While the first is likely to signify the aspiration for national 
integration, the second tends to underline the disintegrative potentials.  
The Javanese majority in number and distribution throughout all provinces of the 
archipelago is consistent with the wide spread of its cultural values, traditional rites, and 
collective histories and memories.8 The Dutch colonial policies of supplying the Javanese work-
power to many plantation areas in the outer islands and the New Order decisions about 
transmigration from the highly dense population of Java to the less dense regions of the other 
islands played a significant role in this distribution. Such migration meant that visible or 
physical Javanese cultural elements (food, dress, arts, language and behaviour) and invisible or 
non-physical elements (social-political orientations and attitudes) are also widely multiplied. 
Since early time, almost all other ethnic and cultural groups have been introduced to and have 
had contact with Javanese ethnic and cultural traditions in their own regions.9 
The Javanese are popularly known as an ethnic group strongly emphasizing hierarchy 
and harmony.10 The horizontal orientation on harmony confirms the Javanese syncretism or 
tantularisme 11  in forming the multi-cultural nation and nurturing national integration. By 
syncretism, it is widely understood that the all good things of every single culture would be 
synergized and become a national culture. By tantularisme, every different culture is respected 
since every culture has its own goodness and virtue. This leads to pluralism or multiculturalism. 
                                                 
8 Some significant number of Javanese have even reached and dwelled in Suriname, New Caledonia and 
South Africa.  
9 Interaction among minor ethnic and cultural groups is very insignificant or never happens at all.  
10 This cultural identity is based on its old traditional view of cosmology, the cosmos (universe) is divided 
into macro and micro cosmos. Between them there are hierarchy and harmony. Within the micro-cosmos 
itself – where human being lives – there are also hierarchy and harmony shown by the relations between 
king/government/elite (gusti) and people/mass (kawula). The structural differentiation and functional 
relations are integral (manunggal, jumbuhing kawula-gusti) to natural law (ukum phinesti) and their right 
implementation will establish a perfect life (kasampurna ning urip). This basic value then determines 
social and political attitude and guides the daily life. See Niels Mulder, Kebatinan dan Hidup Sehari-hari 
Orang Jawa: Kelangsungan dan Perubahan Kultural (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1983); Niels Mulder, Pribadi 
dan Masyarakat di Jawa (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1985); Budiono Herusatoto, Simbolisme dalam Budaya 
Jawa (Yogyakarta: PT.Hanindita, 1991); Ir. Sujamto, Refleksi Budaya Jawa dalam Pemerintahan dan 
Pembangunan (Semarang: Dahara Prize, 1992); and Soemarsaid Moertono, Negara dan Usaha Bina-
Negara di Jawa Masa Lampau: Studi tentang Masa Mataram II, Abad XVI sampai XIX (Jakarta: Yayasan 
Obor Indonesia, 1985). 
11 See Sujamto, Ibid. pp.32–37. Tantularisme is a term referred to Empu Tantular who firstly found the 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Hana Dharma Mangrwa. According to Sajamto, the term of tantularism is better 
than syncretism to describe Javanese view on tolerance and plurality. Tantularisme is a spiritual motif 
(momot) that recognizes and fully comprehends the authentic truths wherever they come from. 
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Nonetheless, Javanese syncretism is also seen as tactical strategy in dealing with cultural and 
societal diversity.  
The Javanese vertical and hierarchical attitudes are also worth noting. Javanese culture 
is widely seen as containing hierarchical social structure. Moreover, such culture confirms the 
need for a strong government. This leads to a situation where the people (including the Javanese 
majority and those on outer islands) are seen to be in a very weak position before a very strong 
government. Rather than a manunggal or populist government, the Indonesian governments 
from Sukarno to Suharto operated in a traditional Javanese kingdom style by maintaining a 
mystically divine power (kasekten). This conception and practice contributes to the formation of 
authoritarian regimes.  
The Javanese conception of power, as it was first popularly conceptualized by Benedict 
Anderson12, is widely believed to have enabled Indonesian state authoritarianism. That power is 
concrete and real in the hands of the ruler and that power is neither legitimate nor illegitimate, 
were widely utilized to validate the authoritarian inclination, particularly in Suharto’s New 
Order. Since power manifests in everything and everybody it is imperative for the leader to 
collect and put it in his hand. And because power exists prior to anything else and its source is 
homogenous rather than heterogeneous, it is free from considerations or questions about its 
legitimacy or illegitimacy. As a consequence, “power is a zero-sum game: to get it, you have to 
take it from someone else”.13  
Another important thing is the Javanese conception of the nation and the state. There is 
no distinction between nation and state. For Javanese the nation or state is personified by the 
king and established in a kingdom (kerajaan)14.  
Although the Javanese influence to Indonesian nation and state appear to be fertile 
topics for further elaboration, it is fair to say that the Javanese hegemony is more likely to have 
been driven by the role of the king/elite/government. National leaders, from Sukarno to Suharto, 
have exploited Javanese culture for their own political advantages. William Liddle, who 
introduced a concept of “Javanism”, suggests that the abangan Javanese character gave Sukarno 
a near-monopoly over the formation of a vocabulary of national political discourse, whereas the 
priyai Javanese culture inspired Suharto to be an idealized version of a traditional Javanese 
                                                 
12 Benedict Anderson, The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture, 1972. These Javanese conceptions contrast 
to the West’s ones where power is an abstraction of social-political relations, its source is heterogeneous, 
it can be accumulated and it concerns with legal and legitimacy considerations. 
13 Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s search for stability (St. Leonards NSW: Allen & 
Unwin, 1999), p. 45. 
14 Kerajaan (kingdom) in Javanese vocabulary is keraton coming from ke-ratu-an and has origin in ke-
datu-an or kedaton. 
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king.15 The key to Javanese cultural value, Liddle argues, is the benevolence-obedience ideal; 
Suharto acted as a benevolent ruler who decided everything for the benefits of his people and at 
the same time enjoyed unreserved obedience from his people. This ideal strongly affected the 
centralization of power in his hand and the uniformity in governmental practices. 
Sukarno and Suharto, by constantly quoting or comparing Indonesia to the old Javanese 
kingdoms, especially Singhasari, Majapahit and Mataram, have created a Java-based Indonesia 
history. Majapahit in the thirteenth century is particularly important to insist the vision and idea 
of Javanese-Indonesia 16  or Greater Java 17  or pan-Indonesia, 18  which includes Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, Brunei, Sulawesi, Maluku, Sunda, Bali and the Malay Peninsula. For Ledge “the 
major kingdoms in Java marked the growth of a sophisticated material culture and of a political 
strength” of Indonesia19 . It was strengthened by national symbols which are rooted in the 
Javanese culture. The national flag with its red and white colours, refers to the Majapahit 
kingdom, national motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (generally translated as diversity in unity) 
originates in the Javanese-language root Sanskrit, and the national emblem, Garuda, also relates 
to Majapahit.20 
The establishment of Batavia (new Jakarta) in 1610 as the Dutch colonial headquarters 
and then the capital city for the newly independent Indonesia bolstered the historical and 
political significance of Java. Although the Dutch were likely to settle at Sunda Kelapa (Batavia) 
because they wanted a port closer to the sea lane than Ambon (Maluku), Jakarta became the 
place of national historic events such as Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Oath, 1928) and the 
proclamation of independence (1945). Since independence, Jakarta has become the centre from 
which power would be divided and distributed to the regions. Jakarta is the core from where 70 
per cent of national economy is produced. It is the place to where national political loyalty is 
directed and regional economic resources are gathered. Because of its closeness to Jakarta, major 
cities in Java have been also the centres for the higher education industry, because of which ten 
of thousands of young people from outer islands come to Java. Urbanization in Jakarta and 
                                                 
15 William Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996) p. 78 
and 80. See also Jorgen Hellman, Performing the Nation: Cultural Politics in New Order Indonesia 
(Copenhagen: NIAS, 2003) pp.168–70 and Ariel Heryanto, “Introduction: State Ideology and Civil 
Discourse” in Arief Budiman, ed., State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton Victoria: Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash Unversity, 1990) pp. 289–300. 
16 See Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia: Peoples and Histories (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003) 
pp. 340–385. 
17 R. William Liddle, Op.cit., p. 78. 
18 See in Christine Drake, Op.cit., p. 22. 
19 Ledge in Ibid. 
20 Ledge in Ibid., p. 33. See also Keith Foulcher, “The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture: 
Patterns of Hegemony and Resistance” in Arief Budiman, ed., Op.cit., p. 303. 
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Javanese cities indicates a discrepancy and has created a core-periphery relation between Jakarta 
and the regions or Java and the outer islands in general. 
Utilizing history is justifiable in establishing and maintaining national pride and unity. 
However, as Christine Drake insists, engineering and crafting different collective memories 
discriminatively and disproportionately has actually deepened the divisions between the 
Javanese inheritors of these treasures and the ‘inheritors-by-extension’ from the outer islands. 
According to her Indonesian source, the greatness of Majapahit is illusionary and can be used to 
denigrate outer islanders’ own great regional histories.21 When used in this way, it does not reate 
a strong national unity. 
The combination of the ethnic majority, cultural hegemony, and political importance of 
Jakarta and Java raise the question about for whom the country stands. Suspicion of internal 
imperialism by the Javanese emerges from this context. Javanization was a conception which 
was used by many people in East Timor and Aceh, as well as Papua, to reflect the Javanese 
presence in their own region and community or to describe its growing influence over their 
cultures and behaviours. The term tends to suggest that being Javanese is the same as being 
Indonesian. In its turn, this social political configuration raised the issues of ethnic and cultural 
minority, social inferiority, political subordination and economic exploitation among non-
Javanese ethnic groups, particularly those in the outer islands.   
 
2. Islamic dilemma 
While Indonesia might have some cultural ground for being a Java-based nation or a 
Javanese-hegemonic nation, Indonesia may be also called an Islamic-nation. This is particularly 
based on the demographic fact that 88 percent of Indonesian population are Muslim, which 
makes Indonesia the largest Muslim country in the world. But rejection will emerge soon. 
Although “Islam is essential to the legitimacy of Indonesia’s New Order Regime and at the same 
time is the major (indeed, only credible) source of popular opposition to it”, as Ruth McVey 
asserts,22 it does not mean that Indonesia is a nation with an Islamic ideology.  
Islamic politics or political Islam in Indonesian nation-state precisely rests on such a 
disjuncture. The only outcome of such a situation is an Islamic political dilemma. On the one 
hand, based on the Muslim overwhelming majority there is a constant demand from some 
Indonesian Muslims for the nation-state to be more Islamic. On the other hand, the government 
has so far been determined to maintain a religiously neutral Indonesia. Major sections of the 
                                                 
21 In Christine Drake, Ibid., p.24 
22 See Ruth McVey, “Islam, state and society in Indonesia”, in http://www.irja.org/politics/islam.htm.  
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Indonesian Muslim community prefer a pluralist and non-theocratic Islamic nation state. Non-
Muslim minorities obviously support a non-Islamic state.  
A few months prior to the Independence Day in 1945, political debates were undertaken 
about Indonesian national ideology. Liberation leaders were divided into a nationalist group 
(paham kebangsaan) and an Islamic group (paham keagamaan). Considering the non-Muslim 
communities and seeking the unity of Indonesian nation, a compromise was then made: 
Indonesia took neither a secular nor a theocratic identity, as formulated in Pancasila. On 18 
August 1945 Pancasila was formally declared the ideology of the Indonesian nation-state.23   
The decision to impose Pancasila as the nation-state ideology, however, was never 
comprehensively accepted by some Islamic leaders. They argued that the Jakarta Charter – 
enshrining “the obligation to carry out the shariah for the adherents of Islam” after the principle 
of “Belief in one God” – would not be dropped from the preamble of the 1945 Constitution 
(UUD 1945). They also argued that UUD 1945 was just a provisional constitution for the sake of 
Indonesian independence.24 The formal imposition of Pancasila and the continuing demand for 
Islamic ideology concurrently invented the dual-identity of Indonesian:  Pancasila and Islam.25 
After the Dutch formally transferred sovereignty in December 1949 to the new 
Indonesian state, demands for the inclusion of Islam in the constitution and as a national 
ideology became stronger. Several regions even carried out armed rebellions to insist on the 
imposition of Islamic identity. The Darul Islam movement in West Java launched a military 
rebellion to form an Indonesian Islamic state (NII). It was then followed by similar movements 
in Aceh and South Sulawesi. Islamic leaders from the Masjumi party backed the Darul Islam 
movements, either because they were against the non-Islamic ideology or they were against the 
tendency to centralize power in the hand of the central government.26   
Both political and military movements to bring Indonesia into an Islamic state failed, 
however. But it was harsh measures by the central government which forced the rebellion 
                                                 
23 Pancasila literally means five principles which include the principle of “belief in one God”, humanism, 
nationalism, democracy and social justice. Pancasila as national ideology and UUD 1945 as national 
Constitution were formally announced on 18 August 1945 and both were seen as the foundations of 
Indonesian nation-state. 
24 A brief but detailed explanation on the 1945 debates can be seen in Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian 
Foreign Policy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) pp. 9–22.  
25Ibid. According to Rizal Sukma, the earlier Islamization process in Indonesia brought about significant 
impacts on the place of Islam in politics and within society and also the state identity. There are four 
characteristics of the process: the place of Islam in Javanese courts, the blending of Islam with older 
Hindu-Buddhist-Javanese traditions, differences between coastal and interior Islam and Javanese and non-
Javanese, and the uneven impact of Islam in the archipelago. 
26 Jacques Bertrand, Op.cit., pp. 35–6.  
  
56
 
against the Pancasila-based nation-state underground. Ideas of and hopes for implementing 
Islamic ideology and law in national and state affairs were still alive.  
Under Suharto’s New Order regime, Muslim aspirations to have a more Islamic 
character in national and state affairs remained. Due to Suharto’s military-backed policy to crack 
down on communism and the communist party (PKI), Islamic politics seemed to gain 
momentum in establishing its role in the Indonesian nation and state. But it was clearly fruitless. 
Not only was Masjumi forbidden to re-establish,27 all Islamic parties under Sukarno’s regime 
were forced to unite in the United Development Party (PPP) in 1974. Even further, the question 
of an Islamic state was settled and would not be reopened. Pancasila was the only legitimate 
ideology, instead, not only for the state, but also for all political and societal organizations 
including those with Islamic characteristics (1984). 
Up to the fall of Suharto, Islamic ideologies and groups, as many observers believed, 
were marginalized. Azyumardi Azra held that for more than forty years Islamic politics was the 
subject of state repression; there was no room for political Islam to breathe.28 Like Azra, van 
Bruinessen also maintained that de-politicization of Islam and de-Islamization of the state 
apparatus had created the feeling that Islam was under threat. 29  Jacques Bertrand even 
highlighted that “more repressive policies were used against Islamist groups…. Any debate on 
questions of Islam and politics was interpreted by the regime as subversive”.30  
In dealing with the government, Muslim groups took different ways. The first was 
taking part in the formal political process by joining the government-controlled party PPP.31 The 
second was returning to and focusing on religious, societal, education and cultural activities. 
This was particularly shown when NU withdrew from PPP in 1984.32 Taking the form of societal 
organizations and distance themselves from formal political institutions was the most popular 
alternative for many Islamic organizations.  
                                                 
27 Masjumi or Majelis Sjuro Muslim Indonesia was an Islamic political party struggling to replace 
Pancasila with Islam in 1950s but dissolved by Sukarno.  
28 Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context (Jakarta: Solstice, 
2006) p. 12. 
29 Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democracy”, in 
Hannemal Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt, Indonesia in Transition (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 
2004) p. 39. 
30 Jacques Bertrand, Op.cit., p. 40. 
31 See Deliar Noer, “Contemporary Political Dimensions of Islam”, in M.B. Hooker, ed., Islam in South-
East Asia (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1988). 
32 “Kembali ke Kitah 1926” (return to the spirit of 1926) was a prominent phrase showing the NU 
movement. This step was taken in part as a sign that NU did not want to cooperate with the corrupt and 
repressive government. See in Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (London: 
Routledge, 2007) p. 18. 
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Apart from the long-established organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah, which 
focused on religious, educational and social activities, there were many more Islamic 
organizations founded during Suharto’s rule. Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, the 
Indonesian Council for Propagation of Islam) 33 and Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia 
Islam (KISDI, Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity) 34 were two organizations 
with strong commitment for an Islamic state or shariah law. Hizb ut-Tahrir, which came to 
Indonesia in 1980s, was another preaching (dakwah) organization. This organization was critical 
of Indonesia’s character as a secular state and did not believe in democracy and the nation-state. 
It demanded that Indonesia to be based on shariah law and be united under a world Islamic 
caliphate.35 Another form of Islamic reactions due to the repressive indoctrination of Pancasila 
was the mosque-based organizations and networks.36  
This brief discussion of Islamic politics reveals three important lessons. First, there was 
a constant conflict between some Muslim groups and the Suharto government. While these 
groups wanted Islamic ideology, the government was inclined to sustain the pluralist or non-
religious ideology (Pancasila). By relying on the national constitution, the government 
apparently intended to build a civic nationalism where equal and universal citizenship rights 
                                                 
33 DDII, founded in 1967 by Masjumi leader Muhammad Natsir, had a goal “to create a conservative 
Islamic constituency capable of challenging the [Suharto] regime”. DDII focused its activities on 
“proselytizing and indoctrinating students in secular universities” which based on the principle of tawhid – 
the oneness of god, that all aspects of life should be based on the life and teachings of the Prophet. See 
Zachary Abuza, Ibid., p. 17. See also Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, eds., Shari’a and Politics in 
Modern Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003). 
34 KISDI, also established by Natsir and DDII activists in 1987, was more focusing on propagandizing 
opposition to the international Jewish-Christian conspiracy, which was seen as wanted to destroy the 
political strength of Islam in Indonesia, rather than opposing Suharto’s secularist-authoritarian government. 
With such agenda, KISDI was more open in its dakwah activities. It was able to mobilize popular support 
toward mistreatment of Muslim not in Indonesia, per se, but abroad such as in Palestine, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. See Van Bruinessen, Op.cit., p. 39–40. KISDI was also known to have support from 
certain elements of the military, most notably with generals Prabowo Subianto (Suhato’s son in law) and Z. 
A. Maulani. Between 1987 and 1993 Suharto tried to use KISDI to counter the democratization movement. 
In 1998 KISDI was allegedly mobilized to crush the student demonstration. See also in Zachary Abuza, 
Ibid., p. 19 and Rizal Sukma, Op.cit., pp. 55–56. 
35 See Zachary Abuza, Ibid., p. 78 – 9; S. Yunanto, et al., Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and 
South-East Asia (Jakarta: FES and RIDEP Institute, 2003). 
36 These are called by van Bruinessen as jama’ah and usrah type organizations. They emerged in 1980s 
and were introduced by DDII. As mosque-based organizations, either in university campus or non-campus, 
their activities were mostly underground or perhaps ignored by security apparatus. The non-campus-based 
organizations openly and politically opposed the government’s tight control over political Islam. They also 
organized military training and were involved in several violent incidents. On the other hand, the campus-
based networks, the so-called Tarbiyah movement, were more likely student study circles and had the 
priority in developing an Islamic society and achieving an Islamic state. Their network members then 
founded Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) following the fall of Suharto and in approaching the 1999 election.  
See Van Bruinessen, Op.cit., pp. 49–53. 
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were guaranteed by the state. 37  Although Islamic struggle in the forms of dakwah and 
underground activities did not directly and significantly harm the state institutions, they 
persistently opposed Pancasila and wanted to replace it with Islamic ideology as the nation-
state’s unifying ideology.  
Second, there is an enduring division within Islamic politics. In political orientation, the 
mainstream Muslims want a modern but secular or religiously neutral nation-state. But, there 
were also several Islamic groups that preferred an Islamic state and/or the implementation of 
shariah law. A small number of radical groups expects an “Islamic political entity” or simply 
stated, a caliphate state.38 This internal fragmentation might confirm the “minority mentality” of 
Indonesian Muslims.39 This also might find its legacy in Islamic political orientations (politik 
aliran) articulated by Clifford Geertz in 1960.40 Obviously, Islamic and Muslim internal division 
did not only weaken the Islamic politics against the government, but also likely weakened the 
societal foundation of the Indonesian nation-state. 
The final implication of Indonesian Islamic politics is related to non-Muslim 
communities. The anti-Islam conspiracy theory popularized by several Muslims reflected a form 
of paranoia towards Christian communities and their Western roots. From the side of Muslims, 
there has been a deep apprehension about Kristenisasi (Christianization) through the spread of 
                                                 
37 See Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (NY: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2000) and also Michael Brown, The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview in 
Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nationalism and 
Ethnic Conflict (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997) pp. 8–9.  Although Pancasila is widely seen as an 
inclusive ideology, some Islamic groups also see Pancasila as an exclusionary ideology because in their 
eyes Pancasila has rejected their Islamic ideology.  
38 Azyumardi Azra, Op.cit. pp. 6–11. A modern nation-state, which is mostly based on Western concepts 
and practice, is a state which adopts secularism or quasi-secularism, even though it may accept Islam as 
the official religion. An Islamic state refers to a traditional monarch state which takes the Qur’an as the 
basis of constitution and shariah as the legal system. While Turkey is seen as an example of modern, 
secular nation-states, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states are the examples for traditional Islamic states. The 
caliphate state is basically defined as a kind of Islamic political entity which wants to establish a single 
and universal caliphate state. “The proponents of the universal caliphate believe that this kind of Islamic 
political entity led by a single caliph is the answer and the only answer to resolve Muslim disunity and 
powerlessness vis-à-vis the Western powers”.  
39 As quoted in Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto (London: Routledge, 1993) p. 
121. In a very simple interpretation, the phenomena illustrate the minor role of Indonesian Muslims in 
politics even though the overwhelming majority in number.  
40 Many scholars and observers attempt to categorize the division of Islam in Indonesia, but without 
ignoring Clifford’s initial classification. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 
1960). A short critical review on Geertzian frame can be seen in Azyumardi Arza, “Menimbang Kembali 
Politik Aliran” in Dr. Imam Tolkhah, Anatomi Konflik Politik di Indonesia [Anatomy of Political Conflict 
in Indonesia] (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2001), pp.xi-xvi. For other classifications of Islam 
movements see Robert Hefner, “Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era”, in Adam Schwarz and 
Jonathan Paris eds., The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia (NY: Council on Foreign Relation Press, 1999) 
pp. 40–72 ; Liddle, Op.cit., p.74–5; Vatikiotis, Op.cit., p.11; and also Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the 
“Third Wave of Democratization” (Richmond: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1997), p. 70. 
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Christian institutions and proselytization among Muslims.41 In contrast, the Christians were also 
anxious about and fearful of Islamization, in particular through the transmigration policy and the 
continuing demand among Muslims to call for an Islamic state or Islamic law. Suharto’s 
manoeuvres to accommodate Islamic politics in his last decade in power and the formation of 
different radical groups increased apprehension among the Christians. DDII, KISDI and the 
intimidating attacks by radical groups against Christian churches and other properties were seen 
as serious threats by Islam to the Christian in the country.42   
Similar to the phenomena of Javanese hegemony, the Muslim overwhelming majority, 
its spread across the archipelago and the continuing demands for Islamic ideology have raised 
the issue of minority status of the other religious communities (the Christians, Hindus, and 
Buddhists). More than a mere statistical matter, the non-Muslim minority groups have tended to 
be very sensitive and reactive to any loss in their perceived rights. On the other hand, the 
Muslim majority was proactive in gaining what they perceived as their majority privileges.  
The relationship between Indonesian Muslims and non-Muslim communities was not 
always antagonistic, however. Despite some worries and anxieties, there was a sort of peaceful 
coexistence. The majority of Muslims generally live in tolerance with non-Muslim compatriots, 
which depicts to the international community the general picture of Indonesian Muslim as 
moderate, tolerant and pluralist.  
It is also worth noting that Indonesian Muslims play a key role in maintaining national 
territorial integrity, as was shown in the liberation wars. Political repression and military 
oppression against political Islam did not push Islamic groups to initiate secession from 
Indonesia. In the case of the Darul Islam, for example, Colin Brown argued that “the Darul Islam 
was never a serious military threat to Indonesia, but its continued existence was a constant 
reminder to Jakarta that the problem of the position of Islam in the state had still not been 
resolved”.43 Instead of challenging the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI), Islamic politics mostly 
sought to have Islamic identity within NKRI. However, as discussed, the demand for a more 
Islamic nation gave non-Muslim communities in East Timor and South Maluku a reason to call 
for separation from NKRI. 
 
 
                                                 
41 The perception of Islam as a threat see in Martin van Bruinessen, Op.cit., pp. 41–3. See also “Media 
Dakwah Scripturalism: One form of Islamic political thought and action in New Order Indonesia”, in 
William Liddle, Ibid., p. 271. 
42 Van Bruinessen, Ibid. 
43 Colin Brown, Op.cit., p. 170. 
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3. Authoritarianism 
The third issue that strongly characterized the Indonesian state until the end of the 
twentieth century is authoritarianism. Authoritarianism by definition is the exercise of strong 
control by the ruler over the ruled or by the government over its people. It is not a typical 
characteristic of the nation, as the abstraction of a collectivity that is seemingly composed of 
equal human beings with similarity in race, ethnic, culture or past history. Authoritarian politics 
chiefly rests on unequal relations between the powerful rulers and the powerless ruled. The 
longstanding practices of such asymmetric relations, justified at some extent at least by cultural 
values, however, might lead to an authoritarian nature of the nation-state. 
Most of the periods of Indonesia’s independent history have been marked by 
authoritarian rule, as it was under the colonial era. With the exception of the liberal politics of 
1949–1957,44 Sukarno was widely seen as holding command of the national political stage from 
1945 to 1965. As mentioned before, Sukarno firmly imposed the unitary state system and 
Pancasila ideology by dissolving the federal format, cracking down on Islamic armed rebellions, 
and tightly controlling national political dynamics. Suharto acted similarly after he took power 
from Sukarno in 1966 and he was even more repressive in ruling the country up to 1998. By 
excessively using the military (ABRI), maximizing Golkar as a supportive political machine and 
controlling the public servant (via Korpri) and other strategic interest groups, for more than three 
decades Suharto ruled the country without the exercise of any meaningful popular voice or 
opposition from the people. 
                                                 
44 There may be a disagreement about the period of liberal politics in Indonesia, which was also known as 
a ‘parliamentary political system’ or ‘constitutional democracy’. For some scholars, the first general 
election held in1955 was seen as the beginning of such a liberal system. On 5 July 1959, President 
Sukarno issued a decree stating the return to the 1945 Constitution and dissolution of the Constituent 
Assembly. The decision “marked the end of the parliamentary democracy period”, Leo Suryadinata wrote. 
See, Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002) p. 26. 
 However, other scholars said that the era of liberal democracy in Indonesia was from 1949 to 1957. 
Following the Round Table negotiations in December 1949, Indonesia began a liberalized political system 
by offering political forces in Indonesia the opportunity to establish various political parties. In February 
1957 President Sukarno promulgated the ‘Conception’ of government on which the national political 
system was based on deliberation and consensus instead of the “50% plus one’ majorities which was 
suspiciously seen as the Western system that was not suitable to Indonesian culture. This promulgation 
was seen as the end of liberal democracy in Indonesia. For references, see Herbert Feith, Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) and Herbert Feith and 
Lance Castles, eds., Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1970). See also, Ruth T. McVey, “The Case of the Disappearing Decade” and Daniel S. Lev, “On 
the Fall of the Parliamentary System”, in David Bourchier and John Legge eds., Democracy in Indonesia: 
1950s and 1990s ( Clayton, Victoria: Monash University, 1994) pp. 3–15 and 39–42; and Rusadi 
Kantaprawira, Sistem Politik Indonesia (Bandung: Sinar Baru, 1983).  
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How Indonesia, and not merely Sukarno and Suharto individually, became an 
authoritarian state remains an interesting topic. Scholars usually refer to Indonesia’s colonial 
history. Benedict Anderson45 and Mangunwijaya46 are two leading scholars who have clearly 
highlighted the role of the Dutch and Japanese colonial powers in shaping Indonesian 
authoritarianism. By looking at the Indonesian power structure in 1983, Anderson maintained 
that Indonesian authoritarianism was mostly inherited from the Dutch colonial power structure. 
The state bureaucracy, which was elitist, paternalistic, strong, and corrupt, was one example of 
the Dutch heritages. In addition were a silent and passive mass and a political culture averse to 
opposition and conflict. Anders Uhlin added that “the armed anti-colonial struggle prepared the 
ground for the development of a strong and comparatively well-organized military, which has 
become a principal impediment to democracy.”47 
The short term of Japanese occupation in Indonesia fortified the societal and political 
basis of authoritarianism and militarism in Indonesia. What mostly inherited from Japan were 
the strong political institutions in social control. Mangunwijaya further explained this: 
 
The most influential novelty brought by the Japanese is the entire fabric of social and 
cultural engineering, with its atmosphere of uniforms, marching, inspection-ceremonies, 
parades, unification of professional organizations, military and paramilitary language, 
attitude and behaviour, security surveillance, and a whole set of commands and chains 
of instruction, etc., often in a benevolent and useful way, but too often fascistic and 
communistic in performance and spirit.48 
 
Javanese culture is the second strand used to explain Indonesian authoritarianism. Like 
the colonial history, the Javanese hegemonic culture might to a large extent affects the structure 
of Indonesian nationality and statehood, and national leadership.  
Sukarno was described as “a romantic Javanese nominal Muslim with populist 
instincts”.49 As mentioned previously, Sukarno frequently cited the Majapahit kingdom as a 
model for Indonesia. As for the dissolving of the federal structure and restoring unitary state in 
1950, Adam Schwarz suggested this was done because Sukarno saw federation as unfit to “the 
stylized collectivism of ancient Javanese kingdom, the mystical sublimation of subject, ruler and 
                                                 
45 Benedict Anderson, “Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical 
Perspective”, Journal of Asian Studies, 1983, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 477–496. 
46 Mangunwijaya, “The Indonesia Raya Dream and its Impact on the Concept of Democracy”, in David 
Bourchier and John Legge eds., Op.cit., pp. 79–87.  
47 Anders Uhlin, Op.cit., p. 28. 
48 Mangunwijaya, Op.cit., p. 86. 
49 In Ricklefs as quoted in Anders Uhlin, Op.cit., p. 31. 
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realm”.50 Sukarno’s favouring of a unitary state was widely explained through the concept of an 
integralist state or negara kesatuan. It was said that within negara kesatuan the diverse societies 
are integrated into the whole, the rulers and the ruled are not separated, and individualism must 
defer to collectivism. As in a family, children or people are taken care of and protected by loving 
parents – or by the government. “They do not need their ‘human rights’ from the whims of their 
parents”, said an integralist proponent Supomo.51 Suharto inherited the concept and secured it 
with repression. 
Javanese mystical views of power (kasekten) seem to have strikingly shaped Sukarno 
and Suharto’s authoritarian views and exercise of power, albeit in different ways. According to 
Liddle, Javanese syncretism brought Sukarno great capacity to deal with, which did not 
necessarily mean to settle, political differences and disputes. Glorious Javanese history gave him 
a grandiose vision of Nusantara or Greater-Java or Indonesia. Liddle also said that the high level 
of Javanese culture was less influential to Suharto. Suharto was “less-cosmopolitan and more 
small-town-conservative, more a product of a bureaucratic and military milieu, and more 
inclined to an arriviste priyai-style cultural outlook”.52 It was also said that Sukarno ruled the 
state by force of his personality, while Suharto led through a network of rigid hierarchy and 
stifling bureaucracy.53 The economic development and the omnipresence and omnipotence of 
military forces had guarded Suharto’s divine power through corporatist and totalitarian policies. 
Keith Loveard added that development kept the majority of people quiet and Suharto remained 
tolerable; and, because there was a strong sense that Suharto had control of the power, whatever 
they did to oppose it would be futile.54   
Suharto’s unsettled and bitter childhood, his military background in KNIL (the 
Netherlands army), PETA (Japanese troop), and TRI (Indonesian People Army), and his 
surprising role in the abortive coup of 30 September 1965, all together might have had some 
influence upon his authoritarian regime.55  
Apart from historical, cultural, and personal background, explanation might also be 
found in the national constitution (UUD 1945). The constitution did not merely enforce the 
unitary state form (NKRI) and national ideology, but also entrusted the president with huge 
                                                 
50 See Adam Schwarz, Op.cit. p. 8. It must be added the political consideration for the decision where the 
federal suggestion was viewed as the Dutch’s strategy of “divide and rule” to weaken the newly 
independent Indonesia and in turn to restore its colonial rule over the archipelago.   
51 As reworded in Adam Schwarz, Ibid.  
52 William Liddle, Op.cit., p. 78. 
53 It was said by Adam Malik, a non-Javanese, Foreign Minister and then Vice-President to Suharto, as 
cited in Vatikiotis, Op.cit,. p. 27. 
54 Keith Loveard, Suharto: Indonesia’s Last Sultan (Singapore: Horizon Books, 1999) pp. 123–4.  
55 Discussion with Prof. Colin Brown on 30 November 2005. 
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power. In addition to executive power, the president held the legislative and judicial authority. 
There was no separation of powers as required by liberal democratic politics.  This seemed to be 
in conformity with the Javanese concept of power and traditions of kingdom. While UUD 1945 
did not explicitly restrict the presidential term, the Javanese culture and traditions allowed the 
king to take all necessary means to maintain power. It was the king himself, in his concern with 
the cosmos, who was to determine when to step down (lengser kaprabon, madheg pandhito).56 
Historical, cultural, constitutional and individual factors may have collectively 
contributed to the emergence of an Indonesian government with authoritarian power. But what is 
more important to emphasize is that the centralized power of the state in the hands of the 
government in fact created a weak instead of a strong nation-state.  
 At the state level, the Indonesian authoritarian regime demonstrated powerful 
institutions particularly the executive agencies. The legislatures (DPR/MPR) often functioned as 
rubber-stamp machines. The judiciary was not independent and was a derivative of the executive. 
Based on a patronage system, the bureaucracy worked without professionalism and public 
accountability. And the military (ABRI) was like a government security apparatus rather than the 
guarantor of the people’s security. 
 State failure is man-made, as Robert Rotberg has suggested. Rather than being caused 
by environmental or external factors, he claims that state leadership could destroy the state and 
that their decisions could continue to weaken the nation.57 Under the New Order patronage 
system, state institutions were composed mostly of those who furthered the government’s 
interests instead of those who served the nation-state interest as a whole. Corruption, collusion 
and nepotism (KKN) became common practice. When corruption was rampant, which meant 
that only a few state apparatus or institutions benefited, fewer and fewer political goods – 
security, education, health services and economic opportunity – were delivered to the people. As 
a consequence, the state institutions suffered from less and less legitimacy.  
At the societal level, the effects of the authoritarian government were clear. The tight 
grip of the government in controlling the people created passive and quiet majority. The state’s 
deep intervention and intense surveillance led people to live without creativity. The 
government’s priorities of national security, stability and economic growth had in fact alienated 
                                                 
56 See Franz Magnis Suseno, “Langsir Keprabon: New Order leadership, Javanese culture, and the 
prospects for democracy in Indonesia” in Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? 
(Bathurst, NSW: Crawford House Publishing, 1999), pp. 214–28. 
57 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States: The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”, The Washington Quarterly, 
CSIS & MIT, Summer 2002, Vol. 25, No. 3. 
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and marginalized some parts of society. Those opposed to the government’s policies were even 
seen as the state’s enemies.  
 State policy in controlling discourses on ethnicity, religion, race and groups – the so-
called anti-SARA policy58 – not only raised vertical discontent, grievance and opposition against 
the government, but also sowed the seed of distrust, hate and hostilities among different 
communal groups. Political and social observers frequently argued that the anti-SARA policy 
made communities unfamiliar with peaceful methods of conflict resolutions. The likely 
alternatives were to avert, hide and bury conflict and then for it to explode through violent acts at 
times when the security apparatus was not present or ineffectual.  
 The authoritarian government had also weakened Indonesian nation-state at the 
international level. This was firstly caused by the fact that the New Order’s development 
programs mostly relied on international markets, investments and financial aid. Worse still, 
foreign economic assistance, which was also the source for corruption among state institutions,59 
was allocated to buy political loyalty. Indonesian dependence upon global free-market 
mechanism and foreign debts made national economic development vulnerable. As will be 
discussed below, the changes in the global system had a bid impact upon the government. 
 Indonesian authoritarianism was not without any positives. Sukarno and Suharto, by 
enforcing the unitary state system and Pancasila had the idealism to build Indonesia a civic 
nationalism. In almost six decades of independence, the Indonesian people learned to be a 
pluralist nation, where, in theory, the vast diverse entities were equal, respected and unified. 
With a strong government, particularly under Suharto’s New Order regime, the nation was 
comparatively stable and united. In tandem with political stabilization, the government carried 
out economic development programs. These resulted in the government’s performance 
legitimacy as William Liddle has termed it.60 All these features also brought about the growth of 
a middle class group which in turn became a political force calling for democratization.61  
 The Indonesian nation-state was built on a strong government instead of on a democratic 
and cohesive society. However, the government’s strength was mostly based on a combination 
of authoritarian politics and economic development which was heavily dependent on 
international aid. This appears to be paradoxical. On the one hand the government endeavoured 
                                                 
58 SARA stands for Suku (ethnicity), Agama (religion), Ras (race) and Antar-golongan (inter-groups). 
59 See for example, Indonesia: Country Procurement Assessment Report, Document of the World Bank, 
Report No. 21823-IND, March 27, 2001. 
60 William Liddle, Op.cit.  
61 See Ed Aspinall, Opposition and elite conflict in the fall of Soeharto, in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May 
eds., The Fall of Soeharto (Bathurst, NSW: Crawford House Publishing, 1998) pp. 130–53. See also 
Anders Uhlin, Op.cit., pp. 44–8. 
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to develop a civic, pluralist and strong nation based on a unitary state form and the Pancasila 
ideology; but, on the other hand, the government’s corporatist and repressive policies were likely 
to undermine the nation-state structure and its integration. 
  
4. The Military 
Although the military (ABRI or later TNI and Polri) seemed to be an integral part of the 
New Order authoritarian regime, in certain ways they also characterized the Indonesian nation-
state. Based on its dominant role, through the doctrine of dual-function and historical fallacies, 
as one Indonesian scholar has asserted,62 Indonesian was also known as a militaristic country. 
According to Mohtar Mas’oed the dominant role of ABRI in Indonesian politics was mainly 
based on their interest in having institutional autonomy and developing a political autonomy in 
dealing with other political institutions.63  
The Indonesian armed forces occupied a position of powerful domination within the 
nation since independence.64  When the civilian government of the new independent nation 
prepared for and preferred diplomatic negotiation with the Dutch who planned to restore 
imperial power and had occupied Yogyakarta (the then Indonesia’s capital in 1949),65 the armed-
forces declared military resistance. It was said that the armed forces would continue war with or 
without the government. By mobilizing unarmed civilians, which then formed a people’s-army, 
this military confrontation helped to force the Dutch to recognize Indonesian sovereignty in 
December 1949. In the 1950s, when national politicians and civilian government were absorbed 
in organizing political parties and fighting for power in the new found liberal democracy and 
parliamentary system, regional rebellions erupted in West Java, Sumatra, South Sulawesi and 
Ambon.66 The armed forces once again acted to suppress the rebellions and to save the unitary 
                                                 
62 See Hermawan Sulistyo, Bedil & Kursi: Dimensi Politik Militer Indonesia (Jakarta: Pensil-324, 2004). 
63 To have an institutional autonomy of ABRI was seen as a defensive interest. This meant that all aspects 
related to military professionalism and organization had to be free from external intervention. On the other 
hand, the political autonomy was seen as more offensive in terms of the possibility of ABRI to take part in 
non-military affairs. See Mohtar Mas’oed, “Bisnis and Otonomi Politik Militer”, in Anas S. Machfudz and 
Jaleswari Pramodhawardani eds., Military without Militarism (Jakarta: LIPI, 2001) pp. 301–23.  
64 The historical background and political analysis of ABRI’s dual-functions, see Vatikiotis, “The Military 
and Democracy in Indonesia”, in R. J. May and Viberto Selochan, eds., The Military and Democracy in 
Asia and the Pacific (Bathurst, NSW: Crawford House Publishing, 1998) pp. 29–46. See also Vatikiotis, 
“Indonesia under Suharto”, Ibid; Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 
1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1982); and Anas S. Machfudz and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, eds., 
Ibid. 
65 Information about Indonesia’s history from 1945 to 1955, see Colin Brown, Op.cit., pp. 156–84. 
66 Toward the role of military during the Indonesian revolution (1945-1949) Anders Uhlin concludes that 
“what is important for the strength and legitimacy of the army after independence is not its actual 
performance during the national revolution, but the way its role as defender of the Republic has been 
described and propagated”. Anders Uhlin, Op.cit., p. 34–5. 
  
66
 
state. The role was repeated on the tragic event of September 1965 when the Communist Party 
(PKI) allegedly launched a coup d’etat and assassinated six senior officers. The army stepped in 
to restore order and saved the state from communism. According to Vatikiotis this event, which 
marked the birth of the New Order, brought ABRI a leading role in Indonesian formal political 
life and ended the twenty years of military-civil tension.67  
 Given the set of historical events above, ABRI was gradually successful in establishing 
the claim that it was the warrior of independence, the guardian of the nation, and the saviour of 
the state. This self-perception, as Finer maintains, imbued a tradition of loyalty to the state, 
rather than obedience to the rulers of the day.68 This was in line with ABRI’s oath, (Sapta Marga 
and Sumpah Prajurit), which enshrined that military loyalty is devoted to NKRI which is based 
on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.  
Military domination in politics was consolidated during the early years of the New 
Order through the dwi-fungsi (dual-function) doctrine. The first function was security and 
defence affairs. Due to Suharto’s priority in maintaining national stability and security, the 
armed force created a territorial command structure. By this structure the armed forces were 
present at every level of government administration.69 They held powerful authority in gathering 
information (penyelidikan) and in making and implementing decision (likes arresting - 
pengamanan and taking control - penanganan). The second function was kekaryaan which was 
generally an engagement in political and administrative activities. Military officers were 
allocated seats in DPR and MPR and in provincial and district assemblies as well. Many active 
and retired military officers posted in bureaucratic positions which were supposedly the civilian 
posts: serving as cabinet ministers, ambassadors, provincial governors and district heads (bupati 
or walikota). In the 1990s around 14,000 military officers occupied political and governmental 
posts outside the formal military structure.70  
Apart from dwi-fungsi, the military extended its role into business. The general reason 
for this was that the government could provide only one-third of the military budget. ABRI was 
thereby forced to generate income to meet the other two-thirds of expenditure. This was carried 
out by running various companies such as in the oil, mining, agribusiness, forestry, 
                                                 
67 In Michael  R. J. Vatikiotis, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia”, Op.cit. 
68 Ibid. 
69 This ranged from the ABRI headquarter in Jakarta to provincial level (Kodam, Regional Command), 
district level (Korem, District Command), sub-district level (Kodim, Subdistrict Command), to village 
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70 Takashi Shiraishi, “The Indonesian Military in Politics”, in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris eds., 
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transportation, insurance and banking sectors. The military also ran illegal businesses, raising 
revenue from local business or imposing tolls in operational areas.71  
 ABRI was likely to show an example of Indonesian oneness in terms of integration, 
cohesiveness and commitment to Indonesian nationality. ABRI was built without any preference 
for ethnicity and religion. However, ABRI’s cohesiveness and self claim to be the defender of 
NKRI and Pancasila was not totally true – or at least, was undermined by its internal problems. 
For example, in the early 1990s a division between the groups of “merah putih” and “hijau” 
came to the fore. Merah putih, which literally means red and white – the colours of Indonesian 
flag – referred to officer groups intended to preserve the military’s institutional autonomy and 
secure the secular character of the state. Hijau or the green was the other group who preferred 
the state to be more Islamic in character. Despite lack of evidence to support such on Islamic 
orientation, it was said that the group members were highly critical of Indonesia’s ethnic 
Chinese and Christian minorities.72 They, as mentioned earlier, had regular contacts with some 
Islamic intellectuals and associations such as the Centre of Information and Development 
Studies (CIDES), ICMI and KISDI. 
A comparatively minor problem within ABRI’s internal affair was factionalism based on 
different graduating years from the Military Academy. A more conspicuous distinction within 
the armed force was the gap between the top-ranked officers and the majority troops in terms of 
social and economic welfare. This was widely seen as a structural reason for the low level 
military personnel being involved in violent and criminal acts.73 Some even saw it as a legitimate 
justification for such acts.  
ABRI’s dual-function plus its business activities in fact weakened the Indonesian state. 
In an economic sense, one political observer argued that ABRI’s businesses had seriously 
distorted the rational economic system which was predominantly based on competition. They 
also weakened national economy, because the military was likely to run rent-seeking 
businesses.74 In addition, the military officers were in fact unable to avoid the passions of having 
and abusing unlimited power, just like the politicians they had strongly criticized. They could 
not keep away from corruption. Mohtar Mas’oed asserted that the practices “did not just 
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jeopardize the military internal institution, but had threatened the continuity of Indonesia as a 
nation”.75  
In the political field, the ABRI’s dual-function was also establishing an internal 
colonialism, as Daniel Dhakidae has suggested. It was implemented through the military control 
over public civilian offices, the exploitation of economic, social and political resources at the 
expense the people, and the ideological manipulation.76 This notion seemed to confirm the 
previous argument that the government authoritarianism in fact failed to bring Indonesia a 
pluralist, civic and modern nation-state. ABRI’s dual-function was undoubtedly unable to 
achieve the ideals of the Indonesian people, nation and state.77  
 One very critical implication of ABRI’s dual-function was related to human rights issues. 
ABRI was widely charged as being the chief violator of human rights. Whether ABRI acted on 
behalf of securing NKRI and Pancasila, the government, the businessmen or their institutional 
interests, the members of the armed forces were extensively involved in intimidating, terrorizing, 
arresting, torturing and/or killing ordinary people.78 Several cases that raised the issue of massive 
human rights violation can be presented.79  The slaughter of hundreds of thousands of PKI 
members and supporters in 1965 was the first and foremost case. In the 1980s the Kedung Ombo 
and Tanjung Priok incidents were two notorious cases. People in Kedung Ombo (Central Java) 
were intimidated, arrested, killed and coercively replaced for the interests of the development of 
an irrigation system. Hundreds of people were shot down in Tanjung Priok due to the allegation 
that they opposed the government and state ideology. In the 1990s, the Santa Cruz massacre 
(1991), the farmer grievance in Nipah (Sampang, Madura, 1993) and Haur Koneng incident 
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(1995) left hundreds dead – deaths caused by armed forces. Military operations in certain 
regions, such as East Timor and Aceh, caused even graver violations of human rights.  
 To sum up this section, ABRI did play a role in securing the unitary and pluralist 
character of the Indonesian nation state. It also significantly contributed to the maintenance of 
national stability. Nevertheless, it has to be said that Indonesian unity and stability was mostly 
based on a militaristic approach rather than on law and order. Even worse, instead of being 
purely and specifically aimed at guarding national integration and security, the armed force was 
often motivated by their self-interests and/or those of the government of the day, rather than the 
security of the general people. This raises the question about for whom Indonesian security force 
(ABRI) were standing. As long as ABRI was committed to its vested-interest or to the 
government’s interests and tended to deny people their basic rights for security, it was another 
sign of the weaknesses of the Indonesian state structure. 
 
C. The weakening government: 
 
There is no doubt that the government and ABRI were the key players in promoting the 
Indonesian nation-state as it was up to the early twenty-first century. Through their authoritarian 
power and coercive force, they attempted to form a pluralist, religiously neutral and unitary 
nation-state. Economic development, although primarily leant on the international free-market 
and overseas investment, made such nation-state-making programs possible. The Javanese 
hegemonic ethnicity and culture, with its strong emphasis on social harmony, seemed to provide 
ground for national unity. Its abangan Islamic religion even helped secure the non-theocratic 
Islamic Indonesia. Despite predispositions towards an authoritarian and centralized regime, and 
other’s suspicions that such a regime had been sustained, the Javanese dominant role helped to 
preserve the vast diverse nation in a comparative unity. A dilemma remained with the role of 
Islamic politics. Half a century of Indonesian nation-state history, the government tight control, 
and the ABRI’s dual-function did not bring aspirations for an Islamic state to an end.   
To what extent the authoritarian government and ABRI were able to maintain Indonesia 
as a unitary, pluralist and harmonious state becomes a crucial question. The role of the 
government seems difficult when we look at the national goal: “to develop an Indonesian nation 
which is independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous” as enshrined in the Preamble of 
the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945). The question is relevant when we look at the inherent 
weaknesses of the authoritarian government which became clearer in the years approaching the 
fall of Suharto. These weaknesses were particularly related to (1) the government’s responses to 
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the rising demand for democratization, which resulted from national development; (2) the 
government’s unchanged policies in dealing with regional discontents and the reinforcement of 
religious identity caused by political repression; (3) Suharto’s ageing; and (4) external or 
international factors. The latter is discussed in a separate section (see Section D). 
Many scholars, like Harold Crouch, William Liddle, Ed Aspinall and Anders Uhlin, 
agree that Suharto’s New Order economic development produced a growing middle class in 
Indonesia; theoretically, these were a determinant force changing the authoritarian politics. 
Relying on the theory of the wave of democratization, Anders Uhlin maintained that the 5-7 
percent annual growth of Indonesian GNP created new social classes that could have demanded 
democratization.80 Ed Aspinall also saw that students, journalists, intellectuals, workers and 
political activists played a critical role in opposing Suharto’s authoritarianism. Nonetheless, he 
argued, for most of the New Order period, the government faced little significant challenge from 
these groups. This was because “the middle class ceded their political rights in exchange for 
social stability and economic growth”.81 
Apart from a group of middle class who favoured the state authoritarianism for security 
and economic reasons (particularly the Chinese ethnic group and Suharto’s business cronies), as 
Uhlin mentioned, there were other groups who were criticizing, opposing or performing non-
conformist behaviour toward either Suharto’s authoritarianism, Indonesia’s unitary form, the 
religiously neutral ideology or the ABRI’s dual-function, or some combination of these. Edward 
Aspinall called these as semiopposition, alegal opposition, and proto-opposition groups.82  
The semiopposition were elements who took part in the formal political system. 
Although their movements were strictly monitored and their political freedoms were limited, 
they to some extent attained benefits from the New Order toleration and political cooptation. 
Working as legislative members (DPR/MPR) or actively involved in political parties (PPP and 
PDIP), Islamic organizations (Muhammadiyah and NU), and societal organizations, they 
employed “work-from-within” strategies to seek political reform.   
Aspinall named “Petition of Fifty” and “Forum Democracy” as examples of alegal 
oppositions. They were “opponents whose activities, without being strictly illegal, have no legal 
sanction and run counter to the spirit if not the text of the Constitution and laws of the regime. 
They are outside the law: alegal”.83 Most of the group’s elements were “exemplary individuals” 
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82 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
83 Ibid., p. 8. 
  
71
 
and dissidents. They were supportive to the unitary and pluralist nation-state. They might have 
contributed to the establishment of strong government, but critically called the government to be 
consistent with the regime’s foundational ideology. Since they were prominent individuals and 
particularly because they did not attempt to mobilize a mass based opposition, their existence 
were permitted, albeit with some reservations. 
The proto-opposition, also known as civil society organizations, also played a certain 
role in undermining the authoritarian regime. As they mainly worked within the society in a very 
specific sector related to various societal interests, their role in promoting political reform was 
incremental rather than one of outright confrontation. In addition to their inherent characteristics 
such as being trustworthy, small in size, flexible and accountable, their rapid increase and spread 
across the nation reinforced pressures for the central government and state institutions to be 
more accommodating, responsible and democratic. 
While huge national resources were allocated to have the mass obedience and to keep 
the semiopposition, alegal opposition and proto-opposition activities at low level, the 
government also had to allocate resources to deal with groups who fundamentally opposed its 
ideology and authoritarian regime. These groups can be classified as mobilizational opposition.84 
They explicitly demanded that the regime be replaced with another system, and for the objective, 
they sought to organize and mobilized a mass support base.  
Two forms of groups fell within the above category. One was groups strongly associated 
with regional entities. East Timor, Aceh and Papua were three regions where there were calls for 
secession from NKRI and therefore a freedom from Pancasila ideology and authoritarian rule. A 
group of people in Maluku was also calling for separation, but as will be discussed later, they 
were less significant. The second group was those associated with religious identities. Although 
Aspinall excluded these two opposition groups from his analysis, their endless political struggles 
to break away from NKRI and/or to establish an Islamic state were considerably weakening the 
New Order authoritarianism. They continued to mobilize broader support, locally, domestically 
and internationally. Tactically, they moved from one issue to another. They diversified fronts, 
from armed insurgency through clandestine politics and diplomatic forums.  
In responding to mobilizational oppositions, the government poured huge amounts of 
money into combating them or reinforced military forces in regions with separatist claims. In 
international forums, the government’s diplomatic approach was reactive or even 
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unsympathetic.85 On behalf of national integration or based on ABRI’s interest, hundreds of 
thousands military personnel were deployed to defend Indonesia’s interests in East Timor and 
Aceh. In other words, there was no change in the government policies in dealing with regional 
discontents. 
As the opposition to authoritarianism tended to grow and resistance to NKRI and 
Pancasila either from regions or Islamic groups persisted or even intensified, the country was 
facing Suharto’s growing age and declining health. The issue was critical due to one thesis 
arguing that Suharto was the key to the New Order authoritarianism.86 During his last decade in 
power, there had been anxiety about his competency to lead the country. The issue here was how 
he could make policies that would keep a balance between his own interests (including his 
family and cronies) and the country’s interests as a whole.  
Concern on Suharto’s future was exacerbated by the issue of succession. This was in 
anticipation that Suharto would die or be incapacitated. In order to prevent a vacuum of power, 
there was a growing expectation that by choosing a strong and loyal vice president, a successor 
would be prepared. But, the discourse of succession was also likely triggered by political 
grievances. For example, the intention of ABRI (led by L. B. Murdani) to nominate a person 
with a military background for vice president in 1987/1988 represented a dispute between 
Suharto and the military. Suharto’s economic policies, which persistently gave more benefits to 
his family and cronies than to national development, were also seen as another reason for 
succession. In the eyes of an increasing number of Indonesians rampant practices of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism among public and military officials were evidence that Suharto’s 
government was incompetent to rule the country.  
Calls for Suharto’s resignation became stronger in 1990s. In 1993, however, Suharto 
was re-elected for his sixth term in power. As he was at 71 years old, doubt rose whether he 
would be able to govern the country due to his bad health (severe kidney and heart problem).87 
Although the New Order authoritarianism had reached some sort of institutionalization, as 
William Liddle argued, 88  or because the regime was more likely constructed on a weak 
patronage system and economic allies, as Robinson and Uhlin contended,89 there was a growing 
concern that the system would collapse at the time when Suharto had to step down or became 
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physically incapacitated. In December 1997 Suharto fell ill. “His illness did not seem to have 
had any permanent impact on him, but it did panic the financial markets and raise the questions 
about the wisdom of his staying on as president for the foreseeable future”, Geoffrey Forrester 
wrote.90 He further said that Suharto became erratic and disdainful. The appointment of his 
business crony, Mohammad (Bob) Hasan and his daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut), as 
the ministers for Trade and Social Affair respectively in his Seventh Development Cabinet 
(1998), was one clear case of his less than accommodating response to criticisms.  
 
D. Indonesia’s International Context 
 
Undoubtedly, Indonesian internal dynamics are closely linked the global dynamics. 
Indonesia emerged as a result of the global anti-colonialism movement of the twentieth century.  
This would be a clear evidence of Indonesia’s international context. This affirms the notion that 
“apart from legend, there was no historical precedent for the effective territorial unity of the new 
state before the Dutch had consolidated their colonial domain.”91 As a political entity, Colin 
Brown asserted, “Indonesia came into existence between 1945, with the proclamation of 
independence by Sukarno and Hatta, and 1949, when the Dutch acknowledged that 
independence”.92 Despite debates about the essence of the Dutch transfer of sovereignty in 
December 1949, there is no question that the Dutch colonialism influenced what Indonesia looks 
like in the past, present and future.  
The decolonization process also helped to form Indonesia’s international orientation and 
relations. In the post-World War II bipolar system, Indonesia declined to align to one of the 
blocs. Instead, Indonesia decisively took an independent position. With the principle of bebas 
dan aktif (literally independent and active) it was said that “the government is of the opinion that 
the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the arena of 
international politics but it should be an active agent entitled to determine its own standpoint 
with the right to fight its own goal – the goal of a fully independent Indonesia”.93 
As a new post-colonial nation-state emerging in a bipolar world, Indonesia had to secure 
its existence within the system. The first and most crucial task was to have international 
recognition as a sovereign nation-state. Diplomatic efforts within the bipolar system, which was 
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normatively founded on the Westphalian state system, seemed to help Indonesia obtain its 
sovereignty, this being the ultimate legal status of international actors. The rivalry between the 
two blocs in expanding their sphere of influence to newly independent countries was favourable 
to Indonesia securing its status as a unitary nation-state, as enshrined in UUD 1945.94 The 
system also appeared to encourage an active Indonesian foreign policy. Sukarno’s confrontation 
policy against the establishment of Malaysia in the early 1960s was an instance of how the 
bipolar system worked. Finally, more than just protecting national sovereignty, the Cold War 
system was also widely seen as contributing to Indonesia’s taking over of Papua from the Dutch 
in 1963 and incorporating East Timor from the Portuguese in 1976.95  
Indonesia’s international non-aligned status, which was asserted through the historical 
event of the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 in Bandung, also reflected the need to keep the 
nation united. According to Michael Leifer and Rizal Sukma, the divisive ideological and 
political competition in the formation years of Indonesia was of paramount significance for 
Indonesian foreign policy which was bound to be circumscribed by the overriding concerns for 
national unity.96  Apart from the division between nationalist and Islamist groups in forming 
Indonesia’s nation-state identity, division also occurred between nationalist and left groups in 
laying down the international orientation of the new state. As Pancasila had just been introduced 
to curb nationalist-Islamic ideological conflict, so too the principle of bebas-aktif appeared to be 
a win-win solution to disputes between one camp, which preferred an alignment with the 
Western bloc and was antagonistic towards communist interests, and the other camp, which 
favoured the communist bloc and opposed alignment with Western colonialist forces. The 
principle of bebas-aktif was thereby a political compromise and it was pragmatically pursued. 
This meant that Indonesian foreign policy “should be resolved in the light of its own interests 
and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face”.97  
However, Indonesia’s interest in internal unity within such international dynamics 
appears ambiguous. On the one hand, there was an understanding that it was, as mentioned 
above, the history of colonialism and the experience of a revolutionary period that had prompted 
internal political integration. On the other hand, external forces were often suspected of being a 
threat to the disintegration of Indonesia. This was specifically shown by the case explained 
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earlier in which a nationalist group under Sukarno leadership abolished the federal form imposed 
by the Round Table Agreement and brought the Republic into being as a unitary nation-state.  
Although suspicion that international forces had an intention to weaken Indonesian unity 
continued to afflict Indonesian foreign relations, there was also a broad acknowledgment that 
domestic diversity in ethnicity, culture, religion and political orientation was the major source of 
threat to national unity and integration. Islamist insurgencies in West Java, Aceh and South 
Sulawesi and regional rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi (PRRI/Permesta) and in South 
Maluku (RMS) were convincing evidences of internal threats to Indonesian nation-state. The 
Madiun Affair in 1948 and the abortive coup in September 1965 were other instances of 
ideological threats.98  All these events underlined the fact that domestic sources of national 
disintegration were more dangerous than external sources. This new understanding led Suharto 
to focus on national stability, security and integration.  
Having national stability as priority, Suharto re-orientated Indonesian foreign relations 
towards cooperation with the West. This replaced Sukarno’s aggressive and confrontationalist 
foreign policy. Suharto’s determination to crack down on communism and the communist party 
(PKI) in Indonesia was particularly beneficial in gaining support from America and its Western 
allies. The Western countries even provided the government with military assistance (in training 
and weaponry) and economic investment. Suharto sought this external assistance in part to 
support the government in securing its power and also to overcome economic problems that 
could have ignited political instability. In its turn, the Cold War system and in particular the 
Western countries served not just to preserve Indonesian territorial integration and political 
integration, but also significantly contributed to instituting authoritarianism by assisting the 
government to control the diverse nation and to develop its economy.  
Until the 1990s there was no evidence to what extent the Western countries were 
concerned with Indonesian ethnic and religious diversity. What is generally known is that those 
countries had great interest in Indonesian stability and integration. With Indonesia stable and 
united, foreign states reciprocally gained benefits in terms of regional security and economic 
interest. Indonesian territory connecting the western (Indian) and the eastern (Pacific) oceans 
and the southern (Australia) and the northern (Asia) continents made Indonesia’s geography 
strategic for international security and trade. Economically Indonesia was also important because 
of its huge natural resources and as a potential market for international products. The 
international interests in Indonesian security and economy, on the one hand, and Indonesian 
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interests in national integration and economic development, on the other, had incorporated 
Indonesia within the international system, which was, once again, a bipolar system based on 
realist politics.  
The integration of Indonesia into the international system was not without problems. 
Indonesian demands for foreign aid and international investment in order to accelerate national 
development meant Indonesia was less independent from external forces. Politically, Indonesia 
was prone to interference from the West. Economically, Indonesia became an integral part of the 
international free-market system but without any effective capacity to control the system or to 
handle its negative impacts. In terms of its security, the Indonesian military and defence system 
was deeply dependent upon the Western countries. The principles of bebas-aktif and non-
alignment were therefore widely criticized, particularly by national left-wing elements and Non-
Alignment country members. 
 By 1989 the international system began to change dramatically. The Soviet Union 
collapsed and the East-West rivalry within the bipolar system diminished. This led to 
disintegration and violent conflicts in Eastern Europe, reviving the idea of balkanization. In the 
West, the relations between the bloc leaders and supporting members required revision. The 
general result was that maintaining close relationship by providing developing states like 
Indonesia with security protection and economic assistance appeared to be less significant.  
In the broader context the new international system showed a structural change. The old 
system framed the weaknesses of many developing states in terms of ideological rivalry (East – 
West conflict) and tended to put aside the political-economy issues (North – South relations). 
Within the decline of ideological contentions, the international relations were more likely to be 
determined by political and economic structures. Today, relations between the West and the rest 
of the world are most influential and are likely to be marked by the clash of civilizations – or 
even the end of history.99 The world structure became more complex and hierarchical. States 
with secure, wealthy and developed liberal democracies were at the top, whereas the insecure, 
weak, and poor states were at the bottom of the new structure. This raises a notion that the 
problem of weak and failing states following the decline of Cold War system was a systematic 
one.100  
Within the new system Indonesia, like many other developing countries, had to provide 
themselves with security and development. The problem was clear: national capacity for 
                                                 
99 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1996).  
100 Hans-Henrik Holm, The responsibility that will not go away: Weak states in the international system, 
Paper presented at West Lafayette, Purdue University, 25–27 February, 1998.  
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securing national territory and maintaining political stability was very limited and domestic 
resources for sustaining economic development were unavailable or very scarce. And it was also 
obvious that solutions to the problems were not merely economic. The key to deal with both 
national problems and the new international system was political. This led to a conclusion that it 
was the national political system which had to substantially change in order to secure Indonesia 
as a nation-state. More specifically, given Indonesian ethnic, cultural and religious diversity has 
existed no matter what the international system, the authoritarian rule was the first characteristic 
that had to be changed.  
To what extent the Indonesian nation-state had to make adjustments to find its place 
within the new international system was particularly crucial due to the internationalization of 
democracy and human rights. Unlike the previous system which solely emphasized power 
politics, the post-Cold War system is based on both norms and power. It was said that norms, 
especially Western norms, underlied the structure of the international system and served to shape 
the ideas, preferences, and purposes of states.101 It is also known that the traditional system that 
had preserved states as the ultimate actors is now unreliable since non-state actors such as MNCs 
and NGOs play increasing roles.  
As has discussed in Chapter Two, the ideas, preferences and norms proposed by the new 
system, which is led by the Western countries, are the principles of democratic legitimacy and a 
law-based state. The argument is that international peace and order could only be achieved if the 
system is based on a democratic governance system instead of on state logic, power politics and 
alliance mechanisms.  
By the early 1990s the discourse of democracy and human rights was particularly 
striking in the case of Indonesia. Pro-democracy movement sought to disseminate the ideas. 
Various forms of forum such as academic courses, discussions, seminars, workshops and 
conferences were organized. Different kinds of associations were formed and networks between 
various groups with similar interest in democratization and concerns on human rights issues 
were developed. Although there were serious problems in the tactics, strategies, and goals of the 
democratization movement, as Uhlin and Aspinall observed, there was no doubt that many 
elements of domestic politics believed that Indonesia had to be a democratic nation-state.102 
Otherwise, the country would be likely to disintegrate and dissolve.  
The increasing number of working and middle classes generated by national 
development and the steady rise of resistance and oppositions driven by government 
                                                 
101 Michael Doyle and John Ikenberry eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997) pp. 268–73. 
102 Anders Uhlin, Op.cit. and Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, Op.cit. 
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discriminative policies and/or military repression, together contributed to the growing demand 
for democratization. In addition, democratization movements in foreign countries were catalytic 
factors fortifying domestic demands. The introduction of glasnost and perestroika in 1985 by 
President Gorbachev in Soviet Union, for example, had been followed by the keterbukaan 
(openness) policy in Indonesia as a response to the growing demand for democracy. “People 
Power” in the Philippines, which forced President Marcos to step down in 1986, was particularly 
inspiring to the democratic movement in Indonesia. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, marking 
the end of the bipolar system, and the Tiananmen massacre in the same year, where pro-
democratic movements were brutally shot down by the military, were two other important events 
which made the democratization movement in Indonesia stronger.  
The collapse of states and the violent ethnic and religious conflicts in the East European 
region had different implications within Indonesia. For Indonesian democratic activists, the roles 
played by labour union, church institutions, and new political parties in Poland, and Hungary 
and mass demonstration in Czechoslovakia and East Germany helped to convince them that the 
change and fall of an authoritarian ruler was possible.103 For political groups seeking an Islamic 
state or those struggling for a state independent from Indonesia, such as East Timor and Aceh, 
the emergence of new states in East Europe based on ethnic or religious identity was inspiring. 
They also began to see the international system as a resourceful forum for their separatist 
movements. For the government and those who preferred the existing format of the Indonesian 
nation-state, the East European experiments were something that had to be avoided in Indonesia.  
In its response to democratization movements, the Indonesian government did very little. 
By its keterbukaan policy, the government showed its limited tolerance for discussing 
controversial issues through public media, such as newspapers and magazines. Mass 
demonstrations were allowed, even though they were limited to labour strikes and Muslim 
protests such as in the case of the Monitor magazine blasphemy (1990), the Gulf War (1991), 
and national lottery for sports (1991 and 1993).104 These kinds of public protests had no serious 
political implications for the nation-state, government power and policies. Reform within the 
state institutions and authoritarian regime was practically absent. Suharto’s movement in 
approaching Muslim groups and showing interest in Islamic religion was more likely a political 
manoeuvre in order to secure his power than a democratic movement in order to give his power 
a larger societal base.   
                                                 
103 Uhlin, Ibid., p. 181–2.  
104 Ibid. 
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In regard to demands for human rights, in June 1993 the government established a 
National Committee for Human Rights (Komnas HAM). The committee was generally intended 
to support the promotion of human rights by formulating national regulations or ratifying 
international conventions. As it was founded on a president decision, the committee was 
responsible to the government and its activities did not have any effect to government policies. 
In its early years, the committee was more symbolic than reflective of the real intention of the 
government to promote human rights. 
 How the new international system affected the Indonesian nation-state can be explained 
by the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991. The international reactions to the incident 
suggested that the international community still paid attention on East Timor although it had 
been incorporated for about fifteen years. Furthermore, the international community had 
condemned the Indonesian government and the military for neglecting democratic solutions and 
basic human rights in the regions. Although foreign major states did not threaten Indonesian 
authority over the territory, the suspension of economic aid definitely afflicted the Indonesian 
government and armed forces.  
 While foreign governments probably acted cautiously in dealing with the Santa Cruz 
incident and still valued highly Indonesian stability and integration, both international and 
national NGOs were enthusiastic in campaigning for democratization and human rights in 
Indonesia and, in particular, questioning the Indonesian administration on East Timor. NGOs 
from the Netherlands and other European countries, America, Australia and neighbouring 
countries in Asia (the Philippines and Thailand) provided national NGOs with financial support 
and accesses to international forums. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Ford 
Foundation, and the Asia Foundation are just a few international NGOs that helped to 
internationally publicize undemocratic practices and human rights violations in Indonesia. 
Working together with national and international media to make known Indonesia’s domestic 
problems internationally and nationalizing international values fortified demands for 
democratization in Indonesia.  
 As mentioned above, the government’s responses to the increasing demands for 
democratization were technically inappropriate and substantially insufficient. They were 
inappropriate because criticisms of national undemocratic policies and practices were likely 
perceived as feelings of distrust of and hostility towards the government. Demands and 
criticisms were not merely ignored, but were continually dealt with using subversive laws by 
which protesters were punished without fair trial. The government’s reactions by giving freedom 
to the press and forming Komnas HAM were also insufficient because the government and 
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ABRI still held the final decisions. Instead of trying to respond positively to the international 
demands and pressures for democratization, the government and its main authoritarian 
institutions tended to shield themselves behind the principle of state sovereignty and nationalism.  
 Failures to accommodate domestic demands and to respond international pressures for 
democratization created an even more difficult condition for the government. When the 
government and ABRI, which were expected to keep the state integration, stability and 
development, were in trouble, the nation-state was technically in trouble too. In short, the 
inappropriate and insufficient adjustment of the government toward international norms of 
democratization and human rights made Indonesia vulnerable to international intervention. 
 
E. Concluding notes 
 
According to the national constitution Indonesia is a unitary state based on Pancasila 
ideology. By NKRI and Pancasila the very diverse people groups and government are expected 
to be integrated based on the principles of belief in one God, humanism, unity, democracy and 
social justice. Since its independence, however, Indonesian nation-state has been closely 
circumscribed by Javanese hegemony, Islamic politics, authoritarian rule and militaristic control. 
These political forces have become the strengths and weaknesses of the Indonesian nation-state.  
The Javanese ethnic majority and its cultural stress on harmony are widely believed to 
help the very diverse ethnic and cultural minorities bond together under NKRI. The 
overwhelming majority of Muslim Indonesian people and their abangan faith are also seen as 
contributing to national integration. On the other hand, the government and ABRI are two key 
institutions which authoritatively introduced and imposed the integrationist nation and pluralist 
state ideology. On these social and political grounds, there is no doubt that Indonesia would be a 
strong nation-state. 
However, the Javanese hegemony also raised the issue of exploitation, marginalization 
and subordination of regional and ethnic minorities. The Muslim majority also raised the feeling 
of non-Muslim minorities being under threat. In addition, some Islamic groups held the notion of 
being marginalized, alienated, and even confronted. All these kinds of social weaknesses were 
severely exacerbated by the government and the military, in particular during Suharto’s New 
Order regime.  
In order to maintain a united, stable and pluralist nation, the government chiefly relied 
on cooptation and repression strategies. By its cooptation strategy the government sought to 
incorporate individuals, social groups and regions into its authoritarian rule. This was carried out 
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by providing incentives, either through delivering economic development with limited political 
freedom or by tolerating illegal practices such as corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). By 
repression strategy, mainly using the coercive military force, the government sought to destroy 
any expression of political grievances, opposition and resistance. This led to massive violations 
of human rights. On many occasions Suharto and ABRI acted for their vested interests and not 
solely for the sake of national integration, plurality and development.  
Although for about three decades Suharto and ABRI preserved national integration and 
Pancasila ideology, it became clear by the 1990s that authoritarian rule and a coercive approach 
were no longer effective. First, the government stabilization and development programs had 
raised domestic demand for political reform. Second, the government corporatist and repressive 
policies were intensifying instead of diminishing disintegrative forces. Some regional entities 
such as in East Timor and Aceh and some Islamic groups continued to struggle either for 
secession from NKRI or for Islamic ideology.  Third, since Suharto got older and his 
government became more corrupt and ineffective, the future of the nation-state was at stake. 
Finally, changes within the international system demanded Indonesia move towards a 
democratic government. 
Although the natural characteristic of Indonesia as a multi-cultural entity, the 
government and the military have been central in attempts to create a united Indonesian nation-
state. Suharto’s authoritarianism to secure NKRI and Pancasila, however, was too expensive, 
politically and economically. ABRI’s dual function appeared counterproductive and dangerous 
to force unity and plurality. Political manoeuvres to maintain the militaristic-authoritarian 
regime only met with increasing domestic demands for political change. Pressure upon the 
government and ABRI also came from the international community. Within the new 
international system most Western countries and international institutions commanded 
democratization and respect for human rights.  
By the rise of domestic demand and international pressure for Indonesian 
democratization, it is clear that Suharto’s authoritarian government and its militaristic 
institutions were weakening. Suharto’s inclination to make incremental political adjustment and 
the military’s reluctance for political reform had weakened the nation-state. Since government 
power had been severely exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis, the increasing domestic 
demand and international pressure for democratization made the country prone to internal 
violent conflicts. With the government weakening and the country by nature weak, Indonesian 
nation-state was also vulnerable to international intervention.  
====== 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
REFORMASI AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR, MALUKU AND ACEH 
 
 
A. Introduction 
  
The main characteristics of the Indonesian nation-state discussed in the previous chapter 
were rightly seen by many analysts as the roots or underlying factors that had permitted conflict 
and violence to explode at the end of 1990s. While the government responses to improve 
domestic conditions were insufficient, the efforts of some domestic elements to fix such an 
unhealthy nation and government system were practically unsuccessful. It seemed that it was 
only a combination of domestic demands (including pro-democracy movements, an elite 
conspiracy and a factional split within the military) and international pressures (including the 
postponement of financial aid, the demand for democratization and human rights and 
particularly the financial crisis in mid-1997) made political change possible in 1998.1 All these 
factors of and demands for political changes were framed in the phrase of the reform movement: 
gerakan reformasi.      
Reformasi, however, was not a narrow term. It was not limited to the replacement of 
President Suharto. As the problem of the Indonesian nation-state was huge and complex, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, so the reform agenda was complicated. The multi-cultural 
foundation of the country, the corrupt and repressive state institutions, and the advent of a 
solidarist and interventionist international system were related to the political reform. And since 
the reform was not carefully planned or well organized, the country became trapped in a 
dangerous condition which was marked by the proliferation of bloody internal conflicts. 
This chapter does not intend to explain how the political reform took place or how it 
generated violent conflicts. The problems this chapter seeks to discuss are the levels or scope of 
                                                 
1 These factors are particularly meaningful in explaining the resignation of Suharto. See Sukardi Rinakit, 
The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Copenhagen S, Denmark: NIAS Press, 2005) pp. 2–5. 
About elite conspiracy, Rinakit wrote that leaders of ICMI were behind this conspiracy. Achmad 
Tirtosudiro (the chairman), Adi Sasono (the secretary) and other Islamic leaders (Amien Rais, Nurcholis 
Madjid, Emha Ainun Nadjib, and also Akbar Tanjung) executed political manoeuvres, including to 
convince Harmoko and Syarwan Hamid (the chairman and the vice-chairman of the MPR) to politely ask 
Suharto to resign, and the possibility of organizing demonstrations. Rinakit also said that since Vice-
President Habibie was the general chairman of ICMI, he was suspected to be the master-mind behind the 
ICMI political manoeuvres to unseat Suharto.  
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reformasi and how these were linked to the dynamics of conflicts that took place in East Timor, 
Maluku and Aceh.  
The first part of this chapter will investigate what reformasi meant. Considering the 
problems of the Indonesian nation-state, reformasi apparently wanted to reform all aspects of the 
nation-state. There were at least four aspects or units of this reform, namely the replacement of 
Suharto, the reform of his political institutions, and the reform of certain national and 
international systems.  
The second part investigates the dynamics of conflicts during the first years of reformasi. 
Since the scope of each of the issues was not clearly defined and the relationships between the 
issues were overlapping, it is quite clear that reformasi was likely to complicate rather than 
resolve the weaknesses of the nation-state. The initial periods of reformasi not only brought old 
grievances and longstanding buried conflicts to the surface, but also generated new ones. 
The last part will present the violent conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh, which 
erupted or re-escalated during the reform era. While the political reform contributed to the 
eruption and re-escalation of the conflicts, this part will specifically explore their “internal 
dynamics” by stressing the local issues, the principal parties to the conflicts and the 
humanitarian effects.  
 
 
B. Reformasi 
 
In the early years of the reform movement, the format of the Indonesian unitary state 
(NKRI) and the secularist character of Pancasila were widely debated. But, questions about the 
government were central. There was a consensus that the authoritarian centralist government had 
to be reformed. This included Suharto personally and his principal political institutions: ABRI, 
Golkar and Korpri.   
 
1.The replacement of  Suharto 
The conceptual and practical reasons that made Suharto the first and foremost target of 
political change were based on the characteristics of his authoritarian regime. It was widely 
believed that Indonesian politics was characterized by paternalistic or patrimonial leadership. 
Within this, there were a small number of elites functioning as patrons to a large number of 
clients. At the peak of the patronage system was Suharto. People groups were at the lowest level. 
Between Suharto and people there were several tiers that formed the pyramid shape of such a 
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patronage system. Structural and functional interactions revealed that patrons gave order and 
provided protection while clients supplied resources and loyalties. Clients at the lowest level 
(peoples) were not only far from the top patron but also suffered multiple exploitations for the 
benefits of the higher tiers. The implications of the New Order patrimonial system were 
favouritism and arbitrariness which were incompatible to economic rationality and which also 
triggered intrigues, distrust, and internal conflicts.2 Many pro-democratic activists thought that 
the strategic way to change this unhealthy practice was to bring down the highest patron, the 
“Javanese king”, Suharto.3  
Since the 1970s demands for democratization had been made by individuals and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). But, direct protests and oppositions against Suharto 
probably became known in the 1980s, when some retired generals, civilian ex-politicians, 
intellectuals and student figures issued a ‘Statement of Concern’ criticizing president Suharto,4 
particularly when Suharto appointed Sudharmono vice-president.5 In the following years, many 
high-ranking military officers and politicians organized as the Forum Pemurnian Kedaulatan 
Rakyat (FPKR – Forum for the Purification of People’s Sovereignty) demanded the replacement 
of the military government with a government based on the sovereignty of the people, criticized 
the business interests of Suharto’s family members and cronies, and campaigned against casting 
a vote (golput) in the unfair general elections.6 
 Due to the advance of Suharto’s age – he was born 8 June 1921 – and the rampant 
expansion of political violence and massive corruption, discourse and debate on succession 
gradually spread. Following the election of Suharto as president for the fifth term (1988-1993), 
students rallied to call on Suharto to step down. 7  Since the mid-1990s opposition to the 
                                                 
2  See “The Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: Suharto and Indonesian Economic 
Development in Comparative Perspective” in R. William Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian 
Politics (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996) pp.107–140. 
3 Many writings about Suharto have been published that present his good and bad sides. Books and articles 
published before 1998 generally present him as a smiling general, bapak pembangunan (the father of 
development), a strong as well as a wise man. His dark sides became public after his downfall in May 
1998. Neutral, objective, and academical political analyses about Suharto can be read, for example, in 
Liddle, “Suharto’s Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions” in Ibid., pp. 15–36; Vatikiotis 
“Suharto,” in Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto (London: Routledge, 1993) pp.1 
– 31; “The Rise of Suharto and After” in Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia (Victoria: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) pp. 47–61; Asvi Warman Adam, Soeharto: Sisi Gelap Sejarah Indonesia 
(Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004). Suharto’s biography can be read in Suharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan 
Saya (Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991). 
4 In Anders Uhlin, Democracy and Diffusion: Transnational Drawing-lesson among Indonesian Pro-
democracy Actors (Lund: Lund University, 1995), p.100. 
5 See in Vatikiotis, Op.cit., pp. 80–5. 
6 Anders Uhlin, Op.cit., p.101. 
7 Ibid., pp.111–16. Edward Aspinall, “The Indonesian student uprising of 1998,” in Arief Budiman et.al, 
Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999) pp. 212–37. 
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government had become more open and stronger and the demands for democratization became 
more focused, suggesting that Suharto had to be replaced. A pamphlet spread by Forum Kota 
(Forkot, a coalition of student movements) in May 1998 saying “We have only one enemy: 
Suharto,” clearly reflected the central issue.8 Following the economic difficulties caused by the 
Asian financial crisis and the eruption of mass violence in 1996 and 1997, opposition to Suharto 
rose rapidly. Various elements of the people across the nation, particularly from the middle class, 
showed support for Suharto’s removal.9  
 The peak of anti-Suharto movements took place in May 1998. Pro-democracy and anti-
Suharto movements demonstrated in Jakarta and other cities. The shooting of students on 12 
May and the rioting in Jakarta and Solo on 13–15 May 1998 made the call for Suharto’s removal 
even stronger. In addition, Suharto’s political supporters became more anxious about the 
increasing anger and frustration of the people. The ruling political elites split and fragmented.10 
On 18 May 1998 the MPR chairmen were forced to ask Suharto to resign. In the following two 
days fourteen of Suharto’s cabinet ministers resigned from their posts, which placed stronger 
pressure on Suharto to step down.  
On 21 May 1998 Suharto finally resigned. The people movement had successfully 
removed the symbol of the authoritarian centralist government. The entry point for reformasi 
(reform) had been obtained.11  
 
2. Institutional reform: ABRI, Golkar, Korpri 
The political structure of Suharto’s New Order regime, as many experts said, was 
complex.12 The replacement of Suharto was insufficient to bring about a democratic system. 
                                                 
8 Two well-known student radical groups were Aldera (Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat – The Alliance for 
People Democracy) and Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD — Democratic People Party.  See “Manifesto of 
the People’s Democratic Party”, 22 July 1996; and Aldera’s political statement sent to MPR/DPR 13 
January 1998.  
9 The advent of Amien Rais in political discourse on succession was significant. Since the mid-1990s he 
frequently spoke about the need for political preparation for the president’s succession. As an influential 
political scientist and the chairman of modernist Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, his opinion got 
various responses, either positive or cynical. To Jawa Pos daily he once stated that he was ready to be 
president in the 1997 general election. The statement got support from a group of people in Yogyakarta. 
See “Amien Rais: Saya Siap Jadi Capres”, Jawa Pos, 26 September 1997 and “Kami Dukung Amien 
Rais”, Bernas, 3 Oktober 1997. 
10 See Sukardi Rinakit, Op.cit. For initial analyses about the fall of Suharto, See Geoff Forrester & R.J. 
May eds., The Fall of Soeharto (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998). 
11 Four modes of political change from Samuel Huntington include transformation, replacement, 
transplacement and intervention. This formulation is used in Arief Budiman “The 1998 crisis: change and 
continuity in Indonesia” in Arief Budiman, et.al, Op.cit., pp.41–58. 
12 The complexity of Suharto’s New Order regime was described using different concepts such as 
beambtenstaat, authoritarianism, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, corporatism, primordial cum military 
regime, and authoritarian bureaucratic capitalism. See Henk Schulte Nordholt and Hanneman Samuel, 
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Instead, all the elements of the authoritarian system needed to be changed and reconstructed. The 
reformasi total meant that all non-democratic institutions and practices had to be transformed. 
Such institutions encompassed the executive institutions involving cabinet members, the 
bureaucracy, and the military; legislative institutions consisting of MPR and DPR and to some 
extent political parties and the electoral system; and the judicial system including the Supreme 
Court and other related law enforcement institutions.13  
ABRI, Golkar, and the state bureaucracy came under intense pressure because of their 
crucial roles in sustaining the authoritarian New Order. 
 
The military (ABRI)  
Two main themes of protest against ABRI/TNI were its dual-function and its massive 
violations of human rights. By the dual-function, as has been discussed, the military held power 
in both defence and non-defence affairs.14  This political construction gave ABRI absolute power. 
ABRI had unquestionable authority to decide what was wrong, what or who were the enemies, 
and what punishment they were likely to receive. According to one scholar, the military had the 
power over the use of violence without proper management of this violence, the latter requiring 
legal restrictions and higher institutions to control and manage the use of violence.15 
The military political domination was obviously at the expense of civilian political 
freedom and security. Not only were people mobilized through officially recognized political 
channels, but they were also intimidated or terrorized. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of 
people died at the hands of their own military apparatus.16 In short, a number of Indonesian 
people lost their basic human rights because of the military political power and interests or the 
interests of those who paid the military most.17 
                                                                                                                                                
“Introduction: Indonesia After Soeharto: Rethinking Analytical Categories”, in Henk Schulte Nordholt 
and Hanneman Samuel eds., Indonesia in Transition (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004) pp. 1–15. 
13 A broader categorization involves state institutions, market institutions, and civil society institutions. 
14 For further information see See Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in 
Indonesia: Challenges, Politics and Power, © 2002, online book 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1599, accessed on 17 October 2003, pp. 69 and 72–4. 
15 Daniel Dhakidae, “Politik militer Indonesia dan kolonialisme internal” [Politics of Indonesian military 
and internal colonialism) in Anas S. Machfudz and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, eds., Military without 
Militarism (Jakarta: LIPI, 2001) pp. 139–49. 
16 See Geoff Simons, Indonesia: The Long Oppression (Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000). See also Joshua 
Barker, “State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Shuharto’s New Order”; and Jun Honna, 
“Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure During the Late Suharto Era: Political and 
Institutional Contexts”, in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson ed., Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia 
(Ithaca: SEAP, Cornell University, 2001) pp. 20-53 and 54–89. 
17 In The Jakarta Post, March 17, 2003. 
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For a long time pro-democracy activists and human rights NGOs,18 student groups,19 and 
many scholars had criticized the excessive involvement of ABRI in Indonesian politics.20  But 
with the arrival of the reform era, there was a common demand that ABRI/TNI had to ‘go back 
to its barracks’. The military had to leave their previous non-military roles and to respect civilian 
supremacy. Furthermore, pro-democracy and human rights activists also urged that ABRI/TNI 
officers and troops who had been involved in killings and other forms of massive human rights 
violation in the past should be brought to justice. Undoubtedly, all these criticisms led to great 
difficulties for ABRI related to its previous performance, existing and future interests in each of 
the following dimensions: organization, politics and economics.  
 
Golongan Karya (Golkar)  
As one of the very important institutions of the New Order regime, Golkar became a 
main target of political reform. Golkar had been the key political machine for Suharto’s political 
legitimacy and ABRI’s political domination. As such, for either political or academic reasons, 
criticisms of Golkar emerged when the New Order was still in power. There had been a growing 
demand for a multi-party system with free and fair general elections and for the abolition of 
Golkar privilege. But, more radical opposition to Golkar emerged following the fall of Suharto. 
A series of events from 1998 to 2001 put substantial pressure on Golkar. As Golkar 
ranked second behind PDIP in the 1999 election, mounting anti-Golkar sentiments accused the 
New Order’s party of continuing manipulative practice and ‘money politics’. Students organized 
in Famred (The Forum for Students’ Action for Reform and Democracy) demonstrated to 
demand Golkar be dissolved. They saw Golkar as the most likely obstacle to democratization 
and deemed it the New Order vehicle for retaining the political status-quo and re-capturing 
power.21 A headline in the Suara Merdeka daily labelled Golkar as a latent danger, a term which 
was used to label the communist party (PKI) in the Suharto era.22 Pressures on Golkar continued 
                                                 
18 Some of the human rights NGOs include LPHAM (Institute for the Defence of Human Rights), YLBHI 
(Indonesia Legal Aid), INSAN (Human Rights Information and Studies), Elsham (the Institute for Policy 
Research and Advocacy), Yapusham (the Centre for Human Rights Studies), PIPHAM (The Centre for 
Human Rights Information and Education), PBHI (the Centre of Indonesia Legal Aid) and PIJAR (The 
Centre for Information and Action Network for Reform). 
19 Apart from PRD and Aldera, student movements, among others, were SMID (Solidaritas Mahasiswa 
Indonesia untuk Demokrasi – Indonesia Student Solidarity for Democracy) and FAMI (Front Aksi 
Mahasiswa Indonesia – Indonesian Student Action Front). For these groups, ABRI was seen as part of the 
fascist government. 
20 PRD, “Society’s Pressing and Urgent Needs”. See also Manifesto of the People’s Democratic Party, 
July 22, 1996. 
21 “Famred Gelar Demo anti-Golkar,” Kompas, 31 March 1999. 
22 “Awas, Golkar Bahaya Laten,” Suara Merdeka, 31 March 1999. 
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in 2001. Kompak (Koalisi Mahasiswa anti Golkar – Student Coalition against Golkar), Koalisi 
Nasional anti-Orde Baru (National Coalition against the New Order), NGOs and thousands of 
people and public figures ran rallies to demand Golkar’s dissolution.23 Sri Bintang Pamungkas 
said that the crises of Indonesian economics, society, and politics were caused by Golkar.24 
Several of Golkar’s regional offices, mostly in East Java, were attacked and destroyed by the 
anti-Golkar protesters. 
 
The Bureaucracy 
The Bureaucracy or public service also became a critical target in reformasi total (total 
reform). Two main reasons for demands that this state institution be reformed were, first, its 
absolute loyalty toward Suharto’s authoritarian regime instead of servicing the public, and, 
second, the massive corruption, collusion, and nepotism. However, unlike ABRI and Golkar, the 
bureaucracy faced softer pressures from the reform movements. There was no single 
organization or radical action directed at the national association of public servants (Korpri), 
either as an institution or its individual members. Perhaps, realizing that Korpri was likely just 
the tool or victim of Suharto authority or that Korpri was very vital in continuing government 
administration, there was no demand to abolish Korpri, but rather that it return to its function as 
public servants rather than Suharto’s administrative vehicle.  
 
3. National transformation 
Compared to the first two levels of political transformation, reform at the national level 
demanding democratic principles was apparently less controversial, because reform at this level 
did not directly relate to particular political forces or threaten their interests. In its general 
understanding, political reform at the national level meant to transform the authoritarian regime 
to a democratic regime. The reform supporters argued that in the future the nation-state had to 
rely on the rule of law instead of on authoritarian power. It was also suggested that rather than 
the government, not least the military, the people had to be the centre of the state. This was the 
people who possess the national sovereignty. Furthermore, the centralized government had to be 
changed through decentralization programs. National power had to be distributed to regions and 
the local communities had to equally participate in national decision making processes and 
development programs. A good and clean government was another discourse within the political 
reform. It was in line with the anti-corruption, collusion and nepotism movement. As the 
                                                 
23 “Ribuan Orang Desak MA Bubarkan Golkar,” Kompas, 20 May 2001; “Perang Terbuka Melawan 
Golkar,” Gatra, 8 February 2001. 
24 “Sri Bintang memimpin demo bubarkan Golkar”, Tempointeraktif, 12 July 2001. 
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upcoming political system was expected to be no longer based on force and manipulation, the 
national governance mechanisms were also expected to adopt accountability and transparency 
principles. 
Nonetheless, the calls for democratic principles were not less dangerous. There were two 
main issues, namely the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI), in both political and territorial terms, 
and the Pancasila ideology which contributed to the eruption of violent conflicts, including in 
the three case studies proposed here. In the matter of NKRI, three main perceptions emerged 
from the collapse of the New Order regime: 
First, some argued that the unitary state had ended or had to be ended. This perception 
was particularly held by separatist groups. Fretilin and clandestine movements in East Timor, 
GAM in Aceh, RMS in Ambon and the Papua Free Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka — 
OPM) in Papua tended to view that the fall of Suharto and his militaristic regime had ended the 
illegal unification of their regions into NKRI. Or at least they saw the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarianism as a crucial moment in their striving for liberation from NKRI. 
Second, the unitary state form of Indonesia had to be reviewed. This perception was 
generally associated with the reformasi. Within this perception three notions were suggested for 
the new Indonesia: federalism, regional autonomy (otonomi daerah), and creation of new units 
of regional administration (pemekaran daerah). Mangunwijaya and Amien Rais were two 
prominent figures who seriously considered national plurality in ethnicity, culture, region, and 
religion as objective conditions for building Indonesia as a federal state. They argued that rather 
than a unitary state, the federalist state was more accommodating to the diverse societal entities 
and in the meantime could reduce the practice of authoritarian and centralized state power. 25   
Third, the unitary state of Indonesia still existed and had to be protected in its original 
state form as an expression of Indonesian nationalism. For government officials, nationalist-
integrationist politicians, and notably the military leaders, separatist movements and federalist 
ideas were dangerous. For the ABRI Commander, Wiranto, for instance, federalism was 
nonsense.26 He restated that the NKRI formulated by the founding fathers was already in its final 
form.27 The Minister of Home Affairs made a similar statement, “The government at all costs is 
determined to secure NKRI”.28 “The form of NKRI does not need to change to federal or another. 
                                                 
25 See in St. Sularto and T. Jakob Koekerits eds., Federalisme untuk Indonesia: Seminar Sehari 
“Federalisme, Mungkinkah bagi Indonesia?  (Jakarta: Kompas, 1999).  Amien Rais once said that 
Indonesian national integration can be conserved by either enlarged autonomy or federal system. See 
Kompas, 1 December 1999 and 9 December 1999 
26 See Kompas, 3 May 1999. 
27 In his address before a meeting of all provincial governors, see Kompas, 16 November 1999. 
28 Kompas, 13 December 1999. 
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What we need to do is to resolve its objective weaknesses”, Akbar Tanjung the DPR chairman, 
known as a nationalist politician, said.29 Megawati, the vice-president and the chairperson of 
PDIP – the largest party in the DPR, also stressed that “since the beginning the nation’s founding 
fathers were convinced that the best form of the Indonesia state was a unitary state.”30 
Another important issue within the political reform concerned Pancasila. As mentioned, 
Pancasila had been criticized, particularly because of the repressive role of the New Order 
regime in interpreting this ideology. The Pancasila ideology was mostly used to justify the 
government authority, interests and policies. The problem of Pancasila, however, was not 
limited to its interpretation but also its place as the state ideology. The fall of Suharto, on the one 
hand, had pushed Muslim groups with Islamic ideological orientation to be more radical in their 
activities. KISDI, DDII, FPI and Laskar Jihad were involved in various violent acts on behalf of 
Islamic teachings or shariah.31  On the other hand, the fall of the authoritarian regime had 
generated a feeling of uncertainty and anxiety among non-Muslim communities.32 The revival of 
Islamic ideology and the emergence of radical organizations forced non-Muslim entities to take 
all necessary actions to defend their political and religious rights.  
With such a political and social configuration the role of Pancasila as a unifying 
ideology was doubted. As tension rose and violent acts took place, one had the impression that it 
was not Pancasila but the authoritarian government and repressive security forces which had 
made for the apparently moderate, tolerant, and harmonious inter-religious interactions. And 
once the government and ABRI were no longer effective to secure these peaceful relationships, 
different religious groups were likely to engage in conflict and violent acts.  
The fear of Balkanization in Indonesia in the early period of reform was particularly 
related to the existence or revival of separatist movements in different regions. But, the threat of 
disintegration was also related to the likelihood of Pancasila being effective as a unifying 
ideology. While the question of NKRI, as raised by the separatist movements, was likely to form 
vertical conflicts, the question of Pancasila was likely to trigger a kind of horizontal conflict. 
And the interconnectedness between the two made the conflicts more complicated as shown by 
the violent regional conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh. 
 
                                                 
29 Kompas, 17 November 1999. 
30 Kompas, 16 July 2000. 
31 See Yunanto et al., Op.cit., p.4. See also Gatra, No. 1–2, 27 November 2004. This edition presents three 
kinds of Indonesian Islam in dealing with democracy: (a) pro-democracy Islam, (b) accept democracy 
with notes, and (c) against democracy Islam. 
32 See Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh, “Islam and the current transition to democracy in Indonesia” in Arief 
Budiman, et.al, Op.cit., p.204–5. 
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4. International issues 
The international capitalist and free market system was also the target of criticisms by 
some elements in Indonesia. It was argued that the international capitalist forces, on which 
Suharto’s New Order leaned to drive economic development, had made the country’s economy 
overly dependent and that in the end the country had been burdened by enormous foreign debts. 
With their left-populist ideologies, radical groups such as PRD, student wings, and some NGOs 
fiercely accused international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, IGGI/CGI, 
and many multinational corporations (MNCs) plus foreign donor states (Japan, USA, EU, 
Taiwan and others) of weakening the Indonesian economic structure and worsening national 
development. In this respect, PRD stated that “Indonesian economic development, which 
benefited only a small number of capital owners and was exploited by foreign investors, has 
precisely led the people to be more brutal. The people were even further away from the 
prosperity and justice goals”.33  
The rise of fuel prices and electricity and telephone charges due to the IMF recovery 
program in 1998 led students and NGO activists to form an alliance to oppose the IMF and other 
international financial organizations. The Pro Democratic Activist Network (Prodem) and LS-
ADI (Lingkar Studi – Aksi untuk Demokrasi Indonesia – Study and Action Circle for Indonesian 
Democracy) organized demonstrations and demanded that the IMF and the World Bank to 
cancel Indonesian debts. They argued, “The New Order government’s debts aren’t Indonesian 
people’s debts”.34 
The second theme of protest against the international system was its interventionist 
tendency. Some government officials, politicians and ABRI officers criticized foreign 
governments, international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) for having forced the implementation of liberal democracy 
and the universal principle of human rights upon Indonesia. They even blamed national pro-
democracy and human rights NGOs for being non-nationalist, anti-government, anti-Pancasila 
organizations or foreign henchmen who worked for foreign instead of national interests. 
Some sections of the Indonesian people also protested against Western states for 
allegedly having conspired to bring about the fall of Suharto and his authoritarian regime. 
Another allegation of international conspiracy was associated with the eruption of regional 
                                                 
33 “Manifesto of the People’s Democratic Party”, 22 July 1996. 
34 “LSM Minta IMF Hapus Utang Indonesia”, Tempointeraktif, 23 April 2001. See also Prijo Wasono, 
“Alliances against globalization: New alliances are formed against IMF and foreign debt”, Inside 
Indonesia, Oct – Dec 2003. 
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conflicts. 35  As we will see, there were allegations that Western countries played a role in 
supporting separatist movements in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh.  
In contrast, there were a number of national pro-democracy and human rights activists 
and NGOs who praised the role of the international community. Those associated with the 
International NGO Forum on Indonesia Development (INFID), for example, believed that 
foreign governments and organizations played a vital role in Indonesian democratization.36 
Nevertheless, pro-democracy and human rights activists often criticized the international 
community for insufficient willingness to act, unresponsiveness, and lack of responsibility in 
handling Indonesia’s ‘multiple-crisis’. In line with the fourth mode of political transition,37 they 
believed that democratization and human rights could be imposed by external forces.  
 What kind of role the international community could and would play in political reform 
in Indonesia was determined by the norms within the new international system. As has been 
discussed, the post-Cold War international order has been promoting a system which is based on 
democratic governance rather than merely on a sovereign state system. Every government is 
required to be democratic and respectful of human rights. Nevertheless, it is also obvious that 
major international states and organizations have also interests in security and economic issues. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, most of the problems within the international system emerged 
because of the disjuncture between the interest in promoting democracy and human rights on the 
one hand and the interests in non-humanitarian fields on the other. All these global principles 
and practices, as will be discussed in the following chapters, were definitely determining the 
roles of the international community in resolving the violent internal conflicts in Indonesia. 
 
C. Reformasi and the political dynamics of internal conflict  
 
The broad agenda of reform reflected the optimistic and holistic view of the democratic 
future of the Indonesian nation-state. Reformasi was not just limited to the replacement of 
Suharto or his successor Habibie. The resignation of Suharto was likely to pave the way for the 
transformation of the notorious and repressive ABRI, the hegemonic Golkar and the corrupt 
bureaucracy. It was hoped that reform at these two levels would lead to reform at the national 
                                                 
35 See Sukardi Rinakit, Op.cit., p. 3. 
36 Anders Uhlin clearly depicts the dissemination of democratic ideas by both interactive and comparative 
forms. See Anders Uhlin, Democracy and Diffusion, Op.cit., pp. 151–206. See also Bob 
S. Hadiwinata, The Politics of NGOs in Indonesia: Developing democracy and managing a movement 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
37 See Arief Budiman, “The 1998 crisis: change and continuity in Indonesia”, in Arief Budiman et al, 
Opcit. 
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level. The “Java-based” and/or the Jakarta-centric system was expected to be more 
“Indonesianized” and/or decentralized. The implementation of Pancasila ideology was expected 
to be more consistent. All these changes were expected to bring a more adaptive but effective 
nation-state within the new international system.  
Nevertheless, reformasi perhaps firstly reflected the emergence of serious challenges or 
even threats to the interests of those who had benefited from the previous political system. There 
was no doubt that these groups would take all necessary steps to maintain their privileges or at 
least to avoid radical loss. On the other hand, reformasi was also seen as an opportunity by the 
longstanding oppressed groups to achieve their political interests.  
How to conduct democratization without harming the interests of certain political groups 
was problematic. Earnest attempts to work out those problems did not guarantee that 
democratization would be free from troubles. Democratization could slow down or be delayed. 
Democratization, as it was promised by reformasi, “is not a panacea for a collapsing state”, 
Marina Ottaway suggested. She further said, democratization “can lead toward democracy, but it 
can also hasten state collapse. Conflict becomes more overt”.38  
The links between the reform era and the eruption of various violent conflicts could be 
described as below.  
First, there was no clarity about the extent or scope of each level of political reform. 
While the four levels of the reform agenda outlined above were commonly accepted, at least in 
the abstract, the scope of each level was vague and led to controversy. For example, the 
replacement of Suharto was generally welcomed, but the students’ demand for his trial for 
alleged corruption and human rights violation instantly generated controversy, resistance and 
animosity from Suharto’s loyalists.  A similar configuration occurred in the case of ABRI and 
Golkar. ABRI’s leaders seemed to admit the necessity to revise its dual function. But, the calls 
for ABRI to return to its barracks and for the trial of the military officers who had committed 
massive human rights violations resulted in acrimony from the military. Golkar also seemed to 
immediately restructure its organization and redefine its orientation to address the changing 
politics.39 But, political opponents also asked for Golkar to be dissolved and its leaders to be 
held responsibility for past mistakes.  
                                                 
38 Marina Ottaway, “Democratization in Collapsed States,” in I. William Zartman ed., Collapsed States: 
The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers Inc., 1995) p. 239.  
39 On 9 – 10 July 1998 Golkar conducted an extra-ordinary meeting (musyawarah luar biasa, MLB). The 
meeting resulted in a new organizational committee led by Akbar Tanjung and new political orientation. 
See “Golkar Harus Introspeksi,” Kompas, 29 July 1998; “MLB Golkar Didemo,” Kompas, 10  July 1998; 
and “Akbar Tanjung: Golkar Dituntut Paradigma Baru,” Kompas 25 July 1998. 
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One critical issue in regard to the vague boundaries of the level of political reform was 
the concept of the right to self-determination. Rather than emphasizing the right of individuals to 
have a democratic government – this was the main theme of reformasi – several regions were 
demanding the right of groups to determine their political destiny by simply having their own 
state.40  Without any clarity in the scope and connection between different levels of reform, post-
Suharto politics was likely to be left without orientation or priority.  
Second, pro- and anti-reformasi supporters were fragmented. It was extremely difficult 
to precisely identify parties and their political stances within the transitional politics. The issues 
or levels of political reform above did not outright indicate their supporting groups. While 
political analyses tended to simplify that students, intellectuals, journalists, urban workers and 
human rights activists were the principal supporters of political reform, it was hard to precisely 
identify those who opposed democratization. ABRI and Golkar were widely seen as pro-status 
quo, but in different forums they often claimed to support democratization. Other forces like 
PDIP, PPP and other new political parties, Islamic organizations and ethnic and regional entities 
were difficult to classify as pro or contra political reform at one or more of the levels above.  
Reform pressures led to Habibie, ABRI, Golkar and the bureaucracy being fragmented 
instead of being reconsolidated. On one hand this prevented the emergence of a new 
authoritarian regime. On the other hand, the fragmentation deteriorated the capacity of 
government institutions to function effectively. In the mean time, the old and newly formed 
opposition political parties, mass organizations and individual leaders also disintegrated. Worse, 
certain government institutions were allowed to take decisions without adhering to widely 
agreed upon rules of law or check and balance mechanisms from other political forces. As we 
will see, Habibie’s policy to offer East Timor a referendum and the excessive military 
involvement in regional conflicts took place in this circumstance. Continuing a huge agenda of 
reform without the principle of the rule of law and strong political institutions, the post-Suharto 
politics was likely to bring the country into chaos and anarchy.   
Finally, the overlapping issues of reformasi and the changing position of elite and 
political forces with respect to reform contributed to the complexity of violent internal conflicts. 
In the first instance, there was a revolutionary conflict with the aim of changing Suharto 
dictatorship to a democratic government. But, there was also ideological conflict since there 
were groups who wanted Indonesia to embrace on Islamic religious orientation. The demands of 
some regions to have greater roles in the national political system and a greater share of revenues 
in national economic development contributed to communal identity conflict. Regions where 
                                                 
40 Marina Ottaway, Op.cit., p. 238. 
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some groups demanded independence from NKRI intensified the secession or separatist conflict. 
There were also factional conflicts, with different political groups competing for power 
and/economic interests.  
All these problems influenced the dynamics of internal violent conflicts that took place 
in the time of political reform. Simplifying these problems, the dynamics of conflict, which 
indicated the escalation or de-escalation and perpetuation or termination of violent conflicts, 
were therefore strongly affected by several factors. First, transitional politics and the 
longstanding internal weaknesses of Indonesian nationality and statehood had become important 
to these internal conflicts. Second, the issues and the parties to the conflicts overlapped. The 
third factor was the lack of cohesiveness and coordination among government institutions. In the 
meantime, vested interests of non-governmental political forces such as political parties, the 
military and individual leaders likely fuelled the conflicts. The final factor contributing to the 
dynamics of the conflicts was the international environment. The internationalization of 
democracy and human rights contributed to the eruption and escalation of violent conflicts. 
However, as we will see, the three domestic factors above were more influential to the dynamics 
of the conflicts.  
The dynamics of each conflict affected how the violent conflicts in East Timor, Maluku 
and Aceh were resolved. Before discussing the resolutions, these dynamics need to be 
investigated.  
 
 
D. Violent internal conflict in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh 
 
Considering the different kinds of violent conflicts that emerged out of the political 
transition, the conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh were chosen as the cases of this 
research. To ensure theoretical consistency with respect to the dynamics of the conflicts and 
taking into account the technical principles of comparative analysis, how the three internal 
conflicts are mapped is crucial. The theoretical guidance suggested that there are three main 
aspects in conflict mapping: (1) the background of the conflict, (2) the conflict parties and issues, 
and (3) the global, regional and state contexts of the conflict.41 In the interest of assessing the 
possibility of international humanitarian intervention, another aspect needs to be added: (4) the 
effects of the violent conflicts. The extent of complex humanitarian emergencies or humanitarian 
                                                 
41 See Miall et al. and Patrick Regan, Chapter Two, Supra pp. 38–40.  
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crises caused by conflicts, as has been discussed, was the theoretical or normative reason for the 
presence of external humanitarian intervention.  
In general, the weaknesses of the Indonesian nation-state as discussed in Chapter Three 
were the background of the conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh. The transitional politics 
following the collapse of the Suharto government were both an additional background and the 
context at a state level of the conflicts. The solidarist tendency of the post-Cold War system, 
emphasizing the internationalization of democracy and human rights, was the global context of 
the conflicts. What is important to emphasize about the conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and 
Aceh in the following sections and chapters are the issues, the parties and the effects of the 
conflicts. These are presented case-by-case. 
 
1. East Timor and the popular consultation  
Decolonization in Portuguese Timor only began following political change in Portugal 
in April 1974. Three prominent political groups emerged in Timor to respond to this change: 
Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT), Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (Apodeti), 
and Association of Timorese Social Democrats (ASDT), which was later popularly known as the 
Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin). Each party had political 
preferences and led the territory into internal armed conflict. The smallest group, Apodeti, had 
an opinion that East Timor was politically and economically too weak to be an independent 
nation and therefore advocated integration with Indonesia. UDT favoured a link with Lisbon, 
while Fretilin wanted full independence. As the largest party, Fretilin unilaterally proclaimed the 
independence of a Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET) on 28 November 1975. 
It was obvious that these different political groups shared the same idea that the East 
Timorese had the right to determine the future of their territory. But, at that time, without a 
consensus based decision and although Fretilin had declared East Timor independence, 
Indonesia invaded in December 1975 and annexed the territory on 31 May 1976 as Indonesia’s 
twenty-seventh province. 
The Indonesian incorporation of East Timor faced strong opposition from the UN and 
the Portuguese, the former colonial administrator. They argued that the integration of East Timor 
within Indonesia was an offence to international principles of the right to self-determination, 
political freedom and independence, and that the use of force was against the territorial integrity 
of the East Timorese.42 Historical and cultural arguments were also proposed to show that the 
                                                 
42 See for example General Assembly Resolution 3485 (XXX), “Question of Timor”, 12 December 1975 
and also the Security Council Resolution 384 (1975), 22 December 1975. In both resolutions it was stated 
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incorporation was illegal and that the East Timorese right to self-determination had to be 
restored.43 
In attempts to justify the integration, the Indonesian government argued that the 
incorporation was based on the consent of the East Timorese through the Balibo Declaration 
(signed on 29 November 1975), in which the leaders of UDT, Apodeti, KOTA, and Trabalhista 
demanded Indonesian political and military assistance. 44 In this sense, Indonesia accepted the 
principle of self-determination, arguing that the Balibo Declaration reflected East Timorese 
political rights. But it was widely believed that Indonesian domestic politics, which was marked 
by the emerging role of ABRI and the anti-communist campaign, motivated the annexation.45 
And due to the existing Cold War system it was said that the major countries such as Australia, 
the USA, France and the UK opposed the emergence of DRET and preferred the incorporation 
of East Timor within Indonesia.46 
For more than two decades East Timor was effectively controlled by Indonesia. And 
since the country was ruled by Suharto’s authoritarian regime, the same regime also generally 
applied in East Timor. It was a combination of military repression, political co-optation, and 
economic incentives. One major difference was that East Timor, in the first decade of the 
incorporation, was the location of massive military operations. The military took the decision to 
close East Timor to the external world in order to extend their operations. It was publicly 
reported that around 200,000 people died as a result of this ‘politics of integration’.  
By 1989 Indonesia’s East Timor policy changed, partly because of national and 
international pressures. The military approach was softened through a “smile policy”, which was 
                                                                                                                                                
to call upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its 
people to self-determination and to call upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all 
its forces from the territory. 
43 See David Hoy, Target Timor: An Account of East Timor (Toowoomba, Qld, 1999) p. 8. 
44 See Yayasan Hak and Fotilos, Timor Lorosae: Sebuah Tragedi Kemanusiaan [Timor Lorosae: A 
Humanitarian Tragedy] (Jakarta, n.d.), pp. 9–14. 
45 See Jose Ramos-Horta, Towards A Peaceful Solution in East Timor (Sydney: the East Timor Relief 
Association Inc., 1997); Jusuf Wanandi, Official Statement for the Public Hearing held by Commission for 
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), Dili, 15 December 2003; Geoffrey C. Gunn, 
“The Five-Hundred-Year Timorese Funu” in Richard Tanter, et al., eds., Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flower: 
East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press Australia Pty Ltd., 2001) 
pp. 10–12.  
46 The invasion of East Timor took place after the US President Gerald Ford and his Secretary State Henry 
Kissinger talked with President Suharto in Jakarta. About Australia’s view, David Hoy wrote that 
Australia realized that Indonesia was likely to successfully annex Portuguese Timor. Military opposition 
for Australia was not an option due to a lack of resources, limited military capabilities, inability to deal 
with the potential indirect affects (refugees etc.) and that the USA favoured Indonesian annexation 
(probably because they were convinced FRETILIN was communist) and because of the interest to secure 
the potential untapped oil and gas reserves in Timor gap. See David Hoy, Op.cit, p. 30–1. Resourceful 
information about the role of the US, see 
http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/index.htm.  
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accompanied by social and economic development.47  Nevertheless, the social and economic 
approaches were continually undermined by the military. Terrorizing and intimidating people, 
exploiting local divisions and employing a network of spies and local provocateurs were the 
standard practices. In addition, the provincial administration in both civilian and military units 
was involved in rampant corruption and other abuses of power, which caused growing anti-
government feelings. The government policies on transmigration and development also 
generated fear of Islamization and Javanization among local communities. 
The issue of the East Timorese right to self-determination plagued Indonesia’s 
administration. Fretilin and its claim for independence persisted. Under the leadership of Xanana 
Gusmao, Fretilin carried out its struggle on three different fronts: the military front under Falintil, 
the political front with a clandestine strategy, and the international diplomatic front under the 
influential figure of Jose Ramos Horta. All fronts were organized under CRRN (National 
Council of Revolutionary Resistance, established in 1981), which was then changed to CNRM 
(National Council of Maubere Resistance, in 1987) and was later changed to CNRT (National 
Council of Timorese Resistance) in 1998.48 
While the East Timorese under the Fretilin umbrella represented the genuine struggle for 
East Timor’s independence, there were other groups of East Timorese who saw the integration 
with NKRI as realistic. These groups included East Timorese who had politically and 
economically benefited from the New Order corporatist policies. Some of them occupied good 
positions in national and regional political and governmental institutions. For these groups the 
issue of the right to self-determination had been subsumed within the unitary state of Indonesia. 
However, difficulties persisted due to campaigns launched by pro-democracy and 
human rights activists. In the post-Suharto era these groups tended to deliberately associate the 
right to self-determination with general issues of human rights. This was in part related to the 
reform demands spreading across the nation and in part a tactical manoeuvre to avoid ABRI’s 
reprisal. Proposing democratization and human rights issues was rather less sensitive and 
dangerous than contesting the right to self-determination, which was officially seen by the 
military as a serious threat to NKRI.  
It is worth noting that the claim for the right to self-determination and the struggle for 
human rights in East Timor were not limited to East Timorese elements. Many Indonesians 
                                                 
47 See in Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, “Indonesian Politics under Suharto”, Op.cit., p. 185. 
48 Research and analysis about the East Timorese resistance can be read in Sarah Niner, “A Long Journey 
of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of CNRT” in Richard Tanter et al., Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flower, 
Op.cit., pp. 15–29; Helen Mary Hill, Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor Lorosae (Dili: Yayasan HAK 
dan Sahe Institute for Liberation, 2000) as an Indonesian version of FRETILIN: The Origins, Ideologies 
and Strategies of a Nationalist Movement in East Timor (MA Thesis, Monash University, May 1978). 
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shared deep concern about the brutality and impunity of the security forces in dealing with East 
Timor. In a response to the mass killing at Santa Cruz cemetery for instance, many pro-
democracy and human rights activists demonstrated in protest against ABRI and the 
government.49 While they rallied in front of the UN office in Jakarta, a student association in 
Yogyakarta made a petition: 
 
For humanitarianism and common welfare we strongly demand the government to revise 
the integration, which apparently brings about much more victims that are unequal to the 
East Timorese adoption of integration. We ask a referendum supervised by the UN in 
order to know the true will of the East Timorese.50 
 
Another student movement in Bandung expressed a similar request, “to demand the Indonesian 
government to withdraw all its armed forces from East Timor and to give East Timorese their 
complete and free right to determine their fate in order to avoid meaningless death”.51  
The international elements also regularly called upon the Indonesian government to 
respect human rights in East Timor. International NGOs such as Amnesty International (AI) and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), the UN and the EU country members constantly condemned 
violations of human rights in that region and even called for the fulfilment of the East Timorese 
rights for self-determination. As mentioned earlier, the Dutch and the US governments had 
suspended foreign aid and military assistance to Indonesia in response to the Santa Cruz tragedy.  
A fundamental change in dealing with East Timor emerged following the nomination of 
Habibie to replace Suharto.  On 9 June 1998 President Habibie made a public announcement that 
the East Timorese would be granted special status or broader autonomy within NKRI. But it was 
not the goal that Fretilin had fought for. Most East Timorese people and leaders rejected the 
offer and demanded the right to self-determination through a referendum.52 According to Xanana 
Gusmao, the East Timorese leader in jail at that time, Habibie’s proposal for political autonomy 
                                                 
49 These protesters included Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights (Infight), LPHAM, Pijar, 
Yayasan Hidup Baru (New Life Foundation), YAPIPHAM, Institut Sosial Jakarta (ISJ), the Joint 
Committee for the Defence of the East Timorese (JCDET), student organizations, and individual figures 
demanded the government to review its policies upon East Timor. See Kompas, 20 November 1991. 
50  Quoted from George J. Aditjondro, Menyongsong Matahari Terbit di Puncak Ramelau (Jakarta: 
Yayasan HAK and FORTILOS, 2000) p. 250. 
51 Ibid., p. 251. Other important organizations advocating the East Timorese interests were Solidaritas 
Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia untuk Rakyat Maubere (SPRIM – Indonesian people solidarity for Maubere 
people), Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi (SMID – Indonesian Student Solidarity for 
Democracy), Solidaritas Mahasiswa Timor Timur (SOLIDAMOR – East Timor Student Solidarity). In 
addition, two political parties PRD (People Democratic Party) and PUDI (the Party of Indonesian 
Democracy Union) publicly supported the East Timorese right to self-determination. 
52 Agence France Press, 6 and 13 June 1998, 18 July 1998, 14 August 1998, 3 and 9 September 1999. 
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for East Timor was like putting the cart before the horse.53 The situation became clearer on 27 
January 1999 when Habibie announced that if the East Timorese rejected the special autonomy, 
East Timor would be considered to have seceded and become an independent state.  
Habibie’s policy was then followed by the resumption of tripartite talks between the 
Indonesian and Portuguese governments under the auspices of the UN on 28 January 1999.54 The 
talks concluded on 5 May 1999. An agreement was reached that primarily stipulated that the 
three parties agreed on a popular consultation for the East Timorese people to decide whether to 
accept the special autonomy proposal within Indonesia or to reject it, leading to the separation of 
East Timor from Indonesia.55 
The policy change in Jakarta and the tripartite agreement in New York significantly 
impacted the political landscape in East Timor. The issue of human rights and democratization 
in the region became irrelevant. The issue now was the choice between special autonomy and 
independence. While those advocating for human rights and democratization in East Timor had 
lost ground, the East Timorese people were divided into two groups: those accepting special 
autonomy and those rejecting it.  
However, there were no clear criteria that could sharply define the social groupings in 
the lead up to the popular consultation scheduled on 30 August 1999.56 Since the East Timorese 
displayed a single common ethnicity under Indonesian rule, the number of sub-ethnic groups did 
not function as a meaningful reference point for social divisions and disputes before the ballot. 
Religion was pointless too, because more than 90 per cent of East Timorese were Catholic 
adherents. Instead of ethnicity or religion, the East Timorese groupings were mainly based on 
their historical perceptions, political orientations, and economic interests.  
The group supporting the special autonomy were those who had benefited economically 
and politically from East Timor’s integration with Indonesia.  But as characterized by the 
                                                 
53 Agence France Press, 14 July 1998. See also “East Timorese Rebels Welcome Offer,” Associated Press, 
January 31, 1999. 
54 For the interest to have international recognition on Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, the 
Indonesian government in 1982 agreed to hold a tripartite talk with the former administration power 
Portugal under the auspices of the UN. The talks stalled but were resurrected caused by the increasing 
international pressures after the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991. In 1997 the UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan made a breakthrough by assigning a Personal Representative on East Timor, 
Jamsheed Marker. See also “East Timor Talks Continue,” Associated Press, February 3, 1999. 
55 See Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East 
Timor 5 May 1999, Articles 1 – 6. This agreement was signed by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, 
the UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan and Portugal Foreign Minister Jaime Gama. Apart from the 
agreement on popular consultation, the three parties also agreed on the modalities (Modalities Agreement), 
set up the schedule, process, and criteria required for popular consultation, and the Security Agreement, 
stipulated that Indonesia hold the responsibility to ensure secure environment for popular consultation.   
56 The popular consultation was firstly scheduled on 8 August, but because of security problem it was 
rescheduled on 22 August, and was finally conducted on 30 August 1999. 
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authoritarian regime, they were only a small number of East Timorese. Most of them worked as 
government officials, political figures, public servants, military officers and traders.  
In approaching the popular consultation, the pro-integration group organized public 
meetings and mobilizations of people. Around 14,000 East Timorese out of 30,000 civil servants 
(Korpri) were endorsed to use their influence to obtain support for the autonomy option. Those 
who were not willing to make personal pledges to support autonomy were automatically 
assumed to be members of the CNRT and were therefore at risk. Employees at the provincial 
level, bupati (heads) and employees of 13 districts, camat (heads) and local employees of 63 
sub-districts, and kepala desa (heads) of the 442 villages were pressured to commit to voting for 
integration. In early April 1999, Governor Soares, accompanied by the regional military 
commander, Col. Tono Suratman, and the head of regional police, Col. Timbul Silaen, held a 
meeting with civil servants in Ermera District. He explained that since they were public servants 
and paid by the Indonesian government, they should support autonomy within NKRI. Failure to 
comply with this political direction would be punished by loss of job, cessation of salary, 
confiscation of government property (such as vehicles and housings), and other forms of threat 
and intimidation.57  
On the other side, the group rejecting special autonomy and preferring the independence 
of East Timor were those who were mindful of East Timor’s different historical and political 
background from that of Indonesia, and that Indonesian annexation in 1975/6 was illegal. They 
were also those who suffered from social discrimination, physical oppression, and political 
repression under Indonesian rule. A former pro-independence student activist described the 
situation as follows: 
 
[B]ecause the Indonesians made a mistake right from the beginning, starting in 1975, by 
killing almost a third of the population, so that almost everyone in East Timor had lost 
family. Despite all the repression to stop the resistance, we were able to carry on. The 
idea of the right to self-determination and independence had been inculcated for many 
years. So when we spoke about the referendum in East Timor, the immediate reaction 
among Timorese was against Indonesia and for independence. The repression explains 
everything.58 
 
On 9 September 1998 the old political groups such as Fretilin, UDT, Apodeti, Sons of 
Mountain Warriors (KOTA) and the Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista) met in Dili and joined 
                                                 
57 See Amnesty International, East Timor: Seize the Moment, 21 June 1999, AI Index: ASA 21/49/99. 
58 Constancio Pinto, “The Student Movement and the Independence Struggle in East Timor: An 
Interview,” in Richard Tanter, et al., Op.cit, p. 38. 
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together in the National Council of Resistance of the People of East Timor (CNRT).59 They 
named Xanana Gusmao as their leader. They rejected the idea of autonomy or special status and 
demanded a referendum on self-determination. They established offices from the capital city of 
Dili down to district and village level. This was followed by student demonstrations in Dili 
demanding the release of Xanana Gusmao from prison and calling for East Timorese 
independence. Thousands of regional civil servants organized a silent but massive protest to 
condemn Governor Soares who threatened to fire those who disapproved of the autonomy 
proposal. Several demonstrations organized by East Timorese students and people took place in 
Dili, Jakarta and other cities demanding the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops and the 
deployment of the UN peace-keeping forces.  
By looking at this political development, it can be seen that the parties to the conflict 
were a faction who wanted the East Timorese incorporation and another faction who fought for 
East Timor’s independence. As it was promulgated in the 5 May 1999 Agreement that only the 
East Timorese were allowed to vote60, the competing parties were all East Timorese. In this 
context, the conflict took the form of horizontal or communal conflict. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the conflict in East Timor was not in an isolated 
environment. From the time of East Timor’s annexation, the conflict was widely perceived as a 
liberation or decolonization war, or a conflict against Indonesian occupation.61 Although the 
armed resistance under Falintil had been relatively small in the last years of Indonesia’s rule, the 
idea for independence was still alive.62 Habibie’ policy to run the popular consultation sought to 
highlight the vertical nature of the conflict which had triggered communal conflict.  
What intensified the conflict surrounding the popular consultation to the level of a 
deadly conflict was the (re-)formation of militia or paramilitary groups. These groups were 
mostly affiliated to the pro-integration faction. In order to mobilize supporters for special 
autonomy, militia groups used or threatened to use violence. Intimidation, terror, torture and 
killing were also directed against pro-independence leaders and supporters. In short, the use of 
                                                 
59 CNRT was formed by resistance representatives in the diaspora in Portugal 23-27 April 1998.  
60 The agreement regarding the modalities gave the entitlement to vote to persons aged 17 years or above, 
born in East Timor, born outside East Timor but with at least one parent having been born in East Timor, 
or whose spouses fall under either of the two categories mentioned before. 
61 In this case one may argue that it was not an internal conflict or intra-state conflict of Indonesia. Rather, 
it was an inter-state conflict between a colonized people of East Timorese and Indonesian colonial power. 
See for example Gerry van Klinken, “Big States and Little Secessionist Movements”, in Damien 
Kingsbury ed., Op.cit., pp. 157–68. 
62 The Fretilin’s armed struggle sustained for two to three years from the first time of Indonesian troop 
invasion. The massive attacks of Indonesian military personnel and arms and the killings of Fretilin’s 
leaders, including Nicolao Lobato, in 1977 brought an end of Falintil offensive forces. Interview with ex 
Falintil member in Dili, 17 April 2004.   
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coercive acts had been the prime strategy of the pro-autonomy faction to win the popular 
consultation. 
The most notorious militia groups were Besi Merah Putih (BMP – Iron Rod for the Red 
and White – the colour of Indonesian flag), Mahidi (Mati atau Hidup demi Integrasi – Live or 
Die for Integration [with Indonesia]), Aitarak (Thorn), and Halilintar (Thunderbolt). 
Approaching the ballot day there were more than twenty pro-integration militia groups formed 
with the aim of mobilizing supporters and eliminating opponents.63  
In addition to the formation of militia or paramilitary groups whose links to ABRI were 
hard to show, the activation of Hansip (civilian defence), Ratih (trained civilians), Wanra 
(people’s resistance), Kamra (people’s security), and pam-swakarsa (voluntarily security forces) 
was clearly associated with ABRI, the national police (Polri) and government institutions.64 All 
these groups that supposedly helped maintain security were in fact pro-autonomy supporters and 
part of the militias.  
With around 30,000 members, the militia groups were involved in various incidents of 
violence that took place across the territory in the pre-ballot period, as well as in systematic 
destruction after the ballot day. Two youths were killed during a clash between pro-
independence protestors and those who wanted to remain part of Indonesia in February 1999 in 
Liquica. Violence in Liquica reoccurred on 6 April 1999.  Some 2,000 pro-independence people 
who sought shelter in a church compound were attacked by BMP militia supported by the 
district military command leaving 60 people killed and many more injured.65  
                                                 
63 Human Rights Watch 1999; ETISC; Tapol, East Timor under the Indonesian Jackboot: An Analysis of 
Indonesian Army Documents, written by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong; Peter Bartu, “The 
Militia, the Military, and the People of Bobonaro,” in Richard Tanter et al., Op.cit., pp. 73–90; Amnesty 
International Report 1999. Amnesty International divides paramilitary units (Halilintar, Makikit, Tim Alfa, 
Tim Saka, and Tim Sera) from militia groups.  
64 Ratih is an old idea and a broad term involving all forms and meanings of civilian engagement in 
People’s Defence and Security System. Ratih is formed and trained by ABRI and is intended to assist 
ABRI in dealing with external invasion and internal rebellion. Wanra is particularly linked to the military 
and Kamra is the police (Polri) auxiliaries. Under national law Wanra is allowed access to ABRI weapons. 
HANSIP is under government control, specifically the Department of Home Affairs. Meanwhile, pam-
swakarsa or voluntary militia does not have a clear position and link to certain institution and does not 
exist in the national security and defence structure. The legal basis for the formation of the involvement of 
civilians in security and defence affairs are Law No.20/1982 for RATIH and Presidential Decision 
(Kepres) No.55/1978 for Kamra. 
65 The number of deaths was unknown exactly. According to the Dili Diocesan Bishop 25 had died inside 
the priest’s house but the number died outside in the churchyard was unknown. A nun who claimed to 
have accounted the bodies said it was 62 of death. From the ABRI version, the number was 5 dead and 25 
injured. UNTAET investigation in October 2000 estimated the death toll was 60. Indonesian National 
Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in its investigation report January 2000 recorded 
approximately thirty people were killed, See Komnas HAM, Report on Investigation of Human Rights 
Violations in East Timor: Executive Summary (Jakarta, 31 January 2000). 
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In Dili, on 17 April 1999 around 20 to 30 trucks and 1,000 Aitarak militias convoyed 
and circled the town. They opened fire into the air and attacked the houses of pro-independence 
supporters and leaders. The Aitarak leader, Erico Guterres, instructed all pro-integration militia 
to conduct cleansing of all those who betrayed integration and also ordered them to kill if needed. 
The house of Manuel Carrascalao, the leader of the pro-independence Movement for 
Reconciliation and Unification of the East Timorese People (GRPRTT – Gerakan Rekonsiliasi 
dan Persatuan Rakyat Timor Timur), where some 150 unarmed refugees were sheltered, was 
attacked. The house of Leandro Isaac, the senior leader of CNRT, was also ransacked. In this 
event, the office of Suara Timor Timur (the Voice of East Timor) daily, the only newspaper in 
East Timor, was destroyed. Through the parade and attacks more than twenty people died, 
including Manuel Carrascalao’s son.66  
Violence in East Timor continued, although on 21 April 1999 a ‘peace agreement’ had 
been signed by pro-integration figures and pro-independence leaders. The agreement was 
endorsed by General Wiranto in his visit to Dili and witnessed by provincial Governor Abilio 
Soares, regional military commander Col. Tono Suratman, and regional police chief Timbul 
Silaen, and also the two bishops of Dili and Baucau. But on the day of and in the days after the 
signing of the agreement violent incidents occurred in Suai, Lospalos, Maliana, Viqueque, 
Ermera, Hera, and other places, resulting in a number of deaths.  
Incidents of intimidation and violence were also directed at the UNAMET personnel 
assigned to conduct the popular consultation. Militia groups increasingly intensified their 
activities in nearly all districts after the 5 May Agreement. Almost every day violent clashes 
took place between the two conflicting parties, with a number of casualties. In the last day of a 
two-week campaign, 26 August, thousands of autonomy supporters rallied in Dili and Aitarak 
militia were involved in attacking and destroying houses, cars, and a CNRT office, and in 
threatening journalists. At least two East Timorese were killed during this rally.  
Violence resumed after the ballot on 30 August 1999 (which took place in a relatively 
calm atmosphere). By 2 September pro-integration militia were continuing intimidation of and 
threats against the pro-independence group. Two people were reportedly murdered in Ermera 
and over a dozen were killed in the enclave of Oecussi in the first 48 hours after the polling day.  
Violence in East Timor culminated on the days after the announcement of the ballot 
result, 4 September 1999; only 21.5 per cent (94,388) chose autonomy and the absolute majority 
78.5 per cent (344,580) rejected it or chose independence. On the afternoon of that day a UN 
Civilian Policeman (CIVPOL) was shot.  By the evening of 5 September houses, buildings, and 
                                                 
66 Amnesty International Report 1999. According to Komnas HAM the death toll was fifteen.  
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cars in Dili and other towns were attacked and burned to the ground. Warehouses, shops, and 
homes were looted. Thousands of people were forced to flee to the hills to avoid militia anger 
and attack. On 6 September militia attacked Bishop Belo’s residence where some 5,000 East 
Timorese sheltered and the ICRC office was ransacked. On 7 September a large number of East 
Timorese were forcibly relocated to West Timor (Indonesia). According to the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) only around 200,000 of East Timor’s 800,000 
people were still living in their own homes in the days after the announcement of the results of 
the popular consultation. The widespread violence and destruction in the couple of days after the 
announcement of the ballot result had caused 1,093 deaths.67   
 
 
2. Violent Communal Conflict in Maluku 
The conflict in Maluku was multidimensional in nature. At the outset the conflict was 
perceived as a riot between the local Ambonese and non-Ambonese migrants. The security 
forces officers told the press that the indigenous Ambonese were disputing with people of other 
ethnic originis, including Bugis, Buton, and Makasar (the so-called BBM group) from the 
neighbouring provinces of Sulawesi. The cause of the conflict, according to the military officers, 
was economic.68  Such identifications, however, changed quickly. Local and national media 
reported that the conflict was between the Christian and Muslim Ambon communities. 69 
Whereas the “Christians” referred to local Ambonese, the “Muslim” society comprised the local 
Ambonese and other ethnic groups from Sulawesi and Java. The involvement of these different 
ethnic and religious adherents constituted this inter-ethno-religious conflict. In its development, 
the conflict was also described as a conflict between those who struggled for the national 
integration of NKRI and those who wanted to secede from NKRI and establish a Republic of the 
South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan – RMS). 
The violent conflict started on 19 January 1999 and was triggered by a fight between a 
Christian Ambonese bus driver and a Muslim non-Ambonese passenger in Ambon, the 
                                                 
67 See reports from UNAMET, The Destruction of East Timor Since 4 September 1999, Report, 11 
September 1999 and United Nations, Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili, 
S/1999/976, 14 September 1999. See also The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
Report, 14 September 1999 and UN, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002 for Internally Displaced 
Persons in Indonesia, New York and Geneva, 2002. 
68 “Jam Malam di Ambon”, Kompas, 22 January 1999; “Ambon Mulai Tenang; Pangab: Tangkap and 
Adili Provokator,” Kompas, 23 January 1999; “Presiden B.J. Habibie: Seyogianya Tidak Ada Kasus 
SARA,” Kompas, 26 January 1999. 
69 See “Ichsan Malik: Maluku Tahu Makna Perdamaian” in 
http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2004/05/23/Profil/pro01.htm  
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provincial capital city. This common and seemingly trivial clash coincided with the time of 
Muslim Ambonese celebrating Idul Fitri. But it was also a time when rumours had been 
spreading that the Christians planned to attack Muslims and that the Muslims had a similar plan 
of attack against the Christians. The fighting on the street soon became a wide-ranging brawl and 
within hours it escalated into a mass violence.  
Before the communal conflict erupted in Maluku70 there had been a series of political 
riots outside Maluku which had involved the Ambonese and been partly motivated by religious 
issues. The first one was a conflict involving Ambonese Christians and Muslims in Jakarta in the 
early months of political reform. In the wake of the MPR Special Session in November 1998 the 
anti-reform leaders managed to form a new vigilante group to counter the pro-reform 
demonstrations.71 Some members of the so-called pam-swakarsa group were Muslim Ambonese. 
In order to raise their militancy, certain politicians and generals told these groups that the pro-
democratic activists, mostly students, were communists and were supported by Christian 
politicians and generals. They even insisted that the mission of pam-swakarsa was a jihad (holy 
war). A clash between pro-reform student activists and pam-swakarsa took place on 13 
November 1998 in which four Muslim Ambonese were killed.72  
The second fight erupted in Jakarta’s Ketapang gambling district on 22 November 1998 
and was viewed as a clash between Ambonese Christians and Muslims. This triggered an inter-
religious conflict leading to killings and church-burning across Jakarta after rumours spread that 
Ambonese Christians had burnt a local mosque. The third case was a riot in Kupang, the capital 
of the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur, on 30 November 1998. This riot was triggered by the 
burning of churches in Jakarta and the murder of local Christian people.  
According to an Ambonese source, he was told that the next riot would happen in 
Ambon and Maluku.73 This seemed to be true, as all Moluccans in Jakarta who failed to show 
the proper card identity (KTP) were forced by the security forces to return to their province of 
origin, Maluku. This measure was coincident with the time that many Christian Ambonese were 
returning for Christmas and Muslim Ambonese were also about to observe the fasting month 
                                                 
70 The Maluku refers to the whole region of North Maluku and Maluku. In September 1999 the province 
of Maluku was divided into two provinces, province of North Maluku and province of Maluku. The North 
Maluku Province comprises the previous North Maluku district of province of Maluku and consists of 
main islands of Halmahera, Morotai Ternate, Todore, Bacan, and Sula archipelago. Maluku Province is 
still used instead of South Maluku and includes the major island of Ambon, Seram, Buru, Banda, Damar 
archipelago, and Kai islands. The term of North Maluku is particularly used to point out the specific 
region. 
71 As mentioned before according to Kivlan Zen, the formation of ‘pam-swakarsa’ was under the order of 
General Wiranto who was asked by President Habibie. See Kivlan Zen, Op.cit., pp. 92–8.   
72 Ibid., pp. 97 and 122–23.  
73 Interview in Ambon, 17 June 2004. 
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(Ramadhan) and to celebrate Idul Fitri with relatives in their homeland. One suggestion is that 
the killings of Muslim and Christian Ambonese gangsters in Jakarta provided them with a strong 
motivation to take revenge on each other in their homelands.74 In Ambon itself there had been 
warnings to Javanese Muslims to leave Ambon before January 1999. BBM communities were 
warned not to attend Ied prayers in the central mosque of Ambon, Al Fatah, because there was 
going to be a massacre. It is also claimed that a Response Centre for the Bloody Idul Fitri 
Conflict – Legal Division was formed before the conflict started.75 
Since the ‘bloody Idul Fitri’ tended to continue with no indication that it would stop 
immediately, social and political observers argued that local culture and social and economic 
conditions perpetuated the conflict. Dieter Bartels, for example, maintained that the purification 
of the traditional Ambonese belief system in Christian and Islamic terms led to its semantic 
depletion. He added that the placement of religion above the adat pela, the processes of 
Indonesization, and globalization as a part of modernization, together have gravely decreased the 
important role of pela as a force to bind different religious devotees.76   
Social and economic factors also underlined the fundamental changes of community 
structure in Maluku under Suharto’s regime. Some of Sukarno’s development projects in the 
region, such as the Wayame shipyard and the Makariki sugar mill were relocated to Java, while 
the Oceanography Institute of Ambon was no longer supported by the New Order government.77 
Furthermore, Suharto’s transmigration programs since the 1970s had allowed people from Java 
and Sulawesi, who were mostly Muslims, to arrive and settle in Maluku and Ambon. Gradually, 
the demographic composition changed in terms of ethnicity and religion, with economic and 
political implications. In central Maluku, and specifically Ambon, Christians were no longer the 
majority. Suharto’s political interest in mobilizing support from Muslim elements gave the 
                                                 
74 See George J. Aditjondro, Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local 
ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges, paper presented at 
the conference of “Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia” organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Department of African and Asian Studies, Humboldt University in Berlin, July 3-5, 2000. 
75 Analysis of the Sectarian Conflict in Maluku and Its Role in the Islamization of Indonesia, A Report by 
Jubilee Campaign UK, December 1999 as revealed in 
http://www.jubileecampaign.demon.co.uk/church/ind5.htm accessed on 1 September 2005.  
76 See Dr. Dieter Bartels, “Your God Is No Longer Mine: Moslem-Christian Fratricide in the Central 
Moluccas (Indonesia) After a Half-Millennium of Tolerant Co-Existence and Ethnic Unity”, as accessed 
from Ambon Berdarah On-line http://www.go.to/ambon . See also in Sandra Pannell ed., A State of 
Emergency: Violence, Society and the State in Eastern Indonesia (Darwin: Northern Territory University 
Press, 2003) pp. 128–53.  
77 These projects were parts of political responses of Jakarta central government in resolving the rebellion 
of Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) demanding separation from NKRI in 1950. All these local prestigious 
projects were then relocated by his successor President Suharto. See George J. Aditjondro, “The Tragedy 
of Maluku,” as accessed from Ambon Berdarah On-line, 
http://www.geocities.com/ambon67/noframe/gja2k_1.htm.  
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Muslim community a greater influence in bureaucratic and political realms. In 1992 for the first 
time a local Muslim Ambonese, M. Akib Latuconsina, was appointed as Maluku governor. He 
was then succeeded by M. Saleh Latuconsina in 1997, who governed the region during the 
eruption of violent conflict.78 In this context an Indonesian scholar maintained that tension and 
latent conflict in Maluku changed into manifest conflict when the relatively equal configuration 
of ethnic and religious groups was achieved.79  
Political factors that contributed to the eruption, escalation and perpetuation of the 
conflict were overwhelming. Both national and regional political elites and organizations played 
roles that substantially influenced the dynamics of the conflict.  
Following the successful toppling of Suharto, the prime targets of reform were Habibie, 
ABRI and Golkar. Since these latter two New Order principal forces failed to show collective 
support to Habibie, Habibie sought political support from Islamic elements and the outer-islands. 
As the founder and former head of ICMI, he was widely seen as more Islamic than his 
predecessors, and managed to mobilize Muslim elements. It was said that he once asked the 
armed forces to mobilize people to secure the MPR Special Session in November 1998. The so-
called pam-swakarsa comprised mostly Muslims from Banten and from Ambon.80 
As the first non-Javanese president, Habibie also sought to mobilize political support 
from the eastern part of Indonesia. The Iramasuka (Irian, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan) 
caucus became the main constituency. Maluku, with its majority Muslim population, became 
important. Habibie initiated a partition of the province into two separate provincial 
administrations in September 1999. By the formation of the new North Maluku province, where 
the Muslim population were the overwhelming majority, he could gain essential extra votes 
through the regional representatives (Utusan Daerah) in MPR for the next presidential election.  
Despite its espoused objectives of improving public services and helping to resolve the 
current conflict, the partition sparked conflict in North Maluku. In the preparations for 
establishing the new province social tensions among people groups in North Maluku increased. 
The ethnic groups of the Makian and the Kao in Malifut were involved in violence. Decades-old 
disputes between the sultan and the people of Ternate and Tidore became violent when Ternate 
                                                 
78 Two former Christian governors of Maluku are J.Latuharhari (1950-1955) and G.J. Latumahina (1965-
1968). Other governors are Muslims but are not Ambonese. The new governor elected in 2003 is a 
Christian, Karel Albert Ralahalu, and also as a retired army major general.  
79 See “Ambon Terbakar” in Zairin Salampessy and Thamrin Husein eds., Ketika Semerbak Cengkih 
Tergusur Asap Mesiu (Jakarta: Sekretariat Tapak Ambon, 2001) pp. 22–23. 
80 See in Kivlan Zen, Op.cit., p. 95. 
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was declared to be the provincial capital.81 Fighting on 18 August and 24 October 1999,which 
caused twelve deaths and one hundred deaths respectively, and forced 4,000 survivors to flee, 
was caused by the inter mixture of factors including national and local elites’ political interests.82 
At the regional level and approaching the national general election scheduled for June 
1999, competition among political parties and conflict among their respective supporters tended 
to escalate. Within the new freer party system PPP, Golkar, PDI-P and other newly formed 
political parties raced to win over voters. While PPP tended to campaign on the basis of its 
Islamic ideology, Golkar campaigned using nationalist-conservative programs, and PDIP 
promoted a reformist-nationalist platform for which most Christian voters were in favour.83 
According to International Crisis Group (ICG), Ambonese Christians attempted to win back 
influence particularly through PDIP. This prompted many Muslims to suspect that elements 
within PDIP had provoked the fighting for political interests.84  
The struggle for power at the national and regional level was an important indication 
that the parties to the conflict were not limited to local Christian and Muslim communities. 
Political elites and organizations at both national and regional levels were in different ways 
contributing to the perpetuation of the conflict. One example was the ‘politics of neglect’ (politik 
pembiaran). It was so called by local NGO activists, indicating that the violence was allowed to 
continue because the government and political elites were occupied in a struggle for power.85 
The June 1999 elections, which resulted in a slight victory for PDIP at the national level 
as well as at the Maluku provincial and Ambon district levels, did not bring the communal 
conflict to an end. The replacement of Habibie by Abdurrahman Wahid, and not by PDIP’s 
leader, Megawati, apparently did not help to end the conflict. And apart from local communities 
and political elites, who were still difficult to identify accurately, there were new parties to the 
conflict: the security force personnel, Laskar Jihad, FKM/RMS and ‘criminal gangs’.  
As in East Timor where the security forces were backing pro-integration groups, in 
Maluku the security forces were also taking part in the conflict. They provoked, trained and 
armed the warring parties. Even further, they sided with the Muslims or Christians and killed 
                                                 
81 Ternate and Tidore are two traditional sultanates that have competed for supremacy for 500 years. 
Although they have been absorbed into the province of Maluku and then the North Maluku, rivalry to 
wield political influence remained to continue. 
82 About conflict in North Maluku see Mahmud Arifin Raimodya, “Kasus Maluku Utara: Mainan Elite 
Politik Lokal”; Smith Alhadar, “Anatomi Kerusuhan Sosial di Maluku Utara”; Tamrin Amal Tomagola, 
“Halmahera Berdarah” in Zairin Salampessy and Thamrin Husain, eds., Op.cit., pp. 65-8, 69-74, 75-92. 
83 The June 1999 election resulted in 53 percent of the votes in Ambon won by PDIP, 19 percent went to 
Golkar and 14 percent to PPP. 
84 CGI, Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku, Asia Report No.31, 8 February 2002, p. 2. 
85 Interviews with NGOs activists in Ambon. 
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each other. Whereas the military troops tended to side with the Muslims, the police personnel 
assisted the Christians.86 This kind of involvement was widely witnessed by local people and 
was also indicated by the use of modern weaponry.87 Most murders since mid-1999 were caused 
by military-standard arms and only a few were caused by traditional weaponries. This evidence 
confirmed the allegations that, according to Gus Dur, “the provocateurs were some military 
elements who were loyal to Suharto,”88 or those who provoked the conflict were living in Jakarta 
and had strong power. “They paid criminals and the unemployed to run the riots”, the secretary 
of Komnas HAM, Clementino dos Amaral said.89  
Several army generals acknowledged that the security personnel had been 
“contaminated” by taking side the warring parties. General Wiranto and his successor as the TNI 
Commander, Admiral Widodo, said that some individual soldiers were influenced by the conflict 
or supported one side because members of their own families had been killed by the other side.90 
The involvement of security apparatus in violence was not solely caused by 
psychological or ‘primordial’ reasons. After a short visit by President Wahid in December 1999 
the chief commander of ABRI, Wiranto, sent 500 troops to Maluku. But it was reported that only 
200 troops arrived at their military camp. The rest of 300 reportedly deserted and joined with the 
warring civilian groups.91 
Political reasons and economic interests caused ABRI to allow and/or perpetuate the 
conflict. ABRI was condemned for failure to maintain security in East Timor and was even 
charged with massive violations of human rights. In this context, ABRI seemed to be hesitant to 
act decisively in Maluku. Another political reason was that ABRI needed this violent conflict to 
raise public opinion that ABRI’s dual-function remained relevant. “To justify the presence of 
fire fighters, the fire has to be created”, an Indonesian scholar illustrated.92 As for economic 
                                                 
86 Since most of the troops were deployed from Kodam Wirabuana/Sulawesi and East Java, the soldiers 
mostly consisted of Muslims while the policemen were mostly (70%) locally recruited Christians. See 
ICG, Op.cit., p. 4. 
87 Maj. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy, Regional Military Commander VII/Wirabuana in a brief to the press 
mentioned that conflict in Maluku was intensifying shown by the number of casualties, the using of 
military standard weaponry, and the involvement of security forces personnel. See “Pangdam 
VII/Wirabuana: Kerusuhan Ambon Makin Parah”, Kompas, 20 Oktober 1999. Many local respondents 
told the similar story based on their experiences. Interviews in Ambon.  
88 See “Hantu Provokator yang Kebal Hukum”, Kompas, 28 January 1999. 
89 See “Makin Jelas, Keberpihakan Aparat di Ambon”, Kompas, 1 Desember 1999. 
90 “Makin Jelas, Keberpihakan Aparat di Ambon”, Kompas, 1 Desember 1999. 
91 George J. Aditjondro, “Gadjah Lawan Gajah Berlaga Orang Maluku Mati di Tengah-tengah”, in Zairin 
Salampessy and Thamrin Husain, eds., Op.cit. p. 44. 
92 See George J. Aditjondro, Guns, Pamphlet, Op.cit., pp. 20–1. 
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interests, the protracted conflict would benefit ABRI in their security protection and other illegal 
businesses including selling weapons and ammunition to warring communal groups.93  
Unlike the case of East Timor, the reports of Muslim Maluku being attacked and 
hundreds being killed by Christians provoked a national Muslim reaction. For example, a large 
Islamic rally (tabligh akbar) was held in Jakarta on 7 January 2000 and attended by Muslim 
politicians like Amien Rais, Fuad Bawazir, Hamzah Haz and Ahmad Sumargono. They 
supported Laskar Jihad, calling for a jihad (holy war) in Maluku. Some 22 Islamic radical groups 
including KISDI, FPI, and PPMI supported the war mission.  
As a Muslim paramilitary group, Laskar Jihad was trained by military elements in Bogor 
(West Java) and Yogyakarta.  Although it had been publicly announced that Laskar Jihad would 
dispatch to Maluku for a jihad, the security forces did not take any appropriate measures to 
prevent this. Worse, although President Wahid ordered the military and police officers not to 
allow Laskar Jihad to dispatch to Maluku, the security officers did not comply with this order. In 
April and May 2000 thousands of Laskar Jihad from Java and Sulawesi arrived in Maluku. 
Undoubtedly, the influx of 10,000 fully militaril equipped mujhahidins in Maluku 
intensified and prolonged the violence. Muslim Moluccans now had significant offensive 
capacity to halt the alleged Christianization process94 and to destroy the Christians’ influence in 
Maluku.95 In his speech on 3 September 2000 the leader of Laskar Jihad, Jafar Umar Thalib, 
declared that all Christians with the potential to disturb Muslims had to be destroyed. “They 
have to be destroyed so that the Muslims can implement shariah law in Ambon”.96 
Although it was initially said that Laskar Jihad aimed to assist their Moluccans Muslim 
coreligionists, many Muslim leaders and security officers also held that the presence of Laskar 
Jihad in Maluku was to help the armed forces to protect NKRI from the RMS separatist 
movement. This seemed to confirm what was said by the head of the national intelligence 
agency, Hendropriyono, who claimed at the outset of the communal violent conflict that the idea 
and supporters of RMS had ignited the conflict.97  
According to a local source, the issue of the RMS re-emerged when some local 
Ambonese formed a Forum for Maluku Sovereignty (FKM, Forum Kedaulatan Maluku) on 18 
December 2000. FKM, led by Alex Manuputty, was initially formed as a moral movement 
                                                 
93 Ibid, p. 21 and Aditjondro, Gajah Lawan Gajah, Op.cit., pp. 44–6. 
94 According to Abdul Aziz, an imam at Al Fatah mosque, the biggest mosque and is seen as the symbol of 
Islamic community in Maluku. See in LIPI, Konflik di Maluku Tengah (Conflict in Central Maluku) (LIPI: 
Jakarta, 2003) p. 99–100.  
95 CGI, Indonesia: Search for Peace in Maluku, Op.cit., p. 15–6. 
96 As quoted in LIPI, Op.cit., p. 105. 
97 “Hendropriyono: RMS Dibalik Kerusuhan Ambon,” Kompas, 10 March 1999. 
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aimed at reconciling Ambonese Christians and Muslims. It was also said that FKM was inspired 
by the fact that the government acted insufficiently to resolve the conflict. But in its 
development, Manuputty used the issue of RMS to attract political attention. One local political 
activist argued: 
 
Because the history of the 1950 RMS had disappeared from the memory of most 
Ambonese, the FKM/RMS political movement never became a big issue within the 
communal conflict. It was the security officers and Laskar Jihad who popularized FKM, 
the revival of RMS, and its apparent crucial role within the conflict.98 
 
  
Besides the parties above, there was another group, which was identified as criminal 
gangs. The identification was synonymous with the terms provocateurs or thugs or unidentified 
persons. These terms were usually used by government officials, since no party would openly 
acknowledge responsibility for violent acts causing murder or physical destruction. The police 
were unable to identify or unwilling to publicly announce those responsible for such violent acts. 
Many incidents of violent acts were attributed to such criminal gangs or unidentified actors.99 
For around three years (from January 1999 to February 2002) the violent communal 
conflict resulted in several thousands people being killed. Thousands of others were injured. The 
number of refugees tended to increase. The escalation of violence following the influx of Laskar 
Jihad forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee from their homes to seek refuge. In 2001 
there were reportedly almost half a million Moluccans internally displaced persons (IDP). They 
sought safety around Maluku and other provinces in Sulawesi, Papua and Java. The town of 
Ambon and other district towns were devastated. Public facilities such as schools, governmental 
buildings, power and telecommunications infrastructure, houses and places of worship were set 
on fire or destroyed. As had been the case in East Timor in the aftermath of referendum, the 
condition was aptly described as a humanitarian disaster that needed an emergency exit.100 
 
 
3. The separatist movement in Aceh 
To the Indonesian public at large, the conflict in Aceh was widely known as a separatist 
conflict in which a number of Acehnese people organized into the Free Aceh Movement (GAM, 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) wanted to secede from NKRI. It was also called a decolonization or 
                                                 
98 Interviews in Ambon. 
99 Z. Larwuy, “Rakyat Terus Meninggal Dunia dan Cacat, Polisi Sulit Tangkap Teroris”, Siwalima, 12 
August 2002. 
100 See UN, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002 for Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia, New 
York and Geneva, 2002. 
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liberation war based on GAM’s perception that Indonesia had illegally occupied the territory. 
The official GAM website stated: 
 
On December 27, 1949, seven long years after their withdrawal from Acheh, the Dutch 
signed a treaty with the newly fabricated artificial entity called ‘Republic of Indonesia’ 
(on the island of Java) pretending to transfer their NON-EXISTENTE 
"SOVEREIGNTY" over Acheh to Indonesia, without referendum of the people of 
Acheh, and against all principles of decolonization of the UN. That was how Acheh was 
illegally made part of Indonesia.101 (Note: capital and spelling as written) 
 
 Considering Indonesian sovereignty over Aceh to be illegal, GAM used international 
principles to justify its independence claim.  
 
On the basis of all the above-mentioned UN Resolutions which have become parts of 
International Law and Conventions, especially UN Resolution 2711 (XXV), adopted on 
October 14, 1970, which recognised the legitimacy of liberation struggles, including 
armed struggle, waged by the colonised people to gain their rights of self-determination 
and to get rid of foreign, colonial domination, the Free Acheh Movement (GAM - 
Gerakan Acheh Merdeka) was established in 1976, and on December 4, 1976, the Re-
declaration of Independence of Acheh was issued from the liberated territory.102 
 
 
But the conflict could also be identified as an anti-regime conflict. In using this term, 
Acehnese people primarily demanded a democratic regime that would be able to accommodate 
Acehnese interests and values. This argument was suggested by GAM leader, Dr. Hasan di Tiro, 
who said that the people rebelled because the government repressed and had seized the people’s 
rights.103  
The ethno-nationalist depiction was also applied to the conflict. It was said that di Tiro 
rejected the Indonesian unitary state system (NKRI) because it brought about Javanese-ethnic 
domination. To strengthen his anti-Javanese feeling, he called on the people in Aceh, Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other regions to regain their rights which had been ignored and 
undermined by the Javanese-colonial power.104 This ethno-nationalist conflict was fortified by 
social and economic reasons. Suharto’s development policies had deprived the Acehnese 
economy through the massive exploitation of local natural resources such as oil, gas, and forests 
                                                 
101 “Why Ahceh wants independence from the colonialism of the Republic of Indonesia?” in 
http://acehnet.tripod.com/why.htm. In this document “Acheh” is used instead of ‘Aceh’ 
102 Ibid.  
103 See Hasan di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary as assessed from 
http://acehnet.tripod.com/price.htm. See also in Gerry van Klinken, “What is the Free Aceh Movement?” 
Inside Indonesia, Digest 89, 25 November, 1999. 
104  See in Moch. Nurhasim et al, Konflik Aceh: Analisis Atas Sebab-sebab Konflik, Aktor Konflik, 
Kepentingan dan Upaya Penyelesaian (Jakarta: LIPI, 2003) pp. 37–8. 
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without any revenue for local economic development. The arrival of Javanese people and non-
Acehnese workers through the transmigration program and industrialization had engendered 
social tensions and ethnic sentiments. Further, merely by looking at the military operations and 
their effects, one may refer to a kind of mass-violence or genocide in the region.105  
All these historical, legal, political, social and economic arguments concluded in the 
declaration of Aceh independence on 4 December 1976 by the leader of GAM, Hasan di Tiro.  
According to the Staff Chief of Command for Security and Order Restoration (Kas 
Kopkamtib) Sudomo, GAM was a separatist-subversive activity against NKRI, Pancasila, and 
the central government.106 And in responding to the GAM separatist movement, the government 
ran Nenggala 16, a series of military operations including intelligence operations, combat 
operations, and civic operations. This was re-enforced by Nenggala 21 and Nenggala 27 for the 
protection of foreign contractors and investment. In June 1979 Nenggala 35   was deployed and 
concluded the military operations in Aceh.  
Although the Nenggala operations could claim success in that many GAM leaders had 
been killed, captured, or forced to flee the region, the military operations inflicted grave human 
rights abuses upon the local population. Michael Ross said that GAM suspects were arrested and 
tortured; women and children were held as hostages; and thirty men were shot dead in public 
without due process. Nenggala operations had also mobilized civilian people on behalf of the 
“total people defence system” (sishankamrata) in the armed conflict.107  
For some ten years after the 1979 Nenggala 35 operation there was no military operation 
in Aceh. Industrialization and development programs continued in the region. However, violence 
re-erupted following the return from Libya of some 800 GAM members at the end of 1980s. The 
arrival of ‘Libyan graduates’ escalated attacks against military and police installations and 
schools, commercial properties, and public infrastructures. Civilians and non-Acehnese workers 
and transmigrants also became the targets of intimidation and they were asked to leave Aceh.  
The deteriorating security led to strong reactions from the central and regional 
governments. The Aceh governor, Ibrahim Hassan, who feared for the disruption of 
development processes and industrialization, asked the central government to devise a military 
solution. In mid 1989 the government created Operasi Jaring Merah (OJM – Red Net 
Operation), a military operation that consisted of organic and non-organic troops, including the 
                                                 
105 Interviews in Banda Aceh. For theoretical considerations see Christian Scherrer, Op.cit., pp. 62-3. See 
also Bjorn Moller, “The Faces of War”, in Hakan Wiberg and Christian P. Scherrer eds., Op.cit., pp. 15-34.  
106 Kompas, 11 and 13 June 1977.  
107 Kirsten E. Schulze, Insurgency and counter-insurgency: a strategic analysis of the Aceh conflict, 
Working Paper, presented at Conference on the Historical Background of the Aceh Problem, Singapore, 
28-29 May 2004. 
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special force (Kopassus) and marine task force to guard the coastline. By the end of 1991, OJM 
was replaced by OJM II, with the aim of restoring security and order and ensuring the regional 
administration could function. This second OJM lasted until 1998 and the collapse of Suharto 
regime. 
To the public, Operasi Jaring Merah was known as a policy to make Aceh a military 
operation zone (DOM, Daerah Operasi Militer). The status of Aceh as a DOM marked the Aceh 
conflict with grave violence and massive violations of human rights. Apart from relying on a 
military offensive and military intelligence, the security forces engaged in a ‘shock therapy’, 
which meant a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation designed to spread fear in the 
population and make them distance themselves from GAM. The security forces carried out 
armed raids and sought out GAM members house-to-house. Villagers suspected of having 
connections with GAM, of providing sanctuary for GAM, supplying GAM with food, 
information and money were arrested, tortured, ‘disappeared’ and even killed. The wives and 
daughters of suspected rebels were detained as hostages, and some of them were raped. Houses 
and villages considered to be those of GAM relatives, supporters, or sympathizers were 
destroyed and burned to the ground.108  
Recruiting of civilian people for the counter-insurgency was carried out through Laskar 
Rakyat (People Troops) in East Aceh and Ksatria Unit Penegak Pancasila (Noble Warriors for 
Upholding Pancasila) in North Aceh and these groups were established based on the 
sishankamrata doctrine. Some 60,000 people were mobilized. They were given basic training, 
armed with knives, machetes, and spears. Some of them were also used as shields or ‘fences of 
legs’ (pagar betis). Ordinary villagers were forced to sweep through an area ahead of armed 
troops. Refusal to participate in these military campaigns or failure to demonstrate sufficient 
commitment in identifying, capturing or killing alleged rebels often resulted in punishment 
including torture, arrest, and summary execution.109 
The arrival of political reform in 1998 did not have any effect in ending the conflict. 
Although the DOM status was lifted on 7 August 1998 by Habibie and the post-Suharto 
presidents extended apologies for the past abuses of human rights, armed and bloody conflict 
continued in the region.  
GAM immediately exploited the chaotic post-Suharto era, marked by weak governments, 
to re-establish its strength. Reorganization and reconsolidation was conducted by separating its 
political leadership based in Sweden from its operational structure in Aceh. The operational units 
                                                 
108 HRW, Indonesia: The War in Aceh, Vol. 13 No. 4 (C), August 2001, pp. 14–21. 
109 For further information about militia groups in Aceh, see Ketakutan dalam Bayangan: Milisi di Aceh, 
Eye on Aceh, July 2004. 
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were given the authority to conduct military attacks independently. GAM also recruited and 
developed some 5,000 – 6,000 troops. In addition to the longstanding members, the new recruits 
came from those returned from abroad (particularly Malaysia), prisoners released during the 
Habibie presidency, and the victims of DOM whose parents and relatives had been killed, 
tortured, or ‘disappeared’.110 
The revival of GAM’s strength was shown by its increasing number of attacks against 
the Indonesian security forces. On 2 November 1998, led by Ahmad Kandang, GAM captured 
and tortured two Indonesian soldiers; in the next month 7 TNI personnel were killed. GAM 
expanded its military operation by intimidating international companies operating in Aceh. 
Exxon Mobil Oil Indonesia (EMOI) for instance was forced to pay taxes. When the demand was 
refused, GAM forced EMOI to shutdown, to stop production and to evacuate workers.  
The transitional politics also gave rise to new parties to the conflict. People groups, 
primarily students and youth associations, and human rights activists organized political rallies 
in Banda Aceh. They demanded social and economic justice in Aceh. They also urged the 
government to pull out all non-organic troops from Aceh. They demanded a human rights 
tribunal for security forces who had committed human rights violations during the DOM era.  
Above all, they vociferously called for a referendum in Aceh in order to give Acehnese 
the basic right to determine whether to be independent from or to remain an integral part of 
NKRI. Widely believed to have been inspired by the referendum precedence in East Timor, the 
idea of referendum in Aceh was quickly and widely welcomed by different Acehnese elements. 
People in urban and remote rural areas showed their enthusiasm for a referendum. In December 
1999 some hundreds of thousands of Acehnese rallied in Banda Aceh at a rally organized by the 
Acehnese Centre for Referendum Information (SIRA, Sentra Informasi Referendum Aceh).111   
Evidence was unavailable to conclude that SIRA with its claim for referendum was 
affiliated with GAM. Local sources maintained that students and human rights activists did not 
have any organizational link with GAM. A referendum was seen as a middle and peaceful way 
of reconciling GAM’s struggle for independence and Indonesia’s interest in NKRI. 112 
Referendum, it was argued, was the best way to resolve the problem of Aceh, with the people of 
Aceh deciding their political future. 
In responding to GAM’s resumed insurgency, Indonesian security forces began to 
launch a new cycle of violence through its counterinsurgency strategy. In 1999 TNI carried out 
                                                 
110 See Kirsten E. Schulze, Op.cit. 
111 “250,000 Warga Aceh Ikut Pawai Referendum,” Kompas, 5 November 1999; “Referendum di Aceh 
Harga Mati,” Kompas, 9 November 1999. 
112 Interviews with former students and SIRA activists in Banda Aceh. 
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Operasi Wibawa followed by Operasi Sadar Rencong I, II, III in 2000 and Operasi Cinta 
Meunasah I and II in 2001. On 11 April 2001, President Wahid issued a presidential instruction 
(Inpres No. 4) allowing the security forces to launch Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan 
Penegakan Hukum (OPKPH - Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law). 
OPKPH was similar to the previous counter-insurgency strategy. Although the police 
(Polri) now held a dominant role and the security forces seemed to be more aware about human 
rights issues, the operation could still claim success in military and political terms.113 Militarily, 
GAM’s strength was reduced from 3,000 to 2,000 fighters. Politically, OPKPH could restore 
government control from only 30 to 40 per cent to 60 to 70 per cent of the province. The public 
administration also recommended its functions. Security in the Lhokseumawe industrial area was 
restored and people could run their businesses.114  
But, instead of merely targeting GAM members, the police and military operation also 
targeted students and human rights activists. Those supporting the idea of referendum were 
arbitrarily charged as supporting GAM. In this sense many human rights advocates were arrested, 
‘disappeared’ or were summarily executed. 
Under President Wahid, there had been dialogue processes to seek a solution to the 
conflict. However, the negotiations facilitated by a Swiss-based international organization, the 
Henry Dunant Centre, failed to bring an effective and permanent solution. From 2000 to 2003 
the negotiation processes were continuingly followed by armed clashes between GAM and 
Indonesian security forces and also by human rights abuses.  
On 19 May 2003 President Megawati Sukarnoputri issued a presidential decision 
(Kepres, Keputusan Presiden No.28) to place Aceh under martial law. This decision legalized an 
integrated operation (OT, Operasi Terpadu) comprising four aspects: the military operation, law 
enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and improving local government. It was taken because of 
the collapse of the peace process facilitated by the HDC. To bring the decision into effect around 
30,000 military personnel and 15,000 police and paramilitary police (brigade mobile – Brimob) 
were deployed. They were equipped with complete weaponries such as Marine tanks, OV-10 
Broncos, F-16 Falcons, and A-4 Skyhawks. Their chief objective was to break up GAM 
                                                 
113 However, OPKPH still had several weaknesses. The increasing professionalism of the security forces 
remained insufficient in distinguishing non-combatants from combatants and in treating civilians. Many of 
the casualties were non-combatants. The recruiting of civilians to help the security forces in pursuing 
OPKPH continued and was the cause of civilian victims and other human rights abuses. The deliberate 
and systematic deployment of ‘shock therapy’ including execution to deter villagers from supporting 
GAM still occurred. Rivalry between the police and military was also a source of OPKPH problems. 
Competition on command of the operation and disputes on economic interests including in the roadside 
extortions have undermined the operation and to some extent have maltreated the people. 
114 Tapol, “Aceh: Military Operations in Aceh Fail,” Tapol Bulletin No. 176, August 2004. 
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concentrations and then to crush the rebels. Other objectives such as the restoration of economic 
activities, the recovery of security, and distribution of humanitarian aid were deemed to have 
been achieved if GAM rebels had been squashed.  
The strategic importance of the military operation, according to the commander in chief 
of Integrated Operation, Major General Endang Suwarya, was to restrict the area under GAM’s 
control, to reduce the strength of GAM, and to cut the organization’s logistics. To support this 
operation the civilian defence system was again reorganized and reactivated. In Central and 
South Aceh the existing organizations of Wanra (People Resistance) were reformed under 
unified command, usually by the heads of the districts (bupati), and new groups were set up in 
other regions. 
In addition to the interest of isolating GAM, the military ruler under the military 
emergency conducted ‘loyalty tests’ for regional civil servants. Those suspected of supporting 
GAM by providing information or government funds were asked to resign. Through this scheme, 
some thirteen camat (heads of sub-districts) were replaced by military officers. For the populace 
at large some 2.65 million new ‘red and white’ personal identity cards (KTP) were issued for 
Acehnese aged 17 or over and/or married. This new KTP had to be displayed at checkpoints and 
those unable to produce them fell under suspicion of being members of GAM. 
After six months of Integrated Operations, it was claimed that GAM’s strength had been 
reduced by 50 to 60 per cent and that 85 per cent of Acehnese had been separated from GAM. 
The Martial Law Administrator estimated that GAM’s strength had been reduced from 5,517 to 
1,509 personnel and from 2,137 to 1,300 weapons. In the run-up to the evaluation of the second 
period of the martial law, the TNI Commander Endriartono Sutarto revealed that during the first 
martial law period 1,165 GAM members had been killed, 1,403 captured, and 799 had 
surrendered. In the second six months, 798 GAM members were killed, 697 were captured, and 
477 surrendered. These chilling figures added to the casualties caused by the DOM policy 
(1989–1998) where around 2,000 people were killed and 3,000 to 4,000 were tortured. The 
policy led to some 625 cases of the rape and tortures of women were recorded, an estimated 
16,375 children were orphaned, and 3,000 women widowed.115 
 
 
                                                 
115 About the implementation of martial law in Aceh, see INFID, Martial law in Aceh after Two Months: 
The Sufferings of Aceh, The Burdens of Indonesians, Briefing Paper, July 2003; HRW, Indonesia: Aceh 
Under Martial Law, Vol. 15 No. 9 (C), November 2003; HRW, Aceh under Martial Law: Inside The 
Secret War, Vol. 15 No. 10 (C), December 2003; HRW, Aceh at War, Vol. 16 No. 11 (C), September 
2004. UN, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002 for Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia, New 
York and Geneva, 2002. 
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E. Concluding Notes 
 
The term under which the weaknesses of the Indonesian nation-state sought to be 
resolved was reformasi. But since the weaknesses of the country involved many aspects of the 
nation-state, reformasi tended to cover almost all aspects of democratization. These included the 
replacement of Suharto, the political changes of Suharto’s New Order main institutions, i.e. 
ABRI, Golkar and bureaucracy, the relationship between the regions and the central government 
within the NKRI and the relationship between religious communities with a state that had 
previously been based on the Pancasila ideology, and the existence of the newly reformed 
Indonesia within the new global system. 
The replacement of the authoritarian Suharto led to a weakening government. The 
government institutions became ineffective in responding to the reform demands. ABRI, Golkar 
and bureaucracy, which were the principal institutions of the New Order regime in maintaining 
national security and integration, became fragmented and powerless. ABRI, in particular, was 
under severe criticism and pressure and as a result was unable and/or unwilling to maintain 
security and order. In the mean time, other political forces which in the past had called for 
political reform became more interested in acquiring power left by the collapse of Suharto’s 
authoritarian system. Without an authoritative government and effective institutions to keep the 
political reform orderly, violent internal conflicts were highly likely, as shown by the eruption 
and re-escalation of violent internal conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh.  
The ineffectiveness of the post-Suharto governments not only made possible these 
violent conflicts. Competing major political forces even exploited the local content of the 
regional conflicts that had existed during the New Order era. Power struggles among political 
elites and forces in Jakarta exacerbated the conflict conditions in the three regions. In the 
interests in holding or grabbing power, most political forces, including the security forces, 
perpetuated these violent regional conflicts.   
The dynamics of the violent conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh had both their 
similarities and their differences. There were four general similarities. First, all the conflicts had 
their root causes in Suharto’s regime. Social and economic injustice was prominent in the three 
regions, and each region had experienced political and military repression. Second, the violent 
conflicts in the three regions involved various parties, including local communities, local and 
national political elites and the security forces. Third, the violent conflicts had generated 
humanitarian crises in the three regions. Finally, the political reform era was vitally influencing 
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the dynamics of the conflicts. The differences among the three cases were clearly related to their 
local contents. In East Timor and Aceh there had been longstanding separatist movements, while 
in Maluku the issue of FKM/RMS separatism (re-)emerged when the inter-religious or 
communal violent conflict occurred. But, as will be elaborated upon in the next chapters, the 
separatist movements in East Timor and Aceh had significant differences. 
One central issue related to the regional violent conflicts was the role of reformasi in 
seeking resolutions to the conflicts. The eruption, escalation and perpetuation of the violent 
conflicts took place in the post-Suharto period, when Indonesia was involved in a process of 
democratization. Thus, while it is the interest of this research to investigate how the conflicts 
were resolved, more importantly, as has been proposed, this research wants to investigate the 
extent to which the reformasi determined the role of the international community in resolving 
the conflicts. This problem will be discussed in the following chapters. 
  
===== 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND  
THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET) 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Having presented the violent conflict in East Timor, particularly with respect to the 
popular consultation on 30 August 1999 (See Chapter IV.D.1.), this chapter will discuss the 
response of the international community to the devastating conflict. 
Theories of humanitarian intervention suggest that the use of foreign military force in 
another state is justified when it is intended to save or to protect people of the state concerned 
from a humanitarian crisis. Since a multinational force had been deployed in East Timor through 
the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) after the referendum, it is reasonable to 
contend that a humanitarian crisis that shocked the international conscience had occurred in the 
region. The UN Security Council Resolution 1264 made it clear that the international 
community was deeply concerned about the deteriorating security and the worsening 
humanitarian situation in East Timor. The establishment of INTERFET through the Resolution 
was undoubtedly intended to solve such a shocking situation.1  
The justification of INTERFET, however, was not solely based on the threshold 
criterion of a ‘conscience shocking situation’. As has been presented and will be discussed 
further, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor had occurred before the referendum and 
culminated only after the announcement of its result. And, unfortunately, the international 
decision to send an Australian-led multinational force in East Timor was made only after other 
conditions for a justified military intervention were met. This situation seemed in line with the 
ICISS proposal that a humanitarian crisis, which is called the just cause or the threshold 
criterion, has to be complemented by other conditions in order to justify military intervention.2  
The significance of these other conditions, which are categorized as precautionary 
criteria, seems to suggest that a military intervention for humanitarian purposes may not take 
place unless these precautionary criteria have been met. Overall, this means humanitarian 
intervention remains a controversial issue, as the ICISS and many scholars have admitted. It is 
                                                 
1 See the UN Security Council Resolution 1264, S/RES/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999. 
2 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, December 2001, p. 35.  
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not international morality and ethics or the demands of the people at risk which make 
humanitarian intervention justified. What could make the intervention feasible, workable, and 
successful is also crucial. And all the conditions that lead to such characteristics demand vigilant 
calculations.  
To a great degree, the applicability of the precautionary criteria of humanitarian 
intervention rests on the relationships between the international community, i.e. the UN and 
major countries, and the state concerned. This means the ultimate decision to take military 
intervention or not, as has been discussed in the theoretical chapter, is more of a political than a 
humanitarian matter. In the case of East Timor, the decision to send in INTERFET, as I have 
proposed, was greatly determined by the dynamics of Indonesian domestic politics at that time. 
This included the decision to hold a referendum, the eruption and escalation of violence, the 
failure of the Indonesian government to restore order and security and the decision to accept the 
UN-authorized military force in the region.  
Prior to the explanation of Indonesian domestic politics, the first part of this chapter will 
examine the justification of INTERFET according to the international standards of humanitarian 
intervention. The examination will include the just cause or the threshold criterion and the 
precautionary criteria as suggested by ICISS. 
The second part of this chapter will focus on the domestic justification of INTERFET. 
Central to this examination is the weakening situation of the Indonesian government. This 
situation not only made possible the unexpected decision to offer a referendum in East Timor, 
but also made the violence in the region intractable. And more importantly, the weakening state 
of Indonesia in such a disturbing regional situation had eliminated any kind of resistance from 
national political elements against the presence of a multinational force in East Timor.  
In the third part of this chapter, the relation of the international principles of 
humanitarian intervention and the domestic conditions that had apparently justified INTERFET 
will be elaborated further. The decision to delay the deployment of the foreign force in the 
region is particularly challenging. Although a humanitarian crisis had emerged, the Indonesian 
state was weakening, and the call for international intervention had mounted, major foreign 
countries such as the US and Australia did not immediately send in an international military 
force. The democratization process brought about by the reformasi seemed to be one central 
reason for this. 
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B. International justification of INTERFET  
 
Up to the day Suharto had to step down from power no one could have imagined that the 
UN or any foreign democratic country would send military forces to East Timor. This does not 
mean that there were no human rights problems in the region. Since the incorporation of the 
territory, human rights activists had constantly sought to focus the international community’s 
attention on the massive violations of human rights there and had sought to raise the possibility 
of meeting the right to self-determination of the East Timorese people. But, the downfall of 
Suharto made the unimagined happen. 
President Habibie’s policy of offering a referendum in the region undoubtedly surprised 
many national and international observers. Although the policy was widely appreciated, it also 
raised fears that a civil war would break out in the region. And as the decision to hold the 
popular consultation under the auspices of the UN had been made, tension mounted between 
those who wanted integration with Indonesia and those who wanted independence. Violent acts 
became more frequent. Realizing that the Indonesian security forces did not fully approve of 
Habibie’s policy and thus were hesitant to maintain order in the region, many human rights 
NGOs and observers expressed the importance of international peacekeeping forces to enable 
the popular consultation to occur in an orderly situation.   
What the appropriate time or situation for humanitarian intervention is, is a highly 
contentious issue. The difficulty is particularly related to the ambiguous term of humanitarian 
crisis. As has been discussed in Chapter One, humanitarian crisis is indicated by the “total or 
considerable breakdown of national authority and the requirement of an international response” 
and the “extensive violence or loss of life, massive displacement of people and widespread 
damage to societies and economies”. While the later indicators could be found in the case of 
East Timor, it is debatable whether the Indonesian authority was unwilling or unable to prevent 
the conflicting East Timorese from committing violent acts and to halt such a humanitarian 
crisis. Consequently, when or in what situation the international community should have 
intervened militarily in order to prevent the East Timorese people from further suffering was not 
simple.  
 
1. The conscience-shocking situation: the threshold criterion  
 
In many respects, the violence could have been predicted, since UNAMET and many 
political observers believed that most East Timorese people were likely to reject the proposed 
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special autonomy.3 Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, envisaged that the forty-eight 
hours after the announcement of the ballot result could bring widespread death and destruction 
in East Timor. Sidney Jones, HRW Asia director, asserted that the violence was predictable and 
preventable: “It’s not just a tragedy. It’s a betrayal of the East Timorese who braved everything 
to vote”.4  
It cannot be doubted that in the period surrounding the popular consultation East Timor 
was in chaos. The political event that was meant to bring the region to a better future had 
initiated lawlessness. 5  Pro-integration supporters sought to hunt down pro-independence 
supporters to massacre them.6 According to Amnesty International (AI), some 1,400 people had 
been killed in the months preceding and in the immediate aftermath of the ballot.7 Without the 
Indonesian security forces being able to prevent pro-integration militias from rampages, almost 
all of the less than one million East Timorese people were forced to seek safe places in the hills, 
while around two hundred thousand were coercively relocated to West Timor.8   
Pro-integration militias, with the involvement of large elements of the Indonesian 
military and police, were also reported to have ransacked, burnt and looted houses, shops, and 
                                                 
3 See Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001) p. 125. 
4 HRW, Indonesian Government Must Prevent East Timor Bloodbath, Press Release, 3 September 1999. 
See also “East Timor and Kosovo are different”, The Jakarta Post, 11 September 1999.  
5 Anthony Smith, “Intervention and East Timor: A New Zealand Perspective,” in David Dickens and Guy 
Wilson-Roberts, Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington: Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2000) pp. 82–3. 
6 “Timor Timur Merdeka; Keharuan Berbaur Kecemasan”, Kompas, 5 September 1999. 
7 AI, Amnesty International and Judicial System Monitoring Programme: Indonesia and Timor Leste; 
Justice for Timor Leste: The Way Forward, AI Index ASA21/006/2004, 1 April 2004. The real number of 
murders during the popular consultation remains unclear. See, for example, Amnesty International, 
Indonesia and East Timor: International Responsibility for Justice, 14 April 2003. HRW reported that an 
estimated 1,000 to 2,000 East Timorese civilians lost their lives in the months before, and days 
immediately after, the voting. The report by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights 
mentioned that reports of extrajudicial killing up to 10 November 1999 had reached a total of 1,093 
deaths. See General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, 54th Session, A/54/660, 10 
December 1999. See also reports from UNAMET, The Destruction of East Timor Since 4 September 
1999, Report, 11 September 1999 and United Nations, Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta 
and Dili, S/1999/976, 14 September 1999. Sources from Australian media such as The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 13 November 1999 and 2 December 1999 and The Australian, 8, 9 and 27 January 2000 also 
provided different figures. Quoting INTERFET’s report in January, The Australian reported an estimate of 
1650 killed, an estimate based upon bodies recovered and reports of grave sites. The Sydney Morning 
Herald, cited the Australian Foreign Minister who said that the likely figure for the post-ballot death toll 
was between 500 and 1000. The estimate of Western diplomats saying that the death total would not go 
beyond 1200 was encountered by Sian Powell of The Australian who believed thousands were dead. 
These media reports are taken from Rodney Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits: Government, Media and East 
Timor (Sydney: UNSW, 2001) p. 75. Businessweek Online 27 September 1999 edition reported that “in 
accordance with UN estimate rampaging militias and Indonesian soldiers have slaughtered at least 7,000 
civilians”. See http://www.businessweek.com/@@aaaaaaaa/1999/99_39/b3648251.htm. 
8 The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Report, 14 September 1999. 
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buildings. About 60 to 80 per cent of houses and buildings in Dili and other towns were 
reportedly destroyed. 9  
Apart from reporting the violent acts, the analyses of international reporters, human 
rights NGOs and observers deemed that a humanitarian crisis had taken place in the region. 
UNAMET, for instance, said that the widespread destruction, forced displacement and selective 
executions were the first steps of a genocidal campaign. “It is clear that these crimes against 
humanity are part of a ‘scorched earth’ policy”, UNAMET added.10 HRW also said that there 
were widespread, systematic crimes against a civilian population which included murder, 
extermination, deportation, forced expulsion, torture, rape, and deliberate denial of access to 
food.11 Indonesian Komnas HAM also detailed the crimes against humanity including mass and 
systematic killings and gender-based violence.12 Ethnic cleansing or mass killing was another 
term used to describe the situation. Sidney Jones from HRW said, “This is not a two-sided 
conflict. It’s a one-sided, well organized, premeditated rampage, led by fully armed militias and 
backed by local troops”.13  
Statements from the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council members at a 
meeting on 11 September 1999 revealed similar allegations. Kofi Annan said that what was 
happening in East Timor might well fall into various categories of international crime. Antonio 
Monteiro from Portugal argued that massacres had been perpetrated in the territory. Richard 
Ryan from Ireland said that crimes against humanity and genocide had been committed in East 
Timor. 14 All these views were confirmed by the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili (8-
12 September 1999), who concluded that “there is strong prima facie evidence of abuses of 
international law committed since the announcement of the ballot result”.15 
                                                 
9 “Kebrutalan Ancam Perang Saudara: 145 Orang Lebih Tewas”, Kompas 6 September 1999. See also 
Komnas HAM, Keterangan Pers Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia tentang Laporan Akhir Komisi 
Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur (KPP HAM), 31 January 2000. 
10 UNAMET, The Destruction of East Timor Since 4 September 1999, Report, Op.cit. 
11 See, for example, HRW, Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor, Briefing: 
Questions and Answers, New York, 20 September 1999. See also Annemarie Devereux, “Accountability 
for human rights abuses in East Timor,” in Damien Kingsbury ed., ed., Guns and Ballot Boxes: East 
Timor’s Vote for Independence (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 2000) pp. 140–42. 
12 Komnas HAM, Ringkasan Eksekutif Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Di Timor 
Timur, Jakarta, 31 January 2000. 
13 HRW, East Timor: Martial Law Will Make Things Worse, Press Release, 7 September 1999. For 
detailed information about human rights violations in East Timor in 1999 see Geoffrey Robinson, East 
Timor 1999: Crimes against Humanity, A Report Commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), July 2003. 
14 United Nation, Security Council Hears 52 Speakers in Open Debate on Situation in East Timor, Press 
Release, SC/6724, 11 September 1999. 
15 United Nations, Report of the Security Council Mission, Op.cit., point 21. 
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But, perhaps, the conscience shocking situation in East Timor did not solely rely on the 
fact that hundreds of East Timorese had lost their lives or that nearly all East Timorese people 
had suffered from crimes against humanity.16 Several other factors or conditions contributed to 
such a shocking situation.  
First, to some extent the suffering of the East Timorese around the time of the popular 
consultation was associated with East Timor’s historical, political, geographical and 
demographic conditions. Historically, East Timor had for more than two decades been struggling 
for their right to self-determination, but “there was an international conspiracy that had for 
twenty four years denied our right to self-determination”, Xanana Gusmao said.17 During the 
same period the East Timorese had also been reported as suffering gross human rights 
violations,18 but these were under only a kind of coercive non-military intervention, according to 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse’s typology,19 or even a non-intervention policy, as suggested by 
Ian Martin20 − or so the international community had demonstrated thus far. Demographically 
and territorially, the relatively small size of East Timor might have contributed to the 
‘conscience-shocking’ perception. There was no part of the territory and population that could 
be seen to be secure.21   
Second, media coverage of events in East Timor before and after the popular 
consultation was crucial. The territory was swamped with some 22 different television camera 
crews and hundreds of foreign reporters from international news agencies such as Reuters, AFP, 
BBC and ABC.22 A large part of the media contingent was Australian journalists. About this 
                                                 
16 The Indonesian government fiercely countered the coverage suggesting mass killings or a genocidal 
campaign in East Timor. The Mission of Indonesia to the UN asserted that mass killing in East Timor was 
a myth. Quoting Reuters journalist, who was said to have information from the UN’s Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), Indonesian representatives to the UN contended that 
no shred of evidence of mass killing or ethnic cleansing had been found. See, Mission of Indonesia – UN, 
Mass killings? Myth or Realty, Press Release, No. 47/X/99, 13 October 1999. 
17 As restated by Nug Katjasungkana from Yayasan HAK, Interview in Dili, 24 April 2004. 
18 HRW and AI were regularly reporting the practices of human rights violation in East Timor. About this 
issue see also John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War (London: Zed, 1996) and Ian Robinson, “The 
East Timor Conflict (1975 – ),” in Michael Cranna ed., The True Cost of Conflict (New York: The New 
Press, 1994) pp. 1–24.  
19 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) p. 115. The typology particularly pointed to the suspension of 
international aid as a response to the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. 
20 Ian Martin, “International Intervention in East Timor” in Jennifer Welsh ed., Op.cit., pp. 143–4.  
21 The overwhelmingly Christian East Timorese, compared to the overwhelmingly Muslim Indonesian 
population, might have contributed to the international empathy, particularly from Western communities 
where the humanitarian intervention most likely came from. Although debatable, this demographic 
configuration had raised suspicions among domestic elements, primarily the Muslim groups, of a different 
kind of international conspiracy to separate East Timor from Indonesia. See Jakarta Post, 6 September 
1999. 
22 Quoted in Rodney Tiffen, Op.cit., p. 64. 
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media coverage, Rodney Tiffen wrote, “concentrated into the two months following the 
referendum on 30 August, East Timor may well have received almost as much media coverage 
as it had in the whole period since 1975 invasion”.23  
Third, the international community was also concerned about the ballot result and its 
implementation. With nearly 80 per cent of East Timorese voting to reject the special autonomy 
proposal, which consequentially meant that East Timor had to be free from NKRI, it had to be 
an institutional responsibility of the UN to ensure its implementation. “The UN came here by 
using the language that they wanted to rescue the people of East Timor from the scorched earth 
catastrophe,” a pro-integration East Timorese asserted.24 Another source argued that the UN and 
foreign agencies seemed to show their commitment to bring the right of East Timorese to self-
determination into effect.25  
Fourth, UNAMET staff, international observers and journalists, and other foreigners had 
been targeted in violent acts by militia groups supported by some elements within the Indonesian 
security forces. 26 There were reasons behind such expanded attacks,27 but these acts of terror 
and intimidation rightly raised the issue that the situation in the region had threatened 
international peace and security. Although saving foreigners in a conflict area such as East 
Timor was likely motivated by domestic political considerations or was appropriately covered 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as suggested by ICISS, the threats against foreigners gave a 
rationale for seeing the situation as a threat against international peace and security.  
Intimidation and terror against UNAMET staff and foreigners began on the night of 
ballot when pro-integration militiamen attacked UNAMET offices and opened fire on a 
UNAMET helicopter sent to collect ballot boxes,28 forcing UNAMET staff, ICRC, UNHCR, 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Interview in Dili 30 April 2004. 
25 Interview in Dili 24 April 2004. 
26 They were 210 UNAMET international staff members, 422 UN Volunteers, 271 Civilian Police 
(CIVPOL) and 50 military liaison offices (MLOs). They came from various countries. They were assisted 
by around 4,000 locally recruited East Timorese. For the interest of popular consultation in August 1999, 
a large number of the Independent Electoral Commission also worked in the region to independently 
advise the Secretary-General on whether the registration and the consultation process were adequately 
carried out. Some 1,300 officially registered observers from abroad and elsewhere in Indonesia also 
arrived in Dili in the lead up to the ballot day. 
27 The expanded targeting of foreigners was particularly triggered by allegations that UNAMET staff and 
foreigners had been biased in conducting the popular consultation for the benefit of pro-independence 
groups. Another reason, according to analysts, was that militia groups and some elements of Indonesian 
security forces wanted to continue their contingency plan to devastate East Timor without the presence of 
foreigners. The plan titled “General Assessment If Option 1 Fails” was allegedly set up by a retired 
general H. R. Garnadi to the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Faisal Tanjung. See 
Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, Op.cit., p. 82. 
28 “Timtim Diblokade; 150 staf UNAMET Sempat Disandera”, Kompas, 1 September 1999. 
  
128
other international NGOs and foreign journalists to leave the territory. This prompted OXFAM 
to call on the UN to send in international peacekeeping force.29 On the afternoon of 4 September 
a UNAMET vehicle carrying Electoral Commissioners was shot at and a member of the UN 
CIVPOL was wounded by gunshot. By 5 September UNAMET international staff and other 
foreigners were forced to pull out from the towns of Ainaro, Los Palos, Same, Liquica and 
Maliana. In such a threatening situation the head of UNAMET Ian Martin asked the Australian 
government for the evacuation of UNAMET staff to Darwin. 30  
Finally, what most shocked the international conscience was the inability and/or 
unwillingness of the Indonesian security forces to act properly. Jose Olivera made the following 
analysis: 
 
I think the INTERFET intervention was caused by the failure of Indonesian police 
(Polri), because according to the 5 May accord security was in the hands of Polri. The 
international community intervened because Polri failed to guarantee the people 
security. In our opinion, the arrival of INTERFET was too late. Yet they knew that 
TNI/Polri was unable to maintain security and that there was a scorched earth plan. 
However, they allowed the East Timorese people to die and after that they came in.31 
 
 Such a notion is in line with Komnas HAM, UNAMET, and the Security Council 
Mission’s assessments, and the general perception about the role of Indonesian security forces. 
The SC Mission, for example, stated:  
 
The involvement of large elements of the Indonesian military and police in East Timor 
in organizing and backing the unacceptably violent actions of the militias has become 
clear to any objective observer and was acknowledged publicly by the Minister of 
Defence on 11 September. The repeated failure of the defence forces, in spite of their 
undoubted capability, to carry out the Government’s obligations and assurances to 
provide security to UNAMET, international organizations and the population as a whole 
meant that the Indonesian authorities were either unable or unwilling to provide the 
proper environment for the peaceful implementation of the 5 May Agreement.32 
 
 
                                                 
29 Kompas, 2 September 1999. 
30 On 7 September, 539 foreigners including UNAMET staff and 76 Australians departed East Timor to 
Darwin. Bishop Belo and a number of UNAMET local staff were also evacuated from Baucau to Darwin. 
From 6 to 14 September some 2,600 people were evacuated from Dili to Darwin. Nearly one-third were 
international personnel and most of them were Australians. DFAT, East Timor in Transition 1998 – 2000: 
An Australian Policy Challenge (Canberra, 2001), pp. 129–31. 
31 Interview, 24 April 2004. 
32 UN, Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili, S/1999/976, 14 September 1999. 
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The decision of the Indonesian government to place East Timor under a state of 
emergency did not improve the security situation. 33  Worse, the military emergency even 
restricted humanitarian operations. Human rights NGOs, such as PBHI, for example, 
argued that giving the military an unlimited authority in an emergency situation would 
have limited access for humanitarian workers to reach people in need. For security 
reason, the military authority would also close certain areas to national and international 
media reporters.34 This fact made larger scale loss of life and destruction very likely. In this 
context a military intervention can be justified as an anticipatory action. “Without this possibility 
of anticipatory action, the international community would be placed in the morally untenable 
position of being required to wait until genocide begins, before being able to take action to stop 
it,” ICISS suggested.35 
From the situation presented above, one may suggest that a humanitarian crisis had been 
existent in East Timor around the time of the popular consultation that could have justified 
immediate presence of international military intervention. However, up to 11 September 1999 
the international community had not come to a political agreement that a military intervention 
was needed to protect East Timorese and foreigners in East Timor. Several countries such as 
New Zealand, Portugal, and Canada had called for the immediate presence of an international 
peacekeeping force in the region, but other major countries such as the USA, the UK, and 
Australia sought to have other conditions in place. This political stance was apparently in line 
with ICISS’s suggestion that “for a military intervention decision to be, and be seen to be, 
justified, there are four other substantial conditions that have to be met at the outset: right 
intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.36 
 
 
2. Precautionary criteria and right authority 
 
Right intention and right authority 
There is no doubt that the international community had the right intention to halt or avert 
human suffering in East Timor. The intention was clearly stated in the UN Security Council 
                                                 
33 HRW, East Timor: Martial Law Will Make Things Worse, Press Release, New York, 7 September 1999. 
See also “Penerapan Darurat Militer Landasan Hukum bagi ABRI untuk Lebih Keras dan Tegas”, 
Kompas, 8 September 1999; “Kekerasan Masih Berlangsung di Timtim; Komnas HAM: Cabut Status 
Darurat Militer”, Kompas, 9 September 1999. 
34 “PBHI Desak Darurat Militer Dicabut; Demi Misi Kemanusiaan”, Kompas, 11 September 1999. 
35 ICISS, Op.cit., p. 33. 
36 Ibid., p. 35. 
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Resolution 1264. Deeply concerned about the deterioration of the security situation in East 
Timor, the continuing violence against and large scale displacement and relocation of East 
Timorese, regular attacks on UNAMET staff and premises and on national and international 
humanitarian personnel, the international military force in East Timor (INTERFET) was 
mandated to restore peace and security and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations in 
East Timor.37  
The same Resolution also proved that the deployment of foreign forces to halt the 
human suffering in East Timor was justified because it was authorized by an internationally 
recognized institution, the UN. Of all the calls for a peacekeeping force in East Timor, the UN 
Security Council was overwhelmingly seen as the only institution able to authorize such a 
measure. There was no shred of evidence that an individual state or a group of states wanted to 
act without UN authorization. Not even Australia, whose troops in Darwin had been widely 
reported as being on high alert and ready to be deployed as quickly as possible, took military 
action independently. According to Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, “It is only if 
there is a call from the UN and agreement from the Indonesian government, we will 
intervene”.38 The Australian government explained further:  
 
Public calls for the UN to take action in East Timor without waiting for Indonesian 
agreement had increased dramatically, but this was never a credible proposition. No 
country was prepared to contribute to an invading force and the UN made it abundantly 
clear that this would never be considered.39 
 
The APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in New Zealand, 9–12 
September 1999, might have forced or generated ‘friendly’ but effective pressure on Indonesia 
to accept international assistance,40 but the ultimate authority to decide to deploy a military force 
                                                 
37 UN Security Council Resolution 1264, S/RES/1264(1999), 15 September 1999, point 3. 
38 “Reaksi Atas Kerusuhan Timtim, Dunia Internasional Kecam Indonesia”, Kompas, 3 September 1999. 
See also “Downer faces search for answer to violence in East Timor”, The World Today Archive - 
Monday, 6 September , 1999 on http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s49593.htm.    
39 DFAT, Op.cit., p. 133. 
40 Within APEC the ASEAN countries were the key members and Indonesia usually claimed ASEAN as 
the cornerstone (sokoguru) of its foreign policy. The important role of ASEAN in INTERFET was also 
made possible due to the growing regional opinion to review ASEAN’s conventional principle of non-
intervention. Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand Foreign Minister and the 1999 Chairman of ASEAN Standing 
Committee, told the reporter that ASEAN country members “are ready to assist in whatever way is 
considered to be appropriate to ensure that Indonesia fulfils its responsibility to solve the problem.” The 
role of ASEAN was also shown by the appointment of Major General Songkitti Jaggabattara as the 
Deputy Commander of INTERFET. See “ASEAN Siap Bantu Indonesia”, Kompas, 11 September 1999. 
For further analysis about ASEAN’s political stance on the international intervention in East Timor see 
James Cotton, “Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention”, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1, Spring 2001, 
pp. 127–42; See also Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, Op.cit., p.112–3.  
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in East Timor lay with the UN Security Council. Coincidental with the APEC meeting, the UN 
Security Council held a meeting in New York at which all of its member countries urged 
Indonesia to accept international assistance. And after gaining Indonesia’s consent, the UN 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1264 establishing a multinational force in 
East Timor on 15 September 1999. 41  The head of UNAMET Ian Martin maintained that 
Indonesia’s consent was critical in comparison to the case of Kosovo where NATO intervened 
without the consent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.42 
 
Proportional means and success in restoring security 
 From the beginning it had been clear to many observers that the central issue among the 
political developments in East Timor around the time of the popular consultation was security: 
the Indonesian government was unable and the security forces were unwilling to secure the 
ballot in peaceful and orderly ways.  
 There were two general theories explaining the unceasing violence in the region. The 
first suggested that the violence was the spontaneous seeking of vengeance by pro-integration 
supporters. Allegations of UNAMET’s bias in conducting the ballot fuelled the disappointed 
pro-integration supporters who displayed their fury and anger by chasing pro-independence 
supporters and threatening foreigners. In this situation, Indonesian security forces were hindered 
by a psychological burden, a general nationalist sentiment, from preventing pro-integration 
supporters from unleashing their discontent. 43  While this argument was mostly held by 
Indonesian elements – notably the security commanders – the second theory was mostly adopted 
by foreign observers. The second theory argued that the violence had been planned and well 
organized long before the ballot. This theory was largely based on the fact that pro-integration 
militias were re-established, mobilized, armed, and directed by Indonesian security elements.44  
 Considering the two possibilities, the UN Secretary General, the Australian government 
and other concerned governments had engaged in intensive discussions about establishing a 
military intervention. In general, the discussions concluded that the military force had to have 
the impression of having huge strength, a robust mandate, and unquestionable legitimacy, so that 
it could operate effectively, including in the worst situation.45 Australia considered that force had 
                                                 
41 See the UN SC Resolution 1264, S/RES/1264(1999), 15 September 1999, point 3. 
42 See Ian Martin, “International Intervention in East Timor” in Jennifer M. Welsh ed., Op.cit. 
43 “Wiranto Bantah, Prajurit Di Balik Kekacauan”, Kompas, 7 September 1999. 
44 HRW, East Timor: The World Must Act or Be Complicit In Killing, Press Release, New York, 5 
September 1999. See also in Damien Kingsbury ed., Op.cit. 
45 Alan Dupont from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (ANU) told The Australian, 9 September 
1999, that the military operation in East Timor required huge logistical support, marine and air forces. 
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to be a “coalition of the willing”: co-ordinated and funded by concerned nations, but authorized 
by the UN SC and with a strong regional component. Australia also stressed that the military 
deployment “should be a short term measure aimed at stabilizing the security situation in 
advance of the deployment of a fully-fledged UN peacekeeping operation.”46 These conditions 
were clearly adopted in Resolution 1264 stipulating that INTERFET was a multinational force 
under a unified command structure, supported by a trust fund, intended to restore security and 
that it would be replaced as soon as possible by a UN peacekeeping operation.47 This was 
consistent with the principle of the proportionality of humanitarian intervention, as suggested by 
many experts including those within the ICISS. 48  
Led by Australia, which was ready and asked by the UN Secretary-General to lead the 
force, INTERFET was supported by 21 countries.49 With 11,500 troops at its peak, 5,500 of 
which were Australian personnel, INTERFET seemed to have the strength needed to deal with 
the security problem in East Timor. Due to its qualifications it had, INTERFET had good 
prospects of success. Without these prospects a multinational security force in East Timor would 
have been unjustified, as ICISS had asserted.50  
In restoring peace and security the first INTERFET troops landing in Dili began to 
secure access for forces and logistics support into the capital, such as air and sea entry points. 
This was accompanied by securing the UNAMET compound. Security operations against pro-
integration militias were then carried out by detaining them and confiscating their weapons.51 
                                                                                                                                                
Because Australia did not have such support, Australian would face a bloodbath in operating in East 
Timor. His opinion was quoted in Kompas, “Australia Ibarat Menggali Kubur”, 10 September 1999.  
46 DFAT, Op.cit., p. 133. 
47 UN SC Resolution 1264 (1999), S/RES/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999, point 3, 9 and 10. 
48 The guidelines proposed by ICISS state: “The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military 
intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question. The 
means have to be commensurate with the ends, and in line with the magnitude of the original 
provocation.” See ICISS, Op.cit., p. 37. 
49 The 22 countries were Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US, one from Latin America (Brazil), three from the Middle East and 
Africa (Egypt, Jordan and Kenya) and four ASEAN country members (Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand). Fiji and Republic of Korea made the coalition more multinational in character. 
50 The failure and ultimate withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia in 1992 – 1993 had been 
highly controversial and unjustified. The ICISS asserted that “military action can only be justified if it 
stands a reasonable chance of success, that is, halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered 
the intervention in the first place”. It further stressed that “military intervention is not justified if actual 
protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely be 
worse than if there is no action at all.” See ICISS, Ibid. p. 37. 
51 These initial operations provoked several incidents of shooting during the first month of INTERFET 
deployment. The first incidents occurred on 22 and 25 September where three journalists and eight 
religious workers were found dead in Dili. The last incident of shooting took place on 16 October when 
around 20 militias reportedly attacked an INTERFET patrolling unit. Three militiamen were killed and 
another three were wounded. See DFAT, Op.cit., pp. 147–8.  
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Within 48 hours INTERFET was able to secure Dili and in less than three weeks INTERFET 
had secured most of East Timor with the exception of some areas in the border region and the 
enclave of Oecussi. In one month INTERFET had established its presence across the region.52  
 INTERFET’s success in restoring security made possible “the urgent need for 
coordinated humanitarian assistance and the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded 
access of humanitarian organizations” required by Resolution 1264. With security controlled by 
INTERFET, UN agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), international NGOs like ICRC and World 
Vision, and many individual states generously contributed to efforts to cope with the 
humanitarian crisis. Improvement in security also made it possible for a large number of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) return to their home towns and villages. OCHA also sought 
to coordinate the return process of East Timorese who were forced to move to West Timor and 
to ensure they had emergency aid. In mid-October some 64,000 people returned to Dili from the 
surrounding hills. By August 2000, the UNHCR had successfully returned nearly 170,000 
refugees from West Timor, while an estimated 85,000 to 120,000 remained there.53 
In supporting the UNAMET programs, one day after INTERFET troops arrived in Dili, 
the head and staff of UNAMET returned from Darwin to Dili. Due to the ballot result, as 
stipulated in the 5 May Agreement, UNAMET had to prepare for a peaceful and orderly transfer 
of authority in East Timor to the UN, enabling the process of the transition of East Timor to 
independence. On 28 September Foreign Ministers Ali Alatas and Jamie Gama and the UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan met in New York. The meeting concluded that there was a need 
to fill the vacuum of authority and to take early measures for the transfer of authority in East 
Timor. This then led to the need for close coordination among INTERFET, UNAMET, 
humanitarian agencies and the CNRT district network to carry out daily basic services. 
INTERFET was responsible for security, UNAMET worked on political affairs related to the 
transfer of authority, humanitarian agencies continued their humanitarian operations and the 
CNRT personnel ran local administration.  
 
 
                                                 
52 P.J. Cosgrove, “Complex Questions – A Commander’s Perspective”, RUSI Journal, London, February 
2001, Vol. 146, Issue 1, pp. 31–35. According to Michael Smith and Moreen Dee, “the speed and success 
of INTERFET’s tactical operations was due to the availability of the INTERFET Trust Fund … and the 
capable air and maritime assets that were deployed quickly to East Timor”. See Juan Federer, The UN in 
East Timor: Building Timor Leste, A Fragile State (Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, 2005) p. 
70. 
53 DFAT, Op.cit., p. 170.  
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Following the MPR decision to accept and respect the ballot result, 54  the UN SC 
assembled and issued Resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999. The Resolution established the UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Like INTERFET, UNTAET was also 
formed under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.55 This meant UNTAET had robust authority, 
with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor. With the establishment of 
UNTAET, Indonesian authority over and responsibility for East Timor was officially transferred 
to the UN. 
 
Last Resort 
Perhaps, the most controversial issue of the humanitarian intervention in East Timor was 
the process to decide when the military intervention could be seen as the last resort to bring the 
humanitarian crisis in the region to an end.  
From February to the first week of September 1999, the Personal Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Jamsheed Marker,56 the Director of the Asia and Pacific Division of the 
Department of Political Affairs (UN), Francesc Vendrell,57 the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Mary Robinson,58 the President of the SC,59 and the UN Secretary-General60 
repeatedly asked the Indonesian authorities to take urgent and effective steps to guarantee the 
East Timorese and UNAMET’s safety and security. Although these requests looked like a 
gamble, as a reporter proposed to the UN Secretary-General,61 the international community 
seemed to see a military intervention as not yet the last resort.  
Since security in the region had deteriorated, Indonesia’s major donors, including the 
US, Australia and Japan, were urged “to pull out every stop they’ve got – and that includes 
                                                 
54 While UNAMET was preparing the process of transfer of authority in East Timor, the Indonesian 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) was convening in Jakarta from 19 to 25 October 1999. As 
expected, on 20 October MPR, as Indonesia’s supreme legislative body, unanimously accepted the choice 
of the East Timorese to separate from NKRI. MPR also agreed to revoke the MPR decision (TAP 
VI/MPR/1978) incorporating East Timor into Indonesia. The Indonesian parliament (DPR) followed 
accordingly to revoke UU No.17/1976 declaring East Timor as the 27th province of Indonesia. A formal 
letter was then sent on 25 October by a newly elected President Abdurrahman Wahid to the UN Secretary 
General that MPR recognized the East Timorese separation from Indonesia. See DFAT, Ibid, p. 155. 
55 UN Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999), S/RES/1272(1999), 25 October 1999. 
56 Press Briefing, 5 February 1999. 
57 Press Briefing, 10 May 1999 
58 Press Briefing, 7 and 9 September 1999. 
59 Press Statement, 8 and 9 September 1999. 
60 Secretary-General’s Statement to the Press, 9 September 1999. 
61 Ibid. In his response, Kofi Annan said that “it was an expectation which was genuine. The Indonesians 
gave their word that they would do it”. 
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suspending aid.”62 Before leaving for Auckland for the APEC summit, President Bill Clinton 
said that military cooperation with Indonesia would be suspended, because, “now it is clear that 
Indonesian military support and are behind militia’s violence”. He also asserted the possibility of 
economic sanctions if the Indonesian government failed to stop the massive violation of human 
rights in East Timor. Similar pressure and economic threats also came from the IMF and the 
World Bank, whose roles were vital for Indonesia’s economic recovery. Hubert Neiss, the IMF’s 
director for Asia, reportedly said that “the events in East Timor are first of all a large human 
tragedy” and Indonesia would face a loss of financial aid if it was unable to solve the East Timor 
crisis. The World Bank had previously warned Indonesia that it was in danger of breaching its 
commitments and that it should allow a peaceful transition to independence in East Timor.63 
Considering security in East Timor did not improve, although the Indonesian 
government had imposed emergency military law, the UN and major countries began to admit 
that the Indonesian government was unable to bring the region under control. At this stage, the 
Western donor countries and the APEC summit changed the conditions for economic sanctions. 
Now the condition was: if Indonesia did not allow an international peacekeeping force to enter 
the region, Indonesia would suffer the withdrawal of international economic aid and assistance.64 
Indonesia was also threatened with allegations of crimes against humanity. The UN Secretary-
General said: 
 
The time has clearly come for Indonesia to seek help from the international community 
in fulfilling its responsibility to bring order and security to the people of East Timor …. 
A number of Governments in the region… have assured me of their willingness to 
participate in an international force for this purpose…. I urge the Indonesian 
Government to accept their offer of help without delay. If it refuses to do so, it cannot 
escape the responsibility of what could amount – according to reports reaching us – to 
crimes against humanity.65 
 
On 11 September the UN SC held an open debate on East Timor. Before the debate the 
Secretary General once again urged “Indonesia to agree without delay to the deployment of an 
international force. The international community is asking for Indonesia’s consent to the 
                                                 
62 HRW, Indonesian Government Must Prevent East Timor Bloodbath, Press Release, New York, 3 
September 1999. See also HRW, East Timor: Suspend Aid Until Militias Brought Under Control, Press 
Release, 1 September 1999 and HRW, East Timor: The World Must Act Or Be Complicit In The Killing, 
Press Release, 5 September 1999. 
63 “Loans to Indonesia under threat” and “IMF suspends talks with Indonesia”, BBC News, 8 and 10 
September 1999.  
64 “Sekjen PBB Kofi Annan Desak Indonesia Segera Terima Pasukan Internasional”, Kompas, 11 
September 1999; “Jaminan PM Jepang Tak Akan Terapkan Sanksi Ekonomi”, Kompas, 12 September 
1999. See also DFAT, Op.cit., p. 137–8. 
65 As quoted in the DFAT, Ibid. pp. 134–5.  
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deployment of such force.”66 On the next day, President Habibie at last sent a formal invitation 
to the UN to send an international peacekeeping force to East Timor. In its 4045th meeting on 15 
September 1999, the UN SC authorized the establishment of a multinational force (INTERFET) 
“pursuant to the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 
12 September 1999.”67 With the Indonesian government’s consent, the UN Security Council 
finally decided a military intervention in East Timor as the last resort for humanitarian purposes, 
which was made through the Resolution. 
Theoretically, a military intervention for humanitarian purposes does not require the 
consent of the state concerned.68 What the ICISS suggested was that a military intervention 
would be justified if there had been a reasonable ground for believing that, in all circumstances, 
the diplomatic and other peaceful measures had not succeeded and would not be successful.69 
The issues surrounding Indonesia’s consent will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
C. Justifying INTERFET: Indonesia’s Domestic Context  
 
 Several important questions can be raised about the international perspective in 
explaining the presence, role and success of INTERFET in halting the violence and averting a 
further humanitarian catastrophe in East Timor. The first challenging question is: would the 
international community, i.e. the UN and other major countries, have established and sent 
INTERFET to East Timor if the Indonesian government had not given its consent? Other 
questions are: (a) would a referendum having been carried out in East Timor if the president was 
not Habibie but someone with a military background (i.e. General Wiranto) or with a strong 
nationalistic ideology (i.e. Megawati)?; (b) would the UN, Australia, and other concerned states 
have sent their troops to the region if the Indonesian security forces and major national political 
forces had rejected the intervention?; and (c) would there have been military humanitarian 
intervention if the ballot result had been in favour of autonomy, even though large scale loss of 
life had taken place? 
These questions are not meant to neglect the validity of the international principles in 
justifying INTERFET. Instead, they are intended to examine the extent of the role of Indonesian 
political dynamics in justifying the military intervention in East Timor. The “if” condition in 
                                                 
66 UN Secretary General Press Release SG/SM/7124, 10 September 1999. 
67 UN SC Resolution 1264 (1999), S/RES/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999, point 3. 
68 See for example in AIV and CAVV, Humanitarian Intervention, No. 13, April 2000, p. 33. 
69 ICISS, Op.cit., p. 36. 
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each question clearly points to Indonesian domestic politics. And with these questions, I wish to 
discuss the proposition that the problems in East Timor and the subsequent intervention by the 
international community primarily resulted from the ‘nearly failed’ state of Indonesia under 
President Habibie.  
The near collapse of Indonesia was particularly characterized by (a) the weak 
transitional government of President Habibie, (b) the reluctance of the Indonesian security force 
to maintain order and security in East Timor, (c) the anxiety of political leaders and parties about 
the popular consultation in East Timor, and (d) the lack of cohesion among Indonesian people in 
dealing with political events in the region. Each of these political forces and its particular 
behaviour contributed to the emergence of a humanitarian crisis and made the presence of 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes in East Timor necessary. 
 
1. The weak transitional government of President Habibie 
 There are three important aspects of the weak transitional government of President 
Habibie in regard to the escalation of violence and the presence of INTERFET in the region. 
These are (a) the decision to offer the East Timorese a referendum, (b) the implementation of 
this decision, and (c) the domestic and international implications of the decision. 
 The change in Habibie’s East Timor policy from offering special autonomy within the 
unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI) (introduced on 9 June 1998) to the possibility of independence 
from NKRI through a referendum (announced on 27 January 1999) not only surprised many 
parties but also made irrelevant the previous progress in resolving the East Timor problem. In 
responding to the dramatic and unexpected policy, Jamsheed Marker, for example, who had 
been intensely involved in seeking a permanent solution to the territory problem, said:  
 
I first got this astonishing news through the media, and although I had anticipated some 
positive movement on the matter of Xanana’s release, the announcement of the offer “to 
release East Timor from Indonesia” took me by complete surprise. I had been in regular 
telephonic communication with Alex (Ali Alatas) on a number of topics, and I got the 
feeling that there was some major rethinking going on in Jakarta, but I did not imagine 
that it would be anything quite so radical. Our attention had hitherto been entirely 
focused on the autonomy proposals, which had by now reached their final shape and 
were awaiting Ministerial approval.70 
 
 
                                                 
70 Jamsheed Marker, East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Independence, p. 122 as quoted from 
http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0786415711&id=4tWSU_F9WW8C&pg=PA121&lpg=PA121
&dq=isbn:0786415711&sig=6getwZLfCxOV3ED2cnkn_4hhm6s#PPA122,M1 on 4 March 2007. 
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Habibie’s policy was very surprising since the previous government had been struggling 
for more than two decades to preserve its authority in East Timor. Despite the world’s 
condemnation of human rights violations there, under Suharto there was no possibility the 
government would have considered the prospect of an independent East Timor. Public 
understanding of Habibie as Suharto’s confidant made it harder to imagine that he would make 
such a dramatic policy change. In the meantime, the post-Suharto government had not made any 
kind of offer for regions such as in East Timor, Aceh, Maluku and Papua to secede from NKRI. 
In its common understanding, reformasi meant a significant reduction in the government’s 
repressive control and, consequently, a larger space for the people to take part in public affairs 
without any intention of placing the unitary state of Indonesia in danger.  
Habibie’s policy on a referendum in East Timor was attractive in terms of its clear 
rationale.71 However, what is more important to state here is that Habibie’s policy on East Timor 
not only went against the grain but instantly provoked opposition among national major political 
forces. Many opposition leaders such as Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid contended that 
Habibie could not and should not make such a vital decision because he was just an interim or 
transitional president. 72  While a senior politician called the offer a sloppy decision, many 
observers asserted that the decision was unconstitutional, illegal, a big mistake, and poorly 
                                                 
71 One notion suggested that it was influenced by his liberal background. Kwik Kian Gie, a PDIP 
politician, held this view. See Kompas, 22 May 1999. Habibie himself said that his decision was basically 
based on moral principles that “as a friend we will let them decide by themselves”. See “Indonesia’s 
Habibie wants East Timor problem fixed by 2000”, CNN, 11 February 1999. Some eight years later, in his 
written testimony to the Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia – Timor Leste, he stressed that 
the policy was based on his deep reflection as a technocrat in carrying out political reform in Indonesia. 
See “Jajak Pendapat, Refleksi Mendalam Habibie”, Kompas - KCM, 27 March 2007. Another notion 
suggested that the policy was intended to have a broader political support particularly from pro-democracy 
and human rights activists, as suggested by a respondent in Dili, 21 April 2004. See also Kompas, 25 June 
1998. It was also suspected that he wanted political support from some Muslim elements who saw the 
incorporation of the predominantly Catholic East Timorese within the overwhelming Muslim population 
of Indonesia caused more trouble than benefit for the government. See Gatra, 21 September 1995; 
Dawam Rahardjo, “Hadiah Nobel and Diplomasi Indonesia”, Tempo, 28 October 1996; Indria Samego, 
“Politisasi Timtim”, Republika, 28 and 29 November 1999. There was also suggestion that the policy was 
more likely motivated by Habibie’s interests to have international support for his power and economic 
recovery program. See Harold Crouch, “The TNI and East Timor policy” in James J. Fox and Dionisio 
Babo Soares eds.,  Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor (Canberra: ANU E 
Press, 2000) p. 147  and Richard Woolcott, “Howard’s ‘noble’ act was folly”, The Age, 7 March 2003. 
There was also suspicion that the policy was made because Habibie was badly agitated by a letter sent by 
Australian PM John Howard who suggested the model of Matignon Accord in New Caledonia to resolve 
East Timor problem. See Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, “First Steps – Timor Independence”, The 
Australian, 20 May 2002, as downloaded from http://www.etan.org/et2002b/may/19-25/20first.htm.  See 
also Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, Op.cit.; DFAT, Op.cit.; and Rodney Tiffen, Op.cit., pp. 
56–57. The text of Howard’s letter and clarification and the response of the Indonesian government can be 
read in DFAT, Ibid, p. 181 (Annex 2) and pp. 29–37. 
72 Kompas, 22 May 1999. 
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timed.73 All these criticisms contended that the decision was made without full consultation with 
major political institutions such as DPR/MPR and was made at a time when all national attention 
and energy were devoted to political reform and economic recovery.  
Without political support from major national political forces, particularly the military 
and major political parties, it was hard to expect that the implementation of the policy would be 
effective. Although there was no evidence that the newly increasing role of opposition parties 
deliberately undermined Habibie’s policy, they distanced themselves from the problem and 
presented the policy as Habibie’s responsibility alone. The role of the security forces was more 
disturbing. Despite no public objection to the policy, some elements of the armed forces had 
engineered a kind of ‘civil war’ among East Timorese that led to a humanitarian disaster.  
It is worth noting that since the new policy was announced, there is no evidence to 
suggest that his government was well prepared for its implementation. If it was true that Habibie 
wanted international support, the government should have been more prepared to run the ballot 
according to the 5 May agreement. 74  What the central government had done was just to allow 
the regional government and the security forces to persuade pro-autonomy supporters with 
money and mobilize them by terror and intimidation. 75  Habibie himself continually faced 
resistance from the reformist movement and was struggling to gain broader political support.76 In 
the mean time, Habibie’s government also had to deal with communal violence in Maluku and 
the revival of separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, a national economic crisis and all of its 
social effects.77   
As violence continued to escalate in East Timor, it became clearer that Habibie’s policy 
was not only opposed by major national leaders; further, Habibie himself seemed to have lost 
commitment from the security forces that order and security in the region could be restored and 
maintained. Although there was no doubt that the security forces were able to control the 
situation, their performance in the regional political conflict showed that the military did not 
support Habibie’s policy and did not want East Timor to be separated from NKRI.  
                                                 
73 Kompas, 5 and 6 September 1999; The Jakarta Post, 6 and 7 September 1999.  
74 Institutionally, the government formed only the Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular 
Consultation (Satgas P3TT), which was formed in the first week of June with the main task as liaison 
between Indonesian government and UNAMET and was not assigned to make the popular consultation 
more attractive for East Timorese voters.  
75 Interviews with pro-integration supporters in Dili, 8 and 12 April 2004. 
76 The Bank Bali scandal, known as Baligate, was one case where Habibie was allegedly involved in using 
money from Bank Bali to finance Golkar campaign. See Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair: Indonesia 
Between 1997 and 2000 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001) pp. 417–30. 
77 See “Judging Habibie”, Asiaweek, 4 September 1999. 
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Finally, the national political circumstances outlined above meant that the international 
pressures for Habibie’s government to take all necessary actions to control the situation were 
practically ineffective. The exertion of economic sanctions or charges of crimes against 
humanity were useless, because the central government was no longer effective as an 
authoritative political institution. The only option available for Habibie, and for the international 
community as well, was to hand over the situation in East Timor to the international community. 
By 12 September 1999, as mentioned before, President Habibie invited the UN to send an 
international peacekeeping force into East Timor. To the media conference he explained that it 
was made after having reports and opinions from Wiranto, Ali Alatas and Faisal Tanjung. He 
went on, saying: “I expect all national components, primarily national leaders and DPR 
members, could understand the step I took, for the security and peace in East Timor in particular 
and Indonesia nationwide in general”.78 
   
2. The reluctance of ABRI 
 The role of the Indonesian security forces (ABRI) in the political processes during the 
popular consultation was central. As has been discussed, the key issue in the series of events in 
East Timor was security, whereby ABRI, according to Indonesian politics and in particular the 5 
May agreement, was responsible to ensure the referendum was held in peaceful and orderly 
conditions. The problem was that ABRI was in fact reluctant to carry out Habibie’s policy and to 
secure the referendum. This attitude gave the political event an anarchical character which was a 
sound reason for humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that ABRI was a 
determining factor in the presence of INTERFET.  
 Given ABRI had an interest in retaining East Timor as part of NKRI, there had been 
significant questioning as to why the military leaders did not reject Habibie’s policy of holding a 
referendum in the region. To this question there are two main explanations. The first suggests 
that there was confidence among the military that autonomy or integration would win out over 
independence. In Harold Crouch’s words: “it seems that they [the military] did indeed accept the 
referendum but saw it as an opportunity to settle the East Timor issue once and for all by making 
sure that the vote would be in favour of continued integration with Indonesia”. But he also 
added: “the military accepted the referendum with a political concession that there should not be 
any question on the correctness of the original intervention in East Timor in 1975 in view of the 
sacrifices made by the military personnel in the previous two decades”. 79  
                                                 
78 Kompas, 13 September 1999. 
79 Harold Crouch, Op.cit. p. 149. 
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The second explanation for the military not opposing Habibie’s policy was that Wiranto 
played a political game in national transitional politics. This game was not limited to his rivalry 
with Prabowo Subianto for patronage from Habibie (who had just replaced Suharto); it was also 
in the interest of the ABRI institution. According to many analyses, as Stephen Sherlock 
proposed, ABRI leaders made little secret of their dislike of Habibie, because Habibie had no 
military background, had a power base mainly within the Islamic intellectual association (ICMI) 
– on which the military had been long suspicious with organizations with Islamic character, and 
had taken over almost all strategic industries that had traditionally been under the influence of 
ABRI.80 And in regard to political reform, the military had an interest in maintaining its political 
role and socio-economic privileges.81  
 Given the military’s political interests, it would be hard to imagine that the Indonesian 
security force would have desired to bring the new policy on East Timor into effect, let alone be 
committed to the 5 May Agreement in maintaining peace and security. “There is a strong feeling 
within the ranks of Indonesia’s serving and former generals that no matter what Habibie has 
promised, the armed forces must not let East Timor go”, Lindsay Murdoch wrote.82 And this was 
part of Wiranto’s diplomatic game, he went on, “calling for disarming and an end to the 
violence, while privately telling his men on the ground to do whatever they can do to ensure that 
vote was not a landslide for independence.” 
 The intractability of the violence was also affected by the internal division within ABRI, 
particularly at the operational level.83 Some key military units and officers on the ground were 
not fully controlled by Wiranto. The most important unit was Kopassus and its officers were 
close to Prabowo, who had just been sacked by Wiranto. It was widely known that Kopassus had 
a long history of a strong presence and role in East Timor and this was particularly so in the pre- 
and post-ballot period.84   The officers were Adam Damiri, the Udayana Military Regional 
Commander (Kodam IX) based in Bali, Tono Suratman, the Wiradharma Military Resort 
Commander (Korem 164) based in Dili, Mahidin Simbolon, the staff chief of Kodam IX 
                                                 
80 Stephen Sherlock, B.J. Habibie: Indonesia’s Interim President? (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Group: Research Note No. 45, 1997–1998, 25 May 1998). 
81 Sukardi Rinakit, Op.cit., p. 114.  
82 The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May 1999. 
83 See “Former Commander Doubts TNI Neutrality in East Timor”, The Jakarta Post, 8 September 1999. 
84 Kopassus, according to Kingsbury, actually ran a policy independently of Wiranto including in planning 
and running the scorched earth operations and organizing militia groups. See Damien Kingsbury, Power 
Politics and The Indonesian Military (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 120–22 and 167. According 
to one source, the total number of military forces and the police in East Timor in late 1998 was 17,914 
troops. See in Harold Crouch, Op.cit., p. 150. 
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Udayana and had a link with Mahidin militia group, and Zacky Anwar Makarim, the chief 
Indonesian liaison officer to UNAMET. 85  
 One unexpected consequence of such political circumstances and operational division 
was that security in the region continued to deteriorate. Pro-integration militias were allowed to 
go on the rampage and in many occasions, as revealed previously, the security force elements 
took part in the violent acts. Not only were the pro-independence supporters hunted to be 
massacred or were their premises destroyed, the UNAMET staff and other foreigners became the 
targets of violent acts.86  
The deteriorating security highlighted the fact that President Habibie did not control the 
military commander Wiranto and/or Wiranto himself did not control the operational 
commanders on the ground. Although Habibie claimed to be a constitutional president and thus 
the supreme commander,87 he did not in fact control the military.88 On many occasions, Habibie 
told the international community that he had ordered Wiranto and all security apparatus to take 
all necessary measures to bring the situation there under control. To national and international 
publics, however, it was clear that security in the region had not been maintained and would not 
be restored. 
 That the military were not under Habibie’s control was particularly shown by the case of 
the imposition of a state of military emergency in East Timor on 7 September 1999. It was 
reported that the DPR had rejected the initiative and that Habibie had declined to impose it. 
However, the decision to place East Timor under martial law was then announced, not by the 
president himself as it traditionally would have been, but by Faisal Tanjung.89 Although Wiranto 
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refuted the allegation that the military forced Habibie to impose martial law, 90  there were 
speculations about the TNI’s interests in compelling the imposition of emergency military law. 
First, the TNI wanted to show its commitment and to meet its responsibility as stipulated in the 5 
May agreement. Success in restoring security would help to refurbish its image, which had been 
widely seen as being awful. Second, TNI demanded one circumstance that could bring their 
contingency plans into effect, namely securing evacuation routes, as mentioned in a leaked 
document. 91  Finally, the military emergency was needed to raise nationalist sentiment in 
particular in dealing with the growing opinion for international intervention.92  
What demonstrated which of the notions above was correct was that the security 
condition in East Timor continued to worsen. This fostered the calls for the urgent presence of 
international military forces in the region. Some government officials had foreseen the 
possibility of an international intervention in East Timor,93 while other officials like Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas disagreed and said there was no reason for the international community to 
send a peacekeeping force.94 On another occasion Alatas said that any peacekeeping force not 
requested by Jakarta would have to shoot its way into East Timor; it would not help the situation 
and was not realistic.95  
Until 10 September 1999 Wiranto remained resistant to any kind of international 
intervention in East Timor. On 2 September Wiranto promised Jamsheed Marker that he would 
take all actions needed to restore peace and security. In subsequent days he said that the idea of 
foreign intervention at a time of deteriorating security in East Timor was dangerous. He argued 
that Indonesia remained responsible for security until the MPR had ratified the ballot result; and 
it would be very dangerous for international peacekeeping forces to be deployed when pro-
integration militias were in anguish and outrage.96 However, since the condition in East Timor 
continued to worsen and the state of military emergency proved ineffective, Wiranto at last 
admitted that the situation had gotten out of control. By 11 September in Dili, Wiranto told the 
media that he would ask Habibie to consider the possibility of an international peacekeeping 
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force in East Timor as soon as possible.97 And on the day after, President Habibie himself 
announced that Indonesia had accepted a UN peacekeeping force to restore order and security in 
East Timor. 98 
 There is no single reason why ABRI finally accepted the international military 
intervention in East Timor. The military decision to ask Habibie to invite an international 
peacekeeping force resulted from a complicated mixture of international and domestic pressures. 
 First, from the international side, Indonesian security forces were facing increasing 
pressure. The international community had threatened to terminate all kinds of international 
assistance for Indonesian military and police. These threatened economic sanctions were also 
followed by the threat of the possibility of bringing those who had committed crimes against 
humanity and war crimes to an international tribunal court.99 This issue not only threatened 
certain officers’ future careers, but also jeopardized military cohesiveness and tarnished the 
military’s reputation.100  
 Second, from a domestic point of view, pressures on the military to accept an 
international force in East Timor also mounted. Various political and social organizations 
believed that Indonesia’s military presence in the region merely exacerbated the situation. 
Several retired generals had also suggested that it would be better for Indonesian security forces 
to leave the region as soon as possible and allow the UN peacekeeping force to take over the 
responsibility of security and order in the region. One of the reasons, according to Theo Syafei, a 
retired general and former commander in East Timor, was that it would be hard for TNI 
personnel to be neutral in handling pro-integration militias.101  
The decision to accept an international peacekeeping force in East Timor was also based 
on an acknowledgment that the continuance of violence in the region would further harm the 
interests of TNI. Attempts to refurbish its reputation by imposing martial law in the region had 
been seen to be pointless. In this context, Wiranto apparently realized that he himself was unable 
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to control officers at the operational level. As the commander-in-chief and with all the authority 
he supposedly had, he had to secure his personal interests and the interests of the military as an 
institution. The only alternative left was to allow a UN peacekeeping force in the region. 
 
3. Political leaders and parties: fishing in troubled waters 
 
 Two terms could be used to describe the attitude of national political leaders and parties 
regarding the political developments in East Timor and the presence of INTERFET in East 
Timor. From a domestic political point of view they were inconsistent and insignificant.  
 When in June 1998 Habibie offered the first option of special autonomy in East Timor, 
his political opponents had no objection because the offer was likely viewed as part of 
reformasi. When in January 1999 Habibie made the second offer of giving East Timor 
independence if special autonomy was rejected, the response of opposition leaders and parties 
primarily Megawati and her PDIP, Gus Dur and his PKB, and Amien Rais with his PAN, varied. 
Megawati and Gus Dur explicitly recommended rejecting the independence of East Timor from 
NKRI. Gus Dur argued that “in the short term it might be no advantage to retain East Timor. 
But, Indonesia had decided to incorporate East Timor and it has to be respected”. Megawati 
made a different argument, claiming that Habibie was just a transitional president and thus had 
no authority to change national laws which legally integrated East Timor with NKRI. 102 After 
the 5 May Agreement was signed, Megawati said to Time magazine that Habibie’s proposal was 
an erratic policy and that allowing the East Timorese to vote on independence was a risky 
policy.103  
 Gus Dur and Megawati’s response to Habibie’s decision was totally different to what 
they had said in July 1998. After a meeting with the Dili Bishop Mgr Belo, who underlined the 
importance of referendum to solve the problem of East Timor, they seemed to adopt the idea as 
part of a peaceful solution to the East Timor problem. According to a media report Gus Dur said, 
“I go with Mgr Belo”, while Megawati recommended accepting Belo’s suggestion as he was a 
credible representative of the East Timor people.104  
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 Unlike Megawati, Gus Dur and other nationalist politicians, Amien Rais, who had 
brought the idea of federalism into the public debate and had once in 1996 proposed the 
possibility of a referendum and even East Timor’s separation from NKRI,105 appeared to be in 
line with Habibie’s policy. After a meeting with Xanana Gusmao in Cipinang prison (Jakarta) on 
20 November 1998, Amien Rais told the media that a referendum was the best way to resolve 
East Timor problem.106 Political leaders and parties with an Islamic character also appeared to 
support Habibie’s policy. Parties with a Christian-based ideology, such as Krisna (Partai Kristen 
Indonesia) and PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa), had no public objections against the 
holding of a popular consultation in East Timor.  
But, the attitude of the major political leaders about East Timor was insignificant due to 
the power struggle leading up to the general election in June 1999. All political leaders and 
parties were more focused on getting voters than debating the referendum.107 As with the central 
government, there is no evidence that nationalist leaders and parties made any efforts to 
persuade the East Timorese people to choose special autonomy within NKRI through the 
popular consultation. Although Megawati or Gus Dur did not expect the East Timorese to reject 
special autonomy, they most likely could see political benefits if Habibie failed to conduct the 
ballot or if East Timorese chose independence from NKRI.  
The notion of fishing in troubled waters was also shown when violence continued to 
escalate in East Timor. Opposition leaders like Megawati continued to blame Habibie for being 
incapable, inadequately prepared and lacking the coordination to carry out such a vital event.108 
She went on to say that Habibie imposed a double-standard policy: “On one hand he offered a 
referendum, but on the other hand he exerted undercover efforts to maintain East Timor as part 
of NKRI through various means”.109 On another occasion she said that the violent conflict 
between pro- and anti- integration groups was “absolutely the responsibility of Habibie as the 
head of state, the head of government, the supreme commander of TNI and Polri.”110   
Interestingly, Megawati and Gus Dur refrained from condemning the military for the 
escalation of violence. While the international community tended to blame Wiranto and the 
security forces for the shocking situation, they tended to see the problems as Habibie’s 
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responsibility. When Habibie asked for the DPR’s approval to impose emergency law, the DPR 
rejected it by simply saying that Habibie was not competent to solve the crisis. A DPR member, 
Zarkasih Nur (PPP), argued that it had been self-evident that martial law was only bringing 
about misery, traumatizing the people and not solving the problem. 111  Another member, 
Muhammad Hikam (PKB), added that “insisting on martial law would give Indonesia a bad 
image in the international forum”.112 But, when the military emergency was imposed, allegedly 
endorsed by the military, the DPR said nothing.  
The concept of fishing in troubled waters was demonstrated again in regard to the calls 
for an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. In line with their vested interests, it is 
likely that the political leaders saw external intervention as giving them additional bargaining 
power in contending with Habibie for the presidential contest. Megawati and her PDIP seemed 
to tacitly share the growing perception that an international intervention was needed to handle 
the humanitarian crisis in East Timor. Golkar had no clear stance about the issue. Islamic 
parties, which generally saw no benefit in maintaining East Timor’s integration within 
Indonesia, were unlikely to oppose foreign intervention. Amien Rais had even said that Australia 
and the international community had to be responsible by taking part in handling the post-ballot 
East Timor.113 On another occasion he said: “Why should we put too much attention and energy 
to handle East Timor? It is wasted. We just make ourselves a ridiculous spectacle for the 
international community”. He went on to say that it was better if the problem of East Timor 
could be transferred to the UN as soon as possible, so that Indonesia could focus on other 
domestic problems which were equally complex and urgent.114 
Gus Dur reacted differently. He reportedly asked the Indonesian government to make 
Indonesian–Australian bilateral relations as its lowest level. He also asked the UN Secretary 
General to investigate allegations of UNAMET bias in holding the ballot. But it must be noted 
that Gus Dur did not oppose foreign intervention in East Timor. He merely showed his dislike of 
the Australian government for being too intrusive and facilitating the separation of East Timor 
from NKRI. 115 
The responses of national political leaders to the issue of humanitarian intervention 
could be described as rational or pragmatic. They were rational because these leaders had 
declared that they would accept the ballot result and they had promised to respect the East 
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Timorese vote on independence from NKRI. 116 Their responses were also rational because the 
problem of East Timor had been legally in the hands of the UN according to the terms of the 5 
May Agreement, except for the security matter. 
Allowing an international peacekeeping force in East Timor was also a pragmatic 
political stance. With the separation of East Timor, opposition leaders and parties looked at the 
MPR session in October 1999 as the main forum by which to judge Habibie. The presence of an 
international force in East Timor would be a strong reason to force Habibie to resign for having 
harmed national sovereignty. 117  In addition, national political leaders seemed to realize that the 
international role was vital in either resolving domestic problems or supporting national political 
stability, whoever would govern the state.   
 Once Habibie had officially invited the UN peacekeeping force to East Timor, all 
political parties expected the end of violence in the region. Two major nationalist parties (PDIP 
and Golkar), which were the top two from the June election, supported the decision. Dimyati 
Hartono (PDIP) and Marzuki Darusman (Golkar) reportedly said that peace and security would 
be restored by the presence of the international force.118 While Amien Rais (PAN) had agreed 
with the necessity of the UN peacekeeping force, other Islamic political parties did not show any 
signs of rejection. On the whole, the political stances showed that the international military 
presence in East Timor faced no resistance from major political parties. 
 
4. Popular politics: the silent majority 
 
 At the ground level of the Indonesian state, the society showed much similarity to the 
government, the military and political forces in its different views of and indecisiveness in 
responding to political developments in East Timor. Severely affected by a national economic 
crisis and perplexed by reform uncertainty, the people’s main interest was surviving the multiple 
crises. Three decades of repressive politics under the New Order authoritarian regime also 
certainly contributed to the people refraining from being involved. They likely saw the problems 
in East Timor as the government’s affairs or as a political commodity for major political forces.  
Media observation showed, however, that a number of Indonesians were unhappy, fed 
up, angry, and disappointed with the independence of East Timor from NKRI. “What exactly 
had the government done, so that East Timorese chose independence?” a former army sergeant 
questioned. “I can not blame Xanana or Carrascalao, but I am really fed up with Habibie!” 
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another former mariner added. Feeling neglected, those who had once been involved in military 
operations in East Timor requested the DPR/MPR revoke the popular consultation. 119  By 
contrast, a lot of people appreciated the people of East Timor who bravely chose to free 
themselves from NKRI. They had the opinion that “East Timor’s people have the right to be 
independent” or “East Timor, which has been annexed by Indonesia, benefits only the military”, 
or “It is a big loser if we retain East Timor”, or “We have to respect that East Timor wants to be 
independent.”120   
In responding to the mounting violence in the territory, Indonesians’ views also varied. 
In judging the role of the TNI/Polri, some groups saw that TNI/Polri members were incapable 
because of their lack of resource and professionalism and the psychological burden to control 
militia members. Other groups, however, believed that the TNI/Polri was institutionally and 
deliberately allowing the violence and destruction either by omitting the violence or 
commissioning pro-integration groups to launch destructive attacks. 121  Direct and severe 
criticisms against the security forces came mostly from pro-democracy and human rights 
activists. PBHI for example contended that the military was likely to exploit the violence for its 
own political interests.122 
Not only were his political opponents blaming Habibie for the political events in East 
Timor, parts of Indonesian society were doing likewise. National media headlines following the 
announcement of ballot result reflected this. Kompas’s editorial on 6 September 1999 raised the 
question of whether Habibie’s transitional government was qualified to offer a referendum.123 Its 
headline, “Timtim Merdeka, Nasib Habibie Habis” (East Timor Frees, Habibie is Finished), 
presented scholars and social organizations’ perceptions that the decision to hold a referendum 
in East Timor was a constitutional and legal offence and that Habibie had to be made to be 
responsible.124 Other media such as Tajuk125, Gatra126, and Forum127 ran similar headlines. They 
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tended to focus on Habibie’s mistake rather than inquiring as to how the violence and 
humanitarian crisis in East Timor should be handled, including the possibility of foreign 
intervention. 
Calls for international intervention in East Timor mostly came from human rights NGOs 
and individuals. Considering martial law was worsening the situation, PBHI publicly urged the 
Indonesian government to give consent to the UN for the sending of foreign forces into East 
Timor. 128  That the presence of UN peacekeeping force would benefit Indonesia was also 
expressed by some university analysts.129 Various popular organizations urged Komnas HAM to 
call on the UN to send an international peacekeeping force.130 When Habibie finally invited the 
UN to send an international peacekeeping force in East Timor, the public’s reaction was 
positive. Fajrul Falaakh, a deputy chairman of NU, said that due to the worsening situation in 
East Timor and the increasing international pressures, “the government has no choice except 
accepting the UN peacekeeping force”.131  
Instead of opposing the presence of an international peacekeeping force in East Timor, 
popular groups in Indonesia more actively debated the issue of which country would likely lead 
the peacekeeping force. Many in Indonesia believed that the international peacekeeping force 
should not be led by Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Canada, or the USA, because they 
viewed these countries as arrogant, intrusive, insensitive to Indonesia’s condition, or having 
narrow interests. Among others, Australia was disliked very much. Indonesian media such as 
Kompas, Tempo, Gatra, and Gamma sought to investigate Australian motives for leading a 
military intervention in East Timor.132 They tended to conclude that Australia was motivated by 
its interests in economic, security, and regional leadership, and by domestic political 
constituencies. The Young Generation of Nahdlatul Ulama (GM NU), composed of a number of 
Islamic youth groups, was reportedly ready to fight against Australia or New Zealand.133  
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Criticism, protest and complaints about Australia and then the UN, the USA and 
European countries did not have any effect on the presence, the role and the justification of 
INTERFET. According to political observers and pro-democratic activists, the anti-international 
intervention and certainly anti-Australian sentiments were triggered by only a few politicians 
and military officers who tried to exploit narrow nationalist sentiment.134 
 
 From the discussion above, three main points highlight the correlation between the 
weakening state of Indonesia and the presence of multinational forces in East Timor 
(INTERFET). 
 First, Habibie’s policy to hold a referendum in East Timor had exacerbated domestic 
politics. Habibie might have claimed his policy was for the national interest and that he himself 
was a risk-acceptant foreign policy maker.135 But for a policy to be well implemented and for the 
leader to be able to act on behalf of the state interest a strong domestic position is required and 
the policy must be implemented in a unified, coherent and strategic manner.136 Far from such 
ideal conditions, Habibie’s policy was in fact widening the gaps and making major political 
forces more fragmented. At an international level, such a domestic political condition had 
reduced the state’s capacity to meet its obligations under the 5 May Agreement. Instead of 
restoring Indonesia’s international image or attracting international assistance, the failure of the 
government to fulfil its international commitment was provoking international criticisms and 
economic sanctions.  
 Second, the escalation of violence in East Timor surrounding the popular consultation 
showed the loss of effective authority of the state institutions. The deteriorating security might 
foremost have reflected the reluctance of the security forces to carry out Habibie’s policy. 
Nevertheless, the situation, in which the lives of East Timorese people, UNAMET staff and 
foreigners were at risk, demonstrated that President Habibie had lost his political power over the 
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military, the military had failed to restore the security, and national political forces were likely to 
fish in the troubled waters by blaming Habibie for the policy and distancing themselves from the 
problems.  
Third, in regard to the calls for the international intervention, the government, the 
military and major national political forces eventually viewed a multinational peacekeeping 
force to restore peace and security in East Timor as important. Such views did not necessarily 
reflect a common interest in improving Indonesia’s international image, in defending national 
territorial integrity or in securing the democratization process (reformasi). Quite the opposite, 
the discussion above has shown that the acceptance of an international peacekeeping force was 
heavily influenced by the need to avert further harm to different political interests, personal or 
institutional. The government, the military and other political forces accepted the international 
military force in East Timor (INTERFET) not because they approved it, but because they did not 
see any political benefit in rejecting it. 
 
 
D. Humanitarian intervention without jeopardizing Indonesia’s democratization  
 
 In general terms, the humanitarian crisis or conscience shocking situation in East Timor, 
as discussed in part B above, was a just cause for an immediate international military 
intervention. Moreover, the UN and foreign governments had met the precautionary conditions 
for a military intervention. Part C has also demonstrated Indonesia’s domestic condition which 
not only justified the international military intervention but also made it highly likely that it 
would be a great success. Indonesia in the early post-Suharto era was nearly a collapsed state. 
President Habibie had lost authoritative power over the military, the military had been 
deliberately involved in exacerbating the violence, and national political forces tended to be 
fishing in these troubled waters. This national condition on the one hand had led to the 
humanitarian crisis and on the other hand showed no resistance to the possibility of foreign 
military intervention in the region. These two conditions suggest that an immediate military 
intervention in East Timor was justified, feasible and in fact very likely.  
Nevertheless, as has been mentioned, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1264 
authorizing the establishment of a multinational force in East Timor after President Habibie had 
made a formal invitation. This raises the question: why did the UN and major foreign countries 
have to wait for Indonesia’s agreement before they made the decision to send a military force 
into East Timor?  
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 A general answer to the question is that the major countries such as the USA, the UK, 
Australia and Japan did not want the military intervention in East Timor to bring the 
democratization process in Indonesia into trouble. This answer needs elaboration from two 
points of view, internationally and nationally. 
 From the international point of view, it was widely reported that the Western democratic 
countries not only welcomed the new era of reform, but also had significantly contributed to 
bringing down Suharto from power. The interests of the USA, Japan, and the IMF that Indonesia 
should be based on liberal political and social principles, and operate in a more transparent and 
efficient manner were seen as a triggering factor for those international major actors to remove 
Suharto.137 The US and its western allies had long been active in developing democratization 
and promoting human rights in Indonesia. According to HRW, the Clinton Administration 
provided $US 31 million to assist democratization in Indonesia, particularly during the June 
parliamentary election. Stanley Roth, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the 
Pacific, also played a key role in mobilizing international support for the elections.138 
In responding to the growing demands for international military intervention in East 
Timor, the US government seemed to act with great caution. Apart from insisting on Indonesia’s 
responsibility to control the situation, President Clinton tried to use economic and military 
sanctions in order to force the Indonesian government to be more decisive. Up to 10 September 
1999, the Clinton administration continued to dismiss the military option. His Defence Minister 
William Cohen told the press that the US would not involve its troops with the multinational 
peacekeeping force in East Timor, but might supply logistical, intelligence, communication and 
transportation supports.139 In a more explicit statement Samuel Berger, a US security advisor, 
said that “the USA would not sacrifice 200 million Indonesian people for 800 thousand East 
Timorese.” He went on to say that, “the American government are not only concerned with the 
East Timorese people but also with the future of Indonesia”.140  
Apart from respecting the democratization process, the international community 
apparently paid similar due attention to the territorial integration of Indonesia. Although there 
were analyses that the destruction of East Timor by pro-integration groups supported by 
Indonesian security forces “was intended as a deliberate warning to other restive provinces 
                                                 
137 See Rinakit, Op.cit., pp. 63–5.  
138 HRW, Indonesia and East Timor: Human Rights Watch Report 1999.  
139 Kompas, 10 September 1999. 
140 As quoted in Kompas, 10 September 1999. 
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which might seek independence, particularly Aceh and Irian Jaya,”141 it is reasonable to say that 
major countries like the US, the UK, Australia and Japan and neighbouring ASEAN member 
countries favoured an integrated Indonesia. The APEC summit (9–12 September 1999) and the 
UN Security Council meeting (11 September 1999) made it clear that an international force was 
needed in East Timor and that its authorization from the Security Council was achievable.142 
What was needed was to convince the Indonesian government that a multinational peacekeeping 
force in East Timor was necessary; for this, Indonesian agreement was required.143 Indonesia’s 
consent was needed in order to eliminate resistance against international intervention in East 
Timor and to eliminate accusations of seeking to disintegrate Indonesia.  
From an Indonesian domestic point of view, there were concerns that the escalating 
violent internal conflicts and the intractability of violence in East Timor might not be merely 
seen by the international community as being generated by the nearly failed state or the 
ineffective transitional government. Instead, the conflicts could be seen as resulting from a 
condition where state power, which had been centralized in the hands of the central government 
and its repressive institutions, was now distributed among a number of political forces, including 
the previously oppressed oppositions, coopted social organizations and repressed regional 
communities. In other words, the eruption of the conflicts could have been perceived as being 
part of a broader transition, the so-called reformasi or democratization process as has been 
discussed in Chapter Four.  
The main reason for western democratic countries to be worried about Indonesian 
democratization was the possibility of Indonesian armed forces using political developments in 
East Timor to seize national power, which could have halted the ongoing democratization. The 
ballot result for the independence of East Timor was seen as an overwhelmingly humiliating 
defeat that tarnished the armed force’s image as the guardian of NKRI. “The unity of the state 
was challenged, the concept of nationalism was slapped in the face, the guardians of the state 
were made to look foolish”, Damien Kingsbury wrote.144 The problem was that not only the 
people of East Timor were made to pay, but Habibie was also made to pay for such a 
humiliating defeat. The military discontent against Habibie became worse when many military 
                                                 
141 See in Harold Crouch, Op.cit., p.163. Harold Crouch himself believed that the destruction was more 
likely driven by the developing situation in East Timor than possible consequences in other provinces and 
the impact was a secondary consideration. 
142 “APEC countries defer to UN on East Timor”, International Herald Tribune, 10 September 1999. 
143 “AS dan Inggris: Semua Di Tangan Indonesia”, Kompas, 10 September 1999. See previous discussion 
under the subheading of right authority. 
144 Damien Kingsbury, “The TNI and the militias”, in Guns and Ballot Boxes, Op.cit. p. 78. 
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officers, particularly those assigned in East Timor, were accused of commissioning massive 
violations of human rights.145 
It is also worth noting that all major national political forces including the government 
and the military appeared to believe that cooperation with the international community was 
crucial for the future of Indonesian democratization and integration. More specifically, due to 
the power politics within the reformasi, there was a growing understanding that no one could be 
in presidential power without support from major countries like the US and its major allies. Or, 
even if he/she came to power, he/she could do nothing without approval and support from major 
foreign donor countries and international institutions. A personal agreement by Megawati to 
international intervention in East Timor, as will be revealed below, clearly reflected such an 
understanding. That Wiranto also finally asked Habibie to accept a foreign security force in East 
Timor was also in this context. In these political circumstances, Megawati and Wiranto wanted 
to be seen as good international citizens, as ICISS persuasively suggests. “The interest in being 
seen to be a good international citizen is simply the reputational benefits… There is much direct 
reciprocal benefit to be gained in an interdependent, globalized world where nobody can solve 
all their own problems.”146  
 
The international concern about Indonesian integration and democratization was shown 
by international efforts to convince major national political leaders that a referendum in East 
Timor was good for Indonesia, East Timor and the international community, and that whatever 
its result, this had to be respected. As UNAMET had began to work in East Timor in June 1999 
a core group of five of the most concerned governments – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the 
UK and the US – made regular contact with major political figures such as Megawati and Gus 
Dur. For example, on a visit to Jakarta on 28 to 29 July 1999 Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer talked with Megawati and Gus Dur to convey Australia’s position on East 
Timor and the advantages of holding a popular consultation.147 Regular dialogue between them 
continued following the conclusion of the Indonesian parliamentary election and the 
announcement of the referendum result.  
From 8 to 12 September 1999 a Security Council Mission dispatched to Jakarta and Dili 
“with the task of discussing with the Government of Indonesia concrete steps for the peaceful 
                                                 
145  See Rinakit, Op.cit., p. 114. According to Rinakit, several nationalist retired generals had asked 
Wiranto to stage a coup against Habibie soon after he was handed power from Suharto. 
146 ICISS, Op.cit., p. 72. 
147 DFAT, Op.cit., p. 109. 
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implementation of the 5 May Agreement”.148 In Jakarta the SC Mission held a meeting with 
Megawati on 8 September to ask her “to refrain from treating any emerging willingness of the 
Government of Indonesia to accept an international security presence as a stick with which to 
beat the government”. In the Mission’s report it was said that Megawati agreed “but declined to 
make a public statement in support of the idea of international intervention”.149 On the day after, 
the Mission also met with Wiranto. The Mission seemed to be trying to convince him that the 
presence of UN troops in East Timor would not deteriorate security there and would not threaten 
Indonesian national integration, which Wiranto was worried about. The Mission argued that the 
lack of political will on the part of the government meant that the situation was deteriorating and 
thus a UN peacekeeping force was necessary. When the Mission visited Dili accompanied by 
Wiranto on 11 September and after witnessing the real situation, Wiranto seemed to change his 
mind and agreed that an international peacekeeping force was needed.150 A similar meeting was 
also conducted with a group of NGO representatives in Jakarta. Not surprisingly, the group 
conveyed to the Mission a 15-NGOs joint-statement calling for the presence of a peacekeeping 
force in East Timor.151 
The necessity of Indonesia’s consent for the UN peacekeeping force in East Timor 
should not be understood as the need for legalization of a military intervention. Rather, major 
foreign countries in APEC and the UN Security Council seemed to be trying to help Indonesian 
government to see that failure to cooperate with the international community would harm 
Indonesia severely. The potential damage to Indonesia was not limited to economic and military 
sanctions, but included the possibility of the disruption of national democratization and 
integration. APEC member countries had a significant interest in ensuring that a foreign military 
measure in East Timor would not undermine Indonesia’s fragile democracy. They asserted that 
they gave support for a strong and united Indonesia and stressed the vital importance of the 
democratic process in Indonesia being pursued to its proper conclusion.152 Such considerations 
were clearly stated in Resolution 1264, with the UN Security Council “reaffirming respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia”.153 
Concern about reformasi was growing due to the failure of the Indonesian security force 
to win pro-autonomy supporters and the increasing international and national pressure on the 
                                                 
148 UN, Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili 8 to 12 September 1999, S/1999/976, 
14 September 1999. 
149 Ibid., point 6. 
150 Ibid., point 9 and 15. 
151 Ibid., point 10. 
152 Statement by New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon, 9 September 1999, at a media conference 
at the conclusion of the foreign ministers’ meeting on East Timor.  See DFAT, Op.cit., p. 136. 
153 UN SC Resolution 1264, S/RES/1264(1999), 15 September 1999. 
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military for its failure to control the situation. Many analysts said that such pressure could spark 
a nationalist backlash or even a military takeover of power. Barnaby Mason in BBC News wrote 
that “to force Indonesian government to accept an international intervention is very likely to 
push the military to use the nationalist card and to re-enter, at however low a level, the political 
stage”.154 Gerry van Klinken and Harold Crouch, quoted by the International Herald Tribune, 
said that fears within the Indonesian elite grew due to the international economic sanctions. 
Therefore, “international diplomacy”, Crouch warned, “should avoid public demands that make 
it difficult for the government to assert its authority over the military”.155 
Since, theoretically, to be legitimated, a humanitarian intervention does not need an 
agreement from the state concerned, the international efforts before 12 September were mostly 
to ensure major political forces in Indonesia on the one hand and the international community on 
the other understand that an international military presence was purely intended to restore order 
and security in East Timor. The USA, the UK, Australia and other major democratic countries 
were apparently very aware that such humanitarian intervention must not have negative effects 
for Indonesian democratization and territorial integration.  
Discussion about the moral, legal and political reasons for the major countries’ delayed 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes in East Timor is daunting.156 However, for the 
present discussion, it is enough to say that the early democratization processes in Indonesia 
enabled the international community to find a feasible condition to deploy an international force 
in the territory. The humanitarian interest of the international community in saving the lives of 
civilians in East Timor, the institutional interest of the UN in bringing into effect the ballot 
result, and the national and international interest in the continuance of democratization in 
Indonesia together made INTERFET an extremely justified intervention which was carried out 
with great success. The significance of INTERFET was not that it didn’t create controversy 
(Gareth Evans called the case for intervention in East Timor marginal)157, but that it brought 
benefits to East Timorese, Indonesians and the international community at the same time. 
 
                                                 
154 As quoted in Kompas, 10 September 1999. 
155 “Sanctions for Indonesia could spark a nationalist backlash, Analysts say”, International Herald 
Tribune, 8 September 1999. 
156 Criticisms for belated response and moral responsibility of major international countries to East Timor 
by comparing the similar reaction to Kosovo and Iraq can be seen in Scott Burchill, “East Timor: Towards 
Rwanda”, in http://www.zmag.org/timorburchill.htm lodged on 6 September 1999 and Edward Herman, 
“Inhumanitarian NonIntervention in East Timor”, in http://www.zmag.org/hermantimor.htm posted on 8 
September 1999. 
157 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, Paper addressed 
before the American Society of International Law, 98th Meeting, Washington DC, 1 April 2004. 
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E. Concluding Notes 
 
INTERFET provided an extreme case of how the international community fulfils its 
responsibility to protect the basic rights of people from grave violation. The UN, Australia and 
other concerned countries and international organizations maintained that the international 
community had a sound rationale and the right intention in preventing East Timorese people 
from suffering. Authorized by the UN through Security Council Resolution 1264 under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the coalition of willing states established and deployed a multinational 
force in East Timor (INTERFET). Equipped with a robust mandate and a strong force, 
INTERFET, led by Australia, could claim complete justification for its success in restoring 
peace and security, supporting UNAMET tasks and facilitating humanitarian operations. 
For the further interest of this research I would like to highlight several preliminary 
conclusions. 
First, the humanitarian crisis or the conscience shocking situation in East Timor justified 
the presence of the international force in East Timor (INTERFET). In addition to the threshold 
criterion, the set of precautionary criteria for a justified military intervention in East Timor were 
also met. 
Second, this chapter has revealed, however, that the conscience shocking situation was 
firstly and chiefly caused by the weakening state of Indonesia. The decisions to offer a 
referendum and the possibility of East Timor’s independence from NKRI were made without the 
necessary conditions within Indonesia to hold the popular consultation in a peaceful and orderly 
means. Since the central government failed to control the security forces, the security force 
elements on the ground failed to maintain and restore security, and other major political forces 
were preoccupied by their own political interests, the popular consultation in East Timor was 
surrounded by massive violence and destruction. The security condition in East Timor in the 
post-popular consultation period was one that the Indonesian government alone was unable to 
cope with and for which an international intervention was needed. 
Third, INTERFET was not only justified by the authorization of the UN Security 
Council, even less so by Indonesian government’s consent, or by strong internationally military 
force and support. The indisputable justification of INTERFET was the fragmentation among 
national political forces. This fragmentation was clearly shown by the absence of the rejection of 
an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. The absence of rejection was basically driven 
by the interest in avoiding personal or institutional harm due to political reform (reformasi). 
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And, in a situation in which there was no meaningful domestic resistance, INTERFET could 
operate to restore order and security in East Timor. Its success in completing its mandates in a 
relatively short time and without casualty demonstrated INTERFET’s indisputable justification.  
Fourth, the political reform (democratization) in Indonesia, however, apparently forced 
the Western democratic and major countries to delay the immediate deployment of an 
international military force to halt or avert the likelihood of large-scale loss of life and 
destruction in East Timor. There was political agreement among the leading members of the 
international community that humanitarian intervention in East Timor should not jeopardize 
Indonesian democratization and integration.  
How the international community responded to the internal violent conflicts and 
humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh on the one hand and the ongoing democratization in 
Indonesia on the other will be discussed in the following chapters. 
 
======  
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN MALUKU AND ACEH:  
DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) was seen by the international 
community to have been completely justified. It was justified by the humanitarian crisis or 
conscience shocking situation. It was justified because it was aimed at halting the possibility 
of larger scale killing and destruction and was proportionally assigned to restore security for 
the completion of UNAMET tasks and the facilitation of humanitarian operations. It was 
justified by the authorization of the UN Security Council. It had Indonesian government 
consent. And finally it was justified since INTERFET had great success in fulfilling its 
objectives in a short period without meaningful armed clashes with pro-Indonesian militias 
and/or Indonesian security forces.  
However, the intervention in East Timor provided one important lesson, namely the 
deployment of INTERFET was decided after the international community made it clear that 
such a military intervention would not jeopardize the democratization process in Indonesia. 
This decision suggested that securing political reforms towards a democratic state of 
Indonesia was no less significant than rescuing the East Timorese people from further 
suffering.   
For politicians in Jakarta, however, the issue after the event was not whether 
INTERFET had justification or not. The key issue now that the case of East Timor in both 
senses of its separation from NKRI and international intervention should not happen in other 
conflicting regions within the country – for example Maluku, Aceh, and Papua. Since the 
problem of East Timor had been in the hands of UNAMET under the protection of 
INTERFET and then transferred to UNTAET, political debates focused on spelling out how 
“the case of East Timor should not happen again” in national political programs.  
This chapter, focusing on the violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh, will investigate 
why an East-Timor-type intervention did not take place in the two regions. To answer this 
question, this chapter is divided into three main parts.  
The first part will discuss the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh which, by 
comparison with East Timor, might prima facie have justified military intervention similar to 
that in East Timor.  
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However, as the second part will show, the international community, both the 
humanitarian NGOs and foreign governments, tended to see the violent conflicts and 
humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh as being totally different to those in East Timor. 
There were two major sets of reasons for this. First, the international community tended to 
see the violent conflicts and humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh as matters falling 
within Indonesia’s domestic jurisdiction. Second, the international community saw that it 
had important interests at stake in Indonesia, including political reform and democratization. 
They were reluctant to intervene in Maluku and Aceh if this would jeopardize the progress 
being made on those issues. The result of these factors was that no international intervention 
took place in either case.  
The third part of this chapter will explore Indonesian political developments in 
regard to political reform that made military intervention for humanitarian purposes in 
Maluku and Aceh unreasonable. Like most major national political forces, the international 
community were inclined to see the conflicts in the two regions as Indonesian domestic 
affairs and thus the solutions to the conflicts rested on Indonesian political dynamics.  
 
 
B. Factors encouraging international intervention 
 
 In the violent conflicts that took place in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh, there were 
many similarities. One example is that all these conflicts erupted and escalated at the outset 
of the reform era following the forced resignation of Suharto. There are at least three other 
aspects of the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh that created conditions similar to those which 
enveloped East Timor. These were the existence of humanitarian crises caused by the 
conflicts, the number of fatalities and the intensity of the conflicts. Another aspect of 
intrastate conflict, that is the strategic environment of the conflict with regards to the 
international community, is also crucial.1 This fourth aspect will be discussed in Part C. 
 These three aspects of the conflicts were pull factors that could have made military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes in Maluku and Aceh possible, as the case of East 
Timor had demonstrated. For practical reasons the three aspects are presented by explaining 
the causes, the intensity and the effects of the conflicts.  
 Looking firstly at the causes of the conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh, it is 
clear that the three cases had roots in one or more of the following: ethnic, religious, social, 
economic and political issues. From the “insider” point of view these issues were likely to 
                                                 
1 The dimensions of the intrastate conflict refer to Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Power: 
Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 2000) pp. 21–24, 
as presented in Chapter Two of this research. 
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confirm the internal, intra-state or domestic nature of the three conflicts. As noted in Chapter 
Three, the issue of Javanization and/or Islamization had been a political issue under the New 
Order regime.2 But it only moved to the political stage when the old regime collapsed. 
Christian Malukans claimed a privileged position in the regional bureaucracy and political 
positions. The East Timorese demanded more vociferously their right to self-determination. 
GAM members found more space to call for freedom from Indonesia.   
 The political content of these regional conflicts, however, was not limited to the 
relationship between the centre and the regions or the relationships among different societal 
groups. As will be explained, the competition for power in Jakarta among national political 
forces and elites contributed greatly to the eruption and perpetuation of the violent conflicts.  
 The separatist issue also needs to be mentioned. All of the regions raised the idea of 
separatism in different ways. There is no need to repeat the case of East Timor here. In 
Maluku the establishment of Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM) in December 2000 was seen 
by some military officers3 and Muslim elements4 as raising the idea of separatism. Although 
the Front was initially intended to unite local leaders in Maluku in order to urge the central 
government to take firmer measures to end the inter-religious conflict, it later took on the 
agenda of reviving the Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS), an agenda which had been 
abandoned in 1950. Despite lacking meaningful membership, political strength or armed 
force, FKM/RMS was portrayed by security officers as a serious threat to national 
integration.  
 There was no doubt that GAM was a separatist organization who wanted Aceh 
independent from NKRI. It organized and recruited armed forces and established a 
government in exile. In 1976 GAM had launched a military rebellion and was involved in 
many guerrilla attacks on Indonesian military forces. Following the collapse of the New 
Order military regime, GAM intensified its armed attacks and expanded its political 
influence in the region. However, many analyses suggest that the GAM was heavily 
motivated by economic and political interests rather than historical or legal ones.5  
Considering the overlapping issues contributing to the conflicts, the conflicts were 
not easy to be resolved. Further, the intensity of the conflicts was greatly affected by the fact 
                                                 
2 See Gerry van Klinken, “Big states and little secessionist movements”, in Damien Kingsbury ed., 
Guns and Ballot Boxes (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 2000) pp. 157–68.  
3 Interviews with Brig. Gen. (Pol.) Adityawarman, Kapolda Maluku, Ambon, 8 June 2004 and Major 
Agus Renaldi and Major Rudy Syamsir, Assintel Kodam Pattimura, Ambon 16 June 2004. Agus 
Renaldi made FKM equal to PRD (Democratic People Party) in the sense that both were serious threat 
to NKRI. FKM brought the idea of separatism and PRD with anti-Pancasila ideology. 
4 Interviews with Muslim leaders in Abon, 11 and 14 June 2004.  
5 Interviews in Banda Aceh with human rights activists, 2 and 10 July 2004. See also Moch. Nurhasim 
et al, Konflik Aceh: Analisis atas Sebab-sebab Konflik, Aktor Konflik, Kepentingan dan Upaya 
Penyelesaian (Jakarta: LIPI, 2003); Kirsten Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a 
Separatist Organization (Washington: East-West Center, 2004).  
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that the parties to the conflicts were not limited to different local communal or societal 
groups. The Indonesian security forces were also involved in the conflicts. Instead of 
attempting to stop the fighting, the security force elements intensified and perpetuated the 
violent conflicts. 
Many people in Indonesia believed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that the 
Indonesian security forces were behind the humanitarian catastrophe in East Timor. The 
same condition prevailed in Maluku and Aceh. Despite the communal or horizontal nature of 
violent conflict in Maluku, commonly viewed as a conflict between the Christian and 
Muslim Malukans, the involvement of TNI/Polri personnel cannot be overlooked. Objective 
political observers and many local, national, and international human rights activists asserted 
that ABRI or TNI and Polri elements had engineered the inter-ethnic and then inter-religious 
conflict. On many occasions they were involved in armed clashes.6  
The separatist character of the Aceh conflict clearly showed that the main parties in 
the armed conflict were a group of Acehnese people organized in GAM and the Indonesian 
security forces. But, since GAM was directly contesting Indonesia’s sovereignty over the 
region, the government of Indonesia became a key player to the conflict.  
However, what would have been the reason for the international community to have 
militarily intervened was that the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh had caused humanitarian 
crises in the regions. The conflicts had generated a large scale loss of life and destruction. 
The conflict in Maluku had caused between 5,000 and 10,000 casualties.7  In Aceh the 
number was also shocking. Three years after the DOM policy was lifted there were 1,531 
deaths.8 This number increased following the imposition of martial law in the region (2003–
2004) during which time some 1,963 GAM members were killed.9   
Another shocking effect of the conflicts was the large number of people that had 
been forced to flee their homes and villages. 10 More than 500,000 people in Maluku sought 
safety within or outside the province, whereas some 200,000 people became refugees in 
                                                 
6 ICG, Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: The Issues, Indonesia Briefing, Jakarta/Brussels, 19 July 2000; and 
Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, Asia Report No. 10, Jakarta/Brussels, 19 
December 2000. 
7 ICG, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder, Ibid.. See also Sandra Pannell ed., A State of Emergency: 
Violence, Society and the State in Eastern Indonesia (Darwin: NTU Press, 2003) p.1. One source 
reported that since violent internal conflict erupted in January 1999 at least 4,000 people in Maluku 
had lost their lives by March 2002. See U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
Indonesia – Complex Emergency, Situation Report, FY 2002. The Amboina Diocese Crisis Centre 
assessed that the number could reach up to 13,000 deaths. Interviews in Ambon, May and June 2004. 
8 Koalisi NGO-HAM Aceh, Position Paper tentang Pembentukan Pengadilan HAM Ad-Hoc Bagi 
Kasus DOM Aceh and Ada Korban  Dibalik Perundingan. Both are Series of Human Rights Reports 
and no year of publication. See also HRW, Human Rights Watch World Report: Asia: Indonesia, 2002. 
9 “TNI: Operasi di Aceh Tetap Diteruskan”, Koran Tempo, 15 July 2003. 
10 General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, 54th Session, A/54/660, 10 December 
1999. See also U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Indonesia – Complex 
Emergency, Situation Report, 5 June 2003. 
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Aceh following the intensifying military operations in the region in 2003.11 Just as Dili had 
been gravely devastated, in Aceh thousands of houses, schools, shops and other buildings 
were burnt or destroyed in 1998–2004.12 This scale of physical destruction also occurred in 
Maluku where almost a half of the city of Ambon was burnt to the ground and towns and 
villages on the outskirts of Ambon were also devastated.13  
 The facts clearly showed that gross violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law took place in all three regions, including widespread violations and abuses 
of the right to life, personal security, physical integrity and the right to property.14 As the 
international community had deep concern about the killings, arbitrary arrests, tortures, rapes 
and widespread forced removal and displacement of people in East Timor, prima facie the 
humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh deserved a similar response in the sense of 
humanitarian interventions. 
In addition, what had shocked the conscience of the international community in the 
case of East Timor was also found in the cases of Maluku and Aceh, namely the failure of 
the Indonesian government to perform its basic function of providing protection to its 
populations in those regions. In East Timor, as discussed in the previous chapter, Habibie’s 
government was unable to obtain commitment from the security forces to maintain and 
restore security in the region. Striking evidence of the breakdown of the central 
government’s authority with respect to Maluku could be seen in the case of the Laskar Jihad 
influx. Although President Wahid had ordered the TNI/Polri commanders to prevent the 
Java-based Muslim militias from leaving for Maluku, the TNI/Polri commanders were 
unwilling to do so. In this sense, the central government had apparently lost its authority over 
the security forces and become ineffective in making and implementing decisions.  
 Evidence of failure of the central government in Aceh was also remarkable. Not only 
had the government failed to meet its promises to bring justice to the region; the continuing 
military operations had in fact deprived the Acehnese people of their basic rights. The 
initiative of President Wahid to solve the Aceh problem through peaceful means was 
continually undermined by the TNI/Polri who consistently held their traditional view that the 
problem in Aceh was the GAM separatist movement, which hence had to be dealt with 
                                                 
11 See United Nations, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002 for Internally Displaced Persons in 
Indonesia, New York and Geneva, 2002, pp. 39–40.  
12 Koalisi NGO-HAM Aceh, “Position Paper tentang Pembentukan Pengadilan HAM Ad-Hoc Bagi 
Kasus DOM Aceh”, Op.cit.. See also Koalisi NGO-HAM Aceh, “Ada Korban Dibalik Perundingan”, 
Op.cit. 
13 C. J. Bohm MSC, Brief Chronicle of the Unrest in the Moluccas 1999 – 2003 (Ambon: Crisis 
Centre Diocese of Amboina) 
14 A report by Komnas HAM about the issue of human rights violations in Maluku, see Laporan Kerja 
KPMM, 18 December 2000. See also HRW, Aceh under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War, Vol. 15, 
No. 10(C), December 2003.  
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through military means. The economic interest of TNI/Polri in the province was also seen by 
political observers as being to water down the peace solution.15   
  
The conditions presented above would have been likely to have met the threshold 
criterion of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The large scale loss of life and 
destruction caused by the violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were arguably not the 
product of deliberate state action. But it was also very clear that such humanitarian crises 
were the products of the state’s inability to end the violence. These situations had 
encouraged the Muslim and Christian leaders in Maluku to send appeals to the international 
community. A letter sent to the international world stated:  
 
We, signing this appeal as the leaders of the Christian and Muslim communities in 
Maluku, ask the international community to assist and take part in handling this 
tragic conflict, which has caused around 8,000 deaths and 500,000 refugees, so that 
the conflict could end soon. 
 
We believe this conflict is not a religious conflict. Religion has been exploited to 
serve the political agenda of certain groups in Indonesia. Malukan people are seen as 
meaningless and have to pay with their lives for such a political game.  
 
Because the violence is carried out by provocateurs and militant extremists, 
including those in the highest level of the government and the military, we believe 
that this conflict could not end without international assistance.16  
 
 
Having deep concern about the humanitarian problems and showing support for the 
call for international intervention, the Bishop of Amboina Diocese added, 
 
Every day a number of innocent people were murdered and there had been hundreds 
of thousands of people forced to flee their homes and villages and to seek safe places. 
It was a human tragedy. And it was really depressing since the military and police 
who always claimed to be the guardian of national stability and security did nothing. 
Even worse, some military and police personnel directly or indirectly took part in 
violent acts. The regional and national governments were also incompetent. They 
allowed Malukans to become involved in a bloody war. Malukan people were left 
without security protection. For this we expected the international community to do 
something.17 
                                                 
15 According to Kontras, for example, the Indonesian military security force get US$ 529,000 per 
month for military and security operations plus US$ 4 a day ‘pocket money’ per person from Exxon 
Mobil. See Human Rights News online http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/exxon080702.htm accessed 
on 17 October 2003. See also “Freeport dan Arun Sumber Keuangan Utama Bagi TNI”, Tempo News 
Room, 19 March 2003 and “Kecuali “Itikad Baik”, Tidak ada Kewajiban Setor “Uang Keamanan” 
kepada TNI”, Gatra, 20 March 2003.  
16 Seruan Bersama kepada Dunia Internasional dari Wakil-wakil Umat Kristen dan Muslim di Maluku, 
signed by Uztad Hadji Abd. Wahab Popoke (the chairperson of MUI-Maluku), Mgr. P.C. Mandagi 
MSC (Bishop of Diocese of Amboina) and Pdt.Dr. I.W.J. Hendriks (the chairperson of GPM), no date, 
A copy of the document was obtained from the Secretary of the GPM.  
17 Interview in Ambon, 9 May 2004 
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 The arrival of thousands of Laskar Jihad in Maluku in May 2000, which caused 
much damage to the Christian side, seemed to push dozens of Malukans to demonstrate 
outside the US embassy in Jakarta on 25 June, “urging Washington to lead a Kosovo-style 
military intervention in the region.”18 Komnas HAM was even reported to call for a UN 
force in Maluku.19  
In Aceh, the participation of the international community in solving the conflict and 
in coping with humanitarian problems was also expected. Having grave concerns for the 
people who lived in fear and insecurity, human rights activists in the region said that 
international assistance was needed to protect the basic rights of Acehnese people.20 The call 
for international pressure was also triggered by the behaviour of Indonesian security forces 
that had been excessively involved in massive human rights abuses. In regard to the idea of 
holding a referendum in Aceh, in a petition sent to President Wahid, SIRA asserted that the 
“independence option must be included in the referendum, and must be held under the 
international community’s control.”21 
Although the religious leaders in Ambon did not expect a military intervention in 
Maluku22 and human rights activists in Aceh were unsure about the presence of military 
forces for humanitarian purposes in the provinces,23 the objective conditions of the people’s 
sufferings in the two regions would have been just causes for international intervention. The 
government’s failure to provide order and security and the involvement of the state apparatus, 
notably the military and police elements, in perpetuating the violent conflicts made the call 
for humanitarian intervention more reasonable. These calls were consistent with the ICISS’s 
suggestion that “in a failed state or collapsed state situation, with no government effectively 
able to exercise the sovereign responsibility of protecting its people, the principle of non-
intervention might seem to have less force.”24 The calls were also in line with the notion that 
“the situations that trigger humanitarian intervention are instances of severe tyranny such as 
crimes against humanity, mass murder and widespread torture and instances of anarchy 
caused by the collapse of social order.”25 
                                                 
18 “Moluccas emergency declared”, BBC News, 26 June 2000. 
19 “Call for UN force for Moluccas”, BBC News, 4 August 2000. 
20 Interviews with human rights and former student activists, Banda Aceh, 2, 11 and 15 July 2004. 
21 Petition and Political Ultimatum of Aceh Nation was made after a peaceful rally of more than 3,000 
Acehnese organized by SIRA in Jakarta on 25 July 2000. The petition is accessed from 
apakabar@saltmine.radix.net posted on 5 August 2000.  
22 Interview with Rev. W. Hendrik, the chairman of GPM, in Ambon, 7 June 2004. 
23 Interviews on 2 July 2004, and with the chairman of Koalisi NGO-HAM Aceh, 17 July 2004. 
24 See ICISS, Op.cit., p. 33. 
25 See William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1995); Michael Ignatieff, “State failure and nation-building,” in J.L. 
Hozgrefe & R. O. Keohane eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas 
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 Nonetheless, the problem of humanitarian intervention is complex. Just as the 
conditions for a humanitarian crisis in terms of the scale of killing and destruction remain 
inconclusive, so the factors that generate the humanitarian crisis are also widely debated. 
ICISS did not draw a distinction between situations where the large scale loss of life “is 
caused by the action – or deliberate inaction – of the state, and those where the state in 
question has failed or collapsed”, and said that it made “no basic moral difference whether it 
is state or non-state actors who are putting people at risk”. But ICISS also argued that the 
international community would be placed in a morally untenable position if they failed to 
take military action as an anticipatory measure in such a condition.26    
 The condition that had generated humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh is thus 
central in this analysis. And this was open to the perceptions of the international community. 
In the case of East Timor, as discussed previously, the international community generally 
perceived that the condition that had put the East Timorese people at risk, and many 
foreigners as well, was the inability of the central government and the unwillingness of 
Indonesian security forces to maintain order and security in the region. How the international 
community perceived the conditions that had caused large-scale killings and destruction in 
Maluku and Aceh will be discussed in the following section. 
  
 
C. Conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were different 
 
 In the case of East Timor, deep international concern for people suffering and the 
deteriorating security condition was generally followed by statements that the international 
community had to do something to rescue the East Timorese people. A similar expression 
was not found in the case of Maluku and Aceh. To a great extent foreign governments, 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations tended to perceive that (1) 
violence in Maluku and Aceh was exacerbated by political reform, (2) the violence and 
humanitarian crises in the regions were Indonesia’s domestic affairs, and (3) solutions to the 
problems had to be sought domestically.  
 
1. Violence as triggered by democratization 
Initially, it must be said that none of the international NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch had defined the situations in Maluku and Aceh as 
humanitarian crises. Or, even when they used this terminology in their reports and press 
                                                                                                                                          
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Fernando R. Teson, “Eight principles for 
humanitarian intervention,” Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006, p. 97. 
26 ICISS, Op.cit. 
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releases, it was not as the criteria that could justify a military intervention. In its 1999 press 
release, for example, HRW called for “urgent international attention to the escalating 
communal conflict in and around Ambon in Indonesia’s Moluccan islands”, but it did not 
call for military intervention for humanitarian purposes.27 The ICG’s first briefing about the 
Maluku conflict carried the title “Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis”28 and reports about the chaotic 
situation, the offensive by Laskar Jihad, the demoralized security force members and the 
inability of the government to act properly29 also showed no indication that ICG wanted to 
encourage foreign countries to send in their military forces.  Similar expressions were 
applied to the situation in Aceh. 
Although expressing deep concern about the humanitarian problems in Maluku and 
Aceh,30 the international NGOs and foreign governments tended to see that the protracted 
violence in Maluku and the re-escalation of armed conflict in Aceh were related to the 
political reform in Indonesia. This view was expressed in two different ways. First, the 
international NGOs and observers persistently argued that the unceasing violence in Maluku 
and Aceh were heavily influenced by political conflict in Jakarta. Second, foreign 
governments showed more interest in supporting the democratization process in Indonesia 
than seeking international military roles in these conflicts. 
Looking at the case of Maluku, all accessed publications provided by HRW, 
Amnesty International and ICG argued that the violent conflict in Maluku was sparked by a 
dispute between a Christian and a Muslim, fuelled by the recent economic crisis, unequal 
distribution of wealth, the decline of traditional authority structures, the perceived 
Islamization of the Indonesian government and civil service, the outbreak of communal 
violence in other parts of the country following the fall of Suharto and misinformation and 
conspiracy theories. 31  As the violent communal conflict continued, with some brief 
interruptions, these organizations began to investigate the role of political elites and the 
military. ICG, for example, contended that the emergence and mobilization of political 
                                                 
27 HRW, Indonesia: International Attention Needed on Ambon Violence, Press Release, 25 February 
1999. See also HRW, The Violence in Ambon, Press Release, 17 March 1999. 
28 ICG, Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis, Op.cit. 
29 ICG, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder, Op.cit. Other reports and briefings are The Search for Peace 
in Maluku (8 February 2002) and Violence Erupts again in Maluku (17 May 2004). 
30 One source said the international community provided humanitarian assistance to Maluku and Aceh. 
The EU and the US was reported to say their willingness to provide humanitarian relief.  The Dutch 
government had allocated 35 billion rupiah as emergency aid for people affected by the conflict. 
States from the Middle East such as United Arab Emirates (UAE) was also reported to supply US$ 3-
4 million for humanitarian assistance. And the UN planned to allocate US$ 12.3 million for Maluku. 
The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Jakarta said that the UN involvement in 
Maluku was not to conduct intervention but to provide humanitarian assistance and support 
reconciliation and peace process in the region. “We would not be directly involved in political 
mediations”, Michael Elmquist the OCHA’s head of representative said. See Kompas, 15 January, 20 
February, 24 April and 30 November 2000.  
31 HRW, Indonesia: Investigation of Bias Needed in Maluku, 7 January 2000. 
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parties along religious lines had exacerbated the situation. ICG also stressed the rise of 
political pressures from Muslim hardline opposition and the military upon the democratically 
elected President Wahid. ICG wrote, “There are powerful resource and political constraints 
limiting the government’s room for manoeuvre”.32 In December 2000 ICG reported:  
 
A number of prominent political figures in Jakarta are suspected of encouraging the 
disruption in Maluku, as in other parts of Indonesia, as part of a strategy to discredit 
and destabilize the Abdurrahman Wahid administration. Other national political 
leaders seem more preoccupied with political manoeuvring in Jakarta than with the 
Maluku crisis, a disaster in a distant region with less than one percent of the national 
population.33 
 
Joe Saunders from HRW also wrote the following in the International Herald 
Tribune: 
 
The upsurge of fighting between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccan islands in 
Indonesia is a direct challenge to the authority of the civilian government in Jakarta. 
A critical question is whether President Abdurrahman Wahid can subject the military 
to basic discipline and bring wayward troops under control. This is a precondition of 
peace in the Moluccas. It is essential if Mr. Wahid is to regain the public confidence 
necessary for economic recovery and continued political reform.34 
 
The two excerpts indicate that the perpetuation of the violent conflicts was closely 
related to the fact that the two early years of democratization were marked by deep political 
fragmentation among major national political forces, which made an effective policy to 
handle these conflicts very difficult. More importantly, the state apparatuses such as the 
security forces and regional governments had been involved in the violent conflicts for their 
own ends.  
It is fair to say that foreign governments did not expect such political fragmentation 
or its negative consequences. What they had clearly expected since the beginning of 
reformasi was that the political reforms would lead to a democratic state that could resolve 
the conflicts through peaceful means. When Habibie took over power from Suharto for 
example, it was reported that President Bill Clinton asked President Habibie to maintain 
political dialogue and openness and that the US government would support Habibie’s 
                                                 
32 ICG, Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis, Op.cit. 
33 ICG, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder, Op.cit., p. 1. 
34 Joe Saunders, “Indonesian Forces Are Part of the Problems in the Moluccas”, International Herald 
Tribune, 4 July 2000. About the conflict between Gus Dur and the military see Sukardi Rinakit, The 
Indonesian Military after the New Order (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005) pp. 197–204. Rinakit 
wrote that certain military elements attempted to destabilize the political situation and tarnish the Gus 
Dur government by sparking off nationwide violence and intensifying ethnic conflict in Ambon. 
  
170
initiatives to meet the people’s demands for political reform. Japan, Australia, Germany and 
ASEAN member countries were said to support democratization in Indonesia.35  
The interest of foreign governments in the democratization process in Indonesia was 
demonstrated through their support for the holding of the 1999 general elections. As 
mentioned before, the US government provided financial support for the election preparation 
and appointed Stanley Roth, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, to 
mobilize support from other donors and Asian governments. 36 Another source also reported 
that the EU alone supplied US$20 million to ensure the election was conducted in a fair and 
free manner. International NGOs such as the Carter Center, the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI) and International Foundation for 
Election System (IFES) supported the first ever democratic election according to 
international principles.37 
The holding of the 1999 election and the election of Abdurahman Wahid as a new 
president were widely welcomed by the international community. Australia welcomed the 
results and promised to support the democratization process. Other countries such as Japan, 
the US, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand hoped the election of Mr Wahid would restore 
political stability to Indonesia.38 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) said, “Australia welcomes the prospect of a more democratic Indonesia and 
encourages the Indonesian authorities to take effective measures to resolve the problems”.39 
Foreign support continued even though Wahid was apparently unsuccessful in bringing the 
violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh to an end. As Wahid was facing strong opposition, the 
international community attempted to help him in securing democratization and in particular 
                                                 
35 “Clinton Minta Habibie Laksanakan Dialog dan Keterbukaan”, Kompas, 28 May 1998; “Jepang 
Dukung Pemilu Indonesia,” Kompas 25 May 1999. 
36 This financial support was mainly allocated for “training, public education, and various election-
monitoring operations under the auspices of Indonesian NGOs and American organizations”. HRW, 
Human Rights Report 1999: Indonesia and East Timor. 
37 “Suara International Terhadap Pemilu 1999”, Kompas, 13 June 1999. Around 600 international 
journalists operated in Jakarta and travelled across the country to cover the election process. 
International broadcasts such as CNN, Reuters, AFP, AP, and Australian ABC sent their reporters and 
television crews to Indonesia. See “Demokrasi Indonesia di Mata Pers Dunia,” Kompas, 14 June 1999. 
Similar to the case of popular consultation in East Timor, thousands of international observers also 
spread to see how the democratic event was carried out across the nation. Asia Foundation ran the 
largest and most comprehensive civil society voter education campaign. The Foundation trained and 
deployed 117,000 community-based voter education volunteers, printed and distributed more than 23 
million voter education books, leaflet, posters and stickers, produced 2,000 voter education television 
and radio broadcasts and sponsored over 250 conferences, debates and workshops. See The Asia 
Foundation, 2004 Indonesia Election Program, February 2004. 
38 International praise for Wahid, BBC News, 20 October 1999. 
39 DFAT, Media Release, 3 October 2000, as accessed from 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/index.html.  
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in dealing with his political opponents, mostly in the military but also particularly in Islamic 
extremist camps.40  
International support for democratization in Indonesia continued when Megawati 
Sukarnoputri was elected to replace Wahid. The US President George W Bush was reported 
as saying:  
 
 
We look forward to working with President Megawati and her team to address 
Indonesia’s challenges of economic reform, peaceful resolution to separatist 
challenges and maintaining territorial integrity.41 
 
Other foreign governments from Australia, Japan, the European Union and ASEAN also 
reportedly supported reform in Indonesia. “The more stable Indonesia is, the more the whole 
region will benefit”, Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra said.42 Ralph L. Boyce, the US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said, “…events are moving 
rapidly in Indonesia. Despite the crises that fill the headlines there are many signs of 
progress. But the historic transition to democracy is fragile, reversible and of vital 
importance to the United States.”43  
 Foreign support for democratization continued in the 2004 elections.44 The UNDP 
ran a project Support to Indonesia Elections 2004 which cost nearly US$24 million. These 
funds were provided by Australia, Canada, South Korea and the EU.45 
 
2. The conflicts as Indonesia’s domestic affairs 
The international tendency to see violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh as 
Indonesia’s domestic affairs can be explained in three different ways.  
First, the international community persistently perceived the conflict in Maluku as 
an inter-communal conflict. As mentioned, international NGOs such as Amnesty 
International, HRW and ICG continued to describe the conflict as being between the 
Christian and Muslim community. This depiction seemed to be effective in keeping the 
conflict as an Indonesian domestic affair.  
                                                 
40See Adam Schwarz, “Wahid Is in Trouble, and He Must Make Some Basic Changes,” International 
Herald Tribune, 5 August 2000. See also Stanley A. Weiss, “In Indonesia, Help Wahid’s Military to 
Stop Being the Problem,” International Herald Tribune, 24 August 2000. 
41 “World reaches out to Megawati,” BBC News, 23 July 2001. 
42 Ibid. 
43 The statement was part of his testimony on 18 July 2001 before a congressional panel and was 
adapted by International Herald Tribune, 23 July 2001, “The Bush Administration Will Be Taking 
Indonesia Seriously”. 
44 For example, Asia Foundation trained some 140,000 volunteers to monitor the election process and 
provide community-level voter education. See The Asia Foundation, 2004 Indonesia Election 
Program, February 2004. 
45 UNDP, Voting for the Future: Support to the 2004 Indonesian Elections, January 2004, as accessed 
from www.undp.or.id.  
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Second, the association of the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh with the 
democratization process in Indonesia signified that the conflicts were part of the Indonesian 
domestic political system. From an Australian perspective, this was relevant to a notion 
suggested that:  
 
It is constructive for the Australian Government to reiterate Australian support for 
Indonesian territorial integrity, while stating a desire to see a peaceful resolution to 
the current internal conflicts. Australian support for the granting of meaningful 
autonomy to Aceh and Irian Jaya, along with other non-military approaches to 
conflict resolution to communal conflict in Maluku and Kalimantan, has been and 
should be presented as non-threatening to Indonesia by being accompanied by strong 
support for Indonesian territorial integrity.46 
   
Third, the violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh had no connections with any foreign 
parties or international interests. The suspicion that conflict in Maluku was triggered by 
RMS members in the Netherlands was baseless.47 Another suspicion proposed by Hussein 
Umar from KISDI that “conflict in Maluku was part of an international conspiracy for a 
Muslim-cleansing policy in eastern part of Indonesia”48 was also irrelevant. Although Iran 
and Libya were alleged to have supplied material support for GAM in the past, this did not 
have any significant effect in raising its international support.49 
A few NGO activists suggested that multinational corporations (MNCs) played a 
role in igniting and perpetuating violent conflict in Maluku,50 such as Exon Mobil in Aceh. 
They argued that foreign companies were competing for the vast natural resources in Maluku 
such as timber, spices, fisheries and mining. For such interests, they added, foreign 
companies used the Indonesian security forces to spark violent conflict and evict people from 
their targeted areas. This notion, however, was not supported by sufficient evidence.  
The domestic nature of the Maluku conflict could also be seen in the matter of 
security. All displaced persons (IDPs) sought safe places either within the province of 
Maluku and North Maluku or outside the two provinces but still in Indonesia. Many IDPs 
                                                 
46 In Chris Wilson, Internal Conflict in Indonesia: Causes, Symptoms and Sustainable Resolution, 
(Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, 7 August 2001). 
47 Kompas, 11 March 1999. President Gus Dur was also said to have suspicion of the Dutch-based 
RMS exile independence movement supplied arms through a charitable foundation Help Ambon in 
Need (HAIN) created by both Christian and Islamic organizations of Malukans in the Netherlands. 
See Peter Bartels, Op.cit., p. 129. 
48 Kompas, 19 July 2000. 
49 Most of GAM arms reportedly came from southern Thailand. See Larry Niksch, Indonesian 
Separatist Movement of Aceh, A Congressional Research Service (CSR) Report for Congress, 25 
September 2002 as accessed from http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS20572.pdf.  See also Kirsten Schulze, 
Op.cit., pp. 25–9.  
50 Interviews with a staff of INSIST (the Institute for Social Transformation) in Jakarta, and with 
activists of Tim Relawan Kemanusiaan/Himpunan Maluku untuk Kemanusiaan (TRK/Humanum) in 
Ambon and Tim Advokasi Penyelesaian Kasus Ambon (TAPAK, Advocacy Team for the resolution 
of the Ambon Case) in Jakarta and Ambon. 
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sought shelter in Sulawesi, Irian Jaya (Papua) and Java. In this sense, violent conflict in 
Maluku did not have any impact for regional and international security.  
The general perception that the problems of Maluku and Aceh were related to 
democratization and were Indonesia’s domestic affairs had two further implications. 
First, by seeing the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh as Indonesian domestic problems, 
the issue of separatism or the call for the right to self-determination in the regions lost its 
potential support. No foreign governments gave any sign of supporting FKM/RMS in 
Maluku and GAM in Aceh. The Dutch government continued to recognize Maluku as an 
integral part of Indonesia, even though thousands of its citizens of Ambon origins were 
reportedly supporting the independence of the Republic of South Maluku.51 The claim of 
FKM/RMS members that Vanuatu and other countries in the Pacific supported RMS 52 
seemed to have no significant effect in elevating the political status of RMS’s claim to the 
right to self-determination.  Sweden, where GAM’s political leaders lived, Malaysia and 
Singapore, where many GAM members found safe haven, never made public statements to 
support Aceh’s separation from NKRI.53  
Second, by stating that the violence and humanitarian problems were related to 
reformasi, there was an explicit indication that the international community recognized the 
need for the Indonesian state to establish its capacity to cope with the problems. This clearly 
did not point to any questioning of the de jure or formal aspect of Indonesian sovereignty 
over territory including the Maluku and Aceh regions, but pointed to the de facto or material 
aspect of sovereignty that the state had to have the capacity to bring the conflicts to an end 
and to handle the humanitarian problems domestically.  
 
3. Solutions to the conflicts had to be sought domestically 
The international perception of the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh as being 
exacerbated by the political conflict in Jakarta reflected a condition that if the political 
conflict could have been resolved, the conflicts in the regions would have been brought to an 
end. This was clearly stated by Ralph Boyce:  
 
Although the United States follows the politics in Jakarta closely, we firmly believe 
that the current leadership crisis is a purely domestic matter. We do hope to see the 
crisis end in a way that promotes reconciliation and effective governance. The Bush 
administration is prepared to support any resolution that can be achieved through 
peaceful and constitutional means."54 
                                                 
51 “Dutch Moluccans appeal for solidarity”, BBC News, 8 March 2001. 
52 Interview with a member of RMS in Ambon, 26 May 2004. 
53 “PM Mahathir Muhammad: Malaysia Tidak Ingin Aceh Lepas dari Indonesia”, Kompas, 20 March 
2000. 
54 “The Bush Administration Will Be Taking Indonesia Seriously,” International Herald Tribune, 23 
July 2001. 
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 Ralph Boyce also said that the US wanted to see a united, stable and prosperous 
Indonesia. Realizing the size and the complexity of the problems in Indonesia, he suggested 
that the ability of any outsider to influence events there was limited. The US government 
wanted to maintain a long-term strategic approach that could withstand inevitable shocks and 
crises without losing sight of overarching objectives. The top priorities of the US were to 
continue to invigorate civil society, to strengthen Indonesian national institutions particularly 
the judicial institutions, to develop a trained, developed and capable police force which could 
handle most civil problems.55 
In regard to the US policy on Aceh, a Congressional paper stated that the US policy 
had been developed within the context of three broader policy objectives towards Indonesia: 
 
The first was to support political evolution in Indonesia towards democracy. The 
second was to support Indonesia’s territorial integrity – to assure post-Suharto 
leaders that the United States would not repeat its East Timor policy of 1999 towards 
other parts of Indonesia where there were separatist movements. The third, 
advocated by the Pentagon and the US Pacific Command, was to restore links 
between the US and Indonesian militaries.56 
 
Within this political context, the Clinton Administration urged GAM to negotiate a 
settlement within a united Indonesia. The paper also said that in 2002, Assistant Secretary of 
State, Matt Daley, met with Hasan di Tiro in Sweden and urged him to accept special 
autonomy.57 
Gareth Evans also asserted that the Indonesian government should be more 
determined in seeking resolutions to its domestic problems including the conflicts in Maluku 
and Aceh: 
 
Indonesia should be attracting more attention than it is getting from Washington and 
Europe… Private messages should convey that international understanding and 
material support will be forthcoming if Indonesia does more to help itself – gets 
serious about corruption, brings the military leadership under effective civilian 
control, brings major human rights violators to justice, delivers even handed security 
protection to communities in conflict, devises a sensitive and workable political 
solution to the problems in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and generally behaves like a 
halfway competent government.58 
 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 See also in Larry Niksch, Indonesian Separatist Movement of Aceh, A Congressional Research 
Service (CSR) Report for Congress, 25 September 2002 as accessed from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS20572.pdf. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Gareth Evans, “A Wake-up Call to Jakarta: Governance, Please”, International Herald Tribune, 7 
February 2001. 
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The likelihood of a domestic solution to the conflict in Maluku was clearly 
underlined by Dan Murphy. He said, “there is little that foreign governments can do other 
than urge Indonesia to enforce its laws and protect its citizens. Stronger intervention would 
undermine the struggling civilian government of President Abdurrahman Wahid.”59 
When on 6 July 2000 the European Parliament was reported by Indonesian media to 
be preparing to call for the international community to intervene in Maluku since violence in 
the region had escalated, this was clearly in contrast to the opinions mentioned above that 
resolution to the humanitarian problems in Maluku and Aceh had to be carried out according 
to national political dynamics. HRW and ICG, for example, emphasized the need to restrain 
the political elites and particularly the security forces from exacerbating the conflict.60  
ICG and HRW suggested some positive steps that foreign governments and the 
international community ought to take.61   
 First, they strongly requested that the international community to be sensitive to 
local conditions and be objective in its response to the situations. Since both Muslim and 
Christian Malukans had experienced terrible losses, statements relying on sources from only 
one side of the conflict tended to fuel one side’s anger against the other.  
 Second, in response to the humanitarian problems caused by the conflict, HRW and 
ICG underlined that international humanitarian workers should be allowed full access to 
assist wounded and displaced people. Foreign donors were also expected to assist 
international humanitarian organizations and the UN agencies in their activities to provide 
humanitarian assistance for people in need. In addition, they also asked foreign governments 
to remind the Indonesian government that gross violation of human rights in Maluku could 
prompt calls for international action. 
Third, although suggesting the possible presence of foreign observers, ICG declined 
to suggest that an international force be sent to Maluku. ICG asserted, “Whatever the 
attractions might be thought to be, foreign military intervention in Maluku would be counter-
productive, could easily lead to further destabilization in Indonesia, and should not be 
sought”. Instead, “foreign donors should consider the provision of special funding for the 
two Maluku provinces conditional on the progress toward reducing the level of violence, and 
the international community should be ready to assist Indonesia with money and investigate 
resources to re-establish the rule of law.”62 
 
                                                 
59 Dan Murphy, “Indonesian Crime in the Moluccas,” International Herald Tribune, 12 January 2001. 
60 HRW, Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon, Op.cit. and Indonesia: Investigation of Bias Needed in 
Maluku, Op.cit; See also ICG, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder, Op.cit., p. 24. 
61 ICG, Ibid, p. 26. 
62 Ibid. 
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The emphasis on democratization as the underlying factor of violence in Maluku and 
Aceh and the perception that these violent conflicts were within Indonesia’s domestic 
jurisdiction were likely to scale down the assessment of the grade of humanitarian crises and 
eliminate the possibility of military intervention. But, as I have argued in Chapter Five, the 
justification of INTERFET was not simply that the lives of East Timorese were at risk or 
almost all the regions had been devastated. There were several factors or reasons that had 
forced the international community to send in a military force to East Timor, but those 
factors were not existent in the case of Maluku and Aceh. 
The first, as mentioned, was that there were no significant numbers of foreigners in 
Maluku and Aceh under threat that could force foreign governments to take coercive 
measures to save their lives. The second was that there was not any kind of ballot or popular 
consultation held in the two regions, the results of which had to be internationally 
implemented.  
In addition to these two factors, it has to be mentioned that the historical, 
demographical and geographical aspects of Maluku and Aceh conflicts made them different 
to the East Timorese conflict. Historically, the UN, foreign governments and international 
NGOs had viewed Maluku and Aceh as legal parts of NKRI. Looking at the proportions of 
total populations that suffered, in East Timor almost all of the 800,000 citizens were 
desperately affected by the violent conflict; by contrast, two million Malukans and four 
million Acehnese out of 220 million Indonesians seemed relatively less significant. 
Geographically, the regions of Maluku and Aceh that had been torn by the violent conflicts 
were also likely insignificant compared to the most parts of Indonesian territory which were 
relatively calm or under control of the central government. 
Taking into account the factors above and considering the international opinions 
about the conflicts in the two regions, a military intervention for humanitarian purposes in 
either Maluku or Aceh was very unlikely. This low likelihood was supported by some 
political changes within Indonesia about which the international community showed a high 
level of interest and support. 
 
 
D. The Changing Political Environment in Indonesia 
 
 There were two different conditions within the Indonesian political context which 
apparently influenced foreign governments and international organizations to refrain from 
reacting similarly in Maluku and Aceh as they had in the case of East Timor. The first 
condition was the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention that could be defined 
as a negative factor. The second factor was more positive. It included the acceleration of 
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democratization, the assurance of national integration (NKRI), and the growing demand for 
reconciliation among the nation’s elites. These two groups of factors could be defined as 
parts of the pull factors which made military intervention for humanitarian purposes in 
Maluku and Aceh unlikely. 
 
1. Anti-international intervention sentiment 
 In contrast to the case of East Timor, where there was no meaningful objection to 
foreign intervention, as shown in Chapter Five, a national response at both governmental and 
nongovernmental levels against the possibility of international intervention in Maluku and 
Aceh was discernible. In general, the response was to reject any form of foreign intervention 
including for humanitarian purposes. The calls for international involvement, mainly by 
religious leaders in Maluku and human rights activists in Aceh, were fiercely refuted by 
other social groups and particularly the government officials and military officers.63 Their 
rejection was expressed in official and public statements, but also through mass 
demonstrations. Politicians and political observers also often asked the government and the 
media to avoid the internationalization of the conflict.  
 Amien Rais was an exception to this rule. In March 1999 he was reported to have 
asked the Clinton administration to place moral pressure on the Habibie government so that 
the latter would be more determined to solve the conflict in Maluku. He said, “If Jakarta was 
unable to stop the unceasingly bloody conflict in Ambon, we may ask for help from America 
to press the government so that the dreadful conflict could be put to an end”.64 Amien Rais 
was also reported to have asked the US State Secretary Madeline Albright in Jakarta for a 
kind of moral intervention by Washington in Indonesia.65  
 For this request Amien Rais was furiously criticized. Critics accused him of having 
betrayed national sovereignty, insulted the dignity of Indonesian Muslims and he was even 
called as a Zionist agent.66 Ahmad Sumargono, the chairman of KISDI, condemned Amien 
Rais for making a political manoeuvre in order to get support from the USA. He contended, 
“Perhaps, Amien thinks that realistically in order to be Indonesian president he has to have 
approval from the international world. And in the recent unipolar international system, the 
US is the king”.  
                                                 
63 See for example Arief Budiman, “Catatan Seorang Indonesia di Australia”, Kompas, 28 September 
1999. See also Stanley A. Weiss, “In Indonesia, Help Wahid’s Military to Stop Being the Problem,” 
International Herald Tribune, 24 August 2000, and, Michael Richardson, “Wahid and the Military 
Struggle for Supremacy”, International Herald Tribune, 10 October 2000. 
64 “Untuk Hentikan Berbagai Kerusuhan Amien Minta AS Tekan Pemerintah RI,” Kompas, 5 March 
1999. See also “Albright Temui Amien, Megawati, Tokoh HAM,” Kompas, 6 March 1999. 
65 Merdeka, 7 March 1999 
66 HA Sumargono, “Perlukan Intervensi AS? Catatan untuk Dr. Amien Rais,” Kompas, 12 September 
1999. See also Abd Rohim Ghazali, “Kasus Ambon dan Ijtihad Politik Amien Rais,” Kompas, 30 
March 1999; “Intervensi Moral Amien Rais,” Kompas, 26 March 1999. 
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 But, in general the government officials and major political forces rejected any 
appeal for international humanitarian intervention in Maluku and Aceh. For example, when 
Marzuki Darusman, the Attorney General, was asked about the possibility of foreign 
intervention in Maluku, he strongly rejected the idea. Because, he said, “the core problem of 
the Ambon conflict is a conflict of interest with political and military nuances”. Considering 
the appeal to have been influenced by religious sentiment, he asserted that the political 
content of the conflict was more influential and, thereby, what had to be done was to send in 
a national peacekeeping mission and instigate effective policing measures through which 
arms could be confiscated, a curfew put in place and provocateurs arrested.67 
 In responding to the media report, which said that the European Union Parliament 
was drafting a resolution for military intervention in Maluku, 68 Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Alwi Shihab briefed 83 international representatives in Jakarta and said, “The Indonesian 
government strongly rejects foreign intervention in the Maluku conflict, but will welcome 
humanitarian assistance for people in need caused by the conflict”. He was also reported as 
saying, “It is expected that the international community shows their understanding and 
support for the government efforts to restore law and order in Maluku and North Maluku 
provinces and to build peaceful relations among society there”.69 
 Surjadi Soedirdja, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, was reported 
as saying that the government policy about the conflict in Maluku was very clear that the 
problems in Maluku and North Maluku were Indonesian domestic affairs. Therefore, “any 
kind of foreign intervention has to be avoided”.70 To national media, Hasan Wirajuda, then 
the General Director of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, explained that the case of 
Maluku should not be treated as being equal to the case of East Timor because the latter had 
been since its beginning an international affair: “The Maluku conflict is an internal problem. 
In addition, Maluku is under an effective administration. In that way, foreign intervention 
though in the kind of humanitarianism could be carried out if only there is a formal invitation 
from the Indonesian government”.71 
 In the case of Aceh, when President Wahid initiated negotiations with GAM in order 
to seek solutions to the problems by inviting the Switzerland-based NGO Henry Dunant 
Centre (HDC), many politicians and political observers in Jakarta warned the government 
that such an initiative helped internationalize the conflict. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, for example, 
proposed that although the international community apparently did not support separatist 
                                                 
67 “Ketua MPR tentang Pertikaian di Maluku: Hentikan Pembunuhan,” Kompas, 5 January 2000. 
68 “Soal Pertikaian di Maluku, Parlemen Eropa Serukan Intervensi Internasional,” Kompas, 8 July 
2000. 
69 Ibid. 
70 “Koflik di Maluku; Banyak Senjata Beredar,” Kompas, 13 July 2000. See also “Sekjen PBB 
Berusaha Tak Agendakan Muluku; Menlu: RI Tak Terima Intervensi Negatif,” Kompas, 18 July 2000. 
71 Ibid. 
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movements in Indonesia, the likelihood of internationalization of the movements was 
existent. She went on, “mobilization of public opinion by NGOs and the media or politicians 
could make the domestic affairs as international issues”.72   
 Critics of the possibility of the involvement of foreign parties in resolving the 
conflicts in Maluku and Aceh included DPR members. They argued that involving foreign 
entities in seeking solutions to domestic problems such as Aceh was a big mistake. Others 
were concerned about the internationalization of the conflicts.73 DPR members from PDIP 
like Sabam Sirait, Sutardjo Surjoguritno and Permadi were also critical about the 
participation of foreign parties in finding solutions to Indonesian domestic problems. “The 
conflict in Aceh is an Indonesian domestic problem. If the government was united and took 
the problem seriously, it could be easily resolved and the international involvement would be 
unnecessary”, Sabam Sirait suggested.74  
 The anti-international intervention feeling and the anti-internationalization of 
domestic policy regarding conflicts was also reflected in efforts to prohibit all kinds of 
activities which were perceived as attempts to bring the conflict in Maluku and Aceh into 
international attention. In the case of Maluku, the security forces attempted to close the 
region from outsiders who were suspected of not having a valid reason for entering the 
region.75 A number of seminars and publications on Aceh were prohibited or censored. A 
Komnas HAM-organized seminar in Banda Aceh in October 2003 was even dissolved by the 
security apparatus. 76  Relevant to this policy was the ban on national and international 
reporters and humanitarian workers entering Aceh as it was feared they might help the 
internationalization of the conflict.77  
                                                 
72 “Catatan Akhir Tahun CIDES: Pemerintah Tak Efektif Dalam Buat Keputusan,” Kompas, 29 
December 1999. See also Omar Halim, “Internasionalisasi Aceh dan Agenda GAM,” Kompas, 7 June 
2005; and M. Dimyati Hartono, “Internasionalisasi Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,” Kompas, 7 June 2005. 
73 “Pemerintah Terperangkap Dalam Internasionalisasi Aceh,” Kompas, 2 June 2005. “Keliru 
Mengajak Negara Lain Dalam Menyelesaikan Masalah Dalam Negeri,” Kompas, 5 June 2005. 
74 Interviews in Jakarta, 7, 14, 15 January 2005. 
75 The policy was particularly based on President Decree placing Maluku under a civil emergency law 
on 26 June 2000. See HRW, Moluccan Islands: Communal Violence in Indonesia, June 2000. See also 
ICG, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder, Op.cit., p. 11 and ICG, Indonesia: The Search for Peace in 
Maluku, Report No. 31, 8 February 2002, p. 18–9. 
76 Media Indonesia, 20 October 1999. See also “Indonesian police break up rights commission session 
in Aceh province”, AFP, 21 October 2003. 
77 Following the President Decree No. 28/2003 authorizing the emergency law in Aceh, President 
Megawati issued Decree No. 43/2003 which forbade foreign tourists from going to Aceh and required 
other foreigners to get permission from the state authority. All humanitarian activities had to be 
coordinated by the Coordinating Minister for Social Affairs. The arrest of a US journalist William 
Nessen on 24 June 2003 was an example of how Indonesian authorities in Aceh attempted to confine 
the region from national and international access. A year before a Scottish academic and an American 
nurse were also arrested based on an allegation of supporting GAM rebels. See “Indonesian press 
alarm on Aceh,” BBC News, 5 June 2003. See also BBC News, 3, 6 August 2003 and 17 March 2004. 
See also HRW, Aceh under Martial Law: Unnecessary and Dangerous Restrictions on International 
humanitarian Access, A Briefing Paper, September 2003; Teuku Samsul Bahri, Aceh Province: Dirty 
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 Rejection of foreign intervention in Maluku was also demonstrated by popular 
groups such as KISDI and FKAWJ. Ja’far Umar, the Forum leader, contended that the call 
for international assistance or the UN to solve the Maluku conflict was insulting the national 
dignity since the problem was Indonesian national affair. Hussein Umar, the KISDI leader, 
urged the government and DPR to be determined to resist foreign intervention and asked the 
international community not to intervene in Indonesia’s domestic affairs. He argued, 
“conflict in Maluku was part of the scenario of a Muslim cleansing policy in eastern parts of 
Indonesia by the international community. The next step is to make easy the separation of 
Irian Jaya (Papua) from NKRI.”78  
 Rallies to reject international intervention in Indonesia’s domestic affairs were also 
conducted by student groups. In Yogyakarta, for example, tens of students demonstrated to 
support the deportation of Sidney Jones, the former director of HRW-Asia and then ICG 
director. Before the rally, the head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) pointed the 
finger at Jones that she had undermined national security. The students blamed Jones and her 
“black” NGOs network for provoking domestic conflicts: “We will not let go of any of our 
territory, as was the case with East Timor”.79 
 The growing sentiment against international intervention should not be seen as a 
sign of the restrengthening of feelings of nationalism in any broad or meaningful sense. Such 
sentiments and the internationalization debates were largely related to the political conflict in 
Jakarta. The military and some politicians in DPR criticized Wahid’s initiative in negotiating 
with GAM, while politicians from PKB supported it. Politicians from PKB and PAN later 
criticized Megawati and then S.B. Yudhoyono for continually involving foreign parties to 
find solutions to the Aceh conflict. The use of arguments that international intervention 
would harm national dignity and sovereignty or that internationalization of a domestic 
conflict would complicate the domestic solution showed that nationalism was just a political 
game. It depended on the speaker’s particular political position. Religious leaders in Maluku 
and human rights activists in Aceh also contended that nationalism was meaningless when 
the government officials, military officers and politicians had in fact failed to provide 
protection and security to the people.80 
 Up until this point there had been no evidence that the international community had 
attempted to mobilize Indonesian domestic support or even to neutralize domestic opposition 
                                                                                                                                          
War Uncovered, Report by Kontras (The Commission for Involuntary Disappearances and Victims of 
Violence) – Aceh, 30 September 2003. 
78 “KISDI and Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah Tolak Campur Tangan Asing di 
Maluku,” Kompas, 19 July 2000. 
79 “Aksi Mendukung Deportasi Sidney Jones di DPRD,” Kompas, 23 June 2004. 
80 Interviews in Ambon and Banda Aceh, May – July 2004. 
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for an international military intervention, as ICISS had theoretically suggested81  and as 
occurred in the case of East Timor. As anti-intervention sentiment grew in Indonesia, it 
would have been very unlikely for foreign governments to have taken the risk of carrying out 
intervention. As has already been mentioned, “a military action for limited human protection 
purposes cannot be justified if in the process it triggers a larger conflict”.82  
 
2. Ongoing process of democratization 
 The growing feeling against foreign intervention in Maluku and Aceh was also 
accompanied by some political gains. These included the institutionalization of democratic 
processes, the assertion of national territorial integration and an increased awareness of the 
need for a consolidated government. At the heart of all these processes was the state’s 
capacity to resolve Maluku and Aceh’s problems through domestic and democratic measures.  
 
a. Institutionalizing democracy  
 The post-Suharto years gradually showed that reformasi was not simply a matter of 
changing the authoritarian ruler. As discussed in Chapter Four, the reform movement 
contained a large number of issues. These included the expectations of having a more 
democratic government, a more accountable security force, more autonomy for the regions, a 
growing respect for human rights and an emerging role for civil society.  
 
The general elections 
 As mentioned, the international community showed strong support for the holding of 
the June 1999 parliamentary election followed by the October 1999 presidential election. 
Based on the newly revised regulations for general elections and the party system endorsed 
by the reform movement, most Indonesian political elements demonstrated enthusiasm for 
and a commitment to bringing the nation into a democratic system.  
 The election results also received positive responses from the international 
community, particularly the Western democratic countries. With PDIP and Golkar in the top 
two positions, winning 34 and 22 per cent of national votes respectively, the nationalist-
secularist ideology of the country would be likely to continue. This kind of ideology had 
brought about constructive relationships between Suharto’s Indonesia and foreign 
governments. A different response would have very likely emerged if the democratic 
election resulted in the victory of parties founded upon Islamic ideology.  
                                                 
81 ICISS, Op.cit., p. 70 
82 Ibid., p. 37. See also Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights, Intervention and Sovereignty,” in Nicholas 
Owen ed., Human Rights, Human Wrongs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 81.  
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 The presidential election in October 1999 brought Abdurrahman Wahid to the 
presidency. 83  His accession to presidential power highlighted another principle of the 
democratic system, that is the supremacy of the civilian voice over that of the military. This 
was one of the vital political points which the reform movement had sought.84  
 The parliamentary and presidential elections in 2004 showed further progress in the 
sense of institutionalizing democratization. The Indonesian people again demonstrated 
enthusiasm and displayed an expectation that the democratic institution of elections would 
guide the country to a more mature democratic state.85 Conducted in a fair and peaceful 
atmosphere, the parliamentary election was not merely a formality or a contest for political 
parties and politicians, but it was viewed as an institution that recognized the basic rights of 
the people to freely choose their representatives in a national political decision-making 
process. 
 The presidential elections in July and September 2004 underlined the principle that 
the people were central to democracy. For the first time in Indonesian history, the people had 
the right to choose the president and vice-president through a direct, free, and fair election, 
which was previously the privilege of the MPR. Representing the Democrat Party (PD), 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) won the presidential election. It may be that the 
popularity of the candidate was the most decisive factor influencing how people cast their 
votes, but it is also true that “politics is never perfect and in democracies the candidates for 
the top executive are seldom ideal. It has been mainly a choice based on the principle of 
minus malum or the ‘lesser evils’ among the candidates,” as one scholar asserted.86 
 
Reform within the national security force 
 Civilizing state authority in the sense of making state institutions more accountable 
took place within the Indonesian security force. In April 1999 the Indonesian police (Polri) 
were separated from the armed forces (ABRI), with the latter being re-named the Indonesian 
National Army (TNI). In accordance with national demands for a revised role of the TNI, the 
TNI leaders introduced the new paradigm within which the military was to be focused on 
national defence affairs while Polri held the responsibility for domestic security matters. The 
MPR Decree (TAP MPR) 7/2000 laid down the formal guidelines for further regulation of 
                                                 
83 “New Hope for Indonesia”, BBC News, 21 October 1999. See also “International praise for Wahid,” 
BBC News, 20 October 1999. See also R. William Liddle, “Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored,” 
Asian Survey XL (January/February 2000) pp. 32–42. 
84 Although Habibie was a civilian, his rise to presidential power was not through election but merely 
based on the constitution. For a discussion about the civilian supremacy, see E. Shobirin Nadj ed., 
Supremasi Sipil, Pelembagaan Politik dan Masalah Integrasi Nasional (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2004. 
85 The Asia Foundation, Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate 2003, 
November 2003.  
86 Jusuf Wanandi, “The Indonesia General Elections 2004,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No.2, 2004 
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the roles of TNI and Polri. The decree also asserted that TNI should be subject to policy 
direction by the government and that it had to support democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights. On the other hand, Polri was defined as the state instrument to maintain security and 
public order, law enforcement and protection of and service to the public.87  
 Also very significant was that the decree obliged TNI and Polri to be neutral in 
political affairs. By this regulation TNI and Polri had to withdraw from daily political 
activities such as holding offices in parliament and executive posts. Although the decree 
mandated that the latest date for the withdrawal of TNI/Polri from DPR/MPR was 2009, the 
military/police faction in DPR and MPR was in fact withdrawn in 2004. Active military and 
police personnel in government and other political posts had the option to return to, or to 
seek release from, their military jobs. 
 Reform within Indonesian security forces was in the first instance a response to the 
democratization demanded by the reform movement as discussed in Chapter Four. More than 
this, related to allegations that the military had undermined Wahid’s civilian government in 
seeking a peaceful solution to the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh, 88  foreign major 
governments wanted to see further development of the TNI/Polri within Indonesian 
democratization. Ralph Boyce claimed that the US government 
 
will also carefully modulate our broader contacts with the Indonesian military as a 
part of any coordinated effort to strengthen Indonesia’s institutions. The military 
remains a central, truly national institution, with enormous potential to support or 
subvert democratization.89  
  
 Foreign governments also began to revise their military ties with the Indonesian 
military. On this issue Gareth Evans suggested:  
 
The United States and other donors should insist that providing any future assistance 
or training be predicated on the Indonesian government making the military’s entire 
budget and expenditures a matter of public record. Such transparency is a bare 
minimum to be expected from any modern military operating in a democratic system. 
Most importantly, international military ties with Indonesia must be viewed through 
the wider optic of reform facing the central government in Jakarta as a whole. The 
Indonesian military does not operate in a vacuum.90 
 
 Several governments were interested in providing information or other assistance 
that would enable the Indonesian government and military to determine the objectives and 
                                                 
87 See ICG, Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform, Report No. 24, 11 October 2001. 
88 ICG, Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February 2001 and Indonesia’s 
Presidential Crisis: the Second Round, Indonesia Briefing, 21 May 2001. 
89 “The Bush Administration Will Be Taking Indonesia Seriously,” International Herald Tribune, 23 
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direction of reform as well as formulate detailed plans.91 HRW 2001 reported that the UK 
resumed sales of Hawk jet fighters and the US lifted a ban on commercial military sales and 
increased its bilateral assistance to US$125 million, which was to be allocated to judicial 
reform, improving civil-military relations and police training.92  
 
The introduction of regional autonomy  
 Indonesia also showed further progress by the introduction of laws on regional 
autonomy. UU No. 22 and No. 25/1999 were widely regarded as being in accordance with 
democratic demands and likely to help find solutions to the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh. 
By extending more power and financial resources to the regions, there was a growing belief 
that some of the root causes of the regional conflicts could be addressed.  
 In the case of Aceh, it was reported that  
 
the US and other governments are said to be willing to support the implementation 
of autonomy in Aceh with funds, expertise and training for Acehnese officials and 
NGOs. Foreign governments have a vested interest in seeing autonomy succeed 
because of their desire that Aceh remain part of Indonesia and their unease about 
attempts to solve the problem by force.93 
 
As a matter of fact, the leading members of the international community believed 
that serious separatist movements were limited to Aceh and Papua, aside from the rather 
different case of East Timor. The separatist movement of the RMS in Maluku was seen as 
insignificant. But, it was also clear that social and economic injustices largely triggered the 
separatist groups. The implementation of regional autonomy could theoretically increase 
respect for regional identities and interests as a basis of a pluralist and democratic state. 
Keeping the vast ethnic, cultural and regional groups united within the Indonesian state 
would contribute to Southeast Asian regional security.94  
 
The growing respect for human rights  
 Another important part of the democratization process that impressed the 
international community was the respect for the promotion of human rights. The fall of 
Suharto paved the way for the realization of various human rights such as civil and political 
rights, economic and cultural rights, minority rights and even the right to self-determination. 
Although their prospects were deeply affected by the processes of democratic transition, 
                                                 
91 ICG, Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform, Asia Report No.24, 11 October 2001. 
92 HRW World Report 2001, “Indonesia: the Role of the International Community” accessed online at 
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93 See ICG, Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict, Asia Report No. 18, 27 June 2001. 
94 See Robert S. Gelbard, “U.S. and Indonesia: Common Goals,” International Herald Tribune, 20 
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185
there was a reasonable hope of human rights development in aspects like freedom of 
expression and political participation. 
 The seventeen-month tenure of President Habibie produced a number of legislative 
changes including the regional autonomy laws outlined above.95 These were followed by a 
new law, UU No.26/2000, establishing a Human Rights Court, which was accepted by the 
DPR on 6 November 2000.96  
 Despite their sluggish implementation, caused largely by political turbulence in the 
following years, the national laws on human rights provided the framework for the nation’s 
legal instruments in dealing with any actual or apparent violations of human rights. The 
importance of these human rights instruments had been strongly denied by Suharto’s regime. 
They were useful to show the international community that the new democratic country, 
which had been long condemned for massive violations of human rights, was now on the 
right track to promoting human rights. 
 
The emerging role of civil society  
 The bottom line of democratization was the increasing participation of the 
population in national decision-making. The reform movement in 1998 remarkably 
demonstrated that popular groups were playing a crucial role in bringing about a democratic 
system. Students, pro-democracy activists, human rights NGOs, journalists, lawyers and 
professionals, intellectuals and other urban, educated groups and religious organizations 
were the influential agents in ending the authoritarian regime and paving the way for the 
emergence of a democratic system.    
 The same pattern could be observed in other democratizing societies. Foreign 
governments, in particular the US, EU and Australia, were of the view that the emergence 
and empowerment of societal organizations was the foundation of good, transparent and 
accountable government and of respect for human rights. Ralph Boyce said: 
 
While strengthening institutions, our strategy includes working wherever possible 
through non-governmental organizations to continue to invigorate civil society. We 
particularly want to concentrate on judicial institutions. With vast ethnic diversity 
                                                 
95 Other legal products included the ratification of ILO Conventions regarding rights to organize, 
elimination of gender-based discrimination of forced labour and minimum age of workers; UU 
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and a history of official abuse, Indonesia will not remain stable for long unless its 
citizens believe that grievances will receive a fair hearing.97 
 
 Foreign countries and international organizations also believed that societal 
organizations including NGOs could play an important role in resolving conflict and dealing 
with humanitarian problems. Apart from working with the established NGOs such as YLBHI 
and PBHI, in Maluku a number of NGOs emerged in response to the eruption of communal 
conflict. 98 A similar situation was found in Aceh. The Coalition for Human Rights in Aceh 
(Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh), SIRA, SMUR and other kinds of societal organizations became 
involved in seeking a solution to the existing violent conflict. Many international agencies, 
particularly pro-democracy and human rights NGOs, developed networks with local NGOs. 
This was in part to strengthen the local community in dealing with the democratic process 
and searching for a peaceful solution to the conflict.  
 
b. Conserving national integrity 
 Although there was no single explanation for the independence of East Timor, as 
was shown in the previous chapter, the separation was seen – particularly by the military and 
nationalist elements – as a big loss to the nation. To avoid its repeat in other regions the post-
Habibie governments took a tougher political stance on national territorial integrity both at 
domestic and international levels. At the domestic level two different approaches were used: 
one legal and democratic, particularly through the implementation of the regional autonomy 
bill discussed above, and the other security or military-based.  
 In the case of the second approach, the military and the police remained central and 
sought to prove that they were the guardians of NKRI. Apart from the general strategy based 
on the territorial structure command, the military urged the government to place Maluku in a 
state of emergency under which the military would have had a legal base to crack down on 
the RMS separatist movement. The continuing military operations in Aceh and the policy to 
place the province under military emergency law in May 2003 were also part of the counter-
insurgency strategy against GAM. While a few groups, primarily democracy and human 
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rights activists, criticized the coercive approach, most national political forces showed no 
objection to it.99  
 At an international level the Indonesian government’s efforts to ensure the 
preservation of NKRI were remarkable. In around 21 months of his presidency, Wahid 
travelled to all continents and visited some 30 foreign countries. In the 40 days after he took 
power, he had spent 23 days on international visits including to ASEAN member countries, 
China, India, Japan, the USA and the Middle Eastern countries.100 The objectives of his 
world tour, he claimed, were: to improve the Indonesian international image, to encourage 
international investment for national economic recovery, and to have international support 
for Indonesian sovereignty and territorial integration, including in Aceh.101 Foreign Minister 
Alwi Shihab visited the Vatican in December 1999 to convince Pope John Paul II that the 
new Indonesian government would be able to solve the Christian–Muslim conflict in 
Maluku.102 
 According to one analyst, Wahid’s foreign policy of seeking international support 
for economic recovery and national integration was supported by his strong domestic 
legitimacy, personal popularity and grass roots support.103 Several analysts such as Hasjim 
Djalal agreed that Wahid’s world tour helped Indonesia to be united.104 “Perhaps, the only 
objective apparently achieved by the world tour was that almost all countries Gus Dur visited 
showed support for Indonesian territorial integration and thus the separatist movement of 
GAM had no support”, Jusuf Wanandi said.105  
 However, other observers disagreed. Rizal Sukma, for example, said that the visits 
were unnecessary. He did not believe that there was any kind of international conspiracy or a 
specific US interest in seeing Indonesia disintegrate.106 This is in line with Robert Gelbard, 
the US ambassador to Indonesia, who said: “the United States firmly supports the same goals 
as Indonesians do for this vast and diverse country – democratization, sustainable economic 
growth and territorial integrity.” Gelbard further said: 
 
Those who claim that foreign governments seek to destabilize Indonesia clearly have 
not thought the matter through rationally. A moment’s reflection reveals that 
instability in Indonesia would serve no national interest of the United States or other 
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101 “Politik Luar Negeri “Tur Keliling Dunia” ala Gus Dur,” Kompas, 1 January 2000. See also Yasmi 
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in Indonesian Foreign Policy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) pp. 93–122. 
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friends of Indonesia. To the contrary, instability here would undermine U.S. national 
security.107 
  
 Although President Wahid faced criticism that his international visits were excessive, 
his foreign policy was unfocused, and the visits had no effect in bringing in international 
investment,108 President Megawati continued the Gus Dur-style diplomacy. In the months 
after replacing Wahid, Megawati visited ASEAN member countries in August and the USA 
in September 2001.109   Her goals, however, were similar: to gain international aid and 
political support for national economic recovery, democratization and integration.110  This 
was clearly emphasized by the new Foreign Minister Hasan Wirayuda: 
 
The Indonesian Foreign Service is called upon to play an active role in defending 
and reserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. Our basic 
message is that it is the interest of the region and the world at large that Indonesia 
remains stable, secure and fully capable of addressing its internal problems.111  
 
 Megawati’s foreign policy to keep the nation integrated was rather progressive and 
focused in its implementation. First, supported by senior diplomats such as the new Foreign 
Minister Hasan Wirayuda, Megawati’s policy was more powerful, including “to ask 
neighbouring states not to support separatist movements and to confine arms smuggling”.112 
Second, Megawati’s foreign policy was supported by relatively more stable domestic politics 
in the sense of political support from DPR (through which a special autonomy bill on Aceh 
was issued) and a closer political relationship with the military (by which more effective 
security operations in Maluku and Aceh were carried out).113 Her foreign policy was also 
characterized by the “back to basics” policy of applying the well-tested “concentric circles” 
formula instead of Gus Dur’s “ecumenical” formula.114  
                                                 
107 A speech to Indonesian government officials, lawmakers and business executives in Jakarta, 14 
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 The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre Twin Towers in New York and the 
global war on terror had affected Megawati’s policy in dealing with GAM in Aceh. When 
the Bush Administration began its military campaign in Afghanistan, international attention 
on military operations in Aceh tended to decrease. The Bali bombings a year later seemed to 
contribute to the Indonesia’s military determination in dealing with the Aceh conflict. Less 
than two months after the US-led military intervention in Iraq in March 2003, Megawati 
placed Aceh under emergency military law. Based on this law the military deployed a 
massive force to crack down on GAM. Further investigation of the relation of the 
international events, particularly the US’s foreign policy and Indonesian domestic policy in 
Aceh, is needed. Initially, it would be reasonable to say that the two sets of international and 
national events were more than just a coincidence.   
 
c. Asserting national elite reconsolidation 
 According to USAID, the US government in 2001 had established as one of its 
foreign policy priorities in Indonesia to work for the institutionalization of democracy. As 
one of four priority countries making the transition to democracy, the US identified 
Indonesia’s importance. It is also said that President Bush continued to support Indonesia in 
its efforts to build a strong democracy and market economy.115 
 Although widely greeted as part of an ever increasing democratic process, the 1999 
elections did not bring about a strong government. The emergence of nearly a hundred new 
political parties, of which 48 were authorized to contest the June 1999 election, reflected 
fragmentation among national political elites.116 And as shown by the events from 2000 to 
2001 the political dynamics in Jakarta were characterized by astonishing disharmony 
between President Wahid and Vice-President Megawati on the one hand and the conflicting 
relationship between President Wahid and DPR and between Wahid and the military (TNI) 
on the other hand.  
 The Wahid–Megawati relationship was as disharmonious as many had initially 
expected.117 Their close personal relationship and their position representing the Islamic 
religious and nationalist ideologies (aliran) were damaged by political turbulence. Megawati 
                                                 
115 USAID, Audit of USAID/Indonesia’s Democracy and Governance Program, Office of Inspector 
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seemed to be upset at failing to win the presidency or at being betrayed by Gus Dur.118 
Although she was elected as the vice-president, the position seemed insufficient to ensure 
her cooperation in a formal relationship with President Wahid. Her reluctance to responsibly 
fulfil the assignment of seeking a solution to the conflict in Maluku was evidence of this. On 
this case, the ICG wrote: 
 
Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri was appointed by the President to spearhead 
reconciliation efforts shortly after his election, but she was ineffectual and appeared 
disinterested, electing to take a New Year’s vacation to Hong Kong while the 
violence in Maluku raged. For her part, Megawati complained to aides that the 
President had made her responsible for Maluku without giving her the power she 
needed to make a difference.119 
 
 Political relations between Wahid and the DPR were tense and showed that his 
ability to lead the multi-crisis country was sadly inadequate. His physical health was poor. 
His behaviour was unpredictable and erratic. 120  One observer said that Wahid’s 
administration was ineffective in making policy, and was likely to consider things easy 
which were in fact difficult.121 The political relations continued to worsen due to his alleged 
involvement in embezzling money from the Yanatera Bulog Foundation and a grant from the 
Sultan of Brunei, and his decision to sack several ministers who he said were unprofessional 
and corrupt. 122 According to ICG, since the beginning of his term, Wahid had adopted “a 
combative attitude towards the DPR.”123 
 Wahid’s relationship with TNI was even worse. One analyst said that although he 
had promised gradual reform within the TNI as a concession for the military votes for his 
presidency,124 he showed a clear intention to accelerate the reduction of the military’s role in 
democratizing Indonesia. His plan to promote reformist officers to replace those he saw as 
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president. But, as he was then elected as Indonesian new president, Megawati was quoted as saying, “I 
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conservatives, including Wiranto, was perceived by the military as a deep intervention by a 
civilian government in internal military affairs.125  
 Disharmony between Wahid and Megawati and conflict between Wahid and DPR 
and Wahid and the military made the violent conflict in Maluku and Aceh difficult to handle, 
which confirmed the human rights activists’ claims about the politik pembiaran (politics of 
neglect) of the central government in the regions. The conflict obviously led to an ineffective 
government. In order to avoid a worse situation, the MPR finally forced Wahid to step down 
on 23 July 2001.126 
 The signs of government consolidation emerged following the accession of 
Megawati to the presidency on 23 July 2001. Her party, PDIP, was the largest in the DPR 
and gave her a stronger political base than Abdurrahman Wahid had had. And in the interest 
of securing her presidency, she avoided conflict with other political forces through her 
characteristic silence.127 She accommodated Hamzah Haz from PPP as vice-president in 
order to have Islamic political support. Her cabinet had a collaborative character in the sense 
that other parties’ representatives were incorporated. Four retired generals were also 
appointed as cabinet ministers. This was not different to Wahid’s cabinet, though. 
 Megawati’s closeness with the military was widely debated. ICG, for example, 
denied that the military support through DPR/MPR for Megawati and the joining of a 
number of retired generals in PDIP was convincing evidence that Megawati had a special 
relation with the military. The military’s political stance supported the removal of Wahid 
rather than the accession of Megawati. And, a number of retired generals were also found in 
other political parties apart from PDIP, ICG argued.128 However, other scholars saw a special 
relationship between Megawati and the military as helping to stabilize Megawati’s 
presidency.129 Rinakit, for example, believed that Megawati’s attitude was pro-military. This 
was said to be shown by her political statements and her support for Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono as vice-president instead of Hamzah Haz.130  
 One issue that could show the close relationship between Megawati and the military 
was the way they dealt with national security, in particular the Maluku and Aceh conflicts. 
An interest in conserving NKRI brought the two sides into closer collaboration. As we will 
see, with this national consolidation, a common policy to solve the conflicts in Maluku and 
Aceh became possible. 
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 The third step towards a consolidated government took place in the 2004 elections. 
This election was the second democratic election ever held in the country. The fragmented 
48 political parties in the 1999 election reduced to only 24 parties contesting the May 2004 
parliamentary election. But, what is more important to state here is the outcome of the 
presidential election.131 The long and exhausting process finally resulted in the victory of 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as the sixth president of the republic. According to the 
democratic spirit, the president would be more accountable to the people rather than to the 
DPR/MPR, which tended to generate disputes. In addition, his background as a retired army 
general would be fruitful to avoid political conflict with the military, particularly in seeking 
an effective policy to solve the conflict in Aceh. 
 
All these political changes tended to suggest that Indonesia was still developing a 
democratic political system, a process for which foreign democratic governments 
demonstrated their support. In this context, it is fair to raise the question of whether 
humanitarian crises triggered by democratization can justify humanitarian intervention. As 
has been mentioned, scholars had proposed that humanitarian crises and massive violations 
of human rights were triggered by either authoritarian regimes or failed states. In the case of 
Iraq and Kosovo, where effective but authoritarian governments existed, NATO, led by the 
US intervened with a humanitarian rationale.132 The UN also sent peacekeeping forces to 
Somalia and Rwanda, where no effective authority existed.133 And, as I have argued, the 
INTERFET was justified because there was no effective authority in East Timor during the 
popular consultation which led the territory into devastating violence and a humanitarian 
catastrophe.  
Considering democratization in Indonesia more important than the humanitarian 
crises caused by violent conflict in Maluku and Aceh technically changed the core issue. 
Supporting democratization was far less controversial than intervening in a humanitarian 
crisis. Widely claimed to be the champions of democracy, the Western countries had taken a 
political stand to sustain Indonesian democratization rather than to initiate humanitarian 
intervention which might have jeopardized the democratic progress. This might be consistent 
with ICISS suggestion that 
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Military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, or if the 
consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if there 
is no action at all. In particular, a military action for limited human protection 
purposes cannot be justified if in the process it triggers a larger conflict.134 
 
 “There is nothing like success to silence one’s critics”, Jennifer Welsh wrote to warn 
that military intervention for humanitarian purposes may fail.135 The large scale loss of life 
and destruction in the Balkans, for example, was caused by NATO’s intervention rather than 
by the earlier violent conflict, and the predominant use of airpower prolonged the conflict, 
according to Nicholas Morris’s criticism.136 
 However speculative, it may be asserted that international military intervention in 
Maluku and Aceh would have been likely to worsen Indonesia’s condition rather than to 
improve it. The logic of the option was that improvement in Indonesian democratic politics 
would provide democratic solutions to the conflicts. By the time democracy had been 
institutionalized, major political forces had been consolidated, and democratic rules had been 
installed, peaceful solutions to the humanitarian crises in the two regions became possible.  
 
E. Concluding Notes 
 
 As humanitarian crises or conscience-shocking situations with just causes for 
humanitarian intervention, the situations in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2002), 
and Aceh (1999–2005) demonstrated many commonalities. The three regional conflicts 
claimed thousands of lives, produced hundreds of thousands of refugees and/or IDPs, and 
saw large-scale destruction of physical infrastructure. The awful role played by Indonesian 
security forces and the ineffective actions of the central government led to allegations of 
massive violations of human rights in Maluku and Aceh. These objective conditions were 
likely to justify an international military intervention in order to protect Maluku and 
Acehnese people from further sufferings.  
 The international community, both NGOs and foreign governments, however, 
tended to see the violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh as related to the democratization 
process (reformasi) and as Indonesia’s domestic affairs. Given that they saw the underlying 
root of the conflicts as Indonesian democratization, considering that the parties to the 
conflicts were limited to domestic entities, and taking into account the contents and the 
dynamics of the conflicts, most leading members of the international community perceived 
that solutions to the conflicts had to be sought domestically and democratically. Such a 
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perception was in line with and to some extent endorsed by major Indonesian political forces, 
especially that the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were Indonesian domestic affairs. 
Accordingly, solutions to the conflicts had to be sought through domestic and democratic 
mechanisms. 
 The rise of anti-international intervention sentiment in Indonesia, and of the 
expectation for the democratization processes, had made international military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes in Maluku and Aceh very unlikely. With the domestic enthusiasm 
for the ongoing process of democratization, the reassertion for territorial unity of Indonesia 
and the importance of a consolidated government, the major foreign and democratic 
governments were more favourably inclined towards assisting the Indonesian government in 
seeking domestic and democratic solutions to humanitarian problems in Maluku and Aceh 
than in militarily intervening in the regions. 
 Within the continuing consolidation process of reformasi accompanied by 
international assistance, Indonesian governments under Wahid, Megawati and Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono endeavoured to bring the violent conflicts in Maluku and Aceh to an 
end. Their efforts to solve the domestic problems seemed to make clear that international 
humanitarian intervention in the two regions was absolutely unnecessary. The next chapter 
will investigate how domestic resources and international assistance were used to solve the 
violent conflicts and humanitarian problems in Maluku and Aceh. 
 
===== 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS: 
BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Given the international community had no intention of militarily intervening in 
Maluku and Aceh and taking into account the considerable progress within Indonesian 
political context, the question now is how the conflicts and humanitarian crises in the two 
regions were addressed and ultimately resolved.  
 The common perception of the international community and the major national 
political forces about the domestic character of the Maluku and Aceh conflicts made 
apparent the need to search for domestic solutions to the conflicts. However, the demand 
that those solutions had to be in line with the democratization process in Indonesia was not 
without difficulties. As mentioned previously, democratization had actually perpetuated 
instead of resolving the two conflicts. 
Based on the two principles that the conflicts had to be resolved domestically and 
democratically, this chapter will investigate the efforts to settle the conflicts in Maluku and 
Aceh. 
The first part of the chapter focuses on conflict resolution in Maluku. This will 
reveal further the domestic political changes that resulted in the conditions required to 
bring the conflict to an end. The role of the international community in seeking a solution 
is also presented. 
The second part, focusing on the case of Aceh, discusses the contributions of 
domestic politics to conflict settlement. This does not mean that the international role was 
less significant. Indeed, the international community played a constructive role in 
hastening and securing a peaceful solution to the conflict.     
 
 
B. Domestic solutions to the Maluku conflict  
 
The violent conflict in Maluku was unexpected to many national and international 
observers. It was also to the surprise of many parties that the conflict caused large-scale 
loss of life and destruction and lasted for three years. More surprisingly still, if it was true 
that the conflict was inter-religious communal, as government officials and security 
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officers consistently said, the government should have been able to end it immediately. 
Several communal conflicts, such as in Mataram and Kupang, the capitals of the Provinces 
of West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara respectively, showed that the security 
forces could act decisively to end conflicts when the political will to do so was present. 
 Based on the factors that had triggered the communal conflict and the national 
political environment that had perpetuated the conflict, as presented in Chapter Four, it is 
clear enough that the parties and the content of the conflict were all domestic. Accordingly, 
one might see that the solution to the conflict lay primarily with the government and the 
security force. In Chapter Six I discussed international and national factors that could have 
led to the resolution to the communal conflict in Maluku without involving the 
international military force. These factors included the international views which 
underlined that the intractability of the conflict was related to democratization in Indonesia, 
that the conflict was an Indonesian domestic affair and that the conflict had to be resolved 
in accordance with national political dynamics. Domestic factors contributing to the 
domestic solution of the conflict were the growing anti-international intervention sentiment 
and the increasing consolidation of democratization. 
 As the Maluku conflict was an intrastate conflict, or a factional conflict according 
to Miall et al’s typology, and the members of the international community saw it as 
Indonesia’s domestic affair, how the conflict was ultimately resolved will be examined in 
the following section. This starts with further investigation of the role of the international 
community and followed by domestic endeavours. 
 
1. International encouragement 
  
Consistent with the international views about the domestic characteristic of the 
conflict and its possible domestic solution, the role of the international community in 
general could be categorized as chiefly to help the Indonesian government to be able to 
solve the conflict. The international preference to assist the Indonesian government, 
however, raised two important issues that need particular attention. First, the inclination of 
the foreign governments and international NGOs to assist the Indonesian government was 
in line with one of normative propositions proposed by the ICISS and Michael Ignatieff. 
Just to say briefly, the ICISS asserted that “prevention of deadly conflict and other forms 
of man-made catastrophe is, as with all other aspects of the responsibility to protect, first 
and foremost the responsibility of sovereign states, and the communities and institutions 
within them.”1 The ICISS added that “for prevention to succeed, strong support from the 
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international community is often needed, and in many cases may be indispensable.”2 This 
is supported by Michael Ignatieff, who said that the building of a legitimate, representative 
and competent state capable of maintaining basic rights regimes for all citizens is more 
important than just exercising the politics of protest by the international community.3 
The second issue related to the international preference is about the significance of 
international morality, ethics and human rights as the fundamental reason moving a state or 
group of states to use military force. Religious leaders in Ambon had argued that the 
conflict was not a matter of Christianity but a problem of humanity. “The Christians and 
Muslims were gravely abused and suffering”, Amboina Bishop Mandagi said.4  In the 
interest of humanitarian protection the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI) 
pleaded, “it would be best if the military and police were pulled out of the Moluccas region 
and replaced with international peacekeepers”. 5  The international priority to help the 
Indonesian government institutions was also surprising since it had been clear that the 
government institutions, primarily the members of the military and the police, were 
involved in the violent conflict.  
The absence of immediate and military action by the UN and major democratic 
countries to save the lives of the Malukan people raised allegation of the double-standards 
or hypocrisy. Interviewed in his office, the Bishop of Amboina said, “I criticized the 
international community since they often showed a double-standard policy. If they did not 
have any interest, they closed their eyes to humanitarian problems and violent acts.”6 If it 
is true that the interests of major foreign governments in the region and in Indonesia in 
general were not affected by the conflict and thus led them not to intervene, it was likely to 
confirm what many analysts of humanitarian intervention had long argued, namely that 
without any pressing national interest in economic, political and security issues, foreign 
powers would not send peacekeeping forces to a region as a form of humanitarian 
intervention. 
Nonetheless, the international preference to foster the Indonesian government 
capacity to solve the conflict domestically was not without any reason. In terms of 
practical or objective reason, the leading members of the international community had 
stated that the conflict from every aspect was an Indonesian domestic jurisdiction. As has  
been mentioned, the international human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
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Human Rights Watch and particularly International Crisis Group ICG), which is well 
known as a NGO dedicated exclusively to conflict early warning, had asserted that foreign 
military intervention under the auspices of the UN would be counter-productive. In 
addition, no individual states, including the Netherlands which had a specific historical 
relation with the region, had called for the need for an international military presence in the 
region. In this sense, it is reasonable to say that the international community had been in a 
firm stance to be consistent with their own account.  
As a theoretical or normative reason, the prevention efforts are not limited to 
activities aimed at improving political or economic conditions of the state concerned, as 
parts of the early warning mechanisms in conflict resolution theories in order to prevent 
the eruption of violent conflicts. In many cases the prevention efforts are also intended to 
build the state capacity, including the democratic institutions, in order to prevent the 
conflict from getting worse.7 In the first cases, the international efforts focus on coping 
with the root or underlying causes of the conflict such as poverty and political repression. 
In the second cases, the efforts are devoted to cope with direct or catalytic causes of the 
violence such as the role of bad leaders and bad economic problems as proposed by 
Michael Brown.8 It is also important to note here the normative proposition asserted by the 
ICISS that a “military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, 
or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if 
there is no action at all.”9  
In regard to the objective and normative reasons above, the role of the 
international community in seeking a resolution to the conflict in Maluku was limited to 
strengthening the capacity of the Indonesian government institutions to end the conflict. 
The role was carried out through different ways, such as the form of straightforward 
assistance, positive inducements or the negative form of threatened punishments. “But the 
essential and common attribute of all these actions and measures”, the ICISS asserted, “is 
that they aim to make it absolutely unnecessary to employ directly coercive measures 
against the state concerned.”10 
In terms of straightforward assistance, it has to be mentioned that the UN agencies, 
international humanitarian NGOs and individual governments had worked in the region to 
provide humanitarian assistance for half a million people internally displaced by the 
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9 ICISS, Op.cit., p. 37. 
10 Ibid. p. 23. 
  
199
conflict.11 In addition to this humanitarian support, foreign governments and international 
organizations attempted to encourage the Indonesian government to be more decisive in 
bringing the conflict under control. They made several visits to Maluku and North Maluku 
provinces to show their deep concern about humanitarian problems and support for the 
government to be much more vigour in coping with the conflict. A delegation of the 
European Union arrived in Ambon on 12 October 2000 and visited North Maluku in the 
following day. The US Consul General in Surabaya Robert Pollard visited the region on 24 
October 2000. Leslie A. Row from the Australian embassy made a fact-finding visit in 
November 2000. The Vatican and Japan representative visited in the end of 2000. In 2001 
they also visited the region.12  
On many occasions, the leading members of the international community also 
reminded the Indonesian government of the international consequences of the continuation 
of gross violations of human rights in Maluku. The UN Secretary-General urged President 
Wahid to take all necessary measures to stop the killing.13 The European Union Parliament 
also demanded the Indonesian Government to “do all within its power to put an end to the 
violence”.14 In regard to the separatist issue, the European Union sought to help find a 
viable solution that could avoid the disintegration of Indonesia.15 The USA, according to 
the ICG report, called on the Indonesian government to “prevent organized groups from 
initiating attacks and stop extremist from outside areas from inflaming the situation and 
engaging in violence”.16 
The international encouragement for the Indonesian government to be decisive in 
bringing the communal conflict to an end became more fruitful following the accession of 
Megawati to the Presidency in July 2001. Unlike President Wahid, as mentioned, President 
Megawati had a close relationship with the military, at least in terms of maintaining 
national integration and security, and she took a political stance that would avoid disputes 
with the DPR. Her readiness to accept Hamzah Haz, who showed sympathy to the role of 
Laskar Jihad in Maluku, as Vice-President, was likely to help in establishing a broadly 
supported policy, particularly endorsement from the Islamic groups, to resolve the 
communal conflict.  
                                                 
11 See ICG, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos, Op.cit., p. 22. See also Graham Brown and 
Suprayoga Hadi, Overcoming Violent Conflict: Peace and Development Analysis in Maluku and 
North Maluku (Jakarta: CPRU-INDP, LIPI and BAPPENAS, 2005) pp. 55–7.  
12 See C. J. Bohm MSC, Brief Chronicle of the Unrest in the Moluccas (Ambon: Crisis Centre 
Diocese of Amboina 1999 - 2003, 2003) pp. 93–5, 99–104, 108–110 and 166. 
13 ICG, Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
14 European Parliament Resolution on the Moluccan Islands, B5-0609, 0612, 0623 and 0647/2000. 
15 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and to the European Parliament: Developing Closer Relations Between Indonesian the 
European Union, Brussels, 2 February 2000, p. 18. 
16 ICG, Op.cit., p. 21. See C. J. Bohm MSC, Op.cit. 
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The international support for the central government was also accompanied by 
political development in Maluku. The June 1999 parliamentary elections resulted in the 
slight victory of PDIP in the Maluku province and Ambon district DPRD. One 
consequence of this victory was that the Christian politicians and constituents were 
apparently able to revive their political domination of regional politics and bureaucracy, on 
which their economic resources and socio-political status had mainly relied.17  
 Since the international community preferred to assist the government, 
consolidation among government institutions under Megawati continued to grow and 
political conflict at local level was no longer the issue, the solution to the conflict was 
foreseeable. As the conflict was more likely a communal conflict, the government could 
take every step that would not be undermined by particular potential ‘spoilers’, either 
elements of the military or radical Islamic groups. How these conditions worked to end the 
conflict is presented below. 
 
2. Malino Agreement 
 
The impact of the arrival of President Megawati in power was firstly shown in the 
priority she gave to bringing the regional conflicts including the Maluku conflict to an end. 
By the end of 2001, Megawati’s Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Jusuf Kalla told 
a reporter that he intended to put an end to the Maluku conflict.18 A work-team for peace in 
Maluku was formed and the peace agreement introduced to the Poso conflict (in December 
2001) was used as a model. Kalla also promised that the peace process would commence 
in a month. He based this optimism on his declared understanding of social conditions 
prevailing in Maluku: that the sources of conflict and the players in the conflict were local. 
He added, “I am very sure that those whose spirit to fight is high, in fact are very tired. 
They are exhausted by the endless tension. They are also tired of the misery and relentless 
hostility. They obviously want a normal life.”19 
In their attempt to solve the conflict Megawati’s government began by defining the 
conflict as a communal or inter-religious one, which was how other national and 
international observers saw it. Politically, this gave the government a reason – indeed an 
                                                 
17 See Gerry van Klinken, “The Maluku War: Bringing Society Back In,” Indonesia, Vol. 71 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University), April 2001. 
18 See “Setelah Poso, Konflik Ambon Juga Segera Didamaikan,” Kompas, 2 January 2002. It is 
worth to note that Jusuf Kalla played the leading role in searching for solution to the conflict. There 
was no political or administrative explanation for his key role. But, based on the media reports Jusuf 
Kalla seemed to have deep concern about the conflict more than other Megawati’s ministers and had 
particular strategy to end the conflict as he had proved in resolving the communal conflict in Poso 
(Central Sulawesi) in December 2001. According to Jusuf Kalla, President Megawati, Vice 
President Hamzah Haz and other cabinet members supported him and his team to end the conflict. 
19 Ibid. 
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obligation – to resolve the issue. It was clearly its responsibility to do so. Moreover, it 
located the responsibility for the conflict within the two communities which were in 
conflict, and absolved external political actors, including the president, members of the 
MPR and DPR and the regional bureaucracy of any responsibility.  
The government managed to view the role of Laskar Jihad and FKM/RMS, who 
were widely believed by national and international observers to have intensified the 
violence, in different light. According to Jusuf Kalla, Laskar Jihad and RMS were the 
effect rather than the cause of the violent conflict: “They existed because of the conflict 
itself”. 20  This statement was helpful not only in confining the conflict to its local 
characteristics but also in projecting that different measures would be employed. 
The second strategy carried out by the government was to end the ‘blame game’, 
which had previously prevailed. Unlike under President Wahid, where the military 
elements and regional bureaucracy were often accused of having exacerbated the conflict, 
Megawati’s administration emphasized that “the government is not asking the people to 
fight but has the obligation to bring prosperity to its people” and deliberately avoided 
attributing political blame.21  
By confining the conflict to being a communal and avoiding blaming state 
institutions and major political forces of engineering the violence, government institutions 
and other political forces were able to begin working constructively. For instance, on 11 
January 2002 the government held a special coordination meeting in Jakarta attended by 
the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
the Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, the governor of Maluku, M.S. 
Latuconsina, the Maluku regional police head (Kapolda), Farouk Muhammad, and the 
Pattimura regional military commander (Pangdam), Mustopo. Briefing media reporters 
after the meeting Jusuf Kalla said: 
 
In the meeting we discussed the necessary steps to solve the conflict in Maluku. 
We explored several options including efforts aiming to stop the conflict and 
measures to maintain security and order. These two options must be worked out 
together.22 
 
Another constructive step in resolving the conflict was a consultation meeting 
between the Ambon district DPRD and the DPR in Jakarta. This was followed by another 
                                                 
20 “Berlangsung di Malino; Kalla: Pertemuan Damai untuk Ambon, 11–12 February,” Kompas, 7 
February 2002. 
21 “Penyelesaian Konflik Maluku Digelar di Kota Malino,” Kompas, 9 January 2002. See also 
recommendations made by the Centre for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS), UGM, Membangun 
Kedamaian di Ambon: Visi dan Rekomendasi Kebijakan, 20 December 1999. 
22 “Penyelesaian Konflik Maluku, Pemerintah Jajaki Dialog ala “Poso””, Kompas, 12 January 2002. 
  
202
consultation between the DPR and government officials including the Coordinating 
Minister, Yudhoyono, the TNI commander, Widodo AS and the Polri head, Da’i 
Bachtiar.23 
With more coordinated efforts, in January 2002 Megawati’s cabinet ministers, led 
by Yudhoyono, made an official visit to Ambon. They conducted dialogues with societal, 
religious, and bureaucratic elements in order to identify the problems precisely and to 
recommend appropriate courses of action. In concluding the visit, Yudhoyono envisaged 
that it might take a nine month program in several stages to restore an atmosphere of 
tranquillity to Maluku. Jusuf Kalla announced that representatives of each conflicting party 
would be invited to participate in a peace dialogue.24 
After conducting several meetings with different parties to the conflict in Ambon, 
Jusuf Kalla brought the two conflicting groups to a peace dialogue held in Malino, in the 
district of Gowa, South Sulawesi on 11–12 February 2002.25 At this “Meeting for Maluku” 
Jusuf Kalla made a widely reported statement:  
 
There is no other choice, conflict in Maluku must be put to an end and the 
Malukan people must live in peace. If not, the Malukan people, especially the 
Ambonese, would become a pariah society, poor, and underdeveloped in all 
aspects…. Therefore, for peace, civilization, human values and for the future of 
the nation and in order to avoid Ambon becoming a pariah society, peace must be 
imposed whatever the cost.26  
 
 
Some 70 representatives of Muslim and Christian Malukans gathered in Malino. 
The peace dialogue was facilitated by the government and mediated by a mediator team 
led by Jusuf Kalla assisted by the Maluku governor, Saleh Latuconsina, South Sulawesi 
governor, Palaguna, the Kodam XVI/Pattimura commander, Mustopo, and the Maluku 
police head, Soenarko.27 A number of observers from Jakarta were also present. 
In the first day of the two day peace dialogue, the government mediator team held 
separate meetings with the delegates of the two warring groups in order to find out their 
political demands. The separate meetings were followed by meeting the two delegate 
groups together and talked about their common goals. On the second day, the two 
                                                 
23 “Walikota dan DPRD Ambon Temui Ketua DPR, Desak Pemerintah Pusat Tangani Konflik 
Ambon”, Kompas, 18 January 2002. 
24 See Kompas, 22 January 2002 
25 “Berlangsung di Malino; Kalla: Pertemuan Damai untuk Ambon, 11–12 February”, Kompas, 7 
February 2002. 
26 “Tak Ada Pilihan, Ambon Harus Damai”, Kompas, 11 February 2002.  
27 Other mediator members were the deputy governor (Paula Renyaan), the spokesman of Maluku 
DPRD (Zeth Sahuburua) and the mayor of Ambon city (Yopie Papilaya). The Coordinating 
Minister for Political and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was also associated with this 
mediator team.  
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delegations came into an agreement and signed the Moluccas Agreement in Malino 
(Perjanjian Maluku di Malino). Under this agreement the two parties agreed to end the 
conflict and all kinds of violence and to uphold the supremacy of justice in a lawful, 
stringent and honest way, impartially and supported by the whole population.28 
Commonly known as the Malino Agreement (Perjanjian Malino),29 the agreement 
was seen as formally bringing the communal conflict to an end, even though it was not a 
peace agreement. According to Jusuf Kalla: 
 
In the Malino Agreement, the two parties did not want to use the word of ‘peace’. 
It was not a problem. I sought a way around it by proposing the phrase ‘the 
cessation of conflict’. In fact, the two terms were similar.30 
 
  
The Malukan people were reported to have warmly greeted the peace agreement. 
The Crisis Centre of the Diocese of Amboina called 12 February “a day to remember”.31 
The international community also welcomed it. The US government, for example, said:  
 
The US welcomes the Indonesian government’s launch of peace talks today in 
Malino between Maluku’s Muslim and Christian communities. Such dialogue is 
key to resolving the conflict in Maluku. These talks are an important step in 
Indonesia’s efforts to end violence, re-establish the rule of law, and provide for 
reconstruction in the troubled province.32 
 
 
3. Post-Malino Agreement 
 
It was not surprising that there were several criticisms of the agreement. The first 
came from the Muslim groups, in particular the Laskar Jihad leader. Through Laskar Jihad 
Bulletin, Jaffar Umar Thalib said: 
                                                 
28 Point 1 and 2 of 11 points of Perjanjian Maluku di Malino, 12 February 2002. 
29 The Agreement was signed by the 35 Muslim and 35 Christian delegates and the observers, a total 
of one hundred signatories. The agreement was also called Perjanjian Malino II in order to show 
difference and as well continuation of Perjanjian Malino I, which was designated to end the 
communal conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in December 2001 and was also led by Jusuf Kalla. 
30 It was said in an interview in Tempo, 13 February 2005.  
The “cessation of conflict” may be similar to the term “cessation of violence” which is conceptually 
proposed by Johan Galtung as “negative peace”. On the contrary, what is called “peace” or “positive 
peace” is conceptually perceived as the removal of ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’ violence in which 
every different social group has an equal opportunity to develop and to expand. See Johan Galtung, 
Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage, 1996). 
There is no evidence which of the terms Jusuf Kalla referred to. But it is sufficient to argue that 
either Kalla or the two conflict parties emphasized more specifically on the importance of ending 
the use of violence. 
31 Bohm, Op.cit., p. 215. 
32 Indonesia: Maluku Peace Talks, Press Statement, Washington DC, 1 February 2002, as accessed 
from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/7948.htm.  
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Any reconciliation that is agreed upon to please the Christians is bound to fail. So 
what should be done instead? To put an end to the conflict in Maluku, the 
government must detain and bring to justice the provocateurs that hide behind the 
conflict…. Of course, if justice has to be done in Maluku, the Muslims themselves 
must do it. In what way? There is no other way than jihad fi sabilillah (the way of 
God)! This has been the teaching of the forefathers of our nation when they 
opposed the Dutch Christians.33  
 
 
Disagreement and dissatisfaction with the agreement was also expressed by 
several other Muslim groups. 34  These groups tried to undermine the agreement by 
questioning the legitimacy of the Muslim representatives in the dialogue, alleging that 
Muslim delegates were bribed to sign the agreement. These groups also refused to mingle 
with the Christians, preferring to live in segregation.35 
Although welcoming the peace initiative, pro-democracy and NGO activists were 
critical of the peace declaration calling it the result of a top-down and an over-simplified 
approach.36 They argued that in order to show that the government was able to solve the 
conflict, it played multiple roles in the whole process: as initiator, the government urged 
both groups to come to the negotiation table; as facilitator, the government constructed 
convergences rather than divergences between the two groups; as mediator, the 
government sought compromise on conflicting issues such as the status of FKM/RMS and 
Laskar Jihad; and as the guarantor for the implementation of the agreement.37 
The peace agreement was also criticized because it did not deal with the basic 
issues of the conflict, including the political content of the conflict and the involvement of 
the security force personnel in the violence. The government mediators seemed to 
deliberately refrain from dealing with those critical issues and also the issues of massive 
violations of human rights committed by the security force members and/or the conflicting 
groups. Asked whether the government was prepared to deal with the allegation of human 
rights violations, the head of the regional police said:  
                                                 
33 As quoted in C. J. Bohm, Op.cit, p. 216 
34 These groups included the Maluku Muslim Meeting Forum (FMMM, Forum Musyawarah 
Muslim Maluku), a Muslim women’s association (FSPB, Forum Silahturahmi Perempuan Baguawa) 
and those associated with the radio station of the Voice of Maluku Muslim Struggle (SPMM, Suara 
Perjuangan Muslim Maluku). See Ibid. 
35 Bohm, Ibid., pp. 221, 223 and 226. 
36 Interviews with Baileo activists and YLBH-Bakubae in Ambon. Similar commentaries were also 
held by other observers and activists. See for examples Ichsan Malik, “Diplomasi Perdamaian 
Malino dalam Penyelesaian Konflik di Poso dan Maluku”, Tempo Interaktif, 
http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/narasi/2004/05/06/nrs,20040506-01,id.html, 6 May 2004 as accessed on 
10 April 2005; Tamrin Amal Tomagola and Jacky Manuputty, “Fase Terbaru Konflik Ambon”, 
Kompas, 5 May 2002; and “RMS dan Laskar Jihad: Simplifikasi Penanganan Konflik di Maluku”, 
Kompas, 5 May 2002. 
37 See also Graham Brown, Christopher Wilson and Suprayoga Hadi, Op.cit., pp. 50–1. 
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I think it is better to see the security personnel to be responsible in maintaining 
security and order. There is no problem with human rights in this case. The 
military and police personnel involved in the violence had been treated according 
to the law we have.38 
 
 
 A similar explanation was also revealed by the new governor of Maluku, Karel 
Rahalalu, by avoiding the issue of human rights violations in the region.  
 
What is important now in Maluku is the law enforcement. This is the first 
condition for justice. Without this law enforcement, conflict would erupt again. 
This is my commitment, and it seems to me that the new head of regional police 
has the same commitment to enforcing the law. In regard to the allegations that the 
security force elements or political elites were involved in the violent conflict, it is 
hard to prove. So far, there is no convincing evidence.39 
 
 
Many human rights activists in Ambon held the same view that the issue of gross 
violations in Maluku was a tough one.40 On this issue one analysis argued, that violent 
events in the aftermath of the Malino Agreement were partly caused by the fact that the 
government was unwilling to publish and make public the findings of the Independent 
National Investigation Team (Komnas - KPPM) about the gross violation of human rights 
in the region during the conflict.41 
The government strategy to end the conflict in Maluku by absolving the political 
content and actors of the conflict initially brought about negative consequences. Just 48 
hours after the declaration of the Malino Agreement several bombs exploded in Ambon. 
Violent acts continued to take place in the following months and years. On 3 April 2002, 
for example, Ambon Plaza, a shopping centre and the building containing the governor’s 
office were destroyed by bomb blasts. Another case was a bomb explosion on 28 April 
2002 which caused twelve deaths and a number of injuries.42  
The Provinces of Maluku and North Maluku in the aftermath of the Malino 
Agreement, however, moved to a relatively calm situation. Most of the violence was 
intermittent and took the form of exploding bombs, grenades or molotov cocktails and, in 
some cases, shooting. In July 2002 a terrible bomb blast occurred in Mardika that injured 
fifty people. Other bomb explosions were in September 2002, killing four people, and in 
                                                 
38 Interview, in Ambon, 8 June 2004. 
39 Interview, in Ambon 18 June 2004. 
40 Interviews with activists from Bakubae Legal Aid (LBH-Bakubae) and legal practitioners in 
Ambon, 10–14 June 2004. See also “Legal Standing akan Ajukan ke HAM Internasional”, Siwalima, 
8 June 2002 and “Unus: Pelanggaran HAM Maluku Sulit Diungkap”, Siwalima, 4 December 2002. 
41 Graham Brown, Op.cit.  
42 “Lampiaskan Kekecewaan, Massa Bakar Kantor Gubernur” and “Teroris Islam Gempur Soya, 12 
Tewas, 21 Terluka, 26 Rumah Terbakar”, Siwalima, 4 and 29 April 2002. 
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January and March 2003. Shootings also frequently occurred both at sea and on land. The 
role of snipers became a public debate, partly because of their indiscriminate victims but 
mainly because of their highly skilled capacity in shooting. In assessment of these events, 
there was speculation that the snipers might be FKM members, members of radical 
Muslim groups or the security forces.43  
The date of 25 April every year is critical to the post-Malino situation in Ambon. 
On this date the “benang raja” (the RMS flag) is usually raised in order to commemorate 
the RMS anniversary.44 As happened at the event in 2001, the hoisting of the flag by gas 
balloon in 2002 spurred attacks from radical Muslim groups. In the following years the 
same event became a regular reason for the re-eruption of violence, causing more 
casualties and damage.45  
To most Christian leaders and people in Maluku, the issue of RMS was 
insignificant in perpetuating the violence. They argued that the issue of FKM/RMS was 
exploited by particular political forces to suggest FKM/RMS existed, and was strong and 
powerful.46 To the eyes of T.A. Tomagola and Jacky Manuputty, the FKM/RMS had 
neither militancy in separatism ideology and political campaigning nor organized and 
armed forces. 47   
As the new governor and the head of regional police cited above, religious leaders 
and political observers together underlined that enforcing law and order was crucial in the 
post-Malino period to bring the agreement into effect. On 20 February and again on 7 
April 2002, S.B. Yudhoyono visited Maluku to view the progress of the peace 
implementation and show support for local government and security forces in restoring law 
and order. In Ambon he said, “I ask the security force apparatus, both the military and 
police personnel, to firmly act towards any group or individual who wants to make the 
Malino Agreement failed.”48 On the same occasion, Jusuf Kalla suggested that violent acts 
in the aftermath of the Malino Agreement had no relation to the previous conflict. “Events 
in the aftermath of Maluku Agreement are acts of terror. We have to say that there is no 
more conflict in Maluku but terrorism”.49 
 
 
                                                 
43 ICG, Indonesia: Violence erupts again in Ambon, Asia Briefing, 17 May 2004. 
44 In 2001 was the first time FKM organized the RMS commemoration. FKM was created on 18 
December 2000 in responding to the arrival of Laskar Jihad in April 2000 and to inaction of the 
government to prevent them from entering Maluku.  
45 See ICG, Op.cit. 
46 Interviews in Ambon, 2 and 7 June 2004. 
47 Tamrin Amal Tomagola and Jacky Manuputty, “Fase Terbaru Konflik Maluku”, Kompas, 5 May 
2002. 
48 “Tindakan Represif Dimulai, TNI/Polri Jangan Takut Langgar HAM”, Siwalima, 10 April 2002. 
49 Ibid. 
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The government priority to prevent the resurgence of mass violence in the region 
was brought into effect by the regional security forces and local government. They 
managed to take firmer steps and became more decisive in enforcing the law. Since the 
agreement was signed, all kinds of weaponry were ordered to be surrendered to the 
security forces.50 The FKM/RMS leader Dr. Alex Manuputty was arrested on 17 April 
2002 followed by the leader of Laskar Jihad Jaffar Umar Thalib on 4 May 2002. In the 
following months the Laskar Jihad was forced to leave Maluku.  
The Malino Agreement also obliged the government to run psychological and 
social rehabilitation activities and commence reconstruction of economic and public 
facilities. Four main programs were carried out: (1) providing financial assistance for 
relatives of those killed in the conflict; (2) establishing a trauma centre for psychological 
rehabilitation; (3) handling the refugees (IDPs) inside and outside of Maluku; and (4) 
reconstructing or rehabilitating houses, mosques, churches, schools and other public 
facilities that had been destroyed or burnt to the ground due to the conflict.51 
 
 
4. Concluding Notes  
 
The Malino Agreement could be conceived of as a formal agreement to put an end 
to the almost three years of inter-religious communal conflict between Christian and 
Muslim Malukans. The agreement, however, was only reached under conditions where (1) 
the international community had no intention to undertake military intervention to bring 
the conflict to an end; (2) the conflict was firmly defined as a local communal conflict; and 
(3) the government became more consolidated and more effective in making and 
implementing decisions to solve the conflict.  
Violent acts that occurred intermittently in the post-Malino period did not 
necessarily reduce the significance of the Agreement as a domestic solution to the conflict. 
The Malino Agreement was a domestic solution because it was initiated, facilitated and 
mediated by the government. It could have been achieved following the reconsolidation 
among the government institutions at both national and regional levels and including both 
the military and civilian elites. Although, the agreement was formally an agreement 
between the Christian and Muslim community groups to cease to take violent acts, the 
agreement could also be seen as an agreement among the government institutions and 
                                                 
50 A total of 1,752 weapons, both home-made and standard, were destroyed in June 2002 in addition 
to ammunition and other explosives in the previous month. See Siwalima, 13 June 2002. 
51 See Graham Brown et al., Ibid. pp. 52–55. See also UN, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002 
for Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia, New York and Geneva, 2002. 
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major national political forces. It was only under a re-united and solid government that the 
Maluku violent conflict could be ended.  
The success of the Megawati administration to solve the communal violence 
domestically, however, was closely related to the role of the international community. In 
addition to the international views about the conflict, international NGOs, such as Amnesty 
International and ICG, and foreign governments showed constant and great support for the 
government of Indonesia to bring the conflict to an end. Instead of initiating to take the 
classical form of humanitarian intervention, the concerned members of the international 
community had decided to help the Indonesian government to be able to settle the conflict.   
 
 
C. Towards the Helsinki Peace Agreement on Aceh  
 
As with the case of the Maluku conflict, foreign countries and international NGOs 
saw that the presence of an international military force in Aceh was unnecessary. 
Recognizing that the intractability of the Aceh conflict was compounded by the fragility of 
democracy in Indonesia, but also believing that it was an Indonesian domestic affair, the 
international community in general expected a domestic solution to the three-decades-long 
armed conflict. As has been mentioned, international NGOs had argued that if Jakarta 
respected human rights and brought justice and prosperity, the conflict in the region could 
be resolved. 52  Foreign governments suggested that the successful implementation of 
regional autonomy legislation was the basic condition for ending the conflict. 53  
Nevertheless, in contrast to the case of Maluku, the international NGOs and 
foreign governments, particularly from the European Union and ASEAN, were more 
diligent and prepared to play a more active role in seeking a proper solution to the Aceh 
conflict, rather than merely encouraging the government of Indonesia. In view of the 
democratic development in Indonesia and having an interest in Indonesian stability and 
integrity, in various ways, they showed their deep concern and interest in bringing a 
peaceful solution to the conflict. As will be discussed further, the Swiss-based Henry 
Dunant Centre (HDC) and the Finnish-based Crisis Management Initiatives (CMI) played 
a significant role in bringing the Indonesian government and the GAM to the negotiation 
table. International individuals, as shown in the case of Security Joint Committee and the 
                                                 
52 See ICG, Aceh: How Not to Win Hearts and Minds, Indonesia Briefing, 23 July 2003, p. 8. 
53 EU, Indonesia Country Strategy Paper 2002 – 2006, IP/02/826, Brussels, 13 June 2002, pp. 10 
and 12. US Congressional Human Rights Caucus (CHRC) Members’ Briefing, Indonesia: Aceh – 
An Update of the Human Rights Situation, July 23, 2003, in 
http://lantos.house.gov/HoR/CA12/Human+Rights+Caucus/Archives/07-23-03+Indonesia.htm and 
http://lantos.house.gov/HoR/CA12/Human+Rights+Caucus/Briefing+Testimonies/Opening+Statem
ent+of+Rep+Phil+English.htm accessed on 7 August 2006. 
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team of wise men under the HDC negotiated frameworks were involved in finding a 
peaceful solution. International organizations, such as the European Union and ASEAN, 
and individual governments, as shown in the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, worked 
together to support peace dialogues facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) 
and to secure the implementation of the agreements reached.  
 
1. International support and initial domestic efforts  
 
Perhaps, without the assiduous international support, as many national and 
international analysts have suggested, a peaceful solution to the armed conflict was 
unlikely.54 But, it is clear that this notion was closely associated with Indonesian domestic 
politics, in which two views, and thus two political forces, differently assessed the 
possibility of the international role. On the one hand, many politicians inside and outside 
the DPR regarded the international community with suspicion. They publicly rejected any 
international intervention and frequently warned the Indonesian government not to 
internationalize the conflict since it was a domestic affair which would be resolved 
domestically. On the other hand, there were some politicians and government officials who 
saw the crucial role of the international community in bringing a peaceful end.  
Efforts to bring the conflict to an end were precisely determined by the two 
different political views. The roles of the members of the international community, 
including the HDC, CMI and the AMM, were also influenced by which of the two 
different views was dominant in the Indonesian political landscape in that time. 
 
Special autonomy    
As has been discussed in Chapter Four, one goal of the political reforms was to 
distribute the state power which was previously centralized in the hands of Jakarta central 
government. The program of decentralization or regional autonomy policy has been seen 
by many political observers as one of the key solutions to solve regional problems and in 
particular to deal with regional separatist movement. 55  Delivering more power and 
revenues to the region was crucial, “so that national integrity in social, economic, legal and 
                                                 
54 See for example Rizal Sukma, Resolving the Aceh Conflict: The Helsinki Peace Agreement, 
Background Paper 4a as accessed from 
http://www.hdccenter.org/datastore/Mediators%20retreats/Background%20Paper%204a%Aceh.doc 
and Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? Policy 
Studies 20 (Washington: East-West Center, 2005). 
55 See, for example, Rodd McGibbon, Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special 
Autonomy the Solution? (Washington: East-West Center, 2004). 
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political aspects could be preserved properly”, as stated in the National Development 
Program (Propenas 2000–2004).56  
Considering that problems in Aceh were not solely due to a separatist movement, 
but were also heavily driven by social and economic injustice, the post-Suharto 
governments and most politicians in Jakarta increasingly believed that special autonomy 
for Aceh could be a panacea. Several groups in Aceh and Jakarta, in addition to the team 
from the Ministry of Home Affairs, set to work on drafting a new law of special autonomy 
for Aceh. After almost two years of drafting, debating and compiling, the draft was finally 
passed in August 2001 as Law 18/2001 on Special Autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam (UU NAD). This new law granted Aceh more power in administrating its 
local affairs and a larger share of revenues form local natural resources. Equally important 
was the legal guarantee to implement Islamic law in the region.  
 UU NAD, however, did not reduce tension and conflict in the region. The law was 
not a direct bid for GAM to drop its claim for independence and many elements in the 
region believed the law did not sufficiently represent local aspirations and groups. Apart 
from seeing the law as leaving control in the hands of the central government, its future 
implementation was heavily undermined by the corrupt local bureaucracy and the massive 
presence of military forces in the region.57 On the mandate for implementing Islamic law, 
local human rights activists often contended that “what Acehnese really needed was 
security and justice, not an Islamic law. The Acehnese are Moslem. We do not need to be 
Islamized with such a law.”58 
 “Perhaps the law’s greatest weakness”, Rodd McGibbon suggested, “was an 
implicit provision that blocked any future political role for GAM”.59 He explained that the 
DPR which passed the law had deliberately excluded any provision for direct election of 
local government heads and the establishment of local political institutions that could 
allow GAM to participate in local political processes. 
 The implementation of the special autonomy in Aceh, however, was not 
determined solely by the good intention of the central government. Political dynamics 
around it was also influential. Prominent to this dynamics was the role of the military. In 
this context, the military continued to see the problem in Aceh as mainly separatist 
movement. With a self-claim as the guardian of national integration, the military 
                                                 
56 Bappenas, Program Pembangunan Nasional (Propenas) 2000-2004, p. 13. This program was 
then transformed to UU No.25/2000 on National Development Programs 2000-2004. 
57 Imam Budidarmawan Prasodjo, Aceh at the Crossroads, Paper presented at the opening plenary 
session of the 10th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in Philadelphia, 
USA, August 12, 2005, p. 3. 
58 Interviews with human rights activists in Banda Aceh, July – August 2004. 
59 Rodd McGibbon, Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? 
( Washington: East-West Center, 2004) p. 17-8.   
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continually saw the military solution to the problem as central. The military also 
considered that the government’s initiatives had provided GAM with space to reinforce its 
political and military strength. In addition, the military saw that the democratic 
governments in Jakarta were not only weak and failed to reduce regional unrest but also 
threatened the interests of the military both at the provincial and national levels. 
Accordingly, the military continued its counter-insurgency strategy albeit under the label 
of security and order operations. These operations undoubtedly undermined the peaceful 
and democratic efforts to solve the conflict.  
  
Negotiating the solution and the role of the HDC 
If President Habibie is remembered for his policy of referendum to solve the 
longstanding conflict of East Timor, President Wahid might be regarded as having laid the 
ground for peaceful negotiations with GAM by involving the Henry Dunant Centre 
(HDC)60 to facilitate the negotiations. 
But, as the motives of Habibie to offer a referendum were widely debated, the 
reasons of Wahid to run negotiations with GAM and to involve the HDC were also unclear. 
So far, there was no precedent in Indonesian history for conducting negotiations facilitated 
by an international NGO when dealing with a separatist movement such as GAM. In 
addition, there was a firm opinion among almost all national elements that the Aceh 
conflict was an Indonesian domestic problem that had to be solved domestically. Also 
important to note that there was a growing anti-international intervention following the 
separation of East Timor, which was widely suspected of being caused by the intervention 
of the international community. 
Perhaps, the reasons for the involvement of the HDC were mostly associated with 
President Wahid himself. He was widely known to have a broad network of contacts with 
NGOs. In addition, he had a genuine intention to resolve the conflict through non-military 
means without causing the separation of Aceh from Indonesia.61 Nevertheless, it must be 
noted that the initial initiative to be a broker in peace dialogues between Wahid’s 
government and GAM came from the HDC itself.62 
                                                 
60 The HDC is also known as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 
61 See Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed, Policy Studies 
1 (Washington: East-West Center, 2003), p. 13.  
62 Konrad Huber, The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation, 
Policy Studies 9 (Washington: East-West Center, 2004) pp. 20–23. According to Huber, having 
realized that East Timor had been already oversubscribed by other humanitarian agencies and seeing 
that Aceh conflict was more strategic than Maluku or Papua, an HDC consultant carried out an in-
depth assessment and contacts with many high-ranking government officials in September – 
October 1999, but did not make contact with the TNI senior officers including Wiranto. In 
November 1999 the HDC’s director Martin Griffiths met with President Wahid and explained the 
  
212
The initiative and/or readiness of President Wahid to invite the HDC could be seen 
as evidence that political changes within Indonesian politics, namely the arrival of a new 
president, was central to the possibility of solution to domestic conflict. Included in this 
context was the likelihood of the role of the international community in seeking solution to 
the conflict. On this issue Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch said that the election of 
erratic but reformist Wahid, a man with a philosophical commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of communal conflict, was part of the Indonesian political changes that gave a 
window of opportunity to initiate negotiations with GAM.63 
Apart from Wahid’s personal relationship with international NGOs, perhaps the 
more important reason for President Wahid to involve the HDC was the tactical 
consideration of the possibility of opposition from national politicians. First, given that the 
HDC was a humanitarian NGO, the government could put forward the importance of 
human rights protection in negotiating a reduction of violence with GAM. This rationale 
was asserted by Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab in responding to criticisms from the DPR 
members. 64 He said, “in the interest of reducing violence in the region and enabling the 
Acehnese people to live normally, the government can negotiate with everyone”. 65 
Second, by involving an NGO the government was likely to avoid the sensitive 
issue of international governmental or state intervention in domestic affairs. HDC had no 
coercive and military capacity to intervene and therefore it would be seen as less 
dangerous to the interests of the nationalist and the military elements in preserving national 
sovereignty and integrity. Furthermore, as an NGO, HDC had the flexibility and 
adaptability to be more acceptable to many national elements. 66  In responding to 
accusations that the government had internationalized the conflict and threatened national 
integration, Alwi Shihab said that the HDC-facilitated negotiations did not internationalize 
the issue and did not recognize GAM as an international actor.67 Although this response 
was not a rebuttal of the allegations, the government was likely to see that a negotiated 
                                                                                                                                       
HDC’s interest in Aceh. It was said that President Wahid was very open to the HDC’s role as a third 
party. The HDC made similar communications with the GAM leaders in Indonesia and Sweden.  
63 Op.cit. pp. 8–9. 
64 Dewi Fortuna Anwar argued that the Humanitarian Pause was “a diplomatic blunder for 
Indonesia” and Amien Rais said that the internationalization of the conflict would lead to 
disintegration. See “Soal Penandatangan tentang Aceh di Luar Negeri, DPR akan Minta Penjelasan 
Pemerintah”, Kompas, 16 May 2000; See also Kompas, 12 and 13 May 2000. 
65 See “Menlu Alwi Shihab: Kesepakatan Geneva adalah “win-win solution””, Kompas 13 May 
2000. See also his further argument in “Nota Kesepakatan RI dengan GAM di Geneva”, Kompas, 5 
May 2000; Jakarta Post, 6 May 2000 and Kompas, 8 May 2000. 
66 A general assessment about the role of NGOs in conflict resolution, see Hugh Miall et al, 
Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) pp. 37–8 and 158–62. 
67 Kompas, 5 and 13 May 2000. 
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solution to the conflict was more important for both the interests in preventing military 
solution and in refurbishing Indonesia’s international reputation.68 
The HDC-facilitated negotiations between the Indonesian government and GAM 
commenced on 24 March 2000 in Geneva and continued to 14–17 April 2000.69 A month 
later on 12 May 2000 the HDC brought the two parties to sign a “Joint Understanding on 
Humanitarian Pause in Aceh” which came into effect on 2 June. This agreement seemed to 
show that the two parties were committed to stopping the fighting and to allowing 
humanitarian assistance to the Acehnese people. This was followed by another round of 
talks held in Geneva in January 2001, which brought about a Provisional Understanding 
known as a Moratorium on Violence. 
However, President Wahid was unable to secure political support for his policy. 
The implementation of the two accords was undermined by his political opponents, notably 
by the military. On 11 April 2001 he tried to appease the military by issuing a Presidential 
Instruction (Inpres No.4/2001), which gave the military more legitimacy to crack down on 
GAM, but this did not have any effect to the negotiation prospect.70 Political condition in 
Jakarta even got worse. Wahid was not only unable to keep the negotiations to continue; he 
even failed to maintain his presidency. The peace negotiations mediated by HDC 
effectively collapsed following his dismissal on 21 July 2001. 
HDC sought to revive the negotiations under President Megawati, who had once 
promised not to allow one drop of the blood of the Acehnese people to be spilled in armed 
conflict. But the return to negotiations was also made possible by the continuing 
international encouragement for the two parties to continue the peace talks. Between 2001 
and 2003 the US and the EU ambassadors to Jakarta made well-publicized visits to Aceh.71 
After his visit Robert Gelbard, the US ambassador, asserted that it was only dialogue that 
could bring a permanent solution to the conflict. 72  The EU Council made a similar 
statement: 
 
                                                 
68 Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, Op.cit. p. 13.  
69 These formal negotiations began after a series of informal talks. These included Wahid 
conversation with the HDC officials in Jakarta and Geneva, a meeting between Indonesian 
ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Hasan Wirayudha, with GAM’s leader Hasan Tiro in 27 January 
2000 and the discussion between the acting state secretary Bondan Gunawan and the GAM’s 
military commander Abdullah Syafi’ie in Aceh on 16 March 2000. 
70 The Inpres was known as Comprehensive Measures to Resolve the Aceh Problem which covered 
political, economic, social, legal and public order, security and information and communication 
fields. 
71 “Delegasi Belanda ke Aceh”, Kompas, 2 May 2001; “Uni Eropa Dukung Dialog RI – GAM”, 
Kompas, 3 October 2001; “Para Dubes Minta Klarifikasi Pernyataan Megawati Soal Aceh”, 
Kompas, 10 April 2003. 
72 “AS Yakin Penyelesaian Masalah Aceh Hanya Bisa Lewat Dialog”, Kompas 6 April 2001. 
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The Council underlined that the only viable way to guarantee the territorial 
integrity of Indonesia is for the government to engage in a genuine dialogue with 
the provinces in order to tackle the root causes of separatism. It emphasized the 
importance of inter-ethnic and inter-regional dialogue and of successful 
decentralization.73 
 
With the introduction of a group of international dignitaries known as a “team of 
wise men”,74 the HDC facilitated new rounds of negotiations in February and May 2002. In 
this round the Indonesian government, which appeared to be more stable and united than 
under President Wahid, firmly insisted that GAM should accept Aceh integration within 
NKRI, accept the UU NAD, and lay down their arms. On the other hand, GAM asserted 
that the security conditions and an international presence to supervise a cease-fire in Aceh 
were important. These rounds resulted in an agreement on “points for further consultation”, 
which included the need for an all-inclusive dialogue leading to the establishment of an 
autonomous democratic government in 2004.75 
The May talks showed progress, with GAM reportedly accepting the UU NAD as 
a starting point for further consultation. But, the government held that the acceptance of 
UU NAD by GAM should be unconditional. 76  On 3 December 2002 a Preparatory 
Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh was held in Tokyo, cosponsored by 
Japan, the US, the European Union and the World Bank.77 This multinational forum clearly 
showed international political and financial support for the on-going dialogue. 
Negotiations continued in Geneva, where on 9 December 2002 the two parties signed a 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) concerned primarily with demilitarization 
measures. GAM was required to place its weapons in designated locations, while the 
Indonesian security forces were required to take a defensive stance.78  
                                                 
73 Council Conclusion of 14/15 May 2001 – Annex 5 of Indonesia: Country Strategy paper 2002-
2006.  
74 The team of wise men was formed by the HDC with a hope that their involvement could reinforce 
the work of the HDC. These wise men consisted of the retired US Marine General Anthony Zinni, 
the former Thailand foreign minister Surin Pitsuan, the former ambassador of Yugoslavia to 
Indonesia Budimir Loncar, former Swedish diplomat Bengt Soderberg and Lord Avebury from the 
UK. It must be noted that these internationally recognized figures took part in renewed talks as 
mediators but not as formal representatives of their respective countries.  
75 See the HDC homepage http://hdcentre.org/Aceh,%20Indonesia%20-%20Activities.  
76 Kompas, 12 May 2002. 
77 Some 16 countries and five international organizations attended the meeting and called on the 
Indonesian government and GAM to agree on a cessation of hostilities as soon as possible. They 
also agreed to provide humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation programs. Australia and Canada 
committed to fund monitoring activities, while the US, Sweden and Norway continuingly supported 
the HDC. See the HDC homepage http://hdcentre.org/Aceh.  
78 A renewed Joint Security Committee (JSC) was established to bring the agreement into effect. 
Consisted of fifty monitors from each side of the government of Indonesia, GAM and HDC, the JSC 
was led by Major General Tanongsuk Tuvinun from Thailand and Brigadier General Nogomora 
Lolodag from the Philippines who acted on behalf of HDC and not their respective countries. See 
HDC, Framework Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Summary in http://hdcentre.org/Aceh. 
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The signing of the CoHA suggested that the government of Indonesia and GAM’s 
leaders had made the reduction of armed conflict and the protection of Acehnese people 
their priority. However, this was not the case. As with the previous accords, the two parties 
were inclined to see the de-escalation of conflict and cessation of hostilities as a 
precondition for the solution of the principal issue, which was the status of Aceh. It would 
be impossible for demilitarization to take place without clear signs of the settlement of this 
substantive issue, as Aspinall and Crouch asserted: “Disagreement over a final settlement 
might have sabotaged the cease-fire negotiations – as such disagreement did in fact 
eventually sabotage its implementation”.79  
Without making the protection of the Acehnese people the top priority and without 
the substantive conflict being settled, the two parties to the conflict showed a lack of 
commitment to upholding the agreement, and the distrust between them increased. This 
made the implementation of the CoHA uncertain. 80  A few weeks after the signing of the 
CoHA each side started to blame other for violating the agreement. The two parties 
eventually returned to armed conflict. And in this situation, the government of Indonesia 
had been ready with a contingency plan: if the negotiations failed to force GAM to accept 
fully the UU NAD and drop its claim for independence, the Indonesian military would be 
deployed with the mission of cracking down on GAM. President Megawati was also 
reported to have admitted that she was employing a double-edged strategy by talking peace 
and preparing for war. “Along with the re-opening of the dialogue we are still preparing 
for a security operation in Aceh”, she said81  
On 18 May 2003, President Megawati placed Aceh under a military state of 
emergency (Kepres 28/2003). No fewer than 40,000 military troops and police were sent to 
the region, the largest military mobilization since 1975 when Indonesia decided to invade 
East Timor. With this new policy the role of the HDC ended.82 
 
 
                                                 
79 See Edward Aspinal and Harold Crouch, Op.cit., pp. 46–7. 
80 Many politicians in Jakarta saw the negotiations as pointless. The MPR chairman Amien Rais 
even made a statement disregarding the role of the HDC as a small and insignificant NGO (LSM 
ecek-ecek). See Kompas, 15 April 2003. Amien Rais was reported as saying, “I have received 
information that the HDC is a trouble-maker…. We should find a solution to the Aceh conflict on 
our own. The HDC never sided with Indonesia, only with GAM. Don’t forget the HDC chairman is 
a friend of Hasan Tiro. That is why it is impossible for the HDC to defend us [the government]”. 
See, “Just say goodbye to HDC: Assembly speaker”, The Jakarta Post, 4 May 2003.  
81 See “Indonesia talks peace, prepares for war in Aceh”, ABC News, 16 May 2003. 
82 Following the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in September 2004 
representatives of the HDC operating in Aceh, Jakarta and Stockholm tried to convene the talks by 
regularly meeting with officials from GAM and the Indonesian government. See the HDC 
homepages, http://www.hdcentre.org.  
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Emergency military law: the more effective government 
 The failure of the negotiation process to bring a peaceful and final solution to the 
Aceh conflict might have been caused partly by the weaknesses of the HDC and the CoHA. 
According to Edward Aspinall, “the HDC designed an open-ended process under which it 
was hoped the parties would identify common interests by concentrating first on ceasing 
hostilities”.83  Together with Harold Crouch, Aspinall argued that the conflict between 
GAM’s claim for independence and the government’s interest in retaining Aceh within 
NKRI was a fundamental problem that had to be resolved. The HDC, through the CoHA, 
was not only unable to resolve this issue, the framework also failed to produce an explicit 
understanding about the real meaning of the agreement that “GAM had accepted the NAD 
law as a starting point”, or to give a clear guidance to the implementation of the cessation 
of hostilities or, finally, how the demilitarization process would be carried out.84 
 Most of the reasons for the failure of the HDC and the CoHA, however, must be 
sought in the Indonesian political context under President Megawati. Although Megawati 
had said she wanted to carry on the negotiation process to settle the Aceh problem, her top 
priority was to preserve national territorial integrity. She said:  
 
 
Constitutionally, it is totally wrong to promote human rights and democracy 
outside the frame of society, nationhood and statehood. Equally, the citizens also 
have the basic duty to defend and develop the nation and state life.85 
 
  
This was in line with the military vision about the imperative of military operations to 
destroy GAM in order to preserve NKRI and to restore security in the region.86 The unity 
of vision between Megawati and the TNI undoubtedly made possible the emergence of one 
policy that would not be undermined by other political forces in its implementation. The 
policy was secured by DPR members who continually criticized the negotiations with 
GAM and asserted the need for domestic solutions to the conflict. Most politicians in 
Jakarta and the bulk of the Indonesian people showed no objection to the military 
operations in Aceh.87 
                                                 
83 This was compared to CMI process which reversed the order and relied on the formula “nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed”.  See Edward Aspinall, Conflict Analysis and Option for 
Systemic Conflict Transformation, Paper prepared for the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 
August 2005. 
84 Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, Op.cit. and also Konrad Huber, Op.cit. 
85 “President Megawati Sukarnoputri: Pemerintah Sudah Sabar”, Kompas, 21 May 2003. 
86 Kiki Syahnakri, “Darurat Militer di Aceh: Implementasi dan Prospeknya”, Kompas, 22 May 2003. 
87 The MPR chairman Amien Rais, the DPA chairman Achmad Tirtosudiro, and the chairman of the 
DPR Commission I supported the military emergency in Aceh. See, “Besok DPR Bertemu Menko 
Polkam; Komisi I beri dukungan politik soal rencana darurat di Aceh”, Kompas, 15 April 2003; 
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It is also worth noting that although foreign governments had previously 
encouraged Jakarta to continue negotiations, they apparently understood Megawati’s 
policy of placing Aceh under a state of emergency law. The position of the US, one of 
major foreign governments for the HDC to facilitate the negotiations, was particularly 
dilemmatic. On 19 March 2003 the US launched its military attack on Iraq. “This was seen 
by many military officers as providing an opportunity to renew the offensive against GAM 
in circumstances where the United States was hardly in a position to object”, Edward 
Aspinall and Harold Crouch wrote. 88  The US and the UK even apparently had no 
objections to the use of the US and the UK-made aircraft and other military equipment in 
offensive operations. The US Secretary of State Colin Powell simply said that the force 
used should not be excessive,89 while the Australian government saw it as falling within 
Indonesian domestic jurisdiction.90 
With such acquiescence from major international powers and without any 
significant objection from national political forces, the imposition of emergency military 
law in Aceh gave the government twin successes.  
First, the government was able to restore the functions of regional administration. 
Before martial law, most districts and sub-districts had been controlled by GAM. This 
administrative restoration enabled the government to restore its function as an authoritative 
decision-making institution and the protector of security for the people in the province. 
Second, the massive military deployment caused a substantial defeat for GAM in 
which many of its civilian supporters, troops, commanders and leaders were killed or 
captured. After twelve months under martial law the Indonesian security forces claimed to 
have reduced the strength of GAM by 9,593.91 The ICG Report said that the military 
operations had significantly disrupted GAM.92 Furthermore, Edward Aspinall suggested 
the battlefield losses had caused morale problems in GAM. Although, he argued, this was 
not the first time GAM had suffered losses in its long struggle: “the optimism of the 
immediate post-Suharto period was replaced by a life of great hardship, with no prospect 
that Acehnese independence could be achieved”.93 
                                                                                                                                       
“Wapres Hamzah Haz: HDC tidak efektif”, Kompas, 4 May 2003. See also ICG, Aceh: How Not to 
Win Hearts and Minds, Indonesia Briefing, 23 Huly 2003, p. 2.  
88 Op.cit. p. 42. 
89 See “Powel Sesalkan Gagalnya COHA”, Kompas, 19 June 2003; “Presiden Megawati 
Sukarnoputri: Pemerintah Sudah Sabar”, Kompas, 21 May 2003 
90 “Aceh war unlikely to hurt ties: Hill”, ABC News, 20 May 2003. 
91 Kompas, 10 June 2005. 
92 About the effect of the massive military operation to GAM, see ICG, Aceh: A New Chance for 
Peace, Asia Briefing No. 40, 15 August 2005, pp. 4–6. 
93 Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis fro Peace in Aceh? Op.cit., 
p. 9. 
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Megawati’s policy of imposing martial law in Aceh and the relative success of the 
military in destroying GAM had several implications. The first was the victory of the 
military approach over the non-military approach. The second was the political 
predominance of preserving territorial integrity above the democratization process. The 
third, in a broader context, was the revival of the military’s political role in national 
politics. Based on these implications, one analyst argued that Megawati’s policy reflected a 
kind of soft-authoritarianism which could threaten the democratization process in 
Indonesia: “The decision to place Aceh under martial law is very likely based on the 
military interest. I see that the decision is reflecting the weakness of democratic control”, 
the former secretary of Komnas HAM Asmara Nababan said.94 A similar notion was also 
put forward by a human rights activist in Banda Aceh: 
 
 
Considering the imposition of martial law as an output of political processes in 
Jakarta, it is reasonable to accept the military supremacy over the civilians in 
making the decision, although there have been huge evidence that the military 
were unable to resolve the conflict.95 
 
 
Nevertheless, what is clear from the implementation of emergency military law in 
Aceh is that under President Megawati the government apparently had regained its status 
as an authoritative decision-making institution and become more effective in implementing 
its decisions. This condition clearly contrasted with the condition under Presidents Habibie 
and Wahid, whose authority in dealing with East Timor, Maluku and Aceh was severely 
undermined by political opposition, primarily from the military.   
 
 
2. Consolidated democratic government and the tsunami factor 
 
It would have been hard to predict the prospect of the separatist conflict had 
Megawati continued in power through the 2004 election. But her political priority of 
maintaining national security and integration and the political conditions surrounding her 
presidency would suggest that the military solution would very likely have accompanied 
the implementation of the special autonomy formulated in UU NAD. Further, if there had 
been any possibility for a renewed negotiation with GAM, including the negotiation 
mediated by an international party, it would have been primarily determined by the 
                                                 
94 “Reformasi Militer Jalan Ditempat”, Kompas, 13 June 2003. 
95 Interview with human rights activist in Banda Aceh, 2 July 2004. 
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stronger position of the government, which was supported by nationalist politicians and the 
military.  
The first ever direct presidential election in 2004, however, resulted in the election 
of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (JK). This 
result changed significantly the national political configuration and made a solution to the 
conflict with a democratic and peaceful character rather than a domestic one more difficult. 
There were at least three main arguments to expect the democratic or peaceful 
solution to the conflict. First, the Yudhoyono government was more stable and had a 
broader political support. Since Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla were elected directly by the 
people instead of by the People Consultative Assembly (MPR), they could avert from 
many nationalist politicians in the DPR and MPR who tended to undermine the 
government policy. The same reason made by the new government also welcomed by the 
international community who promised closer relations and support for the 
democratization process and national integrity.96 The government stability was also related 
to the facts that (1) as a retired general, Yudhoyono was able to ensure military support for 
his presidency and policy on Aceh; and (2) Jusuf Kalla was the chairman of Golkar, the 
largest party in the DPR, and had a good relationship with major Islamic groups. 97 
The second reason that could engender optimism for a peaceful solution to the 
conflict was particularly related to their previous involvement as ministers under President 
Megawati in negotiating solutions to the conflict in Maluku. As discussed previously, 
Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla were the leading figures and were successful in bringing the 
conflicting parties to the Maluku conflict to negotiations which concluded in the Malino 
Agreement on 12 February 2002. They were able to bring this experience and commitment 
to the Aceh peace process. 
Above all, the effectiveness of policy and the possibility of a peaceful solution 
were undoubtedly based on their strong political positions. As has been discussed above, 
under Presidents Wahid and Megawati, the government policy for negotiating the solution 
to the conflict had been serously undermined by other political forces. Having become the 
highest state leaders with a strong commitment to seek a negotiated political settlement, 
Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla “were not only sponsoring a return to negotiation… They 
                                                 
96Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman of the US Secretary of State, said, “We congratulate Indonesia on 
the conclusion of its historic election this year, including the country’s first-ever direct election of 
its president… As Indonesia’s close friend and partner, the United States strongly supports the 
country’s democratic process”. See “Indonesia – Presidential Election”, Press Statement, 
Washington DC, 20 September 2004, http://www.state.gove/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36327.htm   
97 A brief but important information about the two figures, see Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki 
Agreement, Op.cit., p. 14–15. See also Tempo, 7–13 February 2005 and Rizal Sukma, Background 
Paper, Op.cit. 
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were also taking a direct interest in the negotiation process itself and …were prepared to 
explain to the public why negotiations were desirable”.98 
The strong commitment of the Yudhoyono government to a negotiated solution to 
the conflict was shown soon after he took the presidency. With the leading role of Jusuf 
Kalla, the government began to conduct secret talks with GAM leaders both on the 
battlefield (Aceh) and in exile (Sweden).99 About the government initiative one analyst 
said: 
 
Four days before the tsunami struck Aceh, former Finish president Martti Ahtisaari 
was invited by Kalla and Finish businessman Juha Christensen to facilitate 
negotiations, following an agreement for further talks between the government and 
GAM negotiators.100 
 
  
The Indian Oceanic tsunami, which devastated Aceh province on 26 December 
2004, “fostered the emergence of powerful humanitarian context within which the need to 
renew the peace process in Aceh has become more urgent than ever”.101 The tsunami also 
prompted renewed international interest in promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict, 
with various foreign leaders openly calling for a return to talks.102  
The scale of the tragedy was shown by the fact that some 200,000 people were 
killed or missing, approximately 500,000 displaced and much of the region’s infrastructure 
destroyed. 103  Domestically, such a human catastrophe created a psychological 
circumstance that apparently compelled the entire nation, in particular the government, to 
do its utmost to rescue Aceh from further disaster. This included the possibility to end 
military operations and to accelerate the negotiations.104 President Yudhoyono himself 
made the following statement: 
                                                 
98 Edward Aspinall, Ibid. p. 14. See also Rizal Sukma, Ibid. 
99 Edward Aspinall, Ibid., pp. 16–9 and ICG, Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing No. 40, 
15 August 2005, pp. 1–4. 
100 Arno Waizenegger, “Armed Separatism and the 2004 Tsunami in Aceh”, Canada Asia 
Commentary, No. 43, February 2007. 
101 Rizal Sukma, Op.cit. 
102 One analysis about the relationship between natural disaster and the potential for political 
transformation that could lead to “disaster-diplomacy” and negotiated settlement of conflict, see 
Arno Waizenegger, Op.cit. See also Edward Aspinall, Ibid. p. 20 and IGC, Op.cit., pp. 1, 5 and 6. 
The deadly wave seemed not only to prompt the negotiation to re-open but also helped lift the 
international restrictions on military assistance. See “Rebels Express Thanks for Aid to Indonesia”; 
and “U.S. and Indonesia May Restore Military Link”, The New York Times, 17 January 2005. 
103 The number of people who lost their lives caused by the tsunami varied from one source to 
another. The World Bank (2005) recorded 128,000 people dead and 37,000 missing. According to 
Arno Waizenegger the tsunami toll was 170,000. The figures from the Aceh provincial government 
were similar to the World Bank with 128,803 deaths and 37,066 missing.  
104 The former Indonesian government negotiator Wiryono Sastrohandoyo said that both the 
Indonesian government and GAM had to capitalize on the outpouring of sympathy for the Acehnese 
in the post-tsunami aftermath to reach a peaceful solution to the protracted conflict. See “Tsunami 
can boost peace prospects in Aceh”, Jakarta Post, 25 January 2005.  
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The tsunami produced an overwhelmingly moral, political, economic, social 
imperative to end the conflict…I was criticized by those who did not see any 
benefit from renewed talks with GAM. But I was more concerned about the 
judgement of history for missing this rare window of opportunity to resolve the 
conflict.105 
 
 
GAM also showed deep concern about the tragedy and announced to cease 
hostilities to allow access for national and international humanitarian workers. 
Nevertheless, according to Edward Aspinall, they also attempted to capitalize on the 
massive presence of foreign groups to increase their leverage in dealing with the 
Indonesian government.106  
Internationally, the tsunami brought Aceh into the international spotlight. About 
the international consequence of the disaster, one scholar said that after years of isolation, 
and even prohibitions on foreigners from entering, the province suddenly became the 
destination of many thousands of volunteers, both from other provinces of Indonesia and 
overseas. He added that some 250 NGOs from 50 countries arrived and operated in Aceh 
in the aftermath of the tsunami.107 
The massive and rapid influx of international humanitarian workers and foreign 
troops in Aceh became the concern of many elements in Indonesia in the following 
months.108 Apart from praising their humanitarian motives, they were doubtful that the 
Indonesian government was able to effectively coordinate the humanitarian emergency 
activities.109 There was also concern that the presence of foreign troops had hampered the 
military’s security operations, in particular in dealing with GAM. 110  But the primary 
concern, which led to national debate, was that the presence of foreign troops in the region 
had threatened national sovereignty. 111  In a meeting with the DPR, the head of the 
                                                 
105 President Yudhoyono, opening speech, “Building Permanent Peace in Aceh: One Year after the 
Helsinki Accord” conference, August 14, 2006 as cited from Arno Waizenegger, Op.cit. 
106 Edward Aspinall, Op.cit., p.20-21 
107 Imam Prasodjo, Op.cit. p. 5. See also Arno Waizenegger, Op.cit. pp. 6–7. 
108 According to the TNI Commander Endriartono Sutarto there were 3,711 military personnel from 
11 countries, see Kompas, 22 January 2005.  
109 “Politik Bencana”, Kompas, 8 January 2005 and “Curiga Pasukan Asing”, Tempo, 23 January 
2005. 
110 Due to the humanitarian emergency caused by the tsunami, the Indonesian military took an 
active defensive strategy against GAM. By this strategy, the security forces focused on securing the 
humanitarian operations. See, “TNI dan GAM Terus Kontak Tembak”, Kompas, 10 January 2005. 
According to the head of Aceh Desk of the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security, 
Demak Lubis, from 26 December 2004 to 18 January 2005 there had been several armed clashes 
between TNI and GAM causing the death of 61 GAM members. See, “Status Darurat Sipli 
Berlanjut, TNI Defensif”, Kompas, 26 January 2005. 
111 See “Tidak Ada Bule, Tak Ada Melayu”, Kompas, 6 January 2005; “Jangan Curiga”, Kompas, 9 
January 2005. 
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Indonesian Intelligence Agency (BIN) Syamsir Siregar said that foreign troops had a 
hidden agenda within their humanitarian activities such as in investigating the Malacca 
Strait.112  
In responding to this growing debate, the government decided that foreign troops 
in the region were allowed for humanitarian emergency operations only until 26 March 
2005. Asked whether Indonesia was risking the goodwill of foreign governments and aid 
groups by the restriction, President Yudhoyono explained: 
 
 
We are not restricting them to the point that they cannot properly do their work. 
What we are trying to do is coordinate, manage and protect them. After all, Aceh 
is still a conflict area. The safety and security of the international workers is the 
responsibility of Indonesia.113 
 
 
He also said that he did not see that the presence of foreigners in Aceh internationalized 
the fight for independence by GAM, because, he said, “the foreign aid organizations, 
journalists and contingents are here for humanitarian assistance. I hope they won’t have 
any interests other than humanitarian”.114 
Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and Indonesian Defence Minister Juwono Sudharsono 
also explained that three months would be enough for foreign military forces to carry out 
the humanitarian mission, while the international humanitarian workers could stay 
longer.115 Quite surprisingly, the TNI Commander Endriartono Sutarto said that foreign 
troops should be allowed to operate longer because the Indonesian military did not have 
the capacity to cope with such a devastating disaster: “I think the international presence 
should be determined not by the time but by the completion of the task,” he said.116  
 
                                                 
112 See “Kepala BIN Syamsir Siregar: Ada Agenda Tersembunyi”, Kompas, 22 January 2005; 
“Kemanusiaan Dulu, Kedaulatan Belakangan”, Tempo, 9 January 2005; and “Curiga Pasukan 
Asing”, Tempo, 23 January 2005. 
113 “We Are Very Grateful”, Time online, 17 January 2005, 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/501050124/interview.  In the interview Yudhoyono mentioned 
about the killing of the UN humanitarian workers in Atambua (West Timor) where Indonesia was 
blamed as being unable and unwilling to provide protection. 
114 Ibid. 
115 “Militer Asing di Aceh Cukup Tiga Bulan”, Kompas, 12 January 2005; See also “AS dan 
Perancis Pahami Keputusan Indonesia”, Kompas, 14 January 2005. 
116 “Panglima TNI Jenderal Endriartono Sutarto: Selamatkan Kepentingan Yang Lebih Besar”, 
Kompas, 22 January 2005. See also “Jenderal Endriartono Sutarto: Mau Rakyat Mati Hanya Karena 
Kehormatan Bangsa?” Tempo, 23 January 2005; and “Tak Ada Deadline, Tak Ada Pangkalan”, 
Gatra, 29 January 2005. The TNI Commander said that he was rather surprised with the 
government announcement because, as he said, it was his initiative to invite foreign military 
assistance due to the lack of capacity of the TNI in transportation and construction equipments.  
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While the debates about humanitarian operations and the presence of foreign 
troops continued in Jakarta, the government sent a delegate to Geneva at the end of 
January 2005 which was intended to resume negotiations with GAM. As mentioned above, 
before the tsunami devastated Aceh, the government had conducted secret talks with the 
GAM leaders in Aceh and Sweden and both had agreed to invite the Crisis Management 
Initiative (CMI) to facilitate the negotiations. Although the natural disaster helped create a 
psychological environment for the holding of negotiations, domestic political conditions 
were more influential to the resumption of the negotiation process.  
 
 
3. The role of the CMI and the Helsinki Peace Agreement  
 
The dispatch of  three of Yudhoyono’s cabinet ministers to meet with GAM leaders 
in Geneva at the time of national and international attention were devoted to humanitarian 
emergency activities in Aceh raised the questionfrom many politicians in DPR as if the 
government wanted to run the negotiations in secret. 117 These politicians continually saw 
that negotiations with GAM were unnecessary and the involvement of an international 
mediator was dangerous to national sovereignty. The critics mainly came from PDIP, 
whose leader, Megawati, was defeated by Yudhoyono in the September 2004 presidential 
election. In addition to these were nationalist politicians from Golkar and some military 
officers who firmly saw the domestic nature of the conflict and its solution.118 
In response to the allegation that the government ran the negotiations secretly, the 
Defence Minister Juwono Sudharsono explained, “For now the important thing is that the 
two parties could meet after the tsunami. This is only an informal dialogue”. An 
explanation from the Department of Foreign Affairs said that the dialogue was carried out 
under auspices of the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security. “The 
Department of Foreign Affairs is not involved in the dialogue, and the dialogue with GAM 
is not part of our diplomacy. If we [Department of Foreign Affairs] negotiate with GAM, 
we indirectly recognize GAM as an international institution”. 119  
Despite criticisms from the DPR members, the government appeared to be more 
determined to seek peaceful solution. In addition, the Yudhoyono government was in 
strong position vis-a-vis the DPR. To some degree, the president could ignore debates and 
criticisms from nationalist politicians, which he saw counterproductive to the negotiations.  
                                                 
117 They were the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security Widodo AS, the Minister for 
Communication and Information Sofyan Djalil and the Minister of Law and Human Rights Hamid 
Awaludin. 
118 See Laporan Singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR dengan Menteri Luar Negeri, 27 January 2005. 
119 “Presiden Utus Tiga Menteri”, Suara Merdeka, 27 January 2005. 
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The government’s interest in eliminating factors unconducive to negotiations was 
also demonstrated by its inviting another NGO to facilitate the dialogue. By not involving 
an individual government or an international governmental organization, the Indonesian 
government could still argue that there would not be a serious threat to Indonesian 
sovereignty. Besides arguing that the conflict had been internationalized under the 
previous governments, the government also admitted that it was extremely sensitive about 
the issue. “Indeed, we have to be careful with the internationalization”, the head of 
Indonesian negotiators Widodo AS asserted in a meeting with the Commission I of the 
DPR.120   
The renewed negotiations between the Indonesian government and GAM were 
now facilitated by the Helsinki-based NGO the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) led by 
Martti Ahtisaari.121 Unlike in the case of the HDC, the initiative to involve CMI came from 
the Indonesian government, particularly Vice President Jusuf Kalla, and after having made 
contacts with the GAM leaders based in Sweden.122 The choice of CMI and not a return to 
the HDC perhaps was based on calculations that the CMI chairman Martti Ahtisaari, a 
former president of Finland, had a lot of experience in peace negotiations in Serbia, Bosnia, 
Northern Ireland and Namibia. Although CMI was a small NGO, Ahtisaari had “access to 
high-level authorities such as the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, and the European 
Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, which proved 
invaluable at crucial phases of the talks”.123 
Coming to the renewed negotiations, the Indonesian government negotiators were 
characterized by a strong commitment to a peaceful solution, but were also backed by a 
stronger government with more authoritative power. Although there was no significant 
change within the government insistence to ask GAM to accept the special autonomy in 
Aceh as being the principle for a permanent solution to the conflict, the government 
negotiator team offered GAM the possibility of revising the UU NAD, which was passed 
in 2001, in order to accommodate the GAM aspirations. Furthermore, the government 
                                                 
120 “DPR Khawatirkan Internasionalisasi Persoalan”, Kompas, 25 May 2005. 
121 Apart from the different and more effective approach employed by CMI, the latter was also seen 
to have more strength compared to the HDC. Martti Ahtisaari had a long and distinguished career in 
negotiating peace processes in Kosovo, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Namibia. Martti Ahtisaari and 
his CMI were widely regarded as having huge competence and broad access to international 
assistance in political and financial matters needed to carry out the peace talks successfully. See 
Edward Aspinall, Op.cit., pp. 22–3 and 46–7. 
122 See Crisis Management Initiative website http://www.cmi.fi/?content=aceh_project&print1. See 
also ICG, Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing No.40, 15 August 2005, p. 2; and Edward 
Aspinall, Ibid., pp. 18–9. 
123 Edward Aspinall, Ibid. 
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proposed economic compensation and an amnesty for GAM leaders and members if they 
dropped their claim for independence from Indonesia. Nonetheless, the negotiators also 
reminded the GAM leaders of the possibility of farther military operations, if the 
negotiations failed to bring a peaceful solution. This was made by pointing to national 
politicians and the military in Indonesia who preferred domestic and military solution to 
the conflict. 
On the other hand, the GAM leaders came to the renewed negotiations with 
different political stance due to several political changes in Aceh and Jakarta. These 
changes included the humanitarian tragedy caused by the tsunami. In this sense, the GAM 
leaders announced the importance of a ceasefire for humanitarian operations and 
welcomed any initiative that would result in a formal ceasefire agreement with the 
Indonesian government.124 Although accurate information is unavailable, it is reasonable to 
believe that the tsunami also caused damage to GAM, although the Indonesian security 
forces suffered more.125 The GAM’s substantial disruption caused by the TNI offensive 
under martial law was crucial in prompting GAM to return to the negotiations. And 
changes within the Indonesian government in general and in the government’s 
commitment to the negotiations in particular were likely to have motivated the GAM 
leaders to revise their previous political stance.   
In the second round of negotiation (21-23 February 2005) the GAM leaders made 
a significant breakthrough. Bakhtiar Abdullah, the GAM spokesperson, told a reporter:  
 
The conflict cannot be solved like that [i.e., by continuing the demand for 
independence] and we have to come to terms with that…. That [self-government] 
is the main thing on the table.126 
 
 
According to Damien Kingsbury, the advisor of GAM, GAM rejected the term “special 
autonomy” because it was negatively associated with the bad practices in Indonesian 
public policies. And, it was very clear that “independence” was the one the Indonesian 
government definitely rejected. As a compromise, GAM proposed the term “self-
                                                 
124 “GAM Statement”, 1 January 2005. 
125 According to the head of Polri Da’I Bachtiar some 1400 police personnel were killed or missing. 
Kompas, 10 January 2005. Another source revealed that a total of 2,698 Indonesian security 
personnel were either killed or missing. It was also said that the TNI lost an estimated US$55 
million, and Polri US$66 million, worth of weapons and equipment. The GAM itself lost only 70 
combatants as its forces were mainly in the forests and foothills when the tsunami hit. GAM also 
suffered from devastation of supply lines and support systems in coastal areas. See Arno 
Waizenegger, Op.cit., p. 4. 
126 As quoted in Edward Aspinal, Op.cit., p. 26. 
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government” within NKRI as an impasse-breaker.127  On this change Edward Aspinall 
wrote:  
 
This was a shift of historic proportions. It was the first time that GAM had ever 
indicated that it was prepared to accept anything less than independence or a 
referendum. As such, it was widely viewed as a major breakthrough, and it made 
all subsequent progress in the talks possible.128 
 
 
The fundamental change in GAM’s position to the negotiated and possible solution 
to the long-standing conflict could be seen as partly caused by positive changes in 
Indonesia and triggered by the humanitarian tragedy caused by tsunami. But, it is also 
important to note that GAM had experienced a kind of “hurting stalemate”.129 Having been 
militarily defeated, having no meaningful support from the international community and 
considering Indonesia seemed to be moving towards a consolidated democratic 
government, move for GAM to have changed its previous position – particularly to drop its 
longstanding political claim for independence – would have been a rational choice. In this 
sense, the maximum that GAM could apparently do was to seek political concessions, 
economic compensation, and an international guarantee for their implementation. 
In order to progress the negotiations, unlike the HDC emphasizing the 
humanitarian principles and endorsing the Humanitarian Pause and Cessation of Hostilities 
as the condition for further political solutions, the CMI was to work out the solutions to the 
political conflict. This was carried out by taking the special autonomy offered by the 
Indonesian government as the basis for further solutions, which was seen as the 
implementation of the formula “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”130. On this 
situation, Martti Ahtisaari said, “the whole exercise was to find out whether Special 
Autonomy, or self-government, as GAM called it during the talks, offered enough for 
GAM to give up their claim for independence”.131  
Five rounds of talks held in Helsinki between 27 January 2005 and 17 July 2005 
finally brought the two sides into a peace agreement, the Helsinki Memorandum of 
                                                 
127 Damien Kingsbury commented the changing position as saying, “It’s huge, it’s a fundamental 
shift of position [on independence], and in itself it probably constitutes the single biggest step in the 
whole process”. See “Aceh rebels poised to drop independence bid”, ABC News, 23 February 2003.  
128 Edward Aspinall, Op.cit., p. 26. 
129 Edward Aspinall, Ibid., p. 7. The term “mutually hurting stalemate” is to describe a situation 
where the parties to a conflict find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate 
to victory and this deadlock is painful to both parties.  
130 By this formula CMI insisted on the importance of agreement on political settlement before it 
was brought into effect. This principle is seen as a reversal to the HDC approach which stressed the 
importance of the reduction of violence before the political settlement. See further Edward Aspinall, 
Ibid. and Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis, Paper, Op.cit., p. 15 
131 In Edward Aspinall, Ibid., p. 25. 
  
227
Understanding (Helsinki MoU), signed on 15 August 2005. Before the signing of the MOU, 
the chief Indonesian representative to the negotiations Hamid Awaludin said, 
 
From today, the distinctive line between “they” and “we” must be deleted. We 
have only one clear line: “we”, so together, let’s tailor our past differences to 
become a suitable outfit.132  
 
This was complemented by the GAM ‘prime minister’, Malik Mahmud, who said: 
 
We are today to end the conflict that has caused so much sufferings for the 
Achehnese people…. What we hope we have achieved with the signing of this 
peace agreement is the beginning of a process that will bring justice to the people 
of Acheh…. We now leave this historic day and embark on a great journey into a 
new and, we hope, much better future.133 
 
 
The preamble of the Helsinki MoU stated that: 
 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm 
their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the 
conflict in Aceh with dignity for all. 
 
The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the 
government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and 
democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia.134 
 
 
 The second paragraph of the MoU preamble above could be seen as the core of the 
agreement by which the previous conflicting interests that had led to the war had been 
compromised, if not fully met and resolved. The longstanding struggle for Aceh 
independence was transformed to a “government of the Acehnese people” that would be 
established based on a democratic process. On the other hand, the longstanding problem of 
the Indonesian government to fight the separatist movement in order to preserve its 
national integrity was ended with the GAM’s commitment to manifest a democratic 
government of the Acehnese people within NKRI and the Indonesian constitution. 
 The principal agreement above was spelled out in 6 main points, including (1) the 
the governing of Aceh, (2) human rights, (3) amnesty and reintegration into society, (4) 
                                                 
132 Speech by Hamid Awaludin delivered on the day of signing the Peace MOU, GOI and GAM, in 
Helsinki, 15 August 2005 as accessed from http://www/cmi.fi/?content=aceh_project&print.  
133 Statement by Prime Minister Mr. Malik Mahmud on the signing the Acheh Memorandum of 
Understanding, Helsinki, 15 August 2005 as accessed from 
http://www/cmi.fi/?content=aceh_project&print. 
134 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement, 15 August 2005, Preamble. 
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security arrangements, (5) establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and (6) dispute 
settlement.135  
 Before the signing of the agreement Martti Ahtisaari stated:  
 
This is a beginning of a new era for Aceh; much hard work lies ahead. With 
signing, both parties commit themselves not to undertake any action inconsistent 
with the letter or spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding. It is of utmost 
importance that the parties honour the commitments they have made in the 
agreement.136  
 
 
As expected the international community welcomed the signing of the peace 
agreement. The US government commended “both parties for their vision and courage to 
seek lasting peace for the people of Aceh” and looked forward to supporting the 
implementation of the peace agreement in the coming months.137 The Foreign Ministry of 
Japan also welcomed the peace accord. “It has been the basic stance of the government of 
Japan to hope that the problem of Aceh be resolved peacefully under the territorial 
integration of Indonesia”, the ministry stated.138 Australian Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer also hailed the peace deal. “I warmly congratulate the Indonesian Government and 
GAM on concluding this peace agreement. It’s an important step forward,” he said.139 
 While the international community warmly welcomed the peace agreement, the 
response of the Acehnese to the signing of the agreement was “nervous but hopeful”.140 
Major national political forces in Jakarta also responded to the agreement with mixed 
reactions. Many politicians welcomed the peaceful solution, while others remained critical 
and sceptical. As will be discussed below, all the points of the Helsinki MoU were debated 
and in particular the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement, 15 August 2005, points 1–6. 
136 Statement by President Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman of the Board of Crisis Management Initiative, 
former President of Finland and facilitator of the Aceh peace process, in Helsinki on 15 August 
2005, accessed from http://www/cmi.fi/?content=aceh_project&print 
137 Indonesia – Aceh Peace Accord, Press Statement, Washington DC, 15 August 2005 as accessed 
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138 “Japan welcomes Aceh peace accord, offers help”, Kyodo News International, 16 August 2005. 
139 See “Australia Welcomes Signing of Aceh Peace Agreement”, Media Releases FA102, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Australia, 15 August 2005. 
140 In “Signing Accord, Indonesia and Rebels Hope for Peace”, The New York Times, 15 August 
2005. See also “AMM: Hentikan Kekerasan di Aceh; Warga Aceh Bersikap Biasa Saja”, Kompas, 
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4. Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and the Post-Helsinki Agreement 
 
 That the Helsinki MoU stated that the two parties had agreed to set up the 
governing of the Achenese people within the NKRI and UUD 1945, it suggested that the 
implementation of the agreement would be determined by the dynamics of Indonesian 
domestic politics. This had been the spirit of the peace agreement on which the 
government attempted to convince its critics. Therefore, the lasting peace solution to the 
Aceh conflict would depend greatly on the interactions among the government, major 
national political forces primarily the DPR and the military, and the Acehnese elements 
including the GAM.  
 Since the government had recommenced the negotiations, politicians in the DPR 
had been critical about three issues. The first was the way the government conducted the 
negotiations. They criticized the government for being non transparent. “The process was 
closed; the public was unable to know, whereas in fact this is about public policy”, a 
member of the DPR contended.141 One of the DPR members even said, “If the government 
remained closed, Aceh could be released as was the case of East Timor”.142 For these 
reasons, the DPR had asked the government to halt the negotiations with GAM.143 
The second issue was the legal status of the negotiations and the agreement. As has 
been discussed, many politicians were very sensitive about the issue of internationalization. 
Regarding such fear Jusuf Kalla asserted:  
 
 
The Aceh problem is a domestic problem which is resolved overseas. So, the MoU 
between Indonesia and GAM is not an international agreement, because GAM is 
not a state. This is an agreement between our fellow nationals.144  
 
 
 The third issue related to the content of the MoU. However, since the agreement 
and its implementation were mostly related to Indonesian domestic politics, this debate is 
not discussed here. One part of the content that needed to be discussed further is the role of 
the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). This is particularly important because it was widely 
debated in Indonesian national politics; but, more importantly, the role of the AMM is 
central to the problem examined in this research. 
 According to the Helsinki MoU, the Indonesian government and GAM agreed to 
the establishment of an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which “will be established by 
                                                 
141 “DPR Minta MOU Dijelaskan”, Kompas, 23 August 2005. 
142 “Jaga Keutuhan NKRI; MOU RI-GAM Dikhawatirkan Menjebak”, Kompas, 14 August 2005. 
143 “Anggota Komisi I DPR Kecewa Pemerintah Lanjutkan Perundingan Babak Kelima”, Kompas, 
11 July 2005. 
144 Kompas, 6 August 2005 and 7 September 2005. 
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the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries with the mandate to monitor the 
implementation of the commitments taken by the parties”.145 Before signing the MoU, on 
12 July 2005, the government of Indonesia had sent an invitation to the European Union 
and ASEAN to participate in the AMM to assist Indonesia in implementing the final 
agreement on Aceh. On 18 July 2005, the Council of the European Union agreed that the 
EU was prepared to provide observers to monitor the implementation of the MoU.146 On 9 
September 2005 the Council established an “European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh 
(Indonesia)’, named the ‘Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)’ with the mandate pursuant to 
the Helsinki MoU.147 
 Many politicians in Jakarta were very critical for the government of agreeing to the 
formation of the AMM. They feared that the AMM would internationalize the Aceh 
problem and that the AMM had a hidden agenda. DPR spokesperson Agung Laksono put 
forward: “We don’t want the internationalization of the Aceh problem. The DPR warned 
us to be alert to the hidden agenda of foreign parties”.148 There was also anxiety about the 
AMM’s authority in its actions and control of operations without the government of 
Indonesia having a veto.149   
In responding to those criticisms and fears, President Yudhoyono said,  
 
There is no reason to be worried. Aceh will not be separated from NKRI. And 
there is no space for foreign intervention including by the UN. Aceh is our 
sovereign territory. We don’t need to worry as it happened in East Timor. East 
Timor was like that because it was taken over by the UN. In Aceh, there is no any 
party who takes over its resolution.150  
 
 
Previously, Vice President Jusuf Kalla had stated that the government approved the 
presence of foreign monitors in Aceh because the GAM demanded it.151 About the AMM’s 
                                                 
145 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh 
Movement, 15 August 2005, point 5.1. 
146 Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP, 9 September 2005, point 3, 4 and 5.  
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Ditawar; Presiden: Kita Akan Bela dan Pertahankan Hingga Akhir Hayat”, Kompas, 15 August 
2005. 
151 See in Edward Aspinall, Op.cit., p.36. 
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power, he said that the AMM had the credibility and professionalism needed to carry out 
its tasks.152  
While the TNI Commander said that the controversy did not have any impact on 
the military, the Aceh regional military commander, Supiadin, made it clear that “The 
politics of the TNI is the politics of the state. Whatever the policy made by the political 
authority, there is no reason for the TNI to reject it”.153 
So far, there had not been any rejection of the AMM, even though DPR members 
remained critical. This led to a condition where the AMM could carry out its mandates. For 
around 17 months, the AMM operated without resistance from Indonesian political 
elements. 154  This was because of AMM commitment, credibility and professionalism. 
Asked by reporters whether Aceh would become the second East Timor, the head of the 
AMM Pieter Feith asserted: 
 
This is different. The AMM is not authorized by the UN. Its mandate is from the 
EU. And the EU was not involved in East Timor. Unlike East Timor, Aceh will 
not be separated from Indonesia. I can guarantee it.155 
 
He also said that the AMM had no hidden agenda. “Indonesia has to be strong, united and 
sovereign under the NKRI”. This statement was in accordance with the EU’s policy in 
establishing the mission, namely it respected “a united, democratic, stable and prosperous 
Indonesia” and “the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia”.156 As for ASEAN, 
ASEAN and its individual member countries had no interest in intervening in Indonesian 
domestic affairs.  
It has to be noted that formally the AMM was not the party to the Helsinki MoU. 
The parties to the peace agreement were the Indonesian government and the GAM. The 
agreement set out that the government of Indonesia and GAM agreed on the AMM which 
was “established by the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries with the 
mandate to monitor the implementation of the commitments taken by the parties in this 
                                                 
152 Kompas, 16 and 30 August 2005. The Defence Minister Juwono Sudharsono also said that the 
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156 Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP, 9 September 2005, point 2. 
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Memorandum of Understanding.”157 Therefore, the establishment was formally based on 
an invitation sent by the Indonesian government to the EU on 12 July 2005.158  
The decision to invite the EU and ASEAN countries to form the AMM was clearly 
contradictory to Indonesia’s longstanding position of not allowing foreign governments to 
intervene in Indonesian domestic affairs. It was also clear that the government was 
inconsistent in its arguments. The Helsinki MoU was not an international agreement, as 
Jusuf Kalla asserted, but the agreement did clearly demand that foreign countries monitor 
its implementation. If the government had not invited the EU and ASEAN countries, the 
implementation of the peace agreement would have been highly uncertain. 
Even further, the decision was also one of the foundations of the peace agreement; 
without the Indonesian government approving GAM’s demand for the presence of foreign 
monitors, GAM would have been very unlikely to sign the Helsinki MoU. According to 
Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, the decision was constructive for Indonesian foreign 
policy in general and in resolving the Aceh conflict in particular. He said that the modified 
decision was related to the changing global realities and particularly to the lessons drawn 
from the arrival of foreign troops in Aceh in the aftermath of tsunami. He further explained: 
 
Similar to a peace-keeping mission, Indonesia has accepted the presence of the 
AMM consisting of experts from the EU and ASEAN. The AMM team is to 
monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between the GAM and RI.159  
 
Unlike in the case of the conflict resolution in Maluku where the government 
consistently rejected foreign intervention, unlike in the case of East Timor where the 
government was severely pressured to accept INTERFET, in inviting the AMM the 
Indonesian government seemed to be acting autonomously. This is not to deny the 
international encouragement for the Indonesian government to return to peace negotiations. 
The point is that the Indonesian government was better prepared for the international 
involvement in seeking a peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict. Hassan Wirajuda said: 
“This means that we don’t need to be too suspicious and defensive. We have to use our 
freedom to maintain peace, for confidence-building, to be problem solver and to develop 
international communication”.160 
The increasing autonomy of the Indonesian government, which was specifically 
shown by the strong and consolidated power around the President and Vice-President, 
                                                 
157 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding point 5.1. See also Council Joint Action 
2005/643/CFSP, 9 September 2005, Article 1.  
158 Ibid., point 3. It was said that the Indonesian government sent a similar invitation to the ASEAN 
countries Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
159 “Kebijakan LN Harus Diredisain”, Kompas, 19 August 2005. 
160 Ibid. 
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contributed significantly to the tasks allocated to the AMM in its monitoring of the 
implementation of the Helsinki MoU.161 Nevertheless, the AMM was powerful. Unlike in 
the case of CoHA where the Joint Security Committee acted on behalf of the HDC and its 
members did not represent their respective states, the AMM was authorized by the EU and 
funded by the EU, five country members of ASEAN, Norway and Switzerland. “AMM is 
not a NGO, but a joint mission of the EU and five ASEAN country members which have 
experience in monitoring peace processes in a number of countries”, Pieter Feith 
asserted.162 In this sense, the AMM had more powerful support that enabled it to fulfil its 
mandate. 
Theoretically the role of AMM could be categorized as a peacekeeping mission, as 
Hassan Wirayuda claimed. It was formed and deployed after a peace agreement had been 
achieved by the Indonesian government and GAM. It was a non-military form of 
humanitarian intervention in conflict.163  AMM was a civilian and not a military mission. 
Its monitor members did not carry weapons, although some of them had a military 
background.164 According to the Helsinki MoU, the AMM carried out military functions 
(particularly in decommissioning of the GAM armaments and in monitoring the relocations 
of the TNI), political functions (particularly in monitoring of the process and the issuing of 
the Law on the Governing of Aceh) and humanitarian functions (in monitoring the human 
rights situation and facilitating the reintegration of GAM members).165 
Under the AMM the Indonesian military and the GAM fulfilled their commitment. 
The Indonesian security forces had relocated the non-organic troops and left the region 
with the maximum strength as required by the MoU, while the GAM had decommissioned 
all their armaments. 166   In the meantime the Indonesian government had fulfilled its 
commitments to enact the Law of the Governing of Aceh and other commitments 
regarding the amnesty and economic compensations.167 
                                                 
161 Before the AMM commenced its mission Pieter Feith said that the leadership of the president 
and vice president would affect the implementation of the AMM’s tasks. Kompas, 16 August 2005.  
162 Kompas, 24 August 2005. 
163 Additional principles for this form of non-forcible humanitarian intervention are the impartiality 
and the voluntary contributions of countries in forming the mission. See Oliver Ramsbotham and 
Tom Woodhouse, Op.cit. pp. 123–8.   
164 http://www.aceh-mm.org. 
165 See Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding and in http://www.aceh-mm.org. See also “Speech 
by AMM Head of Mission, Pieter Feith, on the occasion of the last TNI departure ceremony”, 29 
December 2005; AMM Press Statements on 12 May 2006 and 14 November 2005. 
166 By the end of December 2005, GAM had decommissioned all of its 840 weapons and the 
military had relocated 31,681 non-organic military and police from Aceh. See the AMM homepage 
http://www.aceh-mm.org. Non-organic troops are usually associated with the Special Force 
Command (Kopassus), Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), and the mobile-brigade of 
police (Brimob) 
167 See the AMM homepage http://www.aceh-mm.org. See also, CMI, Building Peace in Aceh; 
Observations on the work of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and its liaison with local civil 
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5. Concluding notes: 
 
The discussion above suggested that there were several factors that enabled the 
solutions to the Aceh conflict to be found without the presence of foreign military force – 
except for the AMM framework. More than just the absence of international military 
intervention, the solution to the conflict in Aceh was clearly marked by its democratic and 
peaceful characteristics. However, the whole process that had brought the Indonesian 
government and GAM to a peace agreement and had created a peace situation in Aceh 
would be hard to be characterized as a domestic solution in the strictest sense, as many 
nationalist politicians and military officers in Jakarta demanded. 
The continuing interest of the international community in supporting Indonesian 
territorial integrity and the democratization progress was the first main factor which not 
only encouraged the GAM to retreat from its claim for independence from NKRI but 
considerably boosted the confidence of the Indonesian government to solve the conflict 
based on Indonesian political dynamics. The involvement of the CMI in mediating the 
peace negotiations between the Indonesian government and GAM and the role of AMM in 
monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement were clear evidence of the 
international role in resolving the Aceh conflict. Although the role cannot be categorized 
as a military intervention for humanitarian purposes, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
peaceful resolution to the conflict was made possible by the involvement of the 
international community particularly the CMI, EU and ASEAN member countries.  
Political progress in Indonesia was the second main factor which made the 
initiative to solve the Aceh conflict workable and reasonable. The growing consolidation 
of the central government made producing effective policy more feasible as shown by the 
imposition of martial law under President Megawati. But the emergence of President S.B. 
Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla enabled the peaceful negotiations to be the 
means of solving the conflict. Yudhoyono and Kalla were strongly committed to a 
negotiated solution to the conflict. They had the political power to ensure its success. More 
importantly, they used the power effectively in both domestic and international areas. 
Domestically, the government had effectively eliminated political resistance, suspicions 
and fears so that they could secure the negotiation process and reach the peace agreement. 
                                                                                                                                       
society (Finland, n.d.); and ICG, Aceh: So Far, So Good, Asia Briefing No.44, Jakarta/Brussels, 13 
December 2005. See also the ICG subsequent briefings and report: Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, 
Asia Briefing No.48, 29 March 2006; Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report No. 
117, 31 July 2006; and Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh, Asia Briefing No. 61, 22 March 2007. 
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Internationally, the government confidently and cooperatively invited the CMI to facilitate 
the peace negotiations and invited the European Union and ASEAN to form AMM to 
ensure the implementation of the peace agreement.  
 
 
D. Final Notes (for the two cases) 
 
 The international community played different roles in the resolutions of the 
conflicts in Maluku and Aceh, even though they tended to see the two internal conflicts in 
the same general light. They saw the perpetuation of the violent conflicts as closely related 
to the process of democratization in Indonesia. They also believed that the conflicts were 
Indonesian domestic affairs and expected their resolutions to domestic too. 
In the resolution of the Maluku conflict, the role of the international NGOs such as 
HRW and ICG and foreign governments appeared to be consistent with their views. Apart 
from providing humanitarian aid for the people affected by the conflicts, the roles were 
mostly those of encouraging the Indonesian government to be more decisive in bringing 
the conflict to an end. The official visits by the EU delegation and foreign representatives 
from Jakarta to the conflicting region were mostly to suggest that foreign intervention in 
the region was unnecessary and would even jeopardize the democratization process. 
Realizing the conflict was aggravated by the elements of Indonesian security forces, HRW 
and ICG, for instance, asked foreign governments to help the Indonesian security forces to 
improve their capability and performance. Practically, this meant placing the solution of 
the conflict in the hands of the Indonesian government and security forces. 
In the case of the resolution to the Aceh conflict, the international community 
played more active roles. Foreign governments and international NGOs not only 
encouraged the government of Indonesia to seek and to return to peace negotiations with 
GAM. The HDC took the initiative of facilitating the peace dialogues. The CMI later 
mediated the negotiations which led the two parties to sign the Helsinki peace agreement. 
Furthermore, the EU and ASEAN established the AMM to monitor the implementation of 
the agreement. 
The roles of the international community in the two cases, however, were limited 
in the sense that the roles did not meet the form of military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes that took place in East Timor. The limited roles were obviously determined by 
the international perceptions about the two conflicts, but they were also determined by two 
principal changes within Indonesian domestic politics: ongoing democratization and 
gradual political reconsolidation.  
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Within the democratization process, about which the international community 
showed more interest than in directly resolving the conflicts, President Wahid sought to 
solve the communal conflict in Maluku. He also initiated peaceful dialogues with GAM by 
inviting the HDC to solve the Aceh conflict. However, the facts showed that a democratic 
government and peaceful initiatives alone were inadequate to solve the conflict. Coming to 
power with a broader political base and support from the military, President Megawati, in 
just half a year, brought the two conflicting parties to the Maluku conflict to a peace 
negotiation which concluded in the Malino peace agreement.  
 The continuing reconsolidation of the government under President Megawati 
enabled it to be more effective in seeking a solution to the Aceh conflict. Her placing Aceh 
under a state of military emergency not only had political support from the DPR and the 
military but also significantly reduced the GAM’s military strength and political influence. 
This policy, however, made pro-democracy elements and foreign democratic government 
anxious about the future of national democratization and human rights principles. 
 The democratic solution to the conflict in Aceh took place under President S.B. 
Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Directly elected by the people, having had 
experience in peacefully settling the Maluku conflict, and having broader political support 
from the military and the DPR were sound initial conditions for negotiating a peaceful 
solution. In addition to these were the substantial reduction of GAM’s strength caused by 
the massive military operation under President Megawati and the psychological impetus 
generated by the tsunami disaster.   
The strong position and firm commitment of Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla in 
seeking a peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict was accompanied by their realization of 
the importance of international support. They invited the CMI to mediate negotiations with 
GAM and signed the Helsinki peace agreement. While they made every effort to convince 
national political elements that the agreement was workable, they invited the EU and 
ASEAN to send in the AMM in order to secure its implementation. Two years after the 
signing of the Helsinki MoU, the solution to the Aceh conflict was not only achieved 
peacefully but also helped to preserve Indonesian territorial integrity (NKRI).  
 
====== 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis has focused on international humanitarian intervention, defined here as the 
threat or use of military force by states or an international organization for the purpose of 
protecting the people of the target state from widespread deprivation of internationally 
recognized human rights. This is one of the most controversial issues in the fields of 
international relations and conflict resolution studies. Much of the controversy resolves around 
the central question of the circumstances under which such interventions take place, when the 
international community is faced with a situation where the lives of a large number of people 
have been lost or where many others are at risk. What is at stake here are the traditional 
principles of non-intervention in the affairs of states and national sovereignty, which continue to 
be seen as the foundations of the international political order. International humanitarian 
intervention is also controversial in regard to the use of military force in order to put a halt to 
humanitarian tragedy resulting from armed conflict, communal violence and gross violation of 
human rights.  
The cases proposed in this research are related to these controversies. However, it was 
the difference in the responses of the international community to the violent conflicts in East 
Timor, Maluku and Aceh that chiefly inspired this research. Whereas the United Nations and 
major international powers agreed to the sending of a multinational force to East Timor 
(INTERFET) with the main task to restore order and security in the region, they refrained from 
taking similar step in the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh. 
Considering the humanitarian values of humanitarian intervention and considering that 
the conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh were in many respects similar, it was reasonable 
to expect that the United Nations, major foreign states and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) would have acted in the same way. The similarities included the fact that 
the escalation of violence in the three regions was closely associated with the political 
circumstances prevailing in Indonesia following the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. 
The three conflicts were also similar in the sense that they caused large scale loss of life and 
hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. And more importantly, they were similar 
in the sense that the post-Suharto governments had failed to put those regions under control and 
to end the conflicts immediately. 
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The different responses of the international community to the three conflicts could have 
been caused by imprecision in the application of the principles of international humanitarian 
intervention. Or, they might be a reflection of different interpretations of the controversies 
surrounding international humanitarian intervention. Consideration of these aspects directed this 
research to examine the international domain of humanitarian intervention. This was done by an 
in-depth investigation of the factors moving a state or group of states to use military force. These 
factors I characterize as the push factors: ones which might make states feel they are compelled 
to act. 
The different international responses to the cases of East Timor, Maluku and Aceh could 
also have been caused by the political circumstances prevailing in the domestic domain in 
Indonesia when each crisis erupted. The introductory chapter and then Chapter Three and Four 
elaborated that, politically, the early post-Suharto period were characterized by paradox. On the 
one hand, there were week governments which seemed incapable of maintaining order and at 
times appeared to be on the verge of collapse. On the other hand, there were growing 
expectations from both within the state and internationally that the governments would be 
forceful in establishing a state which was democratic and respectful of the people’s lives and 
other basic rights. These domestic circumstances might be more influential in determining the 
different international responses than the factors external to the state. The factors included in this 
domestic domain are categorized in this research as pull factors. 
This research focused on three specific questions. The primary question was: why were 
foreign governments and the international organization prepared to send military force to East 
Timor but declined to intervene militarily in the conflict in Maluku and Aceh? This was 
followed by two further questions: to what extent can the different international responses to the 
crises be explained by reference to Indonesia’s domestic politics? and: how were the conflicts in 
Maluku and Aceh ultimately resolved, if not through international humanitarian intervention?  
To answer those questions, I have explored a number of key theories and concepts, as 
presented in Chapter Two. As noted above, the use of military force for humanitarian purposes is 
generally considered to be justified under certain prescribed conditions. The justification is 
primarily founded on international morality, ethics, human rights law and the emergence of the 
kind of a solidarist international system. Respect for human rights is seen as the basic condition 
for international peace and security. Accordingly, it is widely argued that the United Nations, 
which has broad responsibility for international peace and security, in principle has the 
legitimacy to authorize the use of military force to end existing or prevent imminent grave, large 
scale violations of fundamental human rights irrespective of their national location or the 
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nationality of their perpetrators. Nevertheless, other theories recognize that humanitarian 
intervention is not always motivated solely by humanitarian values. The self-interest of 
individual states in economic, political and security fields is also often decisive in determining 
whether humanitarian intervention will take place. The presence of both of these humanitarian 
and non-humanitarian motives makes humanitarian intervention very likely to happen. The 
absence of one of them makes humanitarian intervention less likely. This condition ultimately 
makes humanitarian intervention a very contentious concept. 
Instead of focusing on the international motives that could justify the use of military 
force abroad, however, I deliberately focus on humanitarian crises with which the use of force is 
proposed.  
As a means of framing my consideration of these international issues, in this thesis I 
have made extensive use of the guidelines proposed by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS suggested that for humanitarian 
intervention to be justified it must meet the threshold criterion (which involves a conscience 
shocking situation marked by a large scale loss of life) and precautionary criteria (which include 
that the military intervention has to have a right intention, right authority, prospect of success, 
and has to be as the last resort and used proportionally). These two sets of criteria make it clear 
that the use of military force for humanitarian purposes not only has to be justified (in terms of 
its being intended to halt people’s suffering) but also has to be feasible in the sense that the 
intervention is able to meet its humanitarian objectives. 
In determining whether the use of military force can be justified and is feasible, the pull 
factors of the state where the humanitarian crisis occurred are likely to be decisive. This is the 
theoretical basis for my hypothesis that the international military intervention in East Timor 
(INTERFET) was primarily caused by a condition where Indonesia at that time was for all 
intensive purposes a failed state, while international intervention did not occur in Maluku and 
Aceh because Indonesia steadily showed signs of democratization and consolidation. 
Furthermore, these domestic developments not only made humanitarian intervention in Maluku 
and Aceh unnecessary but were also crucial to the peaceful and domestic solutions of the 
conflicts.  
Since the different international responses have been investigated and the resolutions to 
the three cases of internal conflicts have been discussed throughout the analytical chapters, this 
chapter draws several conclusions that address the three research questions and confirms the 
hypothesis sketched out in the theoretical chapter. 
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The international intervention in East Timor through INTERFET seems to have met all 
the criteria to justify the deployment of thousands of foreign troops in the region. In the first 
place, the UN Security Council Resolution 1264/1999 provided formal, legal justification. 
INTERFET was intended to provide protection for the East Timorese people and foreigners from 
massacre and acts of terror launched by pro-integration supporters. The intervention was 
necessary because the Indonesian security force elements had also been involved in arming and 
directing pro integration militias instead of responsibly maintaining order and security. Related 
to this fact was that the Jakarta government was unable to control the security forces. In such a 
circumstance, the use of military force in the region was morally, ethically and legally justified. 
That nearly a thousand of people had lost their lives, the Indonesian security forces were 
unwilling to maintain order, and that the central government had failed to control the situation 
created a condition that could meet the threshold criterion for humanitarian intervention. What is 
also important to note is that at that time, the government was very week, the major national 
political forces were fragmented and there was no meaningful resistance to international 
intervention. These weaknesses enabled the intervention to succeed. And this success completed 
the justification of INTERFET. 
However, it is important to note that the multinational force was not deployed in the 
region until after nearly a thousand of people had been massacred, and what is more striking, the 
decision to establish INTERFET was made only after the Indonesian government gave its 
consent to such intervention.  
The theoretical framework of humanitarian intervention used in this thesis does not 
require consent from the state concerned. Still, the Australian and the US governments, as the 
leading members of the international community regarding the issue of East Timor, made it clear 
that the sending of an international peacekeeping force to the region not only had to be 
authorized by the UN but also required Indonesia’s consent. As stated in the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1264/1999, the establishment and the sending of a multinational military 
force in East Timor (INTERFET) was made only after the UN had accepted the Indonesian 
government invitation for the UN to send in the peacekeeping force to the region. That Indonesia 
at last gave its consent, was the result of fragile circumstances at both the national and 
international levels. Nationally, the central government had failed to get a commitment from the 
security forces to restore order and security in East Timor. Furthermore, the government, which 
was strongly dependent upon international support, was under heavy pressure and even threats of 
suspension of financial aid and allegations of crimes against humanity, if the UN intervention 
was not agreed to. 
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The requirement of Indonesia’s consent for INTERFET raised concern about the role of 
Indonesia’s domestic politics in the decision to send INTERFET. From the outset of political 
reform process in Indonesia, the US, the European Union and Australia not only welcomed the 
reform but also played a significant role in supporting and securing the democratization process. 
Leading members of the international community, including those major countries, saw that 
political developments in East Timor were part of the democratization process in Indonesia. The 
international community was of the view that this democratization needed to be encouraged. 
Accordingly, there was a common perception that the international military intervention to end 
violence in East Timor should not jeopardize the democratization process in Indonesia.  
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Auckland, where the US, Japan, 
Australia and ASEAN were the key participants, was prominent in constructing the view that an 
international peacekeeping force in East Timor was necessary and that it was aimed at helping 
Indonesia to restore peace and security there. This view was spelled out in efforts to convince 
the Indonesian government and major political forces in Jakarta that the presence of international 
troops in East Timor would not destabilize Indonesian democratization and jeopardize 
Indonesia’s territorial integrity.  
The interest of the leading members of the international community in not disrupting 
democratization in Indonesia was likely at the expense of the humanitarian values of 
humanitarian intervention. However, what the delay in making a humanitarian intervention in 
East Timor was more likely to show was that the moral and ethical principles or the threshold 
criterion of a justified intervention had to be considered equally with other principles such as the 
authorization by the UN and the prospect that intervention would achieve what it set out to do.  
From the case of international humanitarian intervention in East Timor, three main 
conclusions could be drawn: first, there had been conditions in East Timor such as a 
humanitarian crisis, weak government and fragmented major political forces which together 
made the international humanitarian intervention in the region justified and successful. Second, 
the leading members of the international community required that deployment of a foreign 
military force in the region had to have Indonesia’s consent. This consent was required because 
it was in the interest of the US, the UK and Australia to allow the democratization process in 
Indonesia to progress. Third, Indonesia’s domestic politics were crucial not only in justifying 
INTERFET but also in delaying the implementation of the humanitarian intervention in East 
Timor.  
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The absence of international intervention in the cases of Maluku and Aceh – on the 
surface at least, similar to the case of East Timor – was a challenging issue for the international 
community. The humanitarian conditions in those two regions were no less tragic than in East 
Timor. As has been proposed, comparing the root causes, the dynamics and the effects of the 
violent conflicts in those two regions with East Timor, their situations prima facie would have 
justified humanitarian intervention.  
All this notwithstanding, no members of the international community ever called for the 
UN or any individual states to use military force in order to halt or avert human suffering in 
Maluku and Aceh. Although religious leaders and human rights activists in the two regions had 
made appeals for the intervention of the UN or the EU to help resolve the conflicts, international 
NGOs such as Amnesty International and International Crisis Group (ICG) asserted that 
international intervention in Maluku would destabilize Indonesia. Other members of the 
international community such as the US and the EU also argued that the progress in 
democratization process in Indonesia was the key to end the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh. 
The no individual states or international organizations had any intention to use military 
force to stop the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh was based on perceptions that the 
violent conflicts were chiefly triggered and/or exacerbated by the ongoing process of 
democratization in Indonesia, that the conflicts were Indonesia’s domestic affairs, and that 
solutions had to be sought domestically. Perceptions of the international community of the 
domestic nature of the conflicts and possible domestic solutions clearly demonstrated that the 
Indonesia’s political dynamics were central in prompting the international community to respond 
to the two cases differently to the case of East Timor. 
In relation to the international perceptions, when communal violence was escalating and 
perpetuating, there were two significant changes within Indonesia’s domestic politics. The first 
was a growing anti-international intervention sentiment and the second was the continuing 
development of democratization. It has been suggested that a humanitarian intervention is not 
justified if the intervention triggers a larger conflict or if the consequences of the intervention 
were likely to be worse than without intervention at all. In this sense, it can be concluded that 
changes within Indonesian politics led to a common view that the crises in the two regions 
should be resolved within the democratic progresses in Indonesia rather than by international 
intervention. 
To some degree, the dynamics of national politics at the outset of reformasi era were 
central to the intractability of the conflicts in the three regions and also to their resolutions. In the 
early years of reformasi, the central government, as presented in Chapter Four, was very weak, 
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to the point of being virtually unable to govern the country. While the traditionally strong 
political forces such as the military and Golkar were under political pressures to abandon their 
privileges inherited from the New Order regime, other main political parties and individual 
leaders were fervent in their struggle for power. In the first place, the weak government and 
fragmenting major political forces had allowed communal violence in Maluku to perpetuate and 
armed conflict in Aceh to intensify. The conflicts had gradually worsened because elements of 
the security forces and political elite had obstructed every effort to solve them.  
In the case of East Timor, the international intervention in the region was without 
meaningful resistance, including from the military, nationalist politicians and the people at large. 
This fragmentation among the government institutions and major national political forces had 
not only exacerbated the regional conflicts but also reduced significantly national resistance to 
the international intervention. The situation contributed greatly to the success of INTERFET. 
Nevertheless, reformasi also showed some positive changes. Reformasi originally 
expressed a national expectation for a political reform and was gradually more closely associated 
with democratization of the state. After successfully forcing Suharto to step down, the reform 
movement forced Habibie to release all political prisoners, to free the political parties, to free the 
media, to adopt the international conventions on human rights and to introduce the regional 
autonomy program. The initiative of Habibie to offer special autonomy for East Timor was made 
in the context of democratization process.  
Political fragmentation among the government institutions and major national political 
forces could also be seen as another sign of the democratization process. In its simplest form, the 
fragmentation meant that state power, which was previously centralized in the hands of the 
central government and its principal institutions, was now distributed to a number of political 
institutions, social organizations or individual figures. Although the government became 
inoperative as an authoritative decision making institution, which in turn allowed the violent 
conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh to continue, it could no longer force people to follow 
government policy. The previously oppressed political and social organizations now had 
political rights to take part in public affairs.  
Democratization continued to show progress from 1999 to 2004. Prominent in this 
progress were the conduct of the democratic general elections in 1999 and the introduction of the 
regional autonomy program. 2004 was particularly important because, for the first time in 
Indonesian history, the president and vice-president were elected directly by the people.  
Closely related to the democratic progresses was the growing consolidation among 
government institutions and major political forces. With this consolidation, the condition needed 
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to ensure that a policy could be implemented without being undermined by political opponents 
was present. In other words, it was crucial to have a political circumstance that made the national 
decision making process effective, as many scholars have suggested.   
The positive changes within Indonesia’s domestic politics contributed greatly to the 
possible solutions to the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh. And in answering the final research 
question on how the two conflicts were resolved, this research found two important conditions. 
The first condition was the international community, both international NGOs and individual 
states, had no intention of intervening militarily in the two regions. The second condition was, 
again, the growing democratization and consolidation among Indonesian political forces. The 
combination of these two conditions made it possible to find resolutions to the conflicts in 
accordance with national and international expectation that the two conflicts would have been 
resolved domestically and/or democratically. 
For Maluku, domestic conditions dominated the agenda. Given the political 
fragmentation in the early years of democratization, President Wahid failed to end the Maluku 
conflict because his policy was gravely undermined by political opponents from the military and 
some Islamic groups. When he was succeeded by Megawati, endeavours to bring the conflict to 
an end became more effective. Having prioritized national territorial integrity and not blaming 
the security forces, regional bureaucracy or other political elites for having exacerbated the 
conflict, Megawati enabled the government institutions to run without any significant challenges 
from other political groups. As a result, within six months of being in power, Megawati’s 
government had successfully brought the conflicting groups to a formal agreement to cease 
violence in the region.  
The Malino Agreement, which was an agreement between the Christian and Muslim 
groups in Maluku to end the communal violence, did not resolve the conflict completely. To 
achieve such an agreement, the government deliberately avoided tough and sensitive issues 
particularly about the involvement of the military in engineering the conflict, religious issues, 
and the gross violations of human rights. Violent incidents in the aftermath of the agreement 
demonstrated that the agreement only partially addressed issues. Furthermore, it seems only 
parties marginal to the conflict came to an agreement. 
However, that there was an agreement was an important sign that under Megawati, the 
government had regained the capacity to end this kind of communal conflict even if that 
resolution was rather fragile. This outcome was different to Habibie’s dealings with the violence 
in East Timor and to Wahid’s government seeking peaceful solutions to the conflicts in Maluku 
and Aceh. These two governments were constantly challenged, and their policies to restore order 
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and security in the regions were continually undermined by the military and other political forces. 
That the Maluku conflict was resolved through negotiations also seemed to be symbolic of the 
ongoing democratization process in Indonesia. After all, it was a clear sign that an international 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes was unnecessary in Maluku when the Indonesian 
government was able to solve the conflict according to the dynamics of domestic politics.  
The return of the Indonesian state to effective capacity to resolve particular domestic 
conflicts and, in general, to maintain order has been one of the important issues within 
humanitarian intervention. Since most of the recent practices of gross violation of human rights 
and most of internal violent conflicts stemmed from collapsed or failed states, there has been a 
growing awareness in the international community for the restoration of the state capacity in 
order to address humanitarian crises. This is then followed by another condition such as the 
government legitimacy. In the case of Maluku, Indonesia under Megawati appeared to have back 
its capacity. This was achieved primarily by avoiding any dispute among government 
institutions and political forces that could be counter-productive to efforts in resolving the 
conflicts.  
Compared with Maluku, the resolution to the conflict in Aceh, however, was more 
complex. Instead of relying solely on the growing reconsolidation among the government 
institutions and political forces, the resolution to the conflict was clearly marked by democratic 
initiatives. The final resolution of the conflict was not simply a product of domestic political 
dynamics, as the military and nationalist politicians thought and strongly demanded. The role of 
various members of the international community was crucial to bringing the conflict to an end, 
although that role was clearly less than it had been in East Timor. To a great degree, the 
solutions to the Aceh conflict from Presidents Wahid to Megawati and Yudhoyono were 
strongly affected by national political development in general and political orientation of the 
government towards democratization in particular. The international community did not adopt a 
purely passive position, merely reiterating that the Aceh conflict was associated with democratic 
process in Indonesia, was Indonesia’s domestic affair and had to be resolved domestically. Both 
international NGOs and foreign governments were pro-active in encouraging the Indonesian 
government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
The pro-active role of the members of the international community was clearly in line 
with political development in Indonesia. When President Wahid initiated a peace dialogue with 
GAM, international NGOs and various foreign governments welcomed and supported the 
dialogue. Later, when President Megawati imposed martial law in the region, national and 
international human rights NGOs criticized the policy while major foreign governments said it 
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was Indonesia’s domestic affair. Finally, when Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla resumed 
negotiations with GAM, both international NGOs and foreign states again showed their support. 
The influence of democratization in seeking a resolution to the Aceh conflict was 
demonstrated when President Wahid initiated negotiations with GAM. More importantly, Wahid 
involved the international NGO, Henry Dunant Centre, to facilitate and mediate the negotiations. 
While these democratic efforts failed to bring the conflict to an end, the failure was partly caused 
by domestic Indonesian criticisms of the involvement of the HDC, but more due to Wahid’s 
weak political position and ineffective leadership. 
This research suggests that after Wahid was replaced by Megawati, the efforts to resolve 
the conflict were more influenced by the growing political consolidation within the government 
and major political forces than by democratic development. This was quite similar to the way 
Megawati government resolved the Maluku conflict. Although Megawati initially continued the 
negotiation process, she was more prepared to end the armed conflict domestically by enforcing 
the Aceh special autonomy law or by military operations in order to crack down on GAM. Her 
preference for such domestic solutions was broadly supported by the DPR members and the 
military. With this political support, Megawati not only withdrew from the negotiation but later 
on took the decision to place Aceh under a state of military emergency. With massive military 
operations, Megawati government believed that it might enable the regional administration to 
function again and maintain national integrity, at least in the short term. 
The experience in seeking resolution to the conflict in Aceh under the Wahid and 
Megawati presidencies showed two different lessons. First, the democratic government of Wahid 
attempted to solve the conflict peacefully, but his government was not strong enough to make 
the peace initiatives workable. Second, the stronger and more consolidated government under 
Megawati was able to be more effective in solving the conflict, but it was clear that the military 
solution did not really work. At the same time, there was a growing expectation nationally and 
internationally that the conflict had to be settled peacefully. 
The rise to power of President S.B. Yudhoyono and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, through 
the democratic presidential election in 2004, made a peaceful solution to the conflict in Aceh 
more viable. With a stronger political position and a commitment to bringing a peaceful solution 
to the conflict, the Yudhoyono government had the political conditions needed to secure its 
policy to resolve the conflict democratically and domestically.  
The tsunami that devastated Aceh province in the end of the 2004 made a solution to the 
protracted conflict more urgent. The international response and presence in the region and the 
need for an unhindered reconstruction process prompted the Indonesian government and GAM 
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to resume peace negotiations. More importantly, the influx of thousands of foreign troops in the 
region for humanitarian emergency operations provided the country with an experience that 
cooperation with the international community, including foreign military, could be beneficial in 
the sense that the presence of these troops did not threaten national security.  
With domestic situation conducive to negotiations and strong encouragement from the 
international community, the Indonesian government resumed peace negotiations with GAM. 
This time the negotiations were facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). The 
Yudhoyono government recognized the strategic importance of NGO such as CMI in mediating 
the negotiations. Since CMI had no coercive power, the government could argue that its 
involvement was not a threat to Indonesian sovereignty and security. With respect to criticisms 
of having internationalized the internal conflict, the government contended that the negotiations 
were essentially between fellow citizens (sesama anak bangsa); foreigners simply facilitated 
these negotiations. The talks concluded in the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of 
Understanding, on 15 August 2005. Widely seen as a peace agreement between the Indonesian 
government and the GAM, the Helsinki MoU is expected to ensure sustained peace in the region.  
In agreeing the demands for the governing of Aceh, political participations of GAM 
members, economic incentives, recognitions of human rights, amnesty and reintegration into 
society of GAM members, and security arrangement, the Indonesian government also agreed to 
the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to monitor the implementation of the 
agreement and to settle any dispute that may arise in the ground. 
The importance of the AMM, established by the European Union and five ASEAN 
members, was particularly related to the Indonesian political arena. From the field research in 
this study, it is clear that many politicians in Jakarta continued to see the involvement of 
international organizations in seeking a solution to the Aceh conflict and, even more, the 
presence of foreign representatives in the region as a serious threat to Indonesian security and 
sovereignty. In its response, the Yudhoyono government asserted that the AMM was not a threat 
to Indonesian sovereignty. It asserted that the AMM was needed to monitor the Helsinki 
agreement and that the AMM members had the credibility and professionalism needed to bring 
the peace agreement into effect. 
It is also important for this research to note that the government invitation for the 
European Union and ASEAN to establish the AMM was clear evidence of a crucial development 
in Indonesian politics. Indonesia not only had democratic institutions, such as political parties 
and had conducted democratic general elections, but also had a government which was able to 
cooperate with foreign governments and international organizations on a basis of equality. 
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Unlike in the case of East Timor, where the Habibie government attempted to collaborate with 
the United Nations and other foreign governments but failed to fulfil its international 
commitment, the Yudhoyono government was effective in carrying out its international 
commitment by securing domestic politics and support for the implementation of the Helsinki 
agreement. 
Furthermore, the field research suggests that the CMI and AMM were effective in 
facilitating the peaceful negotiations and in monitoring the peace agreement. While the presence 
of multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) finally brought the violent conflict and the 
humanitarian crisis in the region to an end, in Aceh, the constant political support of the 
international community helped the Indonesian government bring the conflict to a peaceful end. 
In summary, the conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were resolved domestically and 
peacefully. Though the solution in Maluku was hardly democratic, the conflict was resolved 
when the government under President Megawati had reached a level of consolidation 
domestically to allow a solution to be effective. On the other hand, the solution to the Aceh 
conflict was achieved when the government under President Yudhoyono had domestic political 
position and commitment strong enough to hold peaceful negotiations and was able to work 
together with the members of the international community.   
The central concern of this research was to examine the relationships among 
international humanitarian intervention, domestic politics of the state concerned and intrastate 
conflicts. Considering the international principles of humanitarian intervention and taking into 
account the humanitarian crises resulting from violent conflicts in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh, 
this study concludes that Indonesia’s domestic politics was a determining factor in shaping the 
different international responses that occurred. When Indonesian politics was marked by an 
ineffective government and fragmented political forces, international humanitarian intervention 
such as that which took place in East Timor (INTERFET) could take place and was justified and 
successful. When the Indonesian political climate had shifted towards democratization, members 
of the international community saw humanitarian intervention in those two regions as being 
necessary, much less feasible. This is the second conclusion this research put forward: that the 
development of democratization in Indonesia was central in seeking resolutions to the conflicts 
in Maluku and Aceh. The solution to the Maluku conflict was not in and of itself a democratic 
one; however the solution was the product of a consolidated domestic politics. Although the 
solution to the Aceh conflict involved the CMI, the European Union and ASEAN, it was this 
same change in domestic politics, leading to democratization that made resolution possible.  
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The significance of progress towards democratization in Indonesia found by this 
research has implications for humanitarian intervention in other societies experiencing the early 
stages of democratization. The case of East Timor has shown that democratization in Indonesia 
influenced the leading members of the international community not to send immediately an 
international force to the region in order to protect the lives of civilian people because of an 
interest to allow democratization process in Indonesia to develop. The cases of Maluku and 
Aceh showed that the members of the international community were more prepared to assist the 
government institutions to democratize Indonesia rather than to militarily intervene hastily to 
halt the humanitarian crises in these two regions.   
  The roles of the HDC and CMI in the case of Aceh were significant, in particular in 
seeing the dynamics of international interactions. The two international NGOs had significantly 
bridged the growing anti-international intervention sentiment in Indonesia on the one hand and 
the international interventionist tendency particularly of the major international powers on the 
other hand. The conflict that had caused humanitarian crises in Aceh, however, could not have 
been resolved properly either by the Indonesian government alone or by the use of international 
military force. Given that the international NGOs such as the HDC and CMI have no military 
force that could be seen as a threat to Indonesian sovereignty, the conflict could have been 
resolved in accordance to the internationally recognized principles. However, it is important to 
note that it was only when the Indonesia’s domestic politics were conducive and the 
international support, particularly from major international powers, that could make the role of 
the international NGOs effective. 
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